Peace Ranch LLC v. Newsom ( 2022 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 9 PEACE RANCH LLC, No. 2:21-cv-01651-JAM-AC 10 Plaintiff, 11 v. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS 12 ROB BONTA, in his official capacity as Attorney General 13 of the State of California; and DOES 1 through 20, 14 inclusive, 15 Defendants. 16 17 Before the Court is California Attorney General Rob Bonta’s 18 (“Defendant”) motion to dismiss. Mot., ECF No. 24-1.1 Peace 19 Ranch, LLC (“Plaintiff”) filed an opposition. Opp’n, ECF No. 29. 20 Defendant replied. Reply, ECF No. 31. For the reasons set forth 21 below, the Court grants Defendant’s motion. 22 I. BACKGROUND 23 As this is the second round of motions to dismiss, the Court 24 does not repeat the factual background here. That background is 25 set forth extensively in the operative complaint, the parties’ 26 27 1 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was 28 scheduled for June 7, 2022. 1 briefings, and the Court’s prior order. See Order Granting 2 Defs.’ First Mot. to Dismiss (“Prior Order”) at 2-4, ECF No. 20. 3 The pertinent procedural background is as follows: on 4 February 7, 2022, the Court granted the first motion to dismiss 5 for lack of standing. See generally Prior Order. The Court 6 explained: “Plaintiff has failed to allege an injury in fact. AB 7 978 applies to mobilehome parks located within and governed by 8 the jurisdictions of two or more incorporated cities. However, 9 Peace Ranch consists of two parks, one in Anaheim and one in 10 Fullerton, with two different permits. Accordingly, it has not 11 alleged an ‘intention to engage in a course of conduct [. . .] 12 proscribed by a statute,’ nor a ‘realistic danger of sustaining a 13 direct injury as a result of the statute’s operation or 14 enforcement.’ Plaintiff, therefore, does not have standing.” 15 Id. at 7-8 (internal citations omitted). Thereafter, Plaintiff 16 filed a first amended complaint. See First Am. Compl. (“FAC”), 17 ECF No. 23. Defendant now moves again to dismiss. See generally 18 Mot. 19 II. OPINION 20 A. Judicial Notice 21 Plaintiff requests the Court take judicial notice of six 22 exhibits: (1) the Assembly Committee on Housing and Community 23 Development’s analysis of AB 978 as amended April 21, 2021; 24 (2) the Assembly Committee on Housing and Community 25 Development’s Background Information Request Form for AB 978; 26 (3) AB 978 as amended on May 5, 2021; (4) the Senate Judiciary 27 Committee’s analysis of AB 978 amended June 14, 2021; (5) AB 978 28 as amended on June 24, 2021; and (6) AB 978 as approved by the 1 Governor and chaptered. Pl.’s Req. for Judicial Notice (“RJN”), 2 ECF No. 30. The Court previously granted Plaintiff’s request 3 for judicial notice of these same documents. Prior Order at 5. 4 The Court takes judicial notice again as these documents are 5 legislative history whose accuracy cannot reasonably be 6 questioned and thus a proper subject for judicial notice. See 7 Chaker v. Crogan, 428 F.3d 1215, 1223 n.8 (9th Cir. 2005). 8 B. Legal Standard 9 A defendant may move to dismiss for lack of subject matter 10 jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 12(b)(1). Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). If the plaintiff lacks 12 standing under Article III of the United States Constitution, 13 then the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, and the case 14 must be dismissed. See Maya v. Centex Corp., 658 F.3d 1060, 15 1067 (9th Cir. 2011). Once a party has moved to dismiss for 16 lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), the 17 opposing party bears the burden of establishing the court’s 18 jurisdiction. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 19 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). 20 C. Analysis 21 Defendant urges the Court to dismiss the FAC for the same 22 reason it dismissed the original complaint: Plaintiff lacks 23 standing because it has failed to sufficiently allege any 24 injury-in-fact. Mot. at 6-7; Reply at 1. In the FAC, Peace 25 Ranch attempts to fix the standing issue the Court previously 26 identified by pleading the following: RLP “straddles two cities 27 [in Orange County]: Anaheim and Fullerton.” FAC ¶¶ 13, 17. The 28 Legislature designed and enacted a rent cap applicable only to 1 Orange County mobilehome parks straddling two cities, of which 2 the Legislature concluded there was only one: RLP. Id. ¶¶ 34- 3 36. “The Legislature and Defendant Attorney General 4 (collectively, ‘the State’) believe that Rancho La Paz is a 5 single park straddling two cities and is therefore subject to AB 6 978.” Id. ¶ 40. “Given the State’s clear position, and to 7 avoid injury in the form of an action seeking to enforce AB 978 8 and associated penalties based on the belief that RLP is a 9 single park, Peace Ranch has been forced to conform its conduct 10 to the mandates of AB 978” by “maintain[ing] its rents below the 11 rent cap imposed by AB 978.” Id. “Absent this threat, Peace 12 Ranch would not have been compelled to keep RLP’s rents below AB 13 978’s cap.” Id. According to Plaintiff, these allegations 14 establish “a realistic danger of sustaining a direct injury as a 15 result of the statute’s operation or enforcement.” Opp’n at 11 16 (citing to Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442 U.S. 17 289, 298 (1979)). 18 However, the Court agrees with Defendant that these 19 allegations still fall short of establishing a realistic danger 20 of injury from AB 978’s operation. Reply at 1. Because 21 Plaintiff continues to allege RLP is “actually two separate parks 22 (one in Anaheim and the other in Fullerton,” FAC ¶ 40, it does 23 not meet the criteria of a “qualified mobilehome park.” See 24 Prior Order at 7-8. Plaintiff’s choice to comply with AB 978 is 25 irrelevant. Mot. at 6. Voluntary compliance with a law that 26 does not apply does not constitute an injury-in-fact. Id. Nor 27 did Plaintiff bring forward caselaw supporting its position that 28 an injury-in-fact can exist where the challenged statute does not nn en nnn nn nn ne ono nnn SO ID 1 actually apply to the plaintiff. See Opp’n at 10-12. As 2 Defendant points out, Plaintiff’s two principal cases — Bland v. 3 Fessler, 88 F.3d 729 (9th Cir. 1996), and LSO, Ltd. v. Stroh, 205 4 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2000) — are readily distinguishable because 5 they both involved First Amendment rights and this case does not. 6 Reply at 1. 7 Plaintiff again fails to carry its burden to show it has 8 standing. See Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377. Accordingly, the FAC 9 is dismissed.* Finding further amendment would be futile, the 10 Court dismisses this case with prejudice. See Zucco Partners, 11 LLC v. Digimare Corp., 552 F.3d 981, 1007 (9th Cir. 2009) 12 (explaining that “where the plaintiff has previously been granted 13 leave to amend and has subsequently failed to [correct the 14 deficiencies] the district court’s discretion to deny leave to 15 amend is particularly broad”). 16 Til. ORDER 17 For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS WITH 18 PREJUDICE Defendant’s motion to dismiss. 19 IT IS SO ORDERED. 20 Dated: July 8, 2022 21 kA 22 teiren staves odermacr 7008 23 24 25 26 27 2 Because the Court dismisses for lack of standing, the Court does not reach the parties’ additional 12(b) (6) arguments. See 28 | Mot. at 7-15; see also Opp’n at 12-21.