Barnes v. AKM Foods Inc. ( 2022 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 ----oo0oo---- 11 12 AMANDA BARNES, No. 2:22-cv-00311 WBS CKD 13 Plaintiff, 14 v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: DEFENDANT HILLANDALE 15 AKM FOODS INC. dba FLAMES ENTERPRISES, LLC’S MOTION TO RESTAURANT & TAPHOUSE; DISMISS 16 HILLANDALE ENTERPRISES, LLC, 17 Defendants. 18 19 ----oo0oo---- 20 Plaintiff Amanda Barnes (“plaintiff”) brought this 21 action against AKM Foods Inc. dba Flames Restaurant & Taphouse 22 (“Flames”) and Hillandale Enterprises, LLC (“Hillandale”) 23 alleging (1) violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act 24 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101; (2) violations of the Unruh Civil 25 Rights Act (“Unruh Act”), California Civil Code §§ 51-53; and (3) 26 denial of full and equal access to public facilities, California 27 Health & Safety Code § 19955. (Compl. (Docket No. 1).) 28 Defendant Hillandale now moves to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint 1 pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) to the 2 extent it alleges barriers in the exterior area of the business 3 complex, or in the alternative order plaintiff to show cause why 4 she has standing. (Docket No. 17.)1 5 I. Factual and Procedural Background 6 Plaintiff is substantially limited in her ability to 7 walk and must use a wheelchair for mobility. (Compl. ¶ 8.) 8 Plaintiff also uses a trained service dog. (Id.) Hillandale 9 owns and operates the real property, a business complex, within 10 which Flames is located. (Id. ¶ 7.) Flames, and the surrounding 11 business complex, is a public accommodation. (Id. ¶ 9.) 12 Plaintiff lives within approximately 15 miles of Flames. (Id. ¶ 13 10.) On or about December 11, 2021, plaintiff visited Flames and 14 alleges she encountered the following barriers. (Id.) 15 First, the complaint alleges that plaintiff parked in a 16 designated accessible parking space in the complex’s parking lot, 17 but the route of travel from the parking space to the accessible 18 Flames entrance was “a very long distance and contained excessive 19 slopes, making it difficult and strenuous [for plaintiff] to 20 maneuver her wheelchair.” (Id. ¶ 10(a).) 21 Second, the complaint alleges that upon entering Flames 22 with her service dog, plaintiff was told “by a man that appeared 23 to be the owner or manager” that she could not bring her service 24 dog inside Flames. (Id. ¶ 10(b).) The complaint alleges that 25 26 1 Defendant Hillandale and plaintiff request that the court take judicial notice of numerous photographs. (Docket Nos. 27 18, 23.) The court does not rely on these documents, and therefore, the request is denied as moot. 28 1 despite providing her service dog’s identification card, the man 2 refused to allow plaintiff and her service dog to be inside the 3 restaurant. (Id.) Plaintiff decided to leave Flames but the man 4 would not return her service dog’s identification card until 5 approximately 15 minutes later. (Id.) 2 6 The complaint alleges that plaintiff was and continues 7 to be deterred from visiting Flames, but plans to return to 8 Flames once the barriers are removed. (Id. ¶ 12.) 9 II. Discussion 10 Standing pertains to the court’s subject matter 11 jurisdiction under Article III and may be challenged in a motion 12 to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) at any time, which defendant 13 Hillandale has done here. White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th 14 Cir. 2000); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). 15 Article III standing requires that a plaintiff “have 16 (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to 17 the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely 18 to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Spokeo, Inc. 19 v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016). “The plaintiff, as the 20 party invoking federal jurisdiction, bears the burden of 21 establishing these elements.” Id. When the “case is at the 22 pleading stage, the plaintiff must clearly allege facts 23 demonstrating each element.” Id. (quotation marks and 24 2 Flames is defending and indemnifying Hillandale 25 regarding the allegation about the service dog and any further allegations that arise about the interior of Flames in this 26 action. (Joint Status Report at 2 (Docket No. 13).) The only 27 allegations against Hillandale at issue in this motion relate to the ADA compliant accessible parking and route of travel. 28 (Compl. ¶ 10(a).) 1 alterations omitted). 2 Although the court has the discretion to review 3 evidence beyond the complaint when deciding a 12(b)(1) motion to 4 dismiss for lack of standing, the court will not exercise its 5 discretion to do so in these circumstances. See Safe Air for 6 Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004) (“In 7 resolving a factual attack on jurisdiction, the district court 8 may review evidence beyond the complaint without converting the 9 motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.”) (emphasis 10 added). The parties’ arguments, based upon their experts’ 11 opinions, about whether Hillandale can provide a closer 12 accessible parking space to Flames and remove the excessive 13 slopes is a factual question going to the merits of plaintiff’s 14 claim, which is best decided at a later stage once discovery 15 commences, not at the time of a motion to dismiss for lack of 16 standing. 17 Hillandale argues the complaint fails to allege facts 18 in support of an injury because despite the accessible parking 19 space being far from the Flames entrance and containing excessive 20 slopes, plaintiff was still able to get to Flames and was denied 21 entry for a different reason. (Def.’s Mem. ISO Mot. to Dismiss 22 (“Def.’s Mot.”) at 11-12 (Docket No. 17-1).) 23 “Under the ADA, when a disabled person encounters an 24 accessibility barrier violating its provisions, it is not 25 necessary for standing purposes that the barrier completely 26 preclude the plaintiff from entering or using the facility in any 27 way.” Chapman v. Pier 1 Imps. (U.S.) Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 947 28 (9th Cir. 2011). “Rather, the barrier need only interfere with 1 the plaintiff’s ‘full and equal enjoyment’ of the facility,” and 2 the ADA Accessibility Guidelines (“ADAAG”) “establish[] the 3 technical standards required for ‘full and equal enjoyment.’” 4 Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a)). 5 To suffer an injury in fact for purposes of Article III 6 standing, plaintiff need only “encounter[] or become aware of 7 alleged ADA violations that deter [her] patronage of or otherwise 8 interfere with [her] access to a place of public accommodation.” 9 Id. (quoting Doran v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 524 F.3d 1034, 1042 n.5 10 (9th Cir. 2008). Plaintiff’s suit must be “limited to barriers 11 related to [her] particular disability.” Id. 12 Plaintiff alleges she encountered the following ADA 13 barrier at the Hillandale business complex: the “route of travel 14 from [p]laintiff’s parking stall to the [Flames] entrance was a 15 very long distance and contained excessive slopes, making it 16 difficult and strenuous to maneuver her wheelchair.” (Compl. ¶ 17 10(a).) An ADA barrier exists when there is a violation of the 18 ADAAG, and the ADAAG provides, in relevant part, rules pertaining 19 to the permitted length of the accessible route from a parking 20 space to an entrance and the slopes within that route. See 21 Chapman, 631 F.3d at 947; 36 C.F.R., pt. 1191, App. B § 208.3.1; 22 36 C.F.R., pt. 1191, App. D § 403.3. 23 Plaintiff need not “identify what was difficult, how 24 [the route of travel] was strenuous, and whether she had a manual 25 and/or electric wheelchair.” (See Def.’s Mot. at 2.) 26 Regardless of whether plaintiff overcame the excessive slopes and 27 distance, plaintiff sufficiently pleads an injury which relates 28 to her disability because the barrier need not “completely 1 preclude plaintiff from entering” Flames. See Chapman, 631 F.3d 2 at 947. It need only be noncompliant with the ADAAG, and the 3 complaint alleges that the route of travel from the parking space 4 to Flames is noncompliant. See id.; (Compl. ¶ 10(a).) 5 Hillandale cites to Johnson v. Reimal Family Limited 6 Partnership, No. 20-cv-01192, 2021 WL 428631 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 7 2021), in support of its motion. However, Johnson is 8 distinguishable because that court determined the alleged 9 barriers had been removed and therefore that plaintiff’s ADA 10 claim was moot. See Johnson, 2021 WL 428631, at *3-5. Here, 11 Hillandale presents no evidence that the alleged barriers have 12 been removed. To the contrary, Hillandale agrees that excessive 13 slopes exist in the 201 feet long route of travel from the 14 accessible parking space to Flames. 15 The complaint sufficiently alleges facts to support the 16 “injury in fact” requirement for standing because plaintiff 17 encountered accessibility barriers at the business complex owned 18 by Hillandale. (Compl. ¶ 10(a).) Therefore, plaintiff has 19 standing to bring her ADA claim.3 20 3 Plaintiff also has standing to bring her Unruh Act and 21 Health and Safety Code claims because she sufficiently alleges 22 that she encountered accessibility barriers at the business complex in violation of the ADA. Cal. Civ. Code § 51(f) (“A 23 violation of the right of any individual under the federal Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 shall also constitute a 24 violation of [the Unruh Act].”); Wilson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 05CV1216, 2005 WL 3477841, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 5, 25 2005) (“The ADA, . . ., Unruh Act and California Health and Safety Code all address essentially the same rights of being free 26 from discrimination based on physical disability and having full 27 access to accommodations generally available to the public . . . . Therefore the requirements of standing are satisfied as to all 28 of Plaintiff’s claims.”). nen ee nen ene nen nnn nnn ann on i nn nnn nn ne on nn 1 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendant Hillandale’s 2 motion to dismiss (Docket No. 17) be, and the same hereby is, 3 | DENIED. 4 | Dated: August 9, 2022 otto A, hh be WILLIAM B. SHUBB 2 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28