White v. Fleming ( 2022 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 JESSIE TAYLOR WHITE, Case No. 1:22-cv-00580-EPG 11 Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, RECOMMENDING THAT PLAINTIFF’S 12 v. COMPLAINT BE DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND 13 LEIGH G. FLEMING, et al., OBJECTIONS, IF ANY, DUE WITHIN 14 Defendants. TWENTY-ONE DAYS 15 (ECF No. 1) 16 ORDER DIRECTING CLERK TO ASSIGN DISTRICT JUDGE 17 18 Plaintiff Jessie Taylor White (“Plaintiff”) is confined at the Madera County Jail and 19 proceeds pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 20 1983. (ECF Nos. 1,3). The complaint, filed on May 16, 2022, generally alleges that Plaintiff was not arraigned within the amount of time required by California rules, and that his defense 21 attorneys in a pending state court criminal case are not adequately representing him. Plaintiff 22 names as defendants two state court judges and two public defender attorneys. 23 The Court concludes that the complaint fails to state any cognizable claims. Under settled 24 Federal law, this Court will generally not intervene in a pending state court proceeding. 25 Moreover, judges acting in their judicial capacity are immune from damages claims under section 26 1983, and court appointed attorneys are not considered state actors for claims for constitutional 27 violations under section 1983. Accordingly, the Court recommends dismissing the complaint 28 1 without leave to amend. 2 I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT 3 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by pretrial detainees or prisoners 4 seeking relief against a governmental entity or its officers or employees. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a) (requiring court to review civil complaint “in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental 5 entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity”); § 1915A(c) (defining “prisoner” as “any 6 person incarcerated or detained in any facility who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or 7 adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms and conditions of parole, 8 probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program”). The Court must dismiss a complaint or 9 portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to 10 state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who 11 is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 12 As Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court also screens the complaint under 13 28 U.S.C. § 1915. “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been 14 paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that the action or appeal 15 fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 16 A complaint is required to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 17 the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 18 required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 19 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 20 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A plaintiff must set forth “sufficient 21 factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. 22 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting 23 this plausibility standard. Id. at 679. While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken as true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 24 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, a plaintiff’s 25 legal conclusions are not accepted as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 26 Pleadings of pro se plaintiffs “must be held to less stringent standards than formal 27 pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that 28 1 pro se complaints should continue to be liberally construed after Iqbal). 2 II. SUMMARY OF PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT 3 Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that, upon his arrival at the Courthouse in his pending 4 criminal case, he claimed that his right to an arraignment within 72 hours had been violated. His lawyer, Richard Esquival, objected on behalf of Plaintiff. The judge, Judge Healy, noted the 5 objection but continued with the case. Plaintiff raised the objection with the judge’s clerk, but it 6 was ignored. Plaintiff’s case is proceeding toward trial. Plaintiff alleges that this violated his due 7 process rights. 8 Plaintiff also claims that the Court in the state court action refused his request to fire his 9 lawyer, Richard Esquival. Plaintiff claims that his lawyer refuses to accept his directions or voice 10 his objections, and Plaintiff wishes for a different lawyer to be appointed. Attorney Leigh 11 Fleming has refused to remove herself as counsel. The Judge refused to fire his and appoint a 12 different counsel. This damages Plaintiff’s attempt to defend himself at trial. Plaintiff claims this 13 is a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct related to diligence and zealous responsibility. 14 Plaintiff also claims that he filed a motion to fire his counsel several times. He has 15 informed the court and counsel of their conflict and intent to file this lawsuit. However, the state 16 court is neglecting his intents and motions. The attorneys should not be representing him now 17 that Plaintiff is suing them in this lawsuit. Counsel refuses to file Plaintiff’s motions, voice his 18 words, or hear him on all matters. This violates Plaintiff’s right to be heard. 19 Plaintiff asks that this court vindicate Plaintiff’s right to be arraigned within 72 hours and 20 appoint Plaintiff alternate counsel in his state court matter. 21 III. ANALYSIS OF PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT 22 A. Section 1983 23 The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides as follows: Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or 24 usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the 25 jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an 26 action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . . 27 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “[Section] 1983 ‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,’ but merely 28 provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.’” Graham v. Connor, 490 1 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)); see also 2 Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 618 (1979); Hall v. City of Los Angeles, 3 697 F.3d 1059, 1068 (9th Cir. 2012); Crowley v. Nevada, 678 F.3d 730, 734 (9th Cir. 4 2012); Anderson v. Warner, 451 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2006). To state a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant acted 5 under color of state law, and (2) the defendant deprived him of rights secured by the Constitution 6 or federal law. Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006); see also 7 Marsh v. County of San Diego, 680 F.3d 1148, 1158 (9th Cir. 2012) (discussing “under color of 8 state law”). A person deprives another of a constitutional right, “within the meaning of § 1983, ‘if 9 he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative act, or omits to perform an act 10 which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is 11 made.’” Preschooler II v. Clark County Sch. Bd. of Trs., 479 F.3d 1175, 1183 (9th Cir. 2007) 12 (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978)). “The requisite causal connection 13 may be established when an official sets in motion a ‘series of acts by others which the actor 14 knows or reasonably should know would cause others to inflict’ constitutional 15 harms.” Preschooler II, 479 F.3d at 1183 (quoting Johnson, 588 F.2d at 743). This standard of 16 causation “closely resembles the standard ‘foreseeability’ formulation of proximate cause.” 17 Arnold v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 637 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981); see also Harper v. City of 18 Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1026 (9th Cir. 2008). 19 A plaintiff must demonstrate that each named defendant personally participated in the 20 deprivation of his rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77. In other words, there must be an actual 21 connection or link between the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been 22 suffered by the plaintiff. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 691, 695 23 (1978). B. Younger Abstention 24 Plaintiff’s complaint contests the actions of the judges presiding over his state court 25 proceedings, including proceeding to trial notwithstanding a delay in arraignment, and refusing to 26 appoint conflict counsel. Accordingly, the Court first looks at the law regarding requests for 27 injunctions related to ongoing proceedings. 28 1 Federal courts “may not interfere with pending state criminal or civil proceedings.” Aiona 2 v. Judiciary of State of Haw., 17 F.3d 1244, 1248 (9th Cir. 1994). This doctrine, called “Younger 3 abstention,” is rooted in the “desire to permit state courts to try state cases free from interference 4 by federal courts.” Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43 (1971) (“[T]he underlying reason for restraining courts of equity from interfering with criminal prosecutions is reinforced by an even 5 more vital consideration, the notion of ‘comity,’ that is, a proper respect for state 6 functions . . . .”). Thus, “[a]bsent extraordinary circumstances, interests of comity and federalism 7 instruct federal courts to abstain from exercising our jurisdiction in certain circumstances when 8 asked to enjoin ongoing state enforcement proceedings.” Page v. King, 932 F.3d 898, 901 (9th 9 Cir. 2019) (alterations, internal quotation marks and citation omitted); accord Trump v. Vance, 10 140 S. Ct. 2412, 2420 (2020) (noting Younger “generally precludes federal courts from 11 intervening in ongoing state criminal prosecutions”). 12 “Younger abstention is appropriate when: (1) there is an ongoing state judicial 13 proceeding; (2) the proceeding implicates important state interests; (3) there is an adequate 14 opportunity in the state proceedings to raise constitutional challenges; and (4) the requested relief 15 seeks to enjoin or has the practical effect of enjoining the ongoing state judicial proceeding.” 16 Arevalo v. Hennessy, 882 F.3d 763, 765 (9th Cir. 2018) (alterations, internal quotation marks, and 17 citation omitted). 18 Typically, dismissal is required for Younger abstention. Aiona v. Judiciary of State of 19 Hawaii, 17 F.3d 1244, 1248 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating that, when abstaining under Younger, “a 20 district court must dismiss the federal action . . . [and] there is no discretion to grant injunctive 21 relief”) (internal citation omitted). But “federal courts should not dismiss actions where damages 22 are at issue; rather, damages actions should be stayed until the state proceedings are completed.” 23 Gilbertson v. Albright, 381 F.3d 965, 968 (9th Cir. 2004). Lastly, “[f]ederal courts will not abstain under Younger in extraordinary circumstances 24 where irreparable injury can be shown.” Page, 932 F.3d at 902 (internal quotation marks and 25 citation omitted). “[B]ad faith and harassment” are “the usual prerequisites” to show “the 26 necessary irreparable injury.” Younger, 401 U.S. at 53. 27 Here, this case falls squarely within Younger. Plaintiff is a criminal defendant in an 28 1 ongoing state court proceeding. Plaintiff has been raising these issues with the state court, but 2 disagrees with the judges’ orders in his case. Plaintiff asks this court to intervene in the state 3 court matter to direct the criminal proceeding against the judges’ orders. Thus, there is an 4 ongoing state judicial proceeding, the proceeding implicates important state interests, i.e., enforcement of state criminal law, Plaintiff has the opportunity to raise these issues in the state 5 proceeding and appeal to state appellate courts (and potentially seek petitions for writs of habeas 6 corpus), and the requested relief seeks to enjoin the ongoing state proceeding. Accordingly, 7 Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the Younger abstention doctrine. 8 In conclusion, Plaintiff cannot obtain injunctive relief related to his current criminal 9 proceedings through this section 1983 action. Plaintiff may raise these issues in state court, and if 10 convicted, on appeal. However, this section 1983 case is not a vehicle to interfere with that state 11 prosecution. 12 C. Judicial Immunity 13 Additionally, Plaintiff’s claims for damages against the state judges for actions taken in 14 their judicial functions are barred. As the Ninth Circuit explained: 15 Judges are immune from damage actions for judicial acts taken within the 16 jurisdiction of their courts. See Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1872). Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) was not intended to abolish the 17 doctrine of judicial immunity. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554–55, 87 S.Ct. 18 1213, 1217–18, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967). Judicial immunity applies “however erroneous the act may have been, and however injurious in its consequences it may 19 have proved to the plaintiff.” Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 106 S.Ct. 496, 500, 88 L.Ed.2d 507 (1985) (quoting Bradley, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 347). . . . 20 The immunity afforded judges and prosecutors is not absolute. A judge lacks 21 immunity where he acts in the “clear absence of all jurisdiction,” Bradley, 80 U.S. 22 (13 Wall.) at 351, or performs an act that is not “judicial” in nature. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 360, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 1106, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978). The 23 factors relevant in determining whether an act is judicial “relate to the nature of the act itself, i.e., whether it is a function normally performed by a judge, and to the 24 expectations of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity.” Sparkman, 435 U.S. at 362, 98 S.Ct. at 1107. In Sparkman, the Supreme 25 Court held that a judge's ex parte approval of a young woman's sterilization was a 26 judicial act performed within the apparent scope of the court's broad, general jurisdiction. Id. at 357–64, 98 S.Ct. at 1105–09. 27 28 Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986); see also Buckwalter v. Nev. Bd. of Med. 1 Exam'rs, 678 F.3d 737, 740 (9th Cir. 2012) (“The paradigmatic functions giving rise to absolute 2 immunity are those of judges and prosecutors.”). Moreover, to the extent these defendants are 3 sued in their official capacities, such claims are essentially claims against the State of California 4 and are therefore barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Lund v. Cowan, 5 F.4th 964, 969 (9th Cir. 2021) (“The Eleventh Amendment ... applies to Judge Cowan, who serves as a state court 5 judge and is being sued in his official capacity.”), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 900 (2022). 6 Here, Plaintiff is suing two state court judges for decisions they made in his state court 7 case. The judges are immune from such claims under the law cited above. If Plaintiff disagrees 8 with their decisions, he may appeal those decisions or pursue other remedies, but Plaintiff cannot 9 sue them for damages under section 1983. 10 D. Public Defenders are not State Actors Under Section 1983 11 Plaintiff also cannot sue his attorneys under section 1983 because they are not state 12 actions. “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by 13 the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was 14 committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) 15 (citations omitted). “[A] public defender does not act under color of state law when performing a 16 lawyer's traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.” Polk Cnty. v. 17 Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981); Vermont v. Brillon, 556 U.S. 81, 91 (2009) (holding that 18 public defenders are not suitable defendants in § 1983 actions because they are not considered 19 state actors). Because plaintiff's allegations involve the public defenders acting in the capacity as 20 an attorney during the course of criminal proceedings, they was not acting under color of state 21 law. This means that plaintiff cannot bring a claim against his court-appointed counsel. 22 Moreover, any potential claims for legal malpractice do not come within the jurisdiction 23 of the federal courts. Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981). IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 24 For the foregoing reasons, the Court recommends dismissing Plaintiff’s case. The Court 25 also does not recommend giving leave to amend. Notably, Plaintiff’s complaint is directed at his 26 ongoing state case, and asks for an injunction to interfere in the state court action as well as 27 damages against the state court judges and his appointed attorneys. Under the Younger abstention 28 1 | doctrine, Courts should not intervene in an ongoing state prosecution. Moreover, Plaintiff cannot 2 | state section 1983 claims for damages against state court judges or court appointed attorneys. 3 Accordingly, based on the foregoing, IT IS RECOMMENDED that: 4 1. Plaintiff’s complaint be dismissed; and 5 2. The Clerk of the Court be instructed to close the case. 6 These findings and recommendations will be submitted to the United States district judge 7 assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within twenty-one 8 (21) days after being served with these findings and recommendations, Plaintiff may file written 9 objections with the Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the 8 specified time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838-39 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)). 2 Additionally, IT IS ORDERED that the Clerk of Court is directed to assign a district judge 13 to this case. 14 15 | IT IS SO ORDERED. | Dated: _ July 28, 2022 [sf Sy □□ 17 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28