(PC) Muhammad v. CDCR ( 2023 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 KWESI MUHAMMAD, Case No. 2:23-cv-00756-JDP (PC) 12 Plaintiff, ORDER 13 v. 14 CDCR, 15 Defendant. 16 17 18 Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding without counsel, alleges that defendant CDCR 19 violated his rights under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and Section 504 20 of the Rehabilitation Act by failing to provide him with two new mattresses to accommodate his 21 long-Covid disability. ECF No. 1 at 7. This case was filed in state superior court and removed to 22 this court by defendant. I must screen prisoner cases removed in this way. See Walker v. 23 Departmental Review Bd., No. 2:17-cv-02191-AC-P, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 176242, 2017 WL 24 11517550 *1 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2017) (“The screening obligation applies where a complaint is 25 removed from state court.”). After review of the complaint, I find that the claims in the complaint 26 are viable to proceed. 27 28 1 Screening and Pleading Requirements 2 A federal court must screen a prisoner’s complaint that seeks relief against a governmental 3 entity, officer, or employee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must identify any cognizable 4 claims and dismiss any portion of the complaint that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a 5 claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is 6 immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1), (2). 7 A complaint must contain a short and plain statement that plaintiff is entitled to relief, 8 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and provide “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 9 face,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The plausibility standard does not 10 require detailed allegations, but legal conclusions do not suffice. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 11 662, 678 (2009). If the allegations “do not permit the court to infer more than the mere 12 possibility of misconduct,” the complaint states no claim. Id. at 679. The complaint need not 13 identify “a precise legal theory.” Kobold v. Good Samaritan Reg’l Med. Ctr., 832 F.3d 1024, 14 1038 (9th Cir. 2016). Instead, what plaintiff must state is a “claim”—a set of “allegations that 15 give rise to an enforceable right to relief.” Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1264 16 n.2 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (citations omitted). 17 The court must construe a pro se litigant’s complaint liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 18 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam). The court may dismiss a pro se litigant’s complaint “if it 19 appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which 20 would entitle him to relief.” Hayes v. Idaho Corr. Ctr., 849 F.3d 1204, 1208 (9th Cir. 2017). 21 However, “‘a liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements 22 of the claim that were not initially pled.’” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 23 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)). 24 25 26 27 28 1 Analysis 2 Plaintiff alleges that he was diagnosed with post-Covid chronic fatigue syndrome in July 3 2022. ECF No. 1 at 6. He claims that this condition affects his knees, back, shoulders, and hips, 4 and makes sleeping on a single, standard-issue mattress difficult because of the lack of 5 cushioning. Id. at 7. As such, he requested two mattresses from his unit ADA coordinator. Id. 6 The request was denied, and, instead, plaintiff was ultimately provided with a single new mattress 7 and two blankets. Id. at 8. These allegations are sufficient, for screening purposes, to state viable 8 claims under both the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. For screening purposes, I will assume 9 that long Covid, as opposed to a standard infection that runs its course, is a potential disability for 10 the purposes of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. See Guidance on “Long COVID” as a 11 Disability Under the ADA, Section 504, and Section 1557 (July 26, 2021) (available at 12 https://www.hhs.gov/civil-rights/for-providers/civil-rights-covid19/guidance-long-covid- 13 disability/index.html). 14 I also find that, for screening purposes, the CDCR is a viable defendant for these claims. 15 See United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 159 (2006) (Title II of the ADA abrogates sovereign 16 immunity for conduct that violates the Fourteenth Amendment); Pa. Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 17 U.S. 206, 209-10 (1998) (Title II applies to state prisons); Clark v. California Dep’t of Corr., 123 18 F.3d 1267, 1271 (9th Cir. 1997) (California waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity by 19 accepting federal funds and the funding statute “manifests a clear intent to condition participation 20 in the programs funded under the [Rehabilitation Act]”). It is, at this point, at least plausible that 21 California accepts funds in a manner that renders it liable under the Rehabilitation Act. If it does 22 not, defendants may argue as much in a dispositive motion. 23 Accordingly, it is ORDERED that: 24 1. Plaintiff’s complaint is, for screening purposes, cognizable to proceed on his ADA and 25 Rehabilitation Act claims against the defendant. 26 2. Defendant shall file an answer or a motion under Rule 12(b) within the deadlines 27 contemplated by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 28 1 | 1718 SO ORDERED. 3 ( — Dated: _ May 24, 2023 ssn (aioe 4 JEREMY D. PETERSON UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 7 g 9 10 il 12 3 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28