(PC) Walker v. Arnold ( 2022 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 DERIK NATHANIEL WALKER, No. 2:19-cv-0185 TLN AC P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 E. ARNOLD, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, seeks relief under 42 18 U.S.C. § 1983. The matter has been referred to a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 19 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302. Now before this court is plaintiff’s first amended 20 complaint (“FAC”). ECF No. 20. For the reasons stated below, plaintiff will be given a final 21 opportunity to amend. 22 I. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints 23 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 24 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 25 court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are 26 “frivolous, malicious, or fail[] to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,” or that “seek[] 27 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). 28 //// 1 A claim “is [legally] frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” 2 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th 3 Cir. 1984). “[A] judge may dismiss . . . claims which are ‘based on indisputably meritless legal 4 theories’ or whose ‘factual contentions are clearly baseless.’” Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 5 640 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327), superseded by statute on other grounds as 6 stated in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000). The critical inquiry is whether a 7 constitutional claim, however inartfully pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. 8 Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227-28 (citations omitted). 9 “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only ‘a short and plain statement of the 10 claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of 11 what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 12 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (alteration in original) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). 13 “Failure to state a claim under § 1915A incorporates the familiar standard applied in the context 14 of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Wilhelm v. Rotman, 15 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). In order to survive dismissal for failure 16 to state a claim, a complaint must contain more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a 17 cause of action;” it must contain factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the 18 speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). “‘[T]he pleading must contain 19 something more . . . than . . . a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion [of] a legally 20 cognizable right of action.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur 21 R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216 (3d ed. 2004)). 22 “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to 23 relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting 24 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual 25 content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 26 misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). In reviewing a complaint under this 27 standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question, Hosp. Bldg. 28 Co. v. Trs. of the Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976) (citation omitted), as well as construe the 1 pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor, 2 Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969) (citations omitted). 3 II. First Amended Complaint 4 The FAC names as defendants the following officials and employees at California State 5 Prison – Solano (“CSP – Solano”): Warden E. Arnold; Lieutenant J. Lee, a correctional officer; 6 K. Fox, a correctional officer in the prison’s Investigative Service Unit; and A. Thomas, a 7 supervisor in CSP – Solano’s laundry department. ECF No. 20 at 2-4. The claims stem from 8 contraband being found in the CSP-Solano laundry room in October 2016 while plaintiff was 9 working there. Id. at 4-5. Plaintiff appears to contest both defendants’ issuance of a rules 10 violation report against him in the Fall of 2016 and their handling of the subsequent disciplinary 11 hearing. Plaintiff was ultimately found guilty of having violated prison rules, consequently 12 stripped of various privileges, and prosecuted criminally. Id. at 4-12. The criminal case was 13 dismissed for lack of evidence in July 2018. Id. at 11. 14 In addition to the harms of lost privileges and criminal charges, plaintiff contends that he 15 experienced mental duress and pain and suffering caused by (1) transportation to court every sixty 16 to ninety days in belly chains and ankle restraints for a period of almost fifteen months, and (2) 17 placement in administrative segregation until the end of his court proceedings. ECF No. 20 at 14- 18 15. Plaintiff further asserts that defendants’ falsification of evidence and withholding of 19 exculpatory evidence also contributed to his pain and suffering and mental duress. Id. at 15. 20 III. Failure to State a Claim 21 A. Claim One: Eighth Amendment 22 In Claim One, plaintiff contends that defendants violated his Eighth Amendment right to 23 be free from cruel and unusual punishment by (1) continuing to investigate the contraband 24 incident despite knowing that he was innocent; (2) deliberately reporting information they knew 25 to be untrue; (3) using coercive tactics and suggestive procedures that they knew or should have 26 known would yield false information, and (4) causing plaintiff mental duress and pain and 27 suffering when, for almost fifteen months, they transferred him back and forth between 28 institutions in belly chains and ankle restraints every sixty to ninety days and placed him in 1 administrative segregation until court proceedings had ended. ECF No. 20 at 12-14. 2 It is well-settled that claims based upon the falsity of charges and the impropriety of a 3 defendant’s involvement in a grievance procedure, standing alone, do not state constitutional 4 claims. Sprouse v. Babcock, 870 F.2d 450, 452 (8th Cir. 1989). A prisoner has no constitutional 5 right to be free from false accusations. Thus, filing a false disciplinary charge against an inmate 6 is not actionable under Section 1983 where minimum procedural due process protections are 7 provided. See Freeman v. Rideout, 808 F.2d 949, 951-52 (2nd Cir. 1986); see also Hanrahan v. 8 Lane, 747 F.2d 1137. 1141 (7th Cir. 1984). Plaintiff’s theory of “deliberate indifference to the 9 truth,” ECF No. 20 at 13, accordingly does not support an Eighth Amendment claim based on 10 these facts. Neither the U.S. Supreme Court nor the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has 11 ever applied the Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference standard in this context. 12 Accordingly, plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim against defendants for falsely accusing him and 13 wrongfully punishing him are not cognizable, and any attempt to amend is likely to be futile. 14 As for plaintiff’s allegations that he was transported to and from court in belly chains and 15 ankle restraints every sixty to ninety days over a fifteen-month period, ECF No. 20 at 14, these 16 facts do not establish an Eighth Amendment violation. The use of mechanical restraints such as 17 leg manacles or waist chains in addition to handcuffs is not excessive or unreasonable. Spain v. 18 Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 198 (9th Cir. 1979). Additionally, courts must give great deference to 19 the judgment of prison officials in the adoption and execution of policies which, in their 20 judgment, are needed to preserve internal order and maintain security. See generally Bell v. 21 Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979). Moreover, plaintiff cannot recover for “mental distress and 22 pain and suffering,” ECF No. 20 at 14, unless he sustained some physical injury that was more 23 than de minimus and was subjected to the excessive use of force. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (“No 24 Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional 25 facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of 26 physical injury[.]”); Oliver v. Keller, 289 F.3d 623, 627 (9th Cir. 2002) (plaintiff must show more 27 than de minimus physical injury under PLRA); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1992) 28 (more than de minimus use of force required for Eighth Amendment violation). For all these 1 reasons, the circumstances of plaintiff’s transportation do not support an Eighth Amendment 2 claim. 3 Finally, plaintiff’s placement in administrative segregation over a fifteen-month period 4 does not provide a basis for relief on Eighth Amendment grounds. Administrative segregation is 5 not categorically prohibited by the Eighth Amendment, and the complaint lacks factual 6 allegations describing any particular conditions of plaintiff’s confinement in ad seg that deprived 7 him “of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 8 347 (1981). An alternative due process claim is also unavailable on the facts alleged in the 9 petition. The placement of an inmate in administrative segregation in and of itself does not 10 implicate a protected liberty interest. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 486 (1995); Serrano v. 11 Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1078 (9th Cir. 2003). Plaintiff has not shown that his administrative 12 segregation placement was any different than that of others similarly situated, that the length and 13 degree of it was out of the ordinary, or that the placement affected the duration of his sentence. 14 See Serrano, 345 F.3d at 1078 (listing factors considered when determining if prison hardship is 15 atypical and significant). 16 B. Claim Two: Due Process 17 In Claim Two, plaintiff alleges that defendants violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights 18 to due process by (1) falsifying documents that led to plaintiff’s placement in administrative 19 segregation, and (2) concealing and withholding evidence that demonstrated plaintiff’s innocence 20 regarding the laundry contraband incident. See ECF No. 20 at 14-15. 21 As noted above, incarcerated persons have no constitutional right to be free from false 22 charges or fabricated evidence. See Buckley v. Gomez, 36 F. Supp. 2d 1216, 1222 (S.D. Cal. 23 1997) (prisoners have no constitutional right to be free from wrongfully issued disciplinary 24 reports), aff'd without opinion, 168 F.3d 498 (9th Cir. 1999); accord, Sprouse, 870 F.2d at 452; 25 Freeman, 808 F.2d at 951; Hanrahan, 747 F.2d at 1141. The only due process requirements that 26 apply in the prison disciplinary context are the “some evidence” rule of Superintendent v. Hill, 27 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985), and the bare-bones procedural requirements of Wolff v. McDonnell, 28 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974). Wolff requires only (1) advance, written notice of the charged 1 violation; (2) an opportunity to prepare for committee appearance; (3) a written statement of fact- 2 finding; (4) the right to present witnesses and evidence where it would not be unduly hazardous to 3 institutional safety; (5) an impartial decision-making body; and (6) assistance if the inmate is 4 illiterate or if issues are complex. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 564-70. The FAC does not allege facts 5 showing violation of the Wolff requirements. Because the rights of criminal defendants do not 6 apply in the prison disciplinary context, id. at 556, the falsification of documents and withholding 7 of exculpatory evidence do not violate due process and cannot support relief. Accordingly, the 8 facts presented do not state a claim. 9 IV. Leave to Amend 10 Because plaintiff may be able to allege additional facts and/or provide information to 11 remedy the deficiencies in the FAC, he will be given the opportunity to amend. When amending 12 the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the conditions about which he complains resulted 13 in a deprivation of his constitutional rights. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370-71 (1976). Also, 14 the complaint must identify each defendant by name and with specificity as well as allege in 15 specific terms how each one is involved. Arnold v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 637 F.2d 1350, 1355 16 (9th Cir. 1981). There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some affirmative 17 link or connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. See Arnold, 637 18 F.2d at 1355; Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Furthermore, “[v]ague and 19 conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient.” Ivey v. 20 Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982) (citations omitted) (brackets added). 21 Plaintiff is also informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to make 22 his amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an amended complaint be 23 complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is because, as a general rule, an 24 amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 25 1967) (citations omitted), overruled in part by Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th 26 Cir. 2012) (claims dismissed with prejudice and without leave to amend do not have to be re-pled 27 in subsequent amended complaint to preserve appeal). Once plaintiff files a second amended 28 complaint, the previous complaints no longer serve any function in the case. Therefore, in an 1 | amended complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each 2 || defendant must be sufficiently alleged. 3 V. Plain Language Summary of This Order for a Pro Se Litigant 4 You are being given a second and final opportunity to amend your complaint. In deciding 5 || whether to amend, keep in mind that an Eighth Amendment claim can only go forward regarding 6 || your transportation in restraints if you were physically injured, either deliberately or with 7 || deliberate indifference to your safety, or something about the way you were restrained amounted 8 || to excessive force. You can only state an Eighth Amendment claim regarding ad seg placement if 9 || the conditions in ad seg were dangerous or otherwise violated minimum constitutional standards. 10 || “Deliberate indifference” to the truth of the RVR charge cannot support an Eighth Amendment 11 | claim. The falsification of documents or evidence, and the withholding of evidence of your 12 || mnocence, cannot support a claim under either the Eighth Amendment or the Due Process Clause. 13 || You can only bring a due process claim related to an RVR or hearing if the Wolff procedural 14 || rules were violated. 15 You are free to amend the FAC in its entirety if you so choose, provided that your claims 16 || relate to the same events and defendants that you have described to date. You will be given thirty 17 || days to file a second amended complaint. 18 CONCLUSION 19 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff may file a second amended 20 || complaint within thirty days of the date of this order. 21 Plaintiff is cautioned that failure to file an amended complaint within the time allotted will 22 | result in a recommendation that this action be dismissed for the reasons stated above. 23 || DATED: July 12, 2022 ~ 24 Chttt0n— Chane ALLISON CLAIRE 25 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 26 27 28