(PC) Saragoza v. John Doe No. 1 ( 2023 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 BENITO JOSE SARAGOZA, Case No. 1:23-cv-00355-BAM (PC) 12 Plaintiffs, ORDER FOR PLAINTIFF TO SHOW CAUSE WHY ACTION SHOULD NOT BE 13 v. DISMISSED AS BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 14 JOHN DOE NO. 1, et al., (ECF No. 1) 15 Defendants. THIRTY (30) DAY DEADLINE 16 17 Plaintiff Benito Jose Saragoza (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in 18 forma pauperis in this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff’s complaint, filed on 19 March 6, 2023, is currently before he Court for screening. (ECF No. 1.) 20 I. Screening Requirement and Standard 21 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 22 governmental entity and/or against an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 23 § 1915A(a). Plaintiff’s complaint, or any portion thereof, is subject to dismissal if it is frivolous 24 or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary 25 relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b). 26 A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 27 pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 28 1 required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 2 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 3 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken as 4 true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 5 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 6 To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible, which requires 7 sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable 8 for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss v. U.S. Secret 9 Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully 10 is not sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short of satisfying the plausibility 11 standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. 12 II. Plaintiff’s Allegations 13 Plaintiff is currently housed at California State Prison, Los Angeles, California. Plaintiff 14 alleges the events in this action arose while Plaintiff was housed at California State Prison in 15 Corcoran, California (“Corcoran”). Plaintiff names as defendant: (1) John Doe #1, (2) John Doe 16 #2, (3) John Doe #3, (4) John Doe #4, and (5) John Doe #5, correctional sergeant. John Does #1- 17 4 are correctional officers. 18 Plaintiff alleges that each John Doe was “unprofessional, willing to wrong, 19 disrespectfully, hatred.” Plaintiff alleges that in “the year of 2014,” three unknown officers came 20 to his cell and told Plaintiff that Plaintiff was moving. He was told to get naked so Plaintiff could 21 be searched, and Plaintiff refused. The officer said he would make Plaintiff, so Plaintiff complied. 22 The officers were Mexican, two males and one female. When they got to the cell, the female 23 officer slammed the door and said “this our politick bitch.” In the cell, a cellie was in the dark. 24 The cellie got mad, said he was singled cell and told Plaintiff to get out of my cell. The cellie 25 slapped Plaintiff in the back of his head. The next day, the cellie grabbed Plaintiff’s penis and the 26 cellie beat Plaintiff badly. 27 John Doe #1 asked plaintiff get naked to search Plaintiff “knowing [Plaintiff] would be 28 assaulted.” John Doe #1 said he would force the search. John Doe #2 and Jane Doe #3 allowed 1 the first officer to search Plaintiff “with the knowledge of assault.” Sergeant John Doe #4 2 approved the move. Jane Doe #3 stated “this our politick bitch.” Inmate Robison assaulted 3 Plaintiff on day one and day two. John Doe 1 and 2 allowed the assault and PREA violation. The 4 day it happened, Sergeant John Doe #5 never sent Plaintiff to ASU or started PREA investigation. 5 Plaintiff went to the nurse and alleged PREA and they knew already. 6 Plaintiff suffered pain and injury and mental distress. Plaintiff seeks $70,000 for physical 7 and mental pain. Plaintiff alleges that he continues to suffer pain in his back, neck, and pain; 8 something is sticking from his neck; his spine is not straight; he suffers from mental stress and 9 emotional distress; he has dreams about being raped; and he has been feeling not right. Plaintiff 10 believes he was not treated as a person who was raped, and the investigation was not completely 11 done. 12 III. Discussion 13 Failure to comply with the applicable statute of limitations may be grounds for dismissal 14 at the screening phase if it is evident from the face of the complaint that the plaintiff cannot 15 “prevail, as a matter of law, on the equitable tolling issue.” Cervantes v. City of San Diego, 5 F.3d 16 1273, 1276 (9th Cir. 1993). 17 It appears that Plaintiff's claims are time-barred by the statute of limitations. “A claim 18 may be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) on the ground that it is barred by the applicable statute of 19 limitations only when the running of the statute is apparent on the face of the complaint.” Von 20 Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 969 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal 21 citation and quotation marks omitted.) Section 1983 claims “are best characterized as personal 22 injury actions.” Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 279 (1985). California imposes a two-year 23 statute of limitations for personal injury actions. Cal. Code Civ. P. § 335.1; see also Mills v. City 24 of Covina, 921 F.3d 1161 (9th Cir. 2019) (applying this statute to § 1983 claims). The limitations 25 period for § 1983 claims is thus two years. Bd. of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 485 (1980); 26 42 U.S.C. § 1988(a). 27 Prisoners receive an additional two years to file personal injury claims, generally resulting 28 in a total of four years period from accrual for prisoners to file a claim under § 1983. See Cal. 1 Civ. Proc. Code § 352.1(a) (“If a person entitled to bring an action, ... is, at the time the cause of 2 action accrued, imprisoned on a criminal charge, or in execution under the sentence of a criminal 3 court for a term less than for life, the time of that disability is not a part of the time limited for the 4 commencement of the action, not to exceed two years.”). 5 Plaintiff alleges that the injuries at issue in this case occurred on two consecutive days in 6 April 2014. Four years from 2014 means that Plaintiff was required to file his action by 2018. 7 This action was filed on March 6, 2023. Plaintiff's claims thus appear untimely. Accordingly, the 8 Court will order Plaintiff to show cause why this action should not be dismissed for failure to 9 comply with the applicable statute of limitations. 10 While it generally must be raised as an affirmative defense, failure to comply with the 11 statute of limitations can be considered at the screening phase if it is apparent, from the face of 12 the complaint, that plaintiff cannot “prevail, as a matter of law, on the equitable tolling issue.” See 13 Cervantes v. City of San Diego, 5 F.3d 1273, 1276 (9th Cir. 1993). 14 ORDER 15 As it appears from the face of the complaint that Plaintiff's claims are time-barred, it is 16 HEREBY ORDERED that, within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff 17 shall show cause, in writing, why this action should not be dismissed because Plaintiff's claims 18 are barred by the statute of limitations. Failure to comply with this order will result in a 19 recommendation to dismiss the action as barred by the statute of limitations. 20 IT IS SO ORDERED. 21 22 Dated: May 23, 2023 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _ UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 23 24 25 26 27 28