Reason v. City of Richmond ( 2023 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 ----oo0oo---- 11 12 ERIC REASON, an individual; No. 2:20-cv-01900 WBS JDP STEPHANIE BASS, an individual; 13 RASHEED REASON, individually and as Co-Successor-in-Interest to 14 Decedent ERIC REASON II; TYRIQUE ORDER RE: PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION REASON, individually and as Co- FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 15 Successor-in-Interest to Decedent ERIC REASON II; K.R., 16 individually and as Co- Successor-in-Interest to 17 Decedent ERIC REASON II, by and through his Guardian Ad litem 18 LATISHA PARKER; P.R., individually and as Co- 19 Successor-in-Interest to Decedent ERIC REASON II, by and 20 through his Guardian Ad Litem LATISHA PARKER; N.M., 21 individually and as Co- Successor-in-Interest to 22 Decedent ERIC REASON II, by and through his Guardian Ad Litem 23 NIA MILLS; E.L.R., individually and as Co-Successor-in-Interest 24 to Decedent ERIC REASON II, by and through his Guardian Ad 25 Litem SHAWNTAY DAVIS; I.R.V., individually and as Co- 26 Successor-in-Interest to Decedent ERIC REASON II, by and 27 through his Guardian Ad Litem JULIA VELASQUEZ; 28 1 Plaintiffs, 2 v. 3 CITY OF RICHMOND, a municipal 4 corporation, and the ESTATE OF VIRGIL THOMAS, individually and 5 in his capacity as Police Sergeant for the CITY OF 6 RICHMOND, 7 Defendants. 8 9 ----oo0oo---- 10 Plaintiffs move for partial summary judgment on (1) the 11 issue that Sergeant Thomas acted within the scope of his 12 employment; (2) the issue that Sergeant Thomas acted under the 13 color of law; (3) the Fourth Amendment excessive force claim; and 14 (4) the negligence claim.1 15 First, the court construes plaintiffs’ motion on the 16 issue of scope of employment as pertaining to plaintiffs’ state 17 law claims (Claims 3-5). Plaintiffs brought their state law 18 claims against both Sergeant Thomas and the City. (See Second 19 Am. Compl.) The court finds that there is a triable issue of 20 fact as to whether Sergeant Thomas was acting within the scope of 21 his employment as a police officer when he shot Mr. Reason. 22 1 The City objects to the entirety of Exhibit 2 (Vallejo Police Report excerpts) and Exhibit 7 (Sergeant Thomas interview 23 transcript) attached to the Buelna Declaration. (See Def.’s Obj. (Docket No. 64-2).) The City’s evidentiary objections are 24 primarily based on (1) lack of foundation; (2) lack of personal knowledge; and (3) hearsay. (See generally id.) The objections 25 based on lack of foundation, personal knowledge, and vagueness “are superfluous.” Alvarez v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 2:10-cv-2373 26 WBS GGH, 2011 WL 6702424, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2011). As to the objection based on hearsay, the City has not shown why the 27 contents of the documents could not be properly presented at trial. See id. at 1119-20. The City’s evidentiary objections 28 are accordingly overruled. 1 While “[a] police officer’s ‘off-duty’ status does not ‘insulate’ 2 an employer ‘from potential liability for the torts of these 3 officers[,]’” “‘[a]n act serving only the employee’s personal 4 interest is less likely to arise from or be engendered by the 5 employment . . . .’” French v. City of L.A., No. 20-cv-00416 6 JGB, 2022 WL 2189649, at *6 (C.D. Cal. May 10, 2022) (citations 7 omitted). 8 Second, the court construes the motion on the issue of 9 whether Sergeant Thomas acted under the color of law as 10 pertaining to plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims (Claims 1-2). 11 Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims are brought only against Sergeant 12 Thomas. (See Second Am. Compl.) The court finds that there is a 13 triable issue of fact as to whether he was acting under the color 14 of law when he shot Mr. Reason. For example, it is disputed 15 whether Sergeant Thomas “invoked his status as a law enforcement 16 officer with the purpose and effect of influence the behavior of 17 others” or “engaged in conduct that ‘related in some meaningful 18 way either to [his] governmental status or to the performance of 19 his duties.” See Hyun Ju Par v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 952 20 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). 21 Third, the court finds that there is a triable issue of 22 fact as to whether Sergeant Thomas used excessive force in 23 shooting Mr. Reason. “[C]laims of excessive force are to be 24 judged under the Fourth Amendment’s ‘objective reasonableness’ 25 standard.” Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 197 (2004) 26 (citations omitted). Here, whether Sergeant Thomas reasonably 27 feared for his life is a triable issue of fact. See Kisela v. 28 Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018) (excessive force claims eee eee ee ERIE I EI EO 1 “require[] careful attention to the facts and circumstances of 2 each particular case, including . . . whether the suspect pose[d] 3 an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others ... 4 .” )} (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)). 5 Fourth, the court finds that there is a triable issue 6 of fact as to whether the City and Sergeant Thomas were 7 negligent. As discussed above, there are triable issues of fact 8 as to whether Sergeant Thomas used excessive force. Because 9 | plaintiffs’ claims for excessive force and negligence arise from 10 the same conduct, there is a triable issue of fact as to whether 11 Thomas was negligent. See Susag v. City of Lake Forest, 94 Cal. 12 | App. 4th 1401, 1412 (4th Dist. 2002) (“[I]t appears unsound to 13 | distinguish between section 1983 and state law claims arising 14 from the same alleged misconduct.”). Thus, the court must deny 15 | plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on negligence. 16 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiffs’ motion for 17 partial summary judgment (Docket No. 60) be, and the same hereby 18 is, DENIED. 19 | Dated: May 24, 2023 fd. be—~ 50 WILLIAM B. SHUBB UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28