- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, No. 2:22-cv-01262-TLN-KJN 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. SUA SPONTE REMAND ORDER 14 TANYA STUTSON; KEVIN WOODRUFF AKA WANAG TAHATAN 15 BEY; and DOES 1–10, inclusive, 16 Defendants. 17 18 This matter is before the Court on Defendants Tanya Stutson and Kevin Woodruff aka 19 Wanag Tahatan Bey’s (collectively, “Defendants”) Notice of Removal. (ECF No. 1.) For the 20 reasons set forth below, the Court hereby REMANDS the action to the Superior Court of 21 California, County of Contra Costa, due to lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction. 22 /// 23 /// 24 /// 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 1 I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 2 On June 16, 2022, Plaintiff Secretary of Veterans Affairs (“Plaintiff”) brought an action 3 for unlawful detainer against Defendants for possession of real property known as 2013 Mt. 4 Hamilton Dr., Antioch, CA 94531. (ECF No. 1 at 20.) On July 18, 2022, Defendants filed a 5 notice of removal removing this unlawful detainer action from the Contra Costa County Superior 6 Court. (Id. at 1–3.) 7 II. STANDARD OF LAW 8 28 U.S.C. § 1441 permits the removal to federal court of any civil action over which “the 9 district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). “Removal is 10 proper only if the court could have exercised jurisdiction over the action had it originally been 11 filed in federal court.” Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). 12 Courts “strictly construe the removal statute against removal jurisdiction,” and “the 13 defendant always has the burden of establishing that removal is proper.” Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 14 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (per curiam). Furthermore, “[i]f the district court at any time 15 determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the removed action, it must remedy the 16 improvident grant of removal by remanding the action to state court.” California ex rel. Lockyer 17 v. Dynegy, Inc., 375 F.3d 831, 838, as amended, 387 F.3d 966 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied 544 18 U.S. 974 (2005). 19 Federal question jurisdiction is set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1331. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The 20 “presence or absence of federal question jurisdiction is governed by the ‘well-pleaded complaint 21 rule,’ which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on 22 the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” Caterpillar Inc., 482 U.S. at 386. Federal 23 question jurisdiction therefore cannot be based on a defense, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third- 24 party claim raising a federal question. See Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49 (2009); Hunter 25 v. Philip Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 1042–43 (9th Cir. 2009). 26 Alternatively, 28 U.S.C. § 1332 governs diversity jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 27 Section 1332 states that “[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions 28 where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and 1 costs, and is between — (1) citizens of different States.” Id. The burden of proving the amount 2 in controversy depends on the allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint. Lowdermilk v. U.S. Bank 3 Nat’l Ass’n, 479 F.3d 994, 998–1000 (9th Cir. 2007). When the complaint alleges damages less 4 than the jurisdictional requirement, the party seeking removal must prove the amount in 5 controversy with legal certainty. Id.; Rynearson v. Motricity, Inc., 601 F. Supp. 2d 1238, 1240 6 (W.D. Wash. 2009). 7 III. ANALYSIS 8 As to federal question jurisdiction, Defendants’ notice of removal claims the right to 9 possession arises under federal law and that “allegedly aboriginal title of an Indian tribe 10 guaranteed by treaty and protected by statute has never been extinguished.” (ECF No. 1 at 2.) 11 Defendants assert there are federal questions concerning “treaty Law and Constitutionally secured 12 Rights,” land patents, tribal land, and the reliability of specified legal authority. (Id.) However, 13 Plaintiff’s Complaint contains only a single claim for unlawful detainer. (Id. at 20–23.) The 14 instant Complaint therefore relies solely on California state law and does not state any claims 15 under federal law. See Cal. Equity Mgmt., Grp., Inc. v. Hammer, No. 1:12-cv-01204-AWI, 2012 16 WL 3069954, at *2 (E.D. Cal. July 26, 2012). Based on the well-pleaded complaint rule, “federal 17 jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly 18 pleaded complaint.” Caterpillar Inc., 482 U.S. at 386. To the extent Defendants assert the 19 specified federal questions, such arguments relate to Defendants’ defenses or alleged 20 counterclaims. (See ECF No. 1 at 39–43.) For Plaintiff’s suit to “arise under” federal law, 21 Plaintiff’s “statement of [its] own cause of action” must “show[] that it is based upon [federal 22 law].” See Vaden, 556 U.S. at 60. 23 As to diversity jurisdiction, Defendants’ civil cover sheet asserts diversity jurisdiction and 24 that Plaintiff is a citizen of another state. (ECF No. 1-1.) But even assuming there is complete 25 diversity of citizenship, the Complaint makes clear the amount in controversy does not exceed 26 $75,000 because Plaintiff’s demand “does not exceed $10,000.” (ECF No. 1 at 20.) Moreover, 27 Defendants fail to prove, with legal certainty, that the amount in controversy is in fact higher than 28 $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332; see also Lowdermilk, 479 F.3d at 998–1000. 1 In sum, because the Complaint indicates the only cause of action is one for unlawful 2 | detainer, which arises solely under state law, this action does not arise under federal law. Further, 3 | Defendants’ alternate argument as to diversity jurisdiction also fails because the amount in 4 | controversy does not meet the statutory requirement. There being no apparent grounds for federal 5 | jurisdiction, it is appropriate to remand this case, sua sponte, for lack of federal subject matter 6 | jurisdiction. See United Investors Life Ins. Co. v. Waddell & Reed Inc., 360 F.3d 960, 967 (9th 7 | Cir. 2004) (“[T]he district court ha[s] a duty to establish subject matter jurisdiction over the 8 | removed action sua sponte, whether the parties raised the issue or not.”). 9 IV. CONCLUSION 10 For the reasons stated above, the Court hereby REMANDS this action to the Superior 11 Court of California, County of Contra Costa. 12 IT IS SO ORDERED. 13 | DATED: July 22, 2022 14 co /) 1S “ \/ Lu 16 — ZA NZ Troy L. Nunley } 17 United States District Judge 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
Document Info
Docket Number: 2:22-cv-01262
Filed Date: 7/25/2022
Precedential Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 6/20/2024