Faria v. PNC Bank National Assoc. ( 2023 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MICHAEL A. FARIA, et al., No. 2:23-cv-02023-DAD-KJN 12 Plaintiffs, 13 v. ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR A TEMPORARY 14 PNC BANK NATIONAL RESTRAINING ORDER ASSOCIATION, et al., 15 (Doc. Nos. 6, 10) Defendants. 16 17 18 This matter is before the court on an ex parte application for a temporary restraining order 19 filed on behalf of plaintiffs Michael A. Faria and Nanette M. Faria on September 28, 2023. (Doc. 20 No. 6.) For the reasons explained below, plaintiffs’ application will be denied. 21 BACKGROUND 22 On September 18, 2023, plaintiffs filed their verified complaint against defendants PNC 23 Bank, National Association (“PNC Bank”), a mortgage lender, and SN Servicing Corporation 24 (“SN Servicing”), a mortgage servicer, seeking a temporary restraining order deferring a trustee 25 sale of plaintiffs’ property scheduled for October 2, 2023. (Doc. No. 1.) In their verified 26 complaint, plaintiffs allege as follows. 27 Plaintiffs reside at and own the property located at 2315 Piccardo Circle, Stockton, 28 California (the “property”), which they purchased in 1988. (Id. at ¶¶ 3, 11.) In 2006, non-party 1 National City Bank, as the lender to plaintiffs for their purchase of the property, recorded a deed 2 of trust against the property. (Id. at ¶ 12.) According to plaintiffs, defendant PNC Bank is the 3 successor in interest to National City Bank, and defendant SN Servicing is the current servicer for 4 defendant PNC Bank. (Id. at ¶¶ 2–3, 13–14.) Thus, defendant PNC Bank and defendant SN 5 servicing are, respectively, alleged to be the current lender and servicer for the mortgage loan on 6 the property. (Id.) 7 On or about February 21, 2014, plaintiffs filed a voluntary petition for chapter 13 8 bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of California. (Id. at 9 ¶ 15.) In conjunction with their voluntary petition, on or about July 10, 2014, plaintiffs filed a 10 second amended chapter 13 plan of repayment, which included payments that were to be made to 11 defendant PNC bank. (Id. at ¶ 16.) On or about June 30, 2016, plaintiffs filed a first modified 12 chapter 13 plan showing that $17,600.00 in arrears was owed to non-party Bayview Loan 13 Servicing LLC (“Bayview”), which was defendant PNC’s mortgage servicer. (Id. at ¶ 17, 20.) 14 During the administration of their bankruptcy, plaintiffs discovered that Bayview, had not been 15 “providing payment for the property taxes associated with” the property. (Id. at ¶ 18.) As a 16 result, on or about August 26, 2016, plaintiffs filed a motion to modify their plan and demanded 17 an accounting from Bayview. (Id.) 18 On or about December 23, 2016,1 Bayview responded to plaintiffs that they needed to pay 19 $7,263.32 to bring their account holding their homeowner’s insurance and property tax payments 20 current. (Id. at ¶ 19.) Plaintiffs paid Bayview the amount requested. (Id.) However, plaintiffs 21 allege that they still objected to Bayview’s “proof of claim” of $17,600.00 because “Bayview was 22 unable to account for the payments received.” (Id. at ¶ 20.) On or about March 14, 2017, the 23 bankruptcy court entered an order adopting the first modified plan dated June 30, 2016, and 24 ordering “the debtors [to] make all ongoing monthly post-petition mortgage payments directly to 25 ///// 26 ///// 27 1 It appears that plaintiffs intended this date to be 2016, although they apparently alleged the year 28 to be 2015 by mistake. 1 [Bayview] commencing July 2016, and to [PNC Bank] commencing June 2016.”2 (Id. at 43.) 2 On or about October 3, 2017, plaintiffs’ bankruptcy proceeding was closed. (Doc. No. 3 22.) Since the closure of their bankruptcy proceeding, plaintiffs allege that defendants “have 4 constantly bombarded Plaintiffs with correspondence and notices demanding payment for 5 amounts allegedly owed [for] taxes and homeowner’s insurance Defendants claim they paid on 6 Plaintiffs’ behalf for the [property].” (Id. at ¶ 23.) However, plaintiffs “do not believe that such 7 amounts are owed or believe that [defendants3] [sic] paid such amounts directly.” (Id.) 8 On or about August 31, 2023, defendants served plaintiffs with a notice of trustee sale, 9 claiming that plaintiffs were in default to defendants in the amount of $61,893.37, and if that 10 amount was not paid to defendants, the property could be sold at a trustee sale scheduled for 11 October 2, 2023. (Id. at ¶ 24.) 12 Based on the foregoing, plaintiffs bring the following claims against defendants: (1) 13 violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692, et seq.; (2) 14 violation of California’s Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“Rosenthal Act”), 15 California Civil Code § 1788, et seq.; (3) breach of contract; (4) quiet title; and (5) declaratory 16 relief. (Doc. No. 1 at ¶¶ 25–51.) Plaintiffs’ prayer for relief seeks: a temporary restraining order 17 preserving the status quo and deferring the scheduled date of the trustee sale until they can file a 18 motion for a preliminary injunction; a declaratory judgment that plaintiffs are the exclusive 19 owners of the property; and compensatory damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs. (Id. at 9.) 20 ///// 21 ///// 22 ///// 23 ///// 24 ///// 25 2 Although plaintiffs do not explicitly allege that defendant SN Servicing is the successor in interest to Bayview, that is the reasonable inference drawn from plaintiffs’ allegations. 26 27 3 It appears that plaintiffs intended to allege that they do not believe “defendants” paid the amounts in question for taxes and insurance but the complaint mistakenly refers to “plaintiffs” in 28 advancing this allegation. 1 On September 28, 2023, plaintiffs file an ex parte application for a temporary restraining 2 order.4 (Doc. No. 6.) That same day, plaintiffs also filed a summons returned as executed as to 3 both defendants showing that they were served with the complaint on September 19, 2023. (Doc. 4 Nos. 4, 5.) On September 29, 2023, defendant SN Servicing filed an opposition to the pending 5 application for temporary restraining order and a request for judicial notice.5 (Doc. Nos. 9, 10.) 6 LEGAL STANDARD 7 The standard governing the issuing of a temporary restraining order is “substantially 8 identical” to the standard for issuing a preliminary injunction. See Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co. v. 9 John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001). “The proper legal standard for 10 preliminary injunctive relief requires a party to demonstrate ‘that he is likely to succeed on the 11 merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the 12 13 4 In the pending application for a temporary restraining order, plaintiffs’ counsel represents he contacted counsel for defendant SN Servicing on September 19, 2023 regarding postponing the 14 trustee sale to allow for an accounting of plaintiffs’ payments for homeowner’s insurance and 15 property taxes. (Doc. No. 6 at 5.) However, counsel states that the parties were not able to reach a stipulation. (Id.) In addition, plaintiffs’ counsel represents that he received an email from 16 counsel for defendant PNC Bank on September 27, 2023 stating that defendant PNC Bank “no longer had any claims against Plaintiffs or the Subject Property.” (Id.) Despite this 17 representation by defendant PNC Bank, plaintiffs still seek the issuance of a temporary restraining order against both defendants PNC Bank and SN Servicing. 18 19 5 Defendant SN Servicing requests that the court take judicial notice of 12 documents pulled from the official records of the San Joaquin County Recorder: (1) Deed of Trust recorded 20 October 5, 2004, as Document No. 2004-226181; (2) Substitution of Trustee recorded April 6, 2009, as Document No. 2009-051594; (3) Assignment of Deed of Trust recorded December 10, 21 2012, as Document No. 2012-161231; (4) Assignment of Deed of Trust recorded December 10, 2012, as Document No. 2012-161680; (5) Substitution of Trustee recorded April 12, 2023, as 22 Document No. 2013-052600; (6) Assignment of Deed of Trust recorded May 6, 2013, as 23 Document No. 2013-059613; (7) Assignment of Deed of Trust recorded November 23, 2015, as Document No. 2015-139092; (8) Substitution of Trustee recorded March 5, 2019, as Document 24 No. 2019-022353; (9) Substitution of Trustee recorded January 16, 2020, as Document No. 2020- 006933; (10) Corporate Assignment of Deed of Trust recorded July 11, 2022, as Document 25 No. 2022-084005; (11) Assignment of Deed of Trust recorded May 1, 2023, as Document No. 2023-033103; and (12) Assignment of Deed of Trust recorded May 1, 2023, as Document No. 26 2023-033104. (Doc. No. 8.) Because all of these documents are matters of public record and 27 their existence is not subject to reasonable dispute, the court will take judicial notice of them. See Grant v. Aurora Loan Servs., Inc., 736 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1264 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (collecting cases 28 taking judicial notice of documents recorded by the county recorder’s office). 1 balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.’” Stormans, 2 Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109, 1127 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 3 Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)); see also Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack, 636 F.3d 1166, 1172 (9th 4 Cir. 2011) (“After Winter, ‘plaintiffs must establish that irreparable harm is likely, not just 5 possible, in order to obtain a preliminary injunction.’”); Am. Trucking Ass’n, Inc. v. City of Los 6 Angeles, 559 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir. 2009). A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must 7 make a showing on all four of these prongs. All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 8 1135 (9th Cir. 2011). The Ninth Circuit has also held that “[a] preliminary injunction is 9 appropriate when a plaintiff demonstrates . . . that serious questions going to the merits were 10 raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in the plaintiff’s favor.” Id. at 1134–35 (citation 11 omitted). The party seeking the injunction bears the burden of proving these elements. Klein v. 12 City of San Clemente, 584 F.3d 1196, 1201 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Caribbean Marine Servs. Co. 13 v. Baldrige, 844 F.2d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted) (“A plaintiff must do more than 14 merely allege imminent harm sufficient to establish standing; a plaintiff must demonstrate 15 immediate threatened injury as a prerequisite to preliminary injunctive relief.”). Finally, an 16 injunction is “an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the 17 plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 22. 18 The likelihood of success on the merits is the most important Winter factor. See Disney 19 Enters., Inc. v. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d 848, 856 (9th Cir. 2017). Plaintiffs bear the burden of 20 demonstrating that they are likely to succeed on the merits of their claims or, at the very least, that 21 “serious questions going to the merits were raised.” All. for Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1131. 22 “Because Plaintiffs seek a mandatory injunction, they ‘must establish that the law and facts 23 clearly favor [their] position, not simply that [they are] likely to succeed.’” LA All. for Hum. Rts. 24 v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 14 F.4th 947, 956 (9th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted). 25 ANALYSIS 26 Plaintiffs argue that they have “raise[d] questions regarding [defendant SN Servicing’s] 27 accounting of amounts alleged[ly] owed for homeowner’s insurance and property taxes.” (Doc. 28 No. 6 at 6–7.) Plaintiffs contend that, during their bankruptcy, they were making payments to 1 defendant SN Servicing, but that SN Servicing did not pay homeowner insurance or property 2 taxes on their behalf until after plaintiffs filed their “Motion to Amend Confirmed Plan.” (Id. at 3 7.) Since the closure of plaintiffs’ bankruptcy, they have made direct payments to the San 4 Joaquin County Treasurer-Tax Collector, despite defendant SN Servicing claiming it made such 5 payments. (Id.) However, in advancing this argument, plaintiffs fail to connect the allegations in 6 their complaint or their argument in their pending application to any of the asserted claims 7 brought against defendants in this action. Even more troubling, defendant SN Servicing argues in 8 its opposition that plaintiffs have two deeds of trust on the property, and plaintiffs are 9 commingling issues regarding the two deeds of trust when they are in fact separate and distinct. 10 (Doc. No. 9 at 3–4.) Notably, defendant SN Servicing argues it is only associated with a deed of 11 trust recorded in 2004, as opposed to the deed of trust recorded in 2006 that is alleged in, and 12 attached to, plaintiffs’ complaint. (Id. at 4.) Although defendant SN Servicing has raised doubt 13 as to whether it is a properly named defendant in connection with plaintiffs’ claims asserted in 14 this action, the court need not address this issue in resolving the pending application for a 15 temporary restraining order. For the reasons stated below, the court concludes that plaintiffs have 16 neither shown a likelihood of success on the merits nor raised serious questions going to the 17 merits of the four claims they have asserted in their complaint. The court will address each of 18 plaintiffs’ claims in turn below. 19 First, plaintiffs cannot obtain injunctive relief for violations of the FDCPA and Rosenthal 20 Act. See Varnado v. Midland Funding LLC, 43 F. Supp. 3d 985, 992–93 (N.D. Cal. 2014) 21 (finding that remedies under the FDCPA and Rosenthal Act are “are limited to damages, 22 attorney’s fees and costs” and dismissing the plaintiffs “requests for declaratory and injunctive 23 relief under the FDCPA and Rosenthal Act”); Perez v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 21-cv-01977-BAS- 24 LR, 2022 WL 10756681, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2022) (denying an application for a temporary 25 restraining order brought under the FDCPA and Rosenthal Act). 26 Moreover, plaintiffs have not shown that defendants PNC Bank and SN Servicing, alleged 27 to be a mortgage lender and mortgage servicer, qualify under the general definition of “debt 28 collectors” or that foreclosing on a mortgage constitutes debt collection under the FDCPA. See 1 Tierney v. Carrington Mortg. Servs., LLC, No. 22-35221, 2023 WL 2783241, at *2 (9th Cir. Apr. 2 5, 2023)6 (“[T]he Supreme Court held that an entity ‘principally involved in “the enforcement of 3 security interests” is not a debt collector except for the purpose of section 1692f(6) [of the 4 FDCPA].’”) (quoting Obduskey v. McCarthy & Holthus LLP, __ U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 1029, 1033 5 (2019)); Vien-Phuong Thi Ho v. ReconTrust Co., NA, 858 F.3d 568, 572 (9th Cir. 2017) (finding 6 that “actions taken to facilitate a non-judicial foreclosure, such as sending the notice of default 7 and notice of sale, are not attempts to collect ‘debt’ as that term is defined by the FDCPA”). 8 Notably, plaintiffs do allege in their complaint that defendants violated § 1692f(6), which is the 9 one provision in the FDCPA that does apply to entities enforcing security interests. Specifically, 10 to support their FDCPA claim, plaintiffs allege only that defendants “violated this provision 11 through the use of correspondence and notices threatening to take nonjudicial action (i.e., the 12 Trustee Sale) to dispossess Plaintiffs of the Subject Property without a legal ability or intention to 13 do so.” (Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 27.) But this allegation amounts to nothing more than a recitation of the 14 elements of § 1692f(6), which is insufficient to state a cognizable claim. Plaintiffs have failed to 15 present any facts or argument indicating that they are likely to succeed on the merits of an 16 FDCPA claim brought against these defendants predicated on a violation of § 1692f(6). See also 17 Ghalehtak v. Fay Servicing, LLC, No. 17-cv-05976-EMC, 2017 WL 4805589, at *4–5 (N.D. Cal. 18 Oct. 25, 2017) (denying a motion for a temporary restraining order based on an alleged § 19 1692f(6) violation “because injunctive relief is not a remedy in individual actions under the 20 FDCPA”). 21 Second, it is true that under California law, “a nonjudicial foreclosure can be ‘debt 22 collection’ by a ‘debt collector’ so as to trigger the protections of the Rosenthal Act.” Best v. 23 Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 64 Cal. App. 5th 568, 580 (2021) (finding that allegations “that go 24 beyond the scope of an ordinary foreclosure” such as the “‘unethical mismanagement of the 25 escrow account’ and ‘refusal to correct accounting errors,’” can state a Rosenthal Act claim under 26 California’s pleading standard). But here, plaintiffs merely allege in their complaint that “[t]he 27 6 Citation to this unpublished Ninth Circuit opinion is appropriate pursuant to Ninth Circuit Rule 28 36–3(b). 1 foregoing acts and omissions constitute violations of the [Rosenthal Act].” (Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 34.) 2 There are no allegations in the complaint that make clear which provisions of the Rosenthal Act 3 defendants allegedly violated or that specify which actions by defendants were purportedly 4 unlawful. See Mohandas v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 21-cv-03349-JAK-PD, 2023 WL 5 5506004, at *11 (C.D. Cal. July 13, 2023) (dismissing a Rosenthal Act claim brought against 6 mortgage servicer where the plaintiff did not allege that the defendant engaged in any particular 7 actions prohibited by the Rosenthal Act or specify any provisions that were allegedly violated). 8 At most, plaintiffs contend that there is some dispute between them and defendants regarding 9 whether certain payments were made toward plaintiffs’ homeowners’ insurance and property 10 taxes during the administration of plaintiffs’ bankruptcy. But there is no coherent argument 11 advanced by plaintiffs or factual allegations made indicating that this dispute involves violations 12 of the Rosenthal Act on the part of defendants, such as an allegation that their foreclosure on the 13 property is not permitted by law. See Cal. Civ. Code § 1788.10 (listing unlawful conduct 14 prohibited by the Rosenthal Act). 15 Third, plaintiffs allege that they have “performed all the acts, services and conditions 16 required on its part to be performed pursuant to the Deed of Trust,” while defendant “breached 17 the terms of the Agreement by continuing to attempt to collect debts associated with the Deed of 18 Trust.” (Doc. No. 1 at ¶¶ 37–38.) Plaintiffs have failed to identify what “Agreement” they are 19 referring to in their complaint in this regard, let alone what provision of the agreement they 20 contend defendants have breached. See Young v. Facebook, Inc., 790 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1117 21 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (dismissing a breach of contract claim where the plaintiff failed to provide 22 specificity regarding what contractual provisions the defendant had allegedly violated). At the 23 same time, plaintiffs appear to contend that the deed of trust is the contract that serves as the basis 24 for their breach of contract claim. But “a deed of trust is not a contract between a borrower and 25 lender; rather, it is a document conveying an interest in real property as security for performance 26 of an obligation under a contract.” Carter v. Sables, LLC, No. 3:17-cv-00594-MMD-WGC, 2017 27 WL 6328157, at *4 (D. Nev. Dec. 11, 2017) (citing Restatement (Third) of Property (Mortgages) 28 § 1.1 (Am. Law Inst. 1997)) (dismissing a breach of contract claim without leave to amend in an 1 action involving the plaintiff’s mortgage loan because the plaintiff’s contract claim was based on 2 a deed of trust). 3 Fourth, “under California law, a party seeking to set aside a foreclosure or trustee’s sale 4 must make a ‘valid and viable tender of payment of the indebtedness owing.’” Pascascio v. New 5 Century Mortg. Corp., No. 12-cv-00839-PSG-FMO, 2012 WL 1745619, at *3 (C.D. Cal. May 16, 6 2012); see also Wadhwa v. Aurora Loan Servs., LLC, No. 11-cv-001784-KJM-KJN, 2012 WL 7 762020, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2012) (“Tender of the indebtedness is required to quiet title in 8 California.”); Herrejon v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 980 F. Supp. 2d 1186, 1198 (E.D. Cal. 9 2013) (“It is settled in California that a mortgagor cannot quiet his title against the mortgagee 10 without paying the debt secured.”). Plaintiffs have failed to allege in their complaint, nor do they 11 argue in the pending application, that they have made a tender of the amount owing, or that they 12 have to ability to do so. Plaintiffs merely allege in their complaint that defendants “claim a 13 security interest in the Subject Property” and that plaintiffs “deny” defendants’ claim. (Doc. No. 14 1 at ¶ 43.) 15 Fifth and finally, because plaintiffs have not shown that they are likely to succeed on any 16 of their first four claims, such is also the case as to their final claim for declaratory relief. See 17 Darling v. Green, No. 12-cv-00362-PSG-CW, 2013 WL 12132058, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 18 2013) (“[D]eclaratory relief is a remedy, not a freestanding cause of action, and Plaintiffs’ action 19 for declaratory relief survives only to the extent that Plaintiffs’ other causes of action state a claim 20 for relief.”). 21 In sum, the court concludes that plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that they are likely to 22 succeed on the merits of their claims brought against the defendants named in this action or that 23 they have even raised serious questions going to the merits of their claims. Because plaintiffs 24 have failed to make that required showing, their motion for a temporary restraining order will be 25 denied. 26 ///// 27 ///// 28 ///// 1 CONCLUSION 2 For the reasons explained above, 3 1. Defendant SN Servicing Corporation’s request for judicial notice (Doc. No. 10) is 4 granted; and 5 2. Plaintiffs’ ex parte application for a temporary restraining order (Doc. No. 6) is 6 denied. 7 IT IS SO ORDERED. * | Dated: _ September 30, 2023 Dal A. 2, oyel 9 DALE A. DROZD 10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 10