Henry v. County of Solano, California ( 2022 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 SHARON HENRY, No. 2:21-cv-01506-JAM-DB 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS 14 COUNTY OF SOLANO, CALIFORNIA, 15 Defendant. 16 17 I. BACKGROUND 18 Sharon Henry (“Plaintiff”) brings this action against Solano 19 County (“Defendant”) to “hold the District Attorney’s Office 20 accountable for gender, race, age and disability discrimination, 21 harassment, and retaliation in violation of the California Fair 22 Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), the California Labor Code, 23 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), and the 24 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990.” Sec. Am. Compl. 25 (“SAC”) ¶ 4, ECF No. 17. Specifically, Plaintiff, a sixty-year- 26 old black woman, alleges she was stripped of significant portions 27 of her duties as the Chief Deputy District Attorney when she 28 elected to work from home during the COVID-19 pandemic and some 1 of those duties were reassigned to white men. Id. ¶¶ 1-3, 24-25. 2 When she returned to the office in September 2020, these duties 3 were not reinstated. Id. ¶ 25. Plaintiff reported this to Human 4 Resources and was retaliated against further. Id. ¶¶ 29-32. 5 This lawsuit ensued. See Compl., ECF No. 1. 6 While Plaintiff asserts sixteen claims against Defendant, 7 the present motion concerns only four: (i) Claim 1: Race 8 Discrimination in Violation of FEHA; (ii) Claim 5: Gender 9 Discrimination in Violation of FEHA; (iii) Claim 12: Race 10 Discrimination in Violation of Title VII; and (iv) Claim 15: 11 Gender Discrimination in Violation of Title VII. See Mot., ECF 12 No. 18-1. Defendant previously moved to dismiss these same four 13 claims, see First Mot., ECF No. 11, and the Court granted that 14 motion, see February 15, 2022, Hearing, ECF No. 16. Plaintiff 15 then amended her race and gender discrimination claims. See 16 generally SAC. Contending the amendments do not cure the 17 deficiencies identified by the Court, Defendant moves again to 18 dismiss these four claims. See Mot. Plaintiff filed an 19 opposition. See Opp’n, ECF No. 23. Defendant replied. See 20 Reply, ECF No. 24. For the reasons set forth below, the Court 21 grants Defendant’s motion.1 22 II. OPINION 23 A. Legal Standard 24 A Rule 12(b)(6) motion challenges the complaint as not 25 alleging sufficient facts to state a claim for relief. Fed. R. 26 27 1 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was scheduled 28 for June 7, 2022. 1 Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “To survive a motion to dismiss [under 2 12(b)(6)], a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 3 accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible 4 on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 5 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). While 6 “detailed factual allegations” are unnecessary, the complaint 7 must allege more than “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of 8 a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.” 9 Id. “In sum, for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, 10 the non-conclusory ‘factual content,’ and reasonable inferences 11 from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim 12 entitling the plaintiff to relief.” Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 13 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). 14 B. Analysis 15 Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to 16 “discriminate against any individual with respect to [her] 17 compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, 18 because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or 19 national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. Similarly, FEHA 20 prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of race, medical 21 condition, gender, or age. Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(a). 22 Title VII and FEHA also prohibit an employer from retaliating 23 against an individual because he or she has made a charge 24 of discrimination or opposed a discriminatory practice. 42 25 U.S.C. § 2000e-3; Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(h). 26 In the Ninth Circuit, courts analyze Title VII and FEHA 27 discrimination claims together. Metoyer v. Chassman, 504 F.3d 28 919, 941 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 1 229 F.3d 917, 923 (9th Cir. 2000) (assessing Title VII and FEHA 2 claims together “under federal law because Title VII and FEHA 3 operate under the same guiding principles”). To state a claim 4 for either racial or gender discrimination under Title VII or 5 FEHA, Plaintiff must plead: (1) she is a member of a protected 6 class; (2) she was qualified for her position; (3) she 7 experienced an adverse employment action; and (4) similarly 8 situated individuals outside her protected class were treated 9 more favorably, or other circumstances surrounding the adverse 10 employment action give rise to an inference of discrimination. 11 Fonseca v. Sysco Food Servs. of Arizona, Inc., 374 F.3d 840, 847 12 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Guz v. Bechtel Nat'l, Inc., 24 Cal.4th 13 317, 354-355 (2000). 14 Defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the SAC as 15 to the first two elements. Mot. at 5. Rather, Defendant 16 contends Plaintiff’s allegations in support of the final elements 17 remain insufficient. Id. at 5-13. Defendant thus urges the 18 Court to dismiss Plaintiff’s race and gender discrimination 19 claims for the same reason it previously did: the allegations in 20 support of these claims are conclusory, speculative, and vague 21 such that a discriminatory motive for the County’s personnel 22 decisions cannot be inferred. Id. 23 Insisting her race and gender claims are factually 24 supported, Plaintiff directs the Court to the newly added factual 25 allegations in paragraphs 14-17, 27-28, 31, 34, and 39-45. Opp’n 26 at 2-3. After careful review of these paragraphs, the Court 27 finds the SAC continues to lack articulable facts sufficient to 28 create an inference of a discriminatory motive for the County’s 1 personnel decisions. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (explaining the 2 court need not “accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a 3 factual allegation.”). 4 Further, the Court acknowledges Plaintiff’s legal argument 5 that Defendant’s use of certain facially neutral words may 6 support a claim of race and/or gender discrimination; but that is 7 so only when “in combination with other concrete factual 8 allegations” because “without more [plaintiff’s] subjective 9 interpretation of [defendant’s] use of these critical but 10 facially non-discriminatory terms does not, itself, reveal 11 discriminatory animus.” Humphries v. City of New York, No. 13 12 Civ. 2641(PAE), 2013 WL 6196561, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2013). 13 Here that something “more” is missing. There are no concrete 14 facts supporting Plaintiff’s subjective beliefs about those words 15 being race- or gender- charged. See SAC. “Feelings and 16 perceptions of being discriminated against are not evidence of 17 discrimination.” Humphries, 2013 WL 6196561, at *9 (internal 18 citations omitted). 19 In short, neither facially neutral words alone nor 20 Plaintiff’s subjective beliefs about them are sufficient to state 21 a discrimination claim. Nor are her generalized observations 22 about the “work environment at the Solano County District 23 Attorney’s Office.” Opp’n at 2 (citing to SAC ¶¶ 14, 15, 17). 24 Because Plaintiff does not plausibly allege discrimination on the 25 basis of race or gender, claims 1, 5, 12, and 15 are dismissed.2 26 27 2 As the Court dismisses for lack of factual support, it does not reach the parties’ additional arguments regarding the same actor 28 inference. See Mot. at 11-12; see also Opp’n at 8. nee een enn een nnn nn nn nn I OD EO 1 Finding further amendment would be futile, the Court dismisses 2 these claims with prejudice. See 4Zucco Partners, LLC v. □□□□□□□□ 3 | Corp., 552 F.3d 981, 1007 (9th Cir. 2009) (explaining that “where 4 the plaintiff has previously been granted leave to amend and has 5 subsequently failed to [correct the deficiencies] the district 6 | court’s discretion to deny leave to amend is particularly 7 broad”); see also Eminence Cap., LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 8 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Dismissal with prejudice and without 9 leave to amend is not appropriate unless it is clear .. . that 10 the complaint could not be saved by amendment.”). 11 Til. ORDER 12 For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS WITH 13 PREJUDICE Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s race and 14 gender discrimination claims (1, 5, 12, and 15). 15 IT IS SO ORDERED. 16 | Dated: July 13, 2022 17 18 JOHN A. MENDEZ 19 SENIOR UNITED4STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28