(SS) Spearman v. Commissioner of Social Security ( 2022 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 SATANYA MICHELLE SPEARMAN, No. 2:20-cv-01839 AC 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, 15 16 Defendant. 17 18 Plaintiff sought judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security 19 (“Commissioner”), denying her application for a period of disability and disability benefits under 20 Title XVI of the Social Security Act (“the Act”). October 6, 2021, the court reversed and 21 remanded the action to the Commissioner pursuant to the parties’ stipulation. ECF No. 22. 22 Now pending before the court is plaintiff’s July 22, 2022 motion for an award of 23 attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). ECF No. 25. Defendant has responded but has 24 not opposed the fee request. ECF No. 26. For the reasons set forth below, the motion will be 25 granted. 26 I. REASONABLENESS OF FEE REQUEST 27 At the outset of the representation, plaintiff and her counsel entered into a contingent-fee 28 agreement. ECF No. 25-1. Pursuant to that agreement plaintiff’s counsel now seeks attorney’s 1 fees in the amount of $7,600.00, which represents less than 25% of the $55,108.19 in retroactive 2 disability benefits received by plaintiff on remand, for 11.76 hours of attorney time expended on 3 this matter. ECF Nos. 25 at 1-3. 4 Attorneys are entitled to fees for cases in which they have successfully represented social 5 security claimants: 6 Whenever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant under this subchapter who was represented before the court by an attorney, 7 the court may determine and allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee for such representation, not in excess of 25 percent of 8 the total of the past-due benefits to which the claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment, and the Commissioner of Social Security 9 may . . . certify the amount of such fee for payment to such attorney out of, and not in addition to, the amount of such past-due benefits. 10 11 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A). “In contrast to fees awarded under fee-shifting provisions such as 42 12 U.S.C. § 1988, the fee is paid by the claimant out of the past-due benefits awarded; the losing 13 party is not responsible for payment.” Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142, 1147 (9th Cir. 2009) 14 (en banc) (citing Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 802 (2002)). The goal of fee awards under 15 § 406(b) is “‘to protect claimants against “inordinately large fees” and also to ensure that 16 attorneys representing successful claimants would not risk “nonpayment of [appropriate] fees.”’” 17 Parrish v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 698 F.3d 1215, 1217 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Gisbrecht, 18 535 U.S. at 805). 19 The 25% statutory maximum fee is not an automatic entitlement, and the court must 20 ensure that the fee requested is reasonable. Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808-09 (“406(b) does not 21 displace contingent-fee agreements within the statutory ceiling; instead, § 406(b) instructs courts 22 to review for reasonableness fees yielded by those agreements”). “Within the 25 percent 23 boundary . . . the attorney for the successful claimant must show that the fee sought is reasonable 24 for the services rendered.” Id. at 807. “[A] district court charged with determining a reasonable 25 fee award under § 406(b)(1)(A) must respect ‘the primacy of lawful attorney-client fee 26 arrangements,’ ‘looking first to the contingent-fee agreement, then testing it for reasonableness.’” 27 Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1149 (quoting Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 793, 808). 28 In determining whether the requested fee is reasonable, the court considers “‘the character 1 of the representation and the results achieved by the representative.’” Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1151 2 (quoting Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808). In determining whether a reduction in the fee is warranted, 3 the court considers whether the attorney provided “substandard representation or delayed the 4 case,” or obtained “benefits that are not in proportion to the time spent on the case.” Id. Finally, 5 the court considers the attorney’s record of hours worked and counsel’s regular hourly billing 6 charge for non-contingent cases. Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1151-52 (citing Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 7 808); see also, E.D. Cal. R. 293(c)(1) (in fixing attorney’s fees the court considers “the time and 8 labor required”). Below, the court will consider these factors in assessing whether the fee 9 requested by counsel in this case pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) is reasonable. 10 Here, plaintiff’s counsel is an experienced attorney who secured a successful result for 11 plaintiff. There is no indication that a reduction of fees is warranted due to any substandard 12 performance by counsel. There is also no evidence that plaintiff’s counsel engaged in any 13 dilatory conduct resulting in excessive delay. Indeed, counsel was able to secure a stipulated 14 remand. The court finds that the $7,600.00 fee, which does not exceed 25% of the amount paid in 15 past-due benefits paid to plaintiff, is not excessive in relation to the benefits awarded. In making 16 this determination, the court recognizes the contingent fee nature of this case and counsel’s 17 assumption of the risk of going uncompensated in agreeing to represent plaintiff on such terms. 18 See Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1152 (“[t]he attorneys assumed significant risk in accepting these 19 cases, including the risk that no benefits would be awarded or that there would be a long court or 20 administrative delay in resolving the cases”). Finally, counsel has submitted a detailed billing 21 statement in support of the requested fee. ECF No. 25-4. 22 Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, the court concludes that the fees sought by 23 counsel pursuant to § 406(b) are reasonable. 24 II. OFFSET FOR EAJA FEES 25 An award of § 406(b) fees must be offset by any prior award of attorney’s fees granted 26 under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”). 28 U.S.C. § 2412; Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 796. 27 Here, plaintiff’s attorney was previously awarded $2,239.98 in EAJA fees. See ECF No. 24. 28 Counsel therefore must remit that amount to plaintiff. ] Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 2 1. Plaintiffs Motion for attorney Fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) (ECF No. 25), is 3 | GRANTED; 4 2. Counsel for plaintiff is awarded $7,600.00 in attorney’s fees under § 406(b); the 5 || Commissioner shall certify that amount to be paid to counsel from the funds previously withheld 6 || for the payment of such fees; and 7 3. Counsel for plaintiff is directed to remit to plaintiff the amount of $2,239.98 for EAJA 8 | fees previously paid to counsel by the Commissioner. 9 | DATED: August 8, 2022 ~ 10 Chthion— Chore ALLISON CLAIRE 11 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28