(PC) DeOllas v. Sacramento County Sheriff's Office ( 2023 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ANTHONY EUGENE DeOLLAS, II, No. 2:22-CV-1280-DMC-P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 SACRAMENTO COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 18 Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 19 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s complaint, ECF No. 1. 20 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 21 against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. 22 § 1915A(a). This provision also applies if the plaintiff was incarcerated at the time the action was 23 initiated even if the litigant was subsequently released from custody. See Olivas v. Nevada ex rel. 24 Dep’t of Corr., 856 F.3d 1281, 1282 (9th Cir. 2017). The Court must dismiss a complaint or 25 portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can 26 be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 27 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that 28 complaints contain a “. . . short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 1 entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This means that claims must be stated simply, 2 concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to 3 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied if the complaint gives the defendant fair notice 4 of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon which it rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 5 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because Plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of particularity 6 overt acts by specific defendants which support the claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail 7 to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is impossible for the Court to conduct the screening 8 required by law when the allegations are vague and conclusory. 9 10 I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS 11 Plaintiff names the following municipal entities as defendants: (1) Sacramento 12 County Sheriff’s Office; and (2) Sacramento County. See ECF No. 1, pgs. 1, 2. Plaintiff alleges 13 violation of his First Amendment right to freedom of religion as a Native American Indian. See 14 id. at 3, 4. According to Plaintiff, Sacramento County and the Sacramento County Sheriff’s 15 Office are not providing Native American Indian spiritual and religious services at the 16 Sacramento County Main Jail. See id. Plaintiff does not offer and specifics about his spiritual 17 beliefs or describe what services are not being provided or how lack of services affects his ability 18 to practice his religion. 19 20 II. DISCUSSION 21 The Court finds that Plaintiff’s complaint suffers from two defects, as discussed 22 below. First, Plaintiff names as the only defendants two municipal entities but does not allege 23 sufficient facts to establish municipal liability. Second, as to the substance of his First 24 Amendment free exercise claim, Plaintiff’s complaint does not allege sufficient facts to allow the 25 Court to determine if there has been a violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 A. Municipal Liability 2 Municipalities and other local government units are among those “persons” to 3 whom § 1983 liability applies. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). 4 Counties and municipal government officials are also “persons” for purposes of § 1983. See id. at 5 691; see also Thompson v. City of Los Angeles, 885 F.2d 1439, 1443 (9th Cir. 1989). A local 6 government unit, however, may not be held responsible for the acts of its employees or officials 7 under a respondeat superior theory of liability. See Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 8 397, 403 (1997). Thus, municipal liability must rest on the actions of the municipality, and not of 9 the actions of its employees or officers. See id. To assert municipal liability, therefore, the 10 plaintiff must allege that the constitutional deprivation complained of resulted from a policy or 11 custom of the municipality. See id. 12 Here, both named defendants are municipal entities to which § 1983 liability 13 potentially applies. Plaintiff has not, however, alleged any policy or custom related to religious 14 services at the Sacramento County Mail Jail which could form the basis of a First Amendment 15 violation. In order for either of the two named municipal entities to be liable, such liability can 16 only rest on implementation of a municipal policy or custom, which Plaintiff has not alleged. 17 Plaintiff generally alleges that religious services are not being provided. It is unclear, however, 18 whether this is due to the conduct of individual officers at the Sacramento County Main Jail or if 19 this is due to a municipal custom or policy of not providing any religious services in general or 20 Native American Indian religious services in particular. Plaintiff will be provided an opportunity 21 to amend to cure this defect. 22 B. Free Exercise of Religion 23 The United States Supreme Court has held that prisoners retain their First 24 Amendment rights, including the right to free exercise of religion. See O'Lone v. Estate of 25 Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987); see also Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974). Thus, 26 for example, prisoners have a right to be provided with food sufficient to sustain them in good 27 health and which satisfies the dietary laws of their religion. See McElyea v. Babbit, 833 F.2d 28 196, 198 (9th Cir. 1987). In addition, prison officials are required to provide prisoners facilities 1 where they can worship and access to clergy or spiritual leaders. See Glittlemacker v. Prasse, 428 2 F.2d 1, 4 (3rd Cir. 1970). Officials are not, however, required to supply clergy at state expense. 3 See id. Inmates also must be given a “reasonable opportunity” to pursue their faith comparable to 4 that afforded fellow prisoners who adhere to conventional religious precepts. See Cruz v. Beto, 5 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972). 6 However, the court has also recognized that limitations on a prisoner’s free 7 exercise rights arise from both the fact of incarceration and valid penological objectives. See 8 McElyea, 833 F.2d at 197. For instance, under the First Amendment, the penological interest in a 9 simplified food service has been held sufficient to allow a prison to provide orthodox Jewish 10 inmates with a pork-free diet instead of a completely kosher diet. See Ward v. Walsh, 1 F.3d 873, 11 877-79 (9th Cir. 1993). Similarly, prison officials have a legitimate penological interest in getting 12 inmates to their work and educational assignments. See Mayweathers v. Newland, 258 F.3d 930, 13 38 (9th Cir. 2001) (analyzing Muslim inmates’ First Amendment challenge to prison work rule). 14 While free exercise of religion claims originally arose under the First Amendment, 15 Congress has enacted various statutes in an effort to provide prisoners with heightened religious 16 protection. See Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 994 (9th Cir. 2005). Prior to these 17 congressional efforts, prison free exercise claims were analyzed under the “reasonableness test” 18 set forth in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91 (1987); see e.g. O’Lone, 382 U.S. at 349. The 19 first effort to provide heightened protection was the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) 20 of 1993. However, the Supreme Court invalidated that act and restored the “reasonableness test.” 21 See City of Boerne v. P.F. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); see also Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 22 732, 736 (9th Cir. 1997) (recognizing that the United States Supreme Court’s decision in City of 23 Boerne invalidated RFRA and restored the “reasonableness test” as the applicable standard in free 24 exercise challenges brought by prison inmates). 25 Congress then enacted the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act 26 (RLUIPA) in 2000 “. . . in response to the constitutional flaws with RFRA identified in City of 27 Boerne.” Guru Nanak Sikh Soc. of Yuba City v. County of Sutter, 456 F.3d 978, 985 (9th Cir. 28 2006). Under RLUIPA, prison officials are prohibited from imposing “substantial burdens” on 1 religious exercise unless there exists a compelling governmental interest and the burden is the 2 least restrictive means of satisfying that interest. See id. at 986. RLUIPA has been upheld by the 3 Supreme Court, which held that RLUIPA’s “institutionalized-persons provision was compatible 4 with the Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence and concluded that RLUIPA ‘alleviates 5 exceptional government-created burdens on private religious exercise.’” Warsoldier, 418 F.3d at 6 994 (quoting Cutter v. Wilkinson, 125 S.Ct. 2113, 2117 (2005)). Congress achieved this goal by 7 replacing the “reasonableness test” articulated in Turner with the “compelling government 8 interest” test codified in RLUIPA at 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). See id. 9 It is not clear whether a prisoner must specifically raise RLUIPA in order to have 10 his claim analyzed under the statute’s heightened standard. In Alvarez v. Hill, the Ninth Circuit 11 held that, if a complaint contains “factual allegations establishing a ‘plausible” entitlement to 12 relief under RLUIPA, [plaintiff has] satisfied the minimal notice pleading requirements of Rule 8 13 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” 518 F.3d 1152, 1157 (9th Cir. 2008); but see 14 Henderson v. Terhune, 379 F.3d 709, 715 n.1 (9th Cir. 2004) (declining to express any opinion 15 about whether plaintiff could prevail under RLUIPA because plaintiff brought his claim under the 16 First Amendment only). Therefore, it is possible for a prisoner’s complaint to raise both a First 17 Amendment claim and RLUIPA claim based on the same factual allegations. In other words, 18 even if the plaintiff does not specifically invoke the heightened protections of RLUIPA, he may 19 nonetheless be entitled to them. Under Henderson, however, the plaintiff’s claim may be limited 20 to the less stringent Turner “reasonableness test” if the plaintiff specifically brings the claim 21 under the First Amendment only. 22 Under both the First Amendment and RLUIPA, the prisoner bears the initial 23 burden of establishing that the defendants substantially burdened the practice of his religion by 24 preventing him from engaging in conduct mandated by his faith. See Freeman v. Arpaio,125 F.3d 25 732, 736 (9th Cir. 1997) (analyzing claim under First Amendment); see also Warsoldier, 418 F.3d 26 at 994-95 (analyzing claim under RLUIPA). While RLUIPA does not define what constitutes a 27 “substantial burden,” pre-RLUIPA cases are instructive. See id. at 995 (discussing cases defining 28 “substantial burden” in the First Amendment context). To show a substantial burden on the 1 practice of religion, the prisoner must demonstrate that prison officials’ conduct “. . . burdens the 2 adherent’s practice of his or her religion by pressuring him or her to commit an act forbidden by 3 the religion or by preventing him or her from engaging in conduct or having a religious 4 experience which the faith mandates.” Graham v. Commissioner, 822 F.2d 844, 850-51 (9th Cir. 5 1987). The burden must be more than a mere inconvenience. See id. at 851. In the context of 6 claims based on religious diets, a plaintiff must prove that prison officials refused to provide a 7 diet which satisfies his religious dietary laws or that the available prison menu prevented him 8 from adhering to the religious dietary laws mandated by his faith. See Bryant v. Gomez, 46 F.3d 9 948, 949 (9th Cir. 1995). 10 Under the First Amendment “reasonableness test,” where the inmate shows a 11 substantial burden the prison regulation or restriction at issue is nonetheless valid if it is 12 reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest. See Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 884 13 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Turner, 482 U.S. at 89). In applying this test, the court must weight four 14 factors: (1) whether there is a rational connection between the regulation or restriction and the 15 government interest put forward to justify it; (2) whether there are available alternative means of 16 exercising the right; (3) whether accommodation of the asserted religious right will have a 17 detrimental impact on prison guards, other inmates, or the allocation of limited prison resources; 18 and (4) whether there exist ready alternatives to the regulation or restriction. See id.; see also 19 Allen v. Toombs, 827 F.2d 563, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). 20 Under RLUIPA, the government is required to “. . . meet the much stricter burden 21 of showing that the burden it imposes on religious exercise is ‘in furtherance of a compelling 22 government interest; and is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental 23 interest.’” Green v. Solano County Jail, 513 F.3d 992, 986, 989 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing 42 U.S.C. 24 § 2000cc-1(a)(1)-(2) and 2(b)); see also Warsoldier, 418 F.3d at 994-95. Prison security is an 25 example of a compelling governmental interest. See Green, 513 F.3d at 989 (citing Cutter, 125 26 S.Ct. at 2113 n.13). In establishing that the regulation or restriction is the least restrictive means 27 to achieve a compelling governmental interest, prison officials must show that they actually 28 considered and rejected the efficacy of less restrictive means before adopting the challenged 1 practice. See Green, 513 F.3d at 989 (citing Warsoldier, 418 F.3d at 999). 2 Here, the complaint is devoid of specific factual allegations which would allow the 3 Court to determine whether he states a cognizable claim under either the First Amendment or 4 RLUIPA. Plaintiff has not, for example, described the nature of his religious practice or what 5 services were not provided. This prevents the Court from determining whether there has been a 6 substantial burden of Plaintiff’s ability to practice his religion. Plaintiff will be provided an 7 opportunity to amend in light of the standards outlined above. 8 9 III. CONCLUSION 10 Because it is possible that the deficiencies identified in this order may be cured by 11 amending the complaint, Plaintiff is entitled to leave to amend prior to dismissal of the entire 12 action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Plaintiff is 13 informed that, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See 14 Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Thus, following dismissal with leave to 15 amend, all claims alleged in the original complaint which are not alleged in the amended 16 complaint are waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). Therefore, if 17 Plaintiff amends the complaint, the Court cannot refer to the prior pleading in order to make 18 Plaintiff's amended complaint complete. See Local Rule 220. An amended complaint must be 19 complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. See id. 20 If Plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, Plaintiff must demonstrate how the 21 conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See 22 Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how 23 each named defendant is involved, and must set forth some affirmative link or connection 24 between each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. See May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 25 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 / / / ] Finally, Plaintiff is warned that failure to file an amended complaint within the 2 || time provided in this order may be grounds for dismissal of this action. See Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 3 || 1260-61; see also Local Rule 110. Plaintiff also warned that a complaint which fails to comply 4 | with Rule 8 may, in the Court’s discretion, be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(b). 5 || See Neviyel v. North Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1981). 6 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 7 1. Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed with leave to amend; and 8 2. Plaintiff shall file a first amended complaint within 30 days of the date of 9 || service of this order. 10 11 | Dated: January 27, 2023 Ss..c0_, DENNIS M. COTA 13 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28