Schaupp v. County of Stanislaus ( 2022 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 CAROLYN SCHAUPP, et al., Case No. 1:22-cv-00849-JLT-SAB 12 Plaintiffs, ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER 13 v. AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 14 COUNTY OF STANISLAUS, et al., (Doc. 5) 15 Defendants. 16 17 INTRODUCTION 18 On July 11, 2022, Carolyn Schaupp filed a pro se complaint alleging various violations of 19 state and federal law. (Doc. 1 (“Compl.”).)1 Also on July 11, 2022, Plaintiff filed a motion for a 20 temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. (Doc. 5.) The Complaint, which is 120 21 pages long not including more than 100 pages of attachments, advances a long list of claims 22 1 This is not Plaintiff’s first lawsuit. She filed a similar lawsuit on August 28, 2020: 1:20-cv-01221-DAD-BAM 23 Schaupp et al. v. County of Stanislaus et al. (Schaupp I). In Schaupp I, the District Judge Dale A. Drozd denied a request for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction on September 25, 2020, (Schaupp I, Doc. 8), and 24 dismissed all claims in the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on November 19, 2020, (Schaupp I, Doc. 17). As was the case in Schaupp I, the instant complaint appears to indicate that Plaintiff intends to represent her minor 25 children—D.S., L.S., P. I., and J.B.—in this action. (Compl. at ¶¶ 10–12.) As the Court explained in Schaupp I, the Ninth Circuit has held that “a nonattorney parent must be represented by counsel in bringing an action on behalf of his or her child. The choice to appear pro se is not a true choice for minors who under state law cannot determine 26 their own legal actions.” Johns v. Cty. of San Diego, 114 F.3d 874, 876 (9th Cir. 1997) (internal citation omitted). Accordingly, the Court will address the claims as though they are being brought by only Plaintiff. See Laycook v. 27 Cty. of Fresno, No. 1:18-cv-01263-LJO-SAB, 2018 WL 4998136, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2018) (“Plaintiff cannot bring this action to assert the rights of his children without retaining counsel. The Court shall therefore only consider 28 the claims raised in this action as they pertain to Plaintiff.”). 1 against defendants County of Stanislaus (“County”); the Stanislaus County Superior Court; the 2 Stanislaus County Community Services Agency, Department of Child Support Services, District 3 Attorney Office, and Sheriff’s Department; the Modesto Police Department; and many individual 4 defendants apparently associated with the County. (Compl, ¶¶ 13–62.) For the reasons set forth 5 below, Plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction will be 6 denied. 7 DISCUSSION 8 The Complaint describes in detail Plaintiff’s child custody battles stretching over the 9 course of several years. Among other things, Plaintiff complains about the speed and 10 effectiveness of state court proceedings (see id., ¶ 71); alleged actions and failures to act by 11 various County employees related to the placement of Plaintiff’s children (id., ¶. 73-78); 12 decisions (both substantive and procedural) made by state judicial officers in relation to custody 13 proceedings and associated court matters (id., ¶ 80-81, 98–101, 106–118, 120–124, 129–130); the 14 “unlawful seizure” of Plaintiff’s children and related enforcement of state court orders by County 15 employees and/or law enforcement officials (id., ¶¶ 79, 83, 92–93, 108, 119, 126–127); and other 16 acts taken in connection with the judicial process (see, e.g., id. at ¶¶ 128). Plaintiff also alleges 17 “hate crimes”, harassment, and retaliation by County employees (id., ¶¶ 132–36) and disability 18 discrimination (id., ¶¶ 139–42). To the extent the Court has been able to digest the content of the 19 unnecessarily lengthy complaint, the alleged acts of “hate crimes”, harassment, and/or retaliation 20 are also related to the custody battle. (See, e.g., id., ¶ 176 (“Cassidy retaliated against Plaintiff by 21 forcibly seizing Ms. Schaupp Minor Child against her will, without central and material facts 22 . . . .”).) 23 The pending motion for a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction 24 requests that the Court: 25 Enjoin[] Defendants from committing further hate crimes and retaliation against each Plaintiff and lawfully place minor children 26 P.I., L.S. and D.S. in the safety and care of Plaintiff MS. SCHAUPP in the interest of justice and the people. An 27 injunction/TRO would best be implemented striking the unconstitutional and unlawful superior court orders entered without 28 Jurisdiction. 1 (Doc. 5 at 21.) In sum, Plaintiff requests that this Court enjoin unspecified defendants from 2 further claimed “hate crimes and retaliation” against Plaintiff; place P.I., L.S. and D.S. into 3 Plaintiff’s care, and strike state court orders related to the custody dispute. (Id.) 4 The Court will not belabor the analysis here because the Court provided Plaintiff the 5 relevant standards in Schaupp I. As was the case in Schaupp I, Plaintiff has made no showing of 6 her likelihood of success on the merits of this action because it appears that this Court lacks 7 subject matter jurisdiction over her claims. In the order denying Plaintiff’s motion for a temporary 8 restraining order and preliminary injunction in Schaupp I, Judge Drozd explained the relevant 9 jurisdictional defect by quoting Davis v. California Department of Child Services, No. 2:20-cv- 10 01393 TLN AC PS, 2020 WL 5039243, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2020): 11 Although plaintiff’s complaint is cast in terms of federal law violations, it is clear from the content of the complaint and the 12 remedies sought . . . that he is essentially contesting the state court judgment regarding his child support and custody obligations. This 13 amounts to a de facto appeal of the state court judgment. See Cooper v. Ramos, 704 F.3d 772, 777–78 (9th Cir. 2012) (“To 14 determine whether an action functions as a de facto appeal, we pay close attention to the relief sought by the federal-court plaintiff.”). 15 The court does not have jurisdiction to hear such a case. 16 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits federal district courts from hearing cases “brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries 17 caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and 18 rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). To determine if the 19 Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars a case a court must first determine if the federal action contains a forbidden de facto appeal of a state 20 court judicial decision. Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1156 (9th Cir. 2003). If it does not, “the Rooker-Feldman inquiry ends.” Bell v. 21 City of Boise, 709 F.3d 890, 897 (9th Cir. 2013). If a court determines that the action is a “forbidden de facto appeal,” 22 however, the court cannot hear the de facto appeal portion of the case and, [a]s part of that refusal, it must also refuse to decide any 23 issue raised in the suit that is ‘inextricably intertwined’ with an issue resolved by the state court in its judicial decision.” Noel, 341 24 F.3d at 1158; see also Bell, 709 F.3d at 897 (“The ‘inextricably intertwined’ language from Feldman is not a test to determine 25 whether a claim is a de facto appeal, but is rather a second and distinct step in the Rooker-Feldman analysis.”). A complaint is a 26 “de facto appeal” of a state court decision where the plaintiff “complains of a legal wrong allegedly committed by the state court, 27 and seeks relief from the judgment of that court.” Noel, 341 F.3d at 1163. 28 1 In seeking a remedy by which this court invalidates a state court decision and amends the state court record, plaintiff is clearly 2 asking this court to “review the final determinations of a state court in judicial proceedings,” which is at the core of Rooker-Feldman’s 3 prohibition. In re Gruntz, 202 F.3d 1074, 1079 (9th Cir. 2000). Requests to vacate a family court order and child support debt are 4 generally considered de facto appeals. Riley v. Knowles, No. 1:16- CV-0057-JLT, 2016 WL 259336, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 21, 2016). 5 Indeed, requests to the federal courts to reverse the outcomes of family law issues, such as divorce proceedings or child custody 6 determinations, are generally treated as de facto appeals barred by Rooker-Feldman. See Moore v. County of Butte, 547 Fed. Appx. 7 826, 829 (9th Cir. 2013). Accordingly, plaintiffs action constitutes a “forbidden de facto appeal” and the court lacks subject matter 8 jurisdiction to hear the case. 9 | See also Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 702—04 (1992) (holding that the domestic 10 | relations exception to federal subject matter jurisdiction “divests the federal courts of power to 11 || issue divorce, alimony and child custody decrees”); Clemons v. McGlynn, No. 2:18-cv-2463- 12 | TLN-EFB PS, 2019 WL 4747646, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2019) (“Because the core issue in 13 | this action concerns matters relating to child custody, this court lacks subject matter 14 | jurisdiction.”), findings and recommendations adopted, 2019 WL 5960103 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 15 2019). 16 Although Plaintiff's complaint in the present case is not identical to the one filed in 17 | Schaupp I, it is not materially distinct for purposes of Rooker Feldman. The thrust of the claims in 18 | this case challenge underlying custody determinations made by a state court. Moreover, the 19 || pending motion directly seeks to reverse a state court judgment. For those reasons, the motion for 20 | atemporary restraining order and preliminary injunction must be DENIED. 21 CONCLUSION AND ORDER 22 For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff's motion for a temporary restraining order and 93 | preliminary injunction (Doc. 5) is DENIED. 24 IT IS SO ORDERED. 25 . %6 Dated: _ July 14, 2022 : TED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 27 28