(PC) Stanford v. Anaya ( 2022 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 TERRELL CORDARRYL STANFORD, Case No. 2:19-cv-00497-KJM-DMC-P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 14 Y. ANAYA, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 18 Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 19 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that Defendants Johnson and Anaya violated his First and Eighth 20 Amendment rights when they engaged in retaliation, used excessive force against him, and 21 withheld his mail.1 Pending before the Court is Defendants Johnson and Anaya’s motion for 22 summary judgment, ECF No. 42, Plaintiff’s opposition, ECF No. 45, and Defendants’ reply, ECF 23 No. 46. Defendants argues that Plaintiff’s excessive force claims are barred by the Heck2 24 doctrine. ECF No. 42. The undersigned agrees that these claims are barred and recommends 25 granting Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. 26 27 1 Defendants’ motion only addresses Plaintiff’s excessive force claims, and thus Plaintiff’s remaining claims will proceed in litigation. 28 2 Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 On May 17, 2018, Plaintiff was involved in an altercation with Defendants after 3 they entered his cell. Plaintiff contends that Defendants entered his cell to handcuff him so that 4 his cellmate could return from the yard. ECF No. 42-5 at 11. He claims that after Defendants 5 handcuffed him, they “flung” him onto his stomach and attacked him. ECF No. 42-4 at 5-6. He 6 claims that he never resisted Defendants and that their use of force against him was unprovoked. 7 Id. at 8-9. 8 According to Defendants’ evidence, they handcuffed Plaintiff so they could 9 conduct a search of Plaintiff’s cell. ECF No. 42-5 at 8. When Plaintiff refused to exit the cell, 10 each Defendant grabbed one of Plaintiff’s arms and escorted him out of the cell. Id. Anaya 11 claims that during the escort, Plaintiff turned toward Anaya and headbutted Anaya’s right 12 shoulder. Id. Fearing for his and Johnson’s safety, Anaya used physical force to subdue Plaintiff. 13 Id. After the altercation ended, officers found twenty rolled “marijuana sticks” in Plaintiff’s cell, 14 which Plaintiff claims were not his. ECF No. 42-4 at 10-11. 15 Plaintiff received two Rules Violation Report that day. The first dealt with the 16 marijuana found in his cell. Id. Plaintiff was found guilty possession and the hearing officer 17 deducted 180 days of good-time credit. Id. The second RVR concerned the physical altercation 18 between Plaintiff and Defendants. Id. at 11. The RVR alleged that Plaintiff battered Anaya, a 19 peace officer. Id. The hearing officer, officer S. Wagner, found Plaintiff guilty of the second 20 RVR. ECF No. 42-5 at 8-14. However, the third level appeal review reversed the conviction on 21 the grounds that Wagner did not provide Plaintiff with evidence he had requested (the video 22 footage of the incident), and that Wagner did “not determine what evidence was utilized for the 23 finding of guilt.” Id. at 8. 24 The RVR was then heard by Chief Disciplinary Officer, Associate Warden 25 Grether. Id. at 8-25. On rehearing, Plaintiff was provided with the evidence he requested—video 26 footage from the incident, although Grether determined that the footage had no evidentiary value 27 because it did not show the inside of Plaintiff’s cell. Id. at 21. In developing his findings, 28 Grether relied on Officer Bennett’s incident report that stated he witnessed Plaintiff batter Anaya. 1 Id. Additionally, Grether relied on a form completed by Anaya following the incident that 2 indicated that he suffered pain in his right should, which corroborated his claim that Plaintiff 3 headbutted his right shoulder. Id. Wagner found Plaintiff guilty and assessed 150 days of good- 4 time credit loss. Id. at 24, 31; ECF No. 42-4 at 13-14. The record shows that the 150 days of 5 good-time credit Plaintiff lost due the altercation with Defendants on May 17 have been not 6 restored. Id. 7 II. STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGEMENT 8 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for summary judgment or summary 9 adjudication when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 10 together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that 11 the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The 12 standard for summary judgment and summary adjudication is the same. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 13 56(a), 56(c); see also Mora v. ChemTronics, 16 F. Supp. 2d. 1192, 1200 (S.D. Cal. 1998). One of 14 the principal purposes of Rule 56 is to dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses. See 15 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). Under summary judgment practice, the 16 moving party 17 . . . always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of “the pleadings, 18 depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,” which it believes demonstrate the absence of a 19 genuine issue of material fact. 20 Id., at 323 (quoting former Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). 21 If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the 22 opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. See 23 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In attempting to 24 establish the existence of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the 25 allegations or denials of its pleadings but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the 26 form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in support of its contention that the 27 dispute exists. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1); see also Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11. The 28 1 opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might 2 affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 3 242, 248 (1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th 4 Cir. 1987), and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could 5 return a verdict for the nonmoving party, Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1436 6 (9th Cir. 1987). To demonstrate that an issue is genuine, the opposing party “must do more than 7 simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts . . . . Where the record 8 taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no 9 ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted). It is sufficient that “the 10 claimed factual dispute be shown to require a trier of fact to resolve the parties’ differing versions 11 of the truth at trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. 12 In resolving the summary judgment motion, the Court examines the pleadings, 13 depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any. 14 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed, see Anderson, 15 477 U.S. at 255, and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the 16 court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party, see Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. 17 Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing party’s obligation to 18 produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. See Richards v. Nielsen 19 Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 20 1987). Ultimately, “[b]efore the evidence is left to the jury, there is a preliminary question for the 21 judge, not whether there is literally no evidence, but whether there is any upon which a jury could 22 properly proceed to find a verdict for the party producing it, upon whom the onus of proof is 23 imposed.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251. 24 / / / 25 / / / 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 III. DISUCSSION 2 Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights by 3 attacking him in his cell. ECF No. 45. Defendants do not challenge the merits of Plaintiff’s 4 excessive force claims, but instead argue that the claims are barred under the favorable 5 termination rule set forth in Heck. ECF No. 42. The Court finds that the claims are Heck barred 6 and thus recommends granting Defendants’ motion. 7 Where a § 1983 action seeking monetary damages or declaratory relief alleges 8 constitutional violations which would necessarily imply the invalidity of an underlying conviction 9 or sentence, or the result of a prison disciplinary hearing resulting in imposition of a sanction 10 affecting the overall length of confinement, such a claim is not cognizable under § 1983 unless 11 the conviction or sentence has first been invalidated on appeal, by habeas petition, or through 12 some similar proceeding. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 483-84 (concluding that § 1983 claim not 13 cognizable because allegations were akin to malicious prosecution action which includes as an 14 element a finding that the criminal proceeding was concluded in plaintiff’s favor). 15 Heck applies in the prison disciplinary context if the “defect complained of by 16 [Plaintiff] would, if established, necessarily imply the invalidity of the deprivation of his good- 17 time credits[,]” Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 646 (1997); Nonnette v. Small, 316 F.3d 872, 18 875 (9th Cir. 2002), and if the restoration of those credits “necessarily” would “affect the duration 19 of time to be served[.]” See Muhammed v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 754 (2004) (per curiam); see 20 also Nettles v. Grounds, 830 F.3d 922, 927-28 n.4 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (“Heck applies only 21 to administrative determinations that ‘necessarily’ have an effect on ‘the duration of time to be 22 served.’” (citations omitted)); Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 856 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he 23 applicability of the favorable termination rule turns solely on whether a successful § 1983 action 24 would necessarily render invalid a conviction, sentence, or administrative sanction that affected 25 the length of the prisoner’s confinement.”). Here, Defendants have the burden of demonstrating 26 that Heck bars Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims for excessive force. See Sandford v. Motts, 258 F.3d 27 1117, 1119 (9th Cir. 2001) (“It was the burden of the defendants to establish their [Heck] 28 defense….”). 1 Defendants have met their burden of establishing that Heck bars Plaintiff’s 2 excessive force claims. As discussed above, Plaintiff was convicted of battery on a peace officer 3 and the hearing officer, Grether, assessed a punishment of 150 days of good-time credit deducted 4 from Plaintiff’s sentence, which is reflected on Plaintiff’s CDCR Calculation Worksheet. The 5 Worksheet also shows that those 150 days have not been restored, causing Plaintiff’s release date 6 to necessarily be extended. Thus, Plaintiff’s rules violation conviction, which was based on the 7 same incident as Plaintiff’s excessive force claims, necessarily places at issue the duration of time 8 to be served. If Plaintiff is successful in the instant action, the term of Plaintiff’s incarceration 9 would be reduced on a finding that the good time credits should be restored. .Accordingly, his 10 claims for excessive force are barred by Heck. See Edwards, 520 U.S. at 646. 11 Plaintiff argues that the conviction was improper because he did not batter 12 Defendant Anaya, but that he was actually attacked by Defendants. ECF No. 45 at 1-2. That 13 argument is foreclosed by Heck since success on that argument would establish Defendants’ use 14 of force, which would “necessarily imply the invalidity of the deprivation of his good-time 15 credits.” See Burton v. Chenoweth, 2015 WL 7758476, *3 (E.D. Cal. 2015) (“Plaintiff’s 16 disciplinary conviction and his excessive force claim arise from the same incident, and the two 17 versions of events are entirely inconsistent with one another. If plaintiff prevailed on his claim 18 that defendant, unprovoked by plaintiff and without any justification, used excessive force by 19 pepper spraying plaintiff, such success would necessarily invalidate the result of the disciplinary 20 hearing, which was based on the finding that plaintiff caused defendant to fear for his safety and 21 sprayed plaintiff to prevent plaintiff from battering defendant . . . . Plaintiff’s success on this 22 claim would necessarily imply the illegality of the prison disciplinary, which is barred by Heck 23 and Edwards.” (footnote omitted)); see also Sharp v. Morrison, 2010 WL 2838635, *4-5 (E.D. 24 Cal. 2010) (Plaintiff’s excessive force claim was Heck barred when Plaintiff pursued a theory that 25 he was the victim but a disciplinary hearing determined Plaintiff was the aggressor). 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 IV. CONCLUSION 2 Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that Defendants’ motion for 3 | summary judgment, ECF No. 42, be granted. 4 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District 5 | Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within 14 days 6 || after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 7 | objections with the court. Responses to the objections shall be filed within 14 days after service g || of objections. Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal. g | See Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 10 11 | Dated: August 3, 2022 Ssvcqo_ 12 DENNIS M. COTA B UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28