(PC) Lam v. California Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation ( 2023 )

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 MIGUEL MARIO LAM, Case No. 1:23-cv-01167-BAM (PC) 8 Plaintiff, ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO RANDOMLY ASSIGN DISTRICT JUDGE TO 9 v. ACTION 10 CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO CORRECTIONS & REHABILITATION, DISMISS ACTION, WITH PREJUDICE, FOR 11 FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM, FAILURE Defendant. TO OBEY COURT ORDER, AND FAILURE 12 TO PROSECUTE 13 (ECF No. 9) 14 FOURTEEN (14) DAY DEADLINE 15 16 I. Background 17 Plaintiff Miguel Mario Lam (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma 18 pauperis in this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 19 On October 27, 2023, the Court issued a screening order granting Plaintiff leave to file a 20 second amended complaint or a notice of voluntary dismissal within thirty (30) days. (ECF No. 21 9.) The Court expressly warned Plaintiff that the failure to comply with the Court’s order would 22 result in a recommendation for dismissal of this action, with prejudice. (Id. at 7.) The deadline 23 has expired, and Plaintiff has failed to file an amended complaint or otherwise communicate with 24 the Court. 25 II. Failure to State a Claim 26 A. Screening Requirement 27 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 28 governmental entity and/or against an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 1 § 1915A(a). Plaintiff’s complaint, or any portion thereof, is subject to dismissal if it is frivolous 2 or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary 3 relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b). 4 A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 5 pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 6 required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 7 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 8 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken as 9 true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 10 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 11 To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible, which requires 12 sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable 13 for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss v. U.S. Secret 14 Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully 15 is not sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short of satisfying the plausibility 16 standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. 17 B. Plaintiff’s Allegations 18 Plaintiff is currently housed at California State Prison, Corcoran California, where the 19 events in the first amended complaint appear to have occurred. Plaintiff named California 20 Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) as the sole defendant. 21 Plaintiff alleges that on 7/14/22, he was released from administrative segregation, and the 22 property that Plaintiff was allowed to have was stolen by the property officer. The property 23 officer had Plaintiff sign for Plaintiff’s property first, before being allowed to have it, and once 24 Plaintiff got it, he discovered several items were missing, Plaintiff immediately filed a 602 appeal 25 requesting that all his property be returned or he be reimbursed for it. 26 The defendant lied and stated that the 602 was time barred when the defendant is the 27 reason why Plaintiff is not given Plaintiff back his art work. Exh. A to the first amended 28 complaint. The items listed are art materials and on Avenal State Prison Handicraft order. These 1 are items that Plaintiff is allowed to have and were stolen. 2 As remedies, Plaintiff seeks money for the stolen items. 3 C. Discussion 4 Plaintiff’s complaint fails to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 and fails to 5 state a cognizable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 6 1. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 7 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, a complaint must contain “a short and plain 8 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). 9 Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause 10 of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 11 (citation omitted). Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 12 claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. 13 at 570). While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id.; see also 14 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556–57; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. 15 Here, Plaintiff’s complaint is short, but is not a clear statement. While “much liberality is 16 allowed in construing pro se complaints, a pro se litigant cannot simply dump a stack of exhibits 17 on the court and expect the court to sift through them to determine if some nugget is buried 18 somewhere in that mountain of papers, waiting to be unearthed and refined into a cognizable 19 claim.” Samtani v. City of Laredo, 274 F. Supp. 3d 695, 698 (S.D. Tex. 2017). “The Court will 20 not comb through attached exhibits seeking to determine whether a claim possibly could have 21 been stated where the pleading itself does not state a claim. In short, [Plaintiff] must state a 22 claim, not merely attach exhibits.” Stewart v. Nevada, No. 2:09-CV-01063-PMP-GWF, 2011 23 WL 588485, at *2 (D. Nev. Feb. 9, 2011). 24 With respect to exhibits, while they are permissible if incorporated by reference, Fed. R. 25 Civ. P. 10(c), they are not necessary in the federal system of notice pleading, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). 26 The Court strongly suggests to Plaintiff that they should not be submitted where (1) they serve 27 only to confuse the record and burden the Court, or (2) they are intended as future evidence. If 28 this action reaches a juncture at which the submission of evidence is appropriate and necessary 1 (e.g., summary judgment or trial), Plaintiff will have the opportunity at that time to submit his 2 evidence. 3 2. Eleventh Amendment 4 Plaintiff has named CDCR as the sole defendant. “The Eleventh Amendment bars suits 5 for money damages in federal court against a state, its agencies, and state officials acting in their 6 official capacities.” Aholelei v. Dep’t of Public Safety, 488 F.3d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 2007). 7 Indeed, the Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from hearing a Section 1983 lawsuit in 8 which damages or injunctive relief is sought against a state, its agencies (such as CDCR) or 9 individual prisons, absent “a waiver by the state or a valid congressional override. . . .” Dittman 10 v. California, 191 F.3d 1020, 1025 (9th Cir. 1999). “The Eleventh Amendment bars suits which 11 seek either damages or injunctive relief against a state, ‘an arm of the state,’ its instrumentalities, 12 or its agencies.” See Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. City of Lodi, Cal., 302 F.3d 928, 957 n.28 (9th 13 Cir. 2002) (internal quotation and citations omitted), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 961 (2003). “The 14 State of California has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to claims 15 brought under § 1983 in federal court. . . .” Dittman, 191 F.3d at 1025–26 (citing Atascadero 16 State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 241 (1985)); see also Brown v. Cal. Dep’t. of Corrs., 554 17 F.3d 747, 752 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding California Department of Corrections and California Board 18 of Prison Terms entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity). 19 As CDCR is immune under the Eleventh Amendment, Plaintiff cannot pursue claims for 20 damages or injunctive relief against the State or CDCR in this action. Plaintiff’s claim for 21 monetary damages also is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. 22 The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides: 23 Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, 24 privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for 25 redress. 26 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute plainly requires that there be an actual connection or link between 27 the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by Plaintiff. See 28 Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). The 1 Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects another to the deprivation of a constitutional 2 right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s 3 affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the 4 deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 5 Plaintiff must name individual “persons” who purportedly violated Plaintiff’s rights and 6 must include factual allegations identifying what happened, when it happened, and who was 7 involved. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. 8 3. Property/Due Process 9 Insofar as Plaintiff also alleges that some unnamed officer wrongfully destroyed or stole 10 his property, these allegations also are not sufficient to support a cognizable claim. Prisoners 11 have a protected interest in their personal property. Hansen v. May, 502 F.2d 728, 730 (9th Cir. 12 1974). An authorized, intentional deprivation of property is actionable under the Due Process 13 Clause. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 532 n.13 (1984) (citing Logan v. Zimmerman 14 Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 435–36 (1982)); Quick v. Jones, 754 F.2d 1521, 1524 (9th Cir. 1985). 15 However, “an unauthorized intentional deprivation of property by a state employee does not 16 constitute a violation of the procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 17 Amendment if a meaningful post deprivation remedy for the loss is available.” Hudson, 468 U.S. 18 at 533. 19 As Plaintiff alleges that the property was stolen, such conduct was an unauthorized 20 deprivation of property. Due Process is satisfied if there is a meaningful post-deprivation remedy 21 available to Plaintiff. Id. Plaintiff has an adequate post-deprivation remedy available under 22 California law. Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816–17 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Cal. Gov’t Code 23 §§ 810–95). Therefore, Plaintiff fails to allege a cognizable due process claim for the alleged 24 deprivation of his property. 25 4. No Right to Appeals Process 26 To the extent Plaintiff is complaining about his 602 grievances, a prison official’s 27 processing of an inmate’s appeals, without more, cannot serve as a basis for Section 1983 28 liability. See Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (Prisoners do not have a 1 “separate constitutional entitlement to a specific prison grievance procedure.”) (citation omitted), 2 cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1063 (2004); Shallowhorn v. Molina, 572 F. App’x 545, 547 (9th Cir. 3 2014) (district court properly dismissed Section 1983 claims against defendants who “were only 4 involved in the appeals process”) (citing Ramirez, 334 F.3d at 860); Evans v. Cisneros, No. 1:22- 5 CV-01238 AWI BAM PC, 2023 WL 2696670, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2023) (no claim for 6 failing to address appeals). The prison grievance procedure does not confer any substantive rights 7 upon inmates and actions in reviewing appeals cannot serve as a basis for liability under section 8 1983. See also Givens v. Cal. Dep’t of Corrs. & Rehab., No. 2:19-cv-0017 KJN P, 2019 WL 9 1438068, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2019) (“California’s regulations grant prisoners a purely 10 procedural right: the right to have a prison appeal.”) Therefore, prison officials are not required 11 by federal law to process inmate appeals or grievances in a particular way. Consequently, the 12 failure or refusal to process a grievance or the denial, rejection, or cancellation of a grievance 13 does not violate any constitutionally protected right. See Rushdan v. Gear, No. 1:16-cv-01017- 14 BAM (PC), 2018 WL 2229259, at *6 (E.D. Cal. May 16, 2018); Givens, 2019 WL 1438068, at 15 *4. 16 III. Failure to Prosecute and Failure to Obey a Court Order 17 A. Legal Standard 18 Local Rule 110 provides that “[f]ailure . . . of a party to comply with these Rules or with 19 any order of the Court may be grounds for imposition by the Court of any and all sanctions . . . 20 within the inherent power of the Court.” District courts have the inherent power to control their 21 dockets and “[i]n the exercise of that power they may impose sanctions including, where 22 appropriate, . . . dismissal.” Thompson v. Hous. Auth., 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1986). A 23 court may dismiss an action, with prejudice, based on a party’s failure to prosecute an action, 24 failure to obey a court order, or failure to comply with local rules. See, e.g., Ghazali v. Moran, 46 25 F.3d 52, 53–54 (9th Cir. 1995) (dismissal for noncompliance with local rule); Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 26 963 F.2d 1258, 1260–61 (9th Cir. 1992) (dismissal for failure to comply with an order requiring 27 amendment of complaint); Malone v. U.S. Postal Serv., 833 F.2d 128, 130–33 (9th Cir. 1987) 28 (dismissal for failure to comply with court order). 1 In determining whether to dismiss an action, the Court must consider several factors: 2 (1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the Court’s need to manage its 3 docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of 4 cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic sanctions. Henderson v. Duncan, 779 5 F.2d 1421, 1423 (9th Cir. 1986); Carey v. King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440 (9th Cir. 1988). 6 B. Discussion 7 Here, Plaintiff’s second amended complaint is overdue, and he has failed to comply with 8 the Court’s order. The Court cannot effectively manage its docket if Plaintiff ceases litigating his 9 case. Thus, the Court finds that both the first and second factors weigh in favor of dismissal. 10 The third factor, risk of prejudice to defendant, also weighs in favor of dismissal, since a 11 presumption of injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in prosecuting an action. 12 Anderson v. Air W., 542 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1976). The fourth factor usually weighs against 13 dismissal because public policy favors disposition on the merits. Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 14 639, 643 (9th Cir. 2002). However, “this factor lends little support to a party whose 15 responsibility it is to move a case toward disposition on the merits but whose conduct impedes 16 progress in that direction,” which is the case here. In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Products 17 Liability Litigation, 460 F.3d 1217, 1228 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). 18 Finally, the Court’s warning to a party that failure to obey the court’s order will result in 19 dismissal satisfies the “considerations of the alternatives” requirement. Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1262; 20 Malone, 833 at 132–33; Henderson, 779 F.2d at 1424. The Court’s October 27, 2023 screening 21 order expressly warned Plaintiff that his failure to file an amended complaint would result in a 22 recommendation of dismissal of this action, with prejudice, for failure to obey a court order and 23 for failure to state a claim. (ECF No. 9, p. 7.) Thus, Plaintiff had adequate warning that dismissal 24 could result from his noncompliance. 25 Additionally, at this stage in the proceedings there is little available to the Court that 26 would constitute a satisfactory lesser sanction while protecting the Court from further 27 unnecessary expenditure of its scarce resources. As Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis in 28 this action, it appears that monetary sanctions will be of little use and the preclusion of evidence 1 or witnesses is likely to have no effect given that Plaintiff has ceased litigating his case. 2 IV. Conclusion and Recommendation 3 Accordingly, the Court HEREBY ORDERS the Clerk of the Court to randomly assign a 4 district judge to this action. 5 Furthermore, the Court finds that dismissal is the appropriate sanction and HEREBY 6 RECOMMENDS that this action be dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim 7 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, for failure to obey a court order, and for Plaintiff’s failure to 8 prosecute this action. 9 These Findings and Recommendation will be submitted to the United States District Judge 10 assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen 11 (14) days after being served with these Findings and Recommendation, Plaintiff may file written 12 objections with the Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s 13 Findings and Recommendation.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the 14 specified time may result in the waiver of the “right to challenge the magistrate’s factual 15 findings” on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. 16 Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)). 17 IT IS SO ORDERED. 18 19 Dated: December 15, 2023 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _ UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28