(DP) Contreras v. Davis ( 2022 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JORGE CONTRERAS, Case No. 1:19-cv-01523-AWI-SAB 12 Petitioner, DEATH PENALTY CASE 13 v. ORDER (1) GRANTING FURTHER EQUITABLE TOLLING TO FEBRUARY 14 RONALD DAVIS, Warden of San Quentin 1, 2023, and (2) DENYING AS MOOT State Prison, STAY OF THE AUGUST 1, 2022, 15 PETITION FILING DEADLINE Respondent.1 16 17 18 On July 1, 2022, counsel for Petitioner moved to further equitably toll the 28 U.S.C. § 19 2244(d)(1) petition filing deadline from the current as tolled date of August 1, 2022, to February 20 1, 2023. (ECF No. 109.) On July 6, 2022, counsel for Petitioner further moved to stay the 21 August 1, 2022, petition filing deadline during the pendency of the equitable tolling motion. 22 (ECF No. 111.) 23 Counsel for Respondent has not opposed the further tolling motion and the time for doing 24 so has passed. Local Rule 230(c). Counsel for Petitioner represents that counsel for Respondent 25 does not oppose the stay request. (ECF No. 111, at 4.) 26 The Court, having considered the motions, the record, and the controlling law, and 27 1 Pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 25(d), Ron Broomfield, Warden of San 1 finding the matters amenable to decision without a hearing pursuant to Local Rule 230(g), shall 2 grant further equitable tolling to February 1, 2023, and deny as moot the motion to stay the 3 August 1, 2022, petition filing deadline, as discussed below. 4 I. BACKGROUND 5 The facts of this case, reflected in the Court’s docket, are summarized as follows. 6 On December 11, 1996, Petitioner was convicted of first degree felony murder and 7 robbery, with the special circumstance of murder in the commission of the robbery found true, 8 and sentenced to death. The California Supreme Court affirmed Petitioner’s conviction on direct 9 appeal, and summarily denied on the merits his petition for writ of habeas corpus. 10 On October 28, 2019, Petitioner began this federal proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 11 2254. 12 On December 6, 2019, the Court appointed as co-counsel Brian M. Pomerantz, Esq., and 13 Ken Murray, Esq., to represent Petitioner in the case for all purposes, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 14 3599. 15 Counsel for Respondent lodged the record on February 14, 2020, and then lodged an 16 amended record on July 23, 2020. 17 The Court granted Petitioner’s multiple motions for equitable tolling of the 28 U.S.C. § 18 2244(d)(1)) petition filing deadline on grounds of extraordinary impacts raised by the COVID-19 19 pandemic. 20 On April 22, 2022, Mr. Murray filed a notice of withdrawal. 21 On May 16, 2022, the Court denied without prejudice, as premature and insufficient 22 under Holland v. Florida,2 the parties’ stipulated motion for six months’ open-ended equitable 23 tolling in contemplation of appointment of a replacement for Mr. Murray. 24 On June 28, 2022, the Court adopted the June 24, 2022, recommendation of the Selection 25 Board for the Eastern District of California, and appointed Craig M. Cooley as replacement co- 26 counsel. 27 ///// 1 II. DISCUSSION 2 Counsel for Petitioner argue that notwithstanding their reasonable diligence, Mr. 3 Murray’s withdrawal from the case and Mr. Cooley’s substitution as co-counsel raise 4 extraordinary impediments to investigation, development and presentation of a complete federal 5 habeas petition prior to February 1, 2023. Particularly, counsel argue that Mr. Cooley requires a 6 period of six months to learn the case and complete the substantial (i.e. more than 60%) portion 7 of Mr. Murray’s work investigating, developing, and drafting non-record claims, that remains 8 undone. Relatedly, Mr. Pomerantz suggests that the need to replace the current mitigation 9 specialist, and other cases requiring his attention, have prevented him from advancing the 10 petition in the absence of co-counsel, and continue to impede completion of the federal petition. 11 Additionally, counsel for Petitioner argue that a stay of the current August 1, 2022, 12 petition filing deadline pending a ruling on the instant further tolling motion, is necessary to 13 provide protection against a potential default of the petition filing deadline. Counsel for 14 Petitioner represent that counsel for Respondent does not oppose the stay request. 15 “A habeas petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling only if he shows (1) that he has been 16 pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and 17 prevented timely filing.” Fue v. Biter, 842 F.3d 650, 653 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (quoting 18 Holland, 560 U.S., at 649); see also Espinoza-Matthews v. California, 432 F.3d 1021, 1026 n.5 19 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)); Calderon v. United 20 States Dist. Ct. (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1288-89 (9th Cir. 1997) (approving prospective 21 equitable tolling of the one year statute of limitations under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) where 22 “extraordinary circumstances” beyond a prisoner’s control make it impossible to file a petition 23 on time), partially overruled on other grounds by Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. (Kelly V), 24 163 F.3d 530, 540 (9th Cir. 1998), abrogated on other grounds by Woodford v. Garceau, 538 25 U.S. 202 (2003). 26 “[E]quitable tolling is available only when extraordinary circumstances beyond a 27 prisoner’s control make it impossible to file a petition on time and the extraordinary 1 1229 (9th Cir. 2013), but see Grant v. Swarthout, 862 F.3d 914, 918 (9th Cir. 2017) 2 (acknowledging that equitable tolling is appropriate even where “it would have technically been 3 possible for a prisoner to file a petition,” so long as the prisoner “would have likely been unable 4 to do so.”). It may be appropriate where external forces, rather than a petitioner’s lack of 5 diligence, account for the failure to file a timely claim. Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 6 (9th Cir. 1999). Among the factors that courts have considered relevant in deciding whether 7 equitable tolling of the limitations period is appropriate are the complexity of the legal 8 proceedings and whether the state would suffer prejudice from the delay. Hoyos v. Wong, Case 9 No. 09-cv-0388 L (NLS), 2010 WL 596443, at *4–5 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2010). 10 Equitable tolling is limited to rare and exceptional circumstances and typically applied 11 sparingly. Cadet v. State of Florida Department of Corrections, 853 F.3d 1216, 1221 (11th Cir. 12 2017). This “exercise of a court’s equity powers must be made on a case-by-case basis” and it 13 “enables courts to meet new situations that demand equitable intervention, and to accord all the 14 relief necessary to correct particular injustices.” Holland, 560 U.S., at 649–50. The petitioner 15 “bears the burden of showing that this extraordinary exclusion should apply to him.” Miranda v. 16 Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1065 (9th Cir. 2002); accord Milam v. Harrington, 953 F.3d 1128, 1132 17 (9th Cir. 2020). 18 Here, the Court finds that on the facts and evidence now before it, counsel for Petitioner 19 have carried the burden of showing extraordinary circumstances under Holland entitling 20 Petitioner to an additional six months’ tolling for presentation of a complete federal habeas 21 petition. Petitioner had no control over the withdrawal of Mr. Murray, which occurred at a time 22 when the bulk of Mr. Murray’s assigned claim investigation and development remained undone 23 and potentially colorable new claims remained undrafted. Mr. Cooley avers that he needs six 24 months as a condition of accepting appointment, in order to “review the voluminous record, meet 25 Mr. Contreras, and help Mr. Pomerantz identify and retain a mitigation specialist and other 26 mental health experts for mitigation purposes.” (ECF No. 109-1, at 2-4; see also ECF No. 109-2; 27 Beeler, 128 F.3d, at 1289 (extraordinary circumstances for equitable tolling found where much 1 The Court previously observed that Mr. Murray’s withdrawal did not alone deny 2 Petitioner’s right to the assistance of counsel in preparing his federal petition. (ECF No. 103, at 3 4-5, citing Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 924-25 (9th Cir. 2002)) (“the confluence of numerous 4 factors” may prevent timely filing and support equitable tolling); Jurado v. Wong, No. 5 08CV1400 JLS (JMA), 2009 WL 3320494, at *7 (S.D. Cal. Oct.14, 2009) (equitable tolling 6 granted for delay in appointment of counsel, but only to extent of the work necessary to complete 7 a comprehensive federal petition).) Counsel for Petitioner support the instant motion with 8 additional facts regarding the substantial work facing Mr. Cooley as replacement co-counsel. 9 (See ECF No. 109, at 6.) Moreover, Mr. Cooley’s assessment of the length of tolling required is 10 informed by what he knows of the facts and circumstances of the case, and his stated experience 11 in such matters. (See ECF No. 109-1.) 12 The Court again observes the size and complexity of this capital habeas case, where the 13 amended lodging of the record spans 10,820 pages including: the 204 page supplemental opening 14 brief stating 10 claims including subclaims; the California Supreme Court’s 68 page reasoned 15 opinion affirming judgment of conviction and sentence on automatic appeal; and the 213 page 16 state habeas corpus petition stating 14 claims and subclaims supported by 205 exhibits totaling 17 4109 pages. (See e.g., ECF Nos. 71, at 7; 85, at 9; 99, at 6-7.) 18 Furthermore, moving counsel have sufficiently demonstrated ongoing and anticipated 19 reasonable diligence with regard to the extraordinary conditions raised by the departure of Mr. 20 Murray and the arrival of Mr. Cooley. For example, the Court observes (1) moving counsel’s 21 stated professional and personal responsibilities in other matters, (2) the recurring COVID-19 22 restrictions upon in-person visitation including expert evaluation at San Quentin State Prison 23 (where Petitioner lives), (3) Mr. Cooley’s stated willingness to visit Petitioner in-person and 24 accompany expert(s) on such visits as they become available, (4) the noted delay in the process 25 of selecting Mr. Cooley as replacement co-counsel, and (5) Mr. Cooley’s informed estimate of 26 the time needed for him to fully participate in the preparation of the federal petition. (See ECF 27 Nos. 109, at 4-10; 109-1; see also ECF No. 109-2.) 1 before the Court suggests that Respondent would suffer any prejudice should the requested 2 period of additional tolling be granted. 3 Of course, it is concerning that Mr. Pomerantz seems largely unable to quantify counsel’s 4 progress over the last two-plus years of reviewing the record, investigating and developing 5 claims, and preparing the petition.3 Mr. Pomerantz suggests this is because the field 6 investigation necessary to inform the mitigation plan is incomplete due to the impediments 7 discussed above, impediments that he suggests have been exaggerated by the Court’s “piecemeal 8 application of equitable tolling” in the case. (See ECF No. 109, at 7.) Putting aside such 9 concerns for the time being, the Court finds that Petitioner is entitled to further equitable tolling 10 on grounds of the withdrawal and replacement of co-counsel, for the reasons stated. 11 On the facts and evidence now before the Court, the extraordinary impediments raised by 12 the withdrawal and replacement of co-counsel have impeded Petitioner’s right to the assistance 13 of appointed habeas counsel in preparing a complete federal habeas petition. 18 U.S.C. § 14 3599(a)(2); McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 855-57 (1994) (given the complex nature of 15 capital habeas proceedings and the seriousness of the possible penalty, an attorney’s assistance in 16 preparing a federal habeas corpus petition is crucial and includes a right for that counsel 17 meaningfully to research and present a defendant’s claims); McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 18 498 (1991) (in the pre-AEDPA context, stating that “petitioner must conduct a reasonable and 19 diligent investigation aimed at including all relevant claims and grounds for relief in the first 20 federal habeas petition.”), superseded by statute as recognized in Banister v. Davis, __U.S.__, 21 140 S. Ct. 1698, 1707 (2020). 22 For all the reasons stated, the Court finds that Petitioner has carried his burden of 23 showing that notwithstanding the continuing exercise of reasonable diligence by Petitioner and 24 his counsel, the present extraordinary circumstances raised by the withdrawal and replacement of 25 co-counsel make it unlikely that a proper federal habeas petition in this case can be completed 26 27 3 “Answering the Court’s query regarding the percentage of case review, investigation, and petition preparation counsel have completed in general, the answer is who knows.” (ECF 1 | and filed prior to February 1, 2023. Holland, 560 U.S., at 649-50; Miranda, 292 F.3d, at 1065; 2 | see also Grant, 862 F.3d, at 918; Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, Rule 2, 28 U.S.C.A. foll. § 3 For the same reasons, the Court finds that were a motion for equitable tolling to 4 | accompany a federal habeas petition filed on February 1, 2023, Petitioner would carry his burden 5 | on the motion. 6 Accordingly, the motion to further equitably toll the 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) deadline 7 | (ECF No. 109), is granted. Petitioner shall file his federal habeas petition by not later than 8 | February 1, 2023. The motion to stay the August 1, 2022, petition filing deadline (ECF No. 9 | 111), is denied as moot. 10 i IT IS SO ORDERED. □ ~_-SENIOR DISTRICT JUDGE 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28