Reason v. City of Richmond ( 2023 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 ----oo0oo---- 11 12 ERIC REASON, an individual; No. 2:20-cv-01900 WBS JDP STEPHANIE BASS, an individual; 13 RASHEED REASON, individually and as Co-Successor-in-Interest to 14 Decedent ERIC REASON II; TYRIQUE ORDER RE: DEFENDANT CITY OF REASON, individually and as Co- RICHMOND’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 15 Successor-in-Interest to JUDGMENT Decedent ERIC REASON II; K.R., 16 individually and as Co- Successor-in-Interest to 17 Decedent ERIC REASON II, by and through his Guardian Ad litem 18 LATISHA PARKER; P.R., individually and as Co- 19 Successor-in-Interest to Decedent ERIC REASON II, by and 20 through his Guardian Ad Litem LATISHA PARKER; N.M., 21 individually and as Co- Successor-in-Interest to 22 Decedent ERIC REASON II, by and through his Guardian Ad Litem 23 NIA MILLS; E.L.R., individually and as Co-Successor-in-Interest 24 to Decedent ERIC REASON II, by and through his Guardian Ad 25 Litem SHAWNTAY DAVIS; I.R.V., individually and as Co- 26 Successor-in-Interest to Decedent ERIC REASON II, by and 27 through his Guardian Ad Litem JULIA VELASQUEZ; 28 1 Plaintiffs, 2 v. 3 CITY OF RICHMOND, a municipal 4 corporation, and the ESTATE OF VIRGIL THOMAS, individually and 5 in his capacity as Police Sergeant for the CITY OF 6 RICHMOND, 7 Defendants. 8 9 ----oo0oo---- 10 Defendant City of Richmond moves for summary judgment 11 on (1) the issue of vicarious liability for plaintiff’s three 12 state law claims (Claims 3-5) and (2) plaintiffs’ Tom Bane Act 13 claim on separate grounds (Claim 4). (Mot. at 2 (Docket No. 62).) 14 The court will first address the issue of vicarious liability 15 before addressing plaintiffs’ claim under the Tom Bane Act. 16 I. Vicarious Liability (Claims 3-5) 17 The court finds that there is a triable issue of fact 18 as to whether Sergeant Thomas was acting in his capacity as a 19 police officer. The fact that Sergeant Thomas was off duty when 20 he shot and killed Mr. Reason is not dispositive of the issue of 21 whether he was acting within the scope of his employment. See 22 French v. City of L.A., No. 20-cv-00416 JGB, 2022 WL 2189649, at 23 *6 (C.D. Cal. May 10, 2022) (“A police officer’s ‘off-duty’ 24 status does not ‘insulate’ an employer ‘from potential liability 25 for the torts of these officers.’”) (citation omitted). Nor does 26 the fact that Sergeant Thomas may have had a personal motive 27 preclude holding the City vicariously liable for his actions. 28 See id. at *6 (“While ‘[a]n act serving only the employee’s 1 personal interest is less likely to arise from or be engendered 2 by the employment,’ an ‘abuse of authority’ motivated by personal 3 desire ‘arise[s] out of the employment’ when it does ‘not evince 4 a complete departure from [an employee’s] duties.’” (quoting Lisa 5 M. v. Henry Mayo Newhall Mem’l Hosp., 907 F.2d 358, 362 (1995); 6 Rizzo v. Ins. Co. of State of Penn., 969 F. Supp. 2d. 1180, 1192 7 (C.D. Cal. 2013)). 8 II. Tom Bane Act (Claim 4) 9 The City’s motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs’ 10 Tom Bane Act claim must also be denied. First, district courts 11 routinely allow plaintiffs, who act as successors in interest to 12 the decedent and assert violations of the decedent’s 13 constitutional rights, to proceed under the Tom Bane Act. See 14 Medrano v. Kern Cnty. Sheriff’s Office, 921 F. Supp. 2d 1009, 15 1016 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (Ishii, J.); D.G. v. Cnty. of Kern, 1:15- 16 cv-0760 JAM JLT, 2016 WL 6072362, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 13, 17 2016); Harmon v. Cnty. of Sacramento, Case No. 2:12-cv-02758 TLN, 18 2016 WL 319232, at *15–16 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2016); Dela Torre 19 v. City of Salinas, Case No. C-09-00626 RMW, 2010 WL 3753762, at 20 *7 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 17, 2010). 21 Second, the Tom Bane Act’s “specific intent” 22 requirement may be shown by demonstrating that the officer “acted 23 . . . ‘in reckless disregard of constitutional or statutory 24 prohibitions or guarantees.’” See Cornell v. City & Cnty. of 25 S.F., 17 Cal. App. 5th 766, 803-04 (1st Dist. 2017) (citation 26 omitted); Reese v. Cnty. of Sacramento, 888 F.3d 1030, 1045 (9th 27 Cir. 2018) (“[A] reckless disregard for a person’s constitutional 28 rights is evidence of a specific intent to deprive that person of eee ene eee EE IE NO 1 those rights.”). Here, the facts show Sergeant Thomas shot at 2 Mr. Reason when Mr. Reason had his back turned and was running 3 away. (Def.’s Statement Undisputed Facts (“DSUF”) at □□ 15-18 4 (Docket No. 62-1).) Thus, at the very least a triable issue of 5 fact exists as to whether Sergeant Thomas acted with the specific 6 intent to violate Mr. Reason’s rights. 7 Third, the Tom Bane Act authorizes “a civil action for 8 damages, including, but not limited to, damages under Section 52, 9 injunctive relief, and other appropriate equitable relief ... 10 -” Cal. Civ. Code § 51.2(c). Section 52 authorizes recovery for 11 “up to a maximum of three times the amount of actual damage but 12 in no case less than four thousand dollars ... .” Cal. Civ. 13 Code § 52; see also Klein v. City of Laguna Beach, 810 F.3d 693, 14 696 n.2 (9th Cir. 2016). “{[A] plaintiff may pursue the statutory 15 minimum damages of $4,000 in the absence of demonstrating any 16 actual damages.” Moody v. Rodriguez, No. 18-cv-1110 WQH, 2022 WL 17 5236820, at *10 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 2022) (denying defendants’ 18 | motion for summary judgment as to plaintiff’s Tom Bane Act claim) 19 (citations omitted). Thus, statutory damages are available to 20 plaintiffs in the absence of any actual damages. 21 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendant City of 22 Richmond’s motion for summary judgment (Docket No. 62) be, and 23 the same hereby is, DENIED. 24 25 | Dated: May 24, 2023 delim th LA. bE— WILLIAM B. SHUBB 26 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 27 28