(SS) Perez Rubio v. Commissioner of Social Security ( 2023 )

2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 12 RICHARD PEREZ RUBIO, Case No. 1:21-cv-01795-EPG 13 Plaintiff, FINAL JUDGMENT AND ORDER REGARDING PLAINTIFF’S SOCIAL 14 v. SECURITY COMPLAINT 15 COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, (ECF Nos. 1, 16). 16 Defendant. 17 18 19 This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s complaint for judicial review of an 20 unfavorable decision by the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration regarding his 21 application for supplemental security income benefits. The parties have consented to entry of 22 final judgment by the United States Magistrate Judge under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), 23 with any appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. (ECF No. 9). 24 Plaintiff presents the following issue: “Whether the ALJ failed to include work-related 25 limitations in the RFC consistent with the nature and intensity of Plaintiff’s limitations, and failed 26 to offer legitimate reasons for rejecting Plaintiff’s subjective complaints.” (ECF No. 16, p. 3). 27 Having reviewed the record, administrative transcript, the briefs of the parties, and the 28 applicable law, the Court finds as follows: 2 A. RFC 3 Plaintiff challenges the following RFC assessed by the ALJ: 4 After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the claimant has the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform a full range of work 5 at all exertional levels but with the following nonexertional limitations: he can perform simple, routine tasks with only occasional changes in the work setting. He 6 can have occasional interaction with supervisors and coworkers but no interaction 7 with the public but can be in the same proximity as the public. 8 (A.R. 19). 9 Specifically, Plaintiff argues that, had the ALJ properly evaluated his subjective 10 complaints regarding his mental limitations, the ALJ would have included further limitations in 11 the RFC, which might have precluded all work, leading to Plaintiff being found disabled. (ECF 12 No. 16, pp. 9-15). 13 A claimant’s RFC is “the most [a claimant] can still do despite [his] limitations.” 20 14 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a), 416.945(a); see also 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2, 15 § 200.00(c) (defining an RFC as the “maximum degree to which the individual retains the 16 capacity for sustained performance of the physical-mental requirements of jobs”). “In 17 determining a claimant’s RFC, an ALJ must consider all relevant evidence in the record, 18 including, inter alia, medical records, lay evidence, and the effects of symptoms, including pain, 19 that are reasonably attributed to a medically determinable impairment.” Robbins v. Soc. Sec. 20 Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 883 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In 21 reviewing findings of fact with respect to RFC assessments, this Court determines whether the 22 decision is supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence means 23 “more than a mere scintilla,” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 402 (1971), but less than a 24 preponderance. Sorenson v. Weinberger, 514 F.2d 1112, 1119, n. 10 (9th Cir. 1975). It is “such 25 relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” 26 Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401 (internal citation omitted). 27 In terms of evaluating a Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, the Ninth Circuit has concluded 28 as follows: Commissioner may not discredit the claimant’s testimony as to subjective 2 symptoms merely because they are unsupported by objective evidence. Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 343 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc); see also Cotton v. 3 Bowen, 799 F.2d 1403, 1407 (9th Cir. 1986) (“it is improper as a matter of law to discredit excess pain testimony solely on the ground that it is not fully 4 corroborated by objective medical findings”). Unless there is affirmative evidence 5 showing that the claimant is malingering, the Commissioner’s reasons for rejecting the claimant’s testimony must be “clear and convincing.” Swenson v. Sullivan, 876 6 F.2d 683, 687 (9th Cir. 1989). General findings are insufficient; rather, the ALJ must identify what testimony is not credible and what evidence undermines the 7 claimant’s complaints. 8 Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th Cir. 1995), as amended (Apr. 9, 1996). 9 However, “[t]he standard isn’t whether [the] court is convinced, but instead whether the 10 ALJ’s rationale is clear enough that it has the power to convince.” Smartt v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 11 489, 499 (9th Cir. 2022). An ALJ’s reasoning as to subjective complaints “must be supported by 12 substantial evidence in the record as a whole.” Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 1428, 1433 (9th Cir. 13 1995). 14 As an initial matter, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff’s “medically determinable 15 impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms.” (A.R. 20). 16 Accordingly, because there is no affirmative evidence showing that Plaintiff was malingering, the 17 Court looks to the ALJ’s decision for clear and convincing reasons, supported by substantial 18 evidence, for not giving full weight to Plaintiff’s symptom testimony. Here, the ALJ summarized 19 Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and the reasons for discounting them as follows: 20 The claimant alleges he does not like to be around other people because they have 21 no manners and are rude, which makes him mad so he self isolates in his bedroom. The claimant alleges his mother has to remind him to do things and schedules all 22 of his appointments for him. The claimant alleges he only goes to individual therapy, but group therapy because he does not like being around others. The 23 claimant’s representative alleged in a pre-hearing brief the claimant experiences 24 “severe, chronic pain and persistent psychological limitations” yet alleged no physical impairment to account for said pain (14E, 3). The representative further 25 alleged the claimant has various anxiety symptoms including 1-2 panic attacks a week, visual hallucinations, and various depression symptoms including daily 26 crying, which the claimant testified he cries only “here and there” (hearing 27 testimony; 14E, 3). . . . . 28 record shows the claimant’s mental symptoms are well managed. 2 . . . . 3 In February 2020, at the time of his alleged onset date (AOD), the claimant had an annual mental health assessment. He alleged anxiety, depression, anger, and 4 paranoia but denied suicidal/homicidal ideations, hallucinations, and manic 5 episodes. His reported symptoms met the criteria for major depressive disorder with anxious distress, paranoid personality disorder, and anxiety. He admitted he 6 was independent in his activities of daily living (4F, 4-5). It was noted that while the claimant used to have his mother sit outside the door during his 20-minute 7 therapy sessions, now he can last an hour. He admitted he attended his son’s 8 graduation, went to the fair with friends at least twice, worked with his friend to build a fence, had a girlfriend of one month, and alleged playing with his phone 9 helps relieve his anxiety (4F, 5-6). . . . He also acknowledged he had two sons ages 11 and 13 whom he had good relationships with and whom he sees on weekend 10 visitation (4F, 6-7). . . . He also alleged an explosive temper and that he was 11 currently on parole (4F, 9). 12 Part of the mental health assessment included a mental status examination which showed the claimant was alert, oriented, and guarded with appropriate attire, good 13 eye contact, and posturing motor activity but unremarkable behavior. He had an anxious/fearful mood and affect, normal speech, coherent thought process, 14 paranoid ideation, and normal attention and concentration. He had average 15 intelligence, fair insight, good judgment, good recent memory, and fair remote/longterm memory (4F, 11-14). He was diagnosed with recurrent depression 16 with anxious distress, panic disorder, and paranoid personality disorder with rule out social phobia disorder (4F, 15). 17 In March 2020, the claimant had a follow up appointment with his psychiatrist 18 where he was in no distress, admitted he was independent in his activities of daily living, denied any physical complaints, denied any medication side effects, and 19 denied any suicidal/homicidal ideations or hallucinations (5F, 46). Examination 20 showed he had an anxious/depressed mood, but otherwise unremarkable findings and his risk for hospitalization or dangerous behaviors was deemed to be low, 21 suggesting his symptoms were not as limiting as may have been alleged (5F, 47- 48, 54). By April 2020, the claimant was again in no distress, had relatively 22 normal examination findings including an euthymic mood, admitted Propranolol 23 was helping his anxiety, and his risk for hospitalization or dangerous behaviors was again deemed to be low (5F, 57-59, 65). 24 May [] 2020 treatment notes show the claimant was again in no distress, was 25 independent in his activities of daily living, denied any medication side effects, had no physical complaints, denied any suicidal/homicidal ideations or 26 hallucinations, and admitted he was doing well on his medications (5F, 68). His 27 mental status exam was again fairly normal with an euthymic mood, unremarkable thought process and thought content, fair judgment and insight, fair memory, 28 for hospitalization or dangerous behaviors was again deemed to be low (5F, 76). . . 2 . In July 2020, the claimant alleged some irritability but admitted it was not a 3 problem, and he was again in no distress, had relatively normal examination 4 findings including an euthymic mood, and was again deemed at low risk for hospitalization or dangerous behaviors (6F, 7-9, 15). . . . 5 Treatment notes for September, November, and December 2020 all showed the 6 claimant was in no distress, was able to maintain his activities of daily living, denied any medication side effects, alleged no physical complaints, denied 7 suicidal/homicidal ideations and hallucinations, and repeatedly admitted he was 8 doing fine on his medications (7F, 15, 22, 29). His examinations continued to show relatively normal findings. He was oriented and cooperative with an 9 unremarkable mood, unremarkable thought process and thought content, good judgment and insight, good memory, intact attention and concentration, and 10 average intelligence (7F, 16-17, 23-24, 31). His risk for hospitalization or 11 dangerous behaviors remained low (7F, 20, 27, 35). 12 In January 2021, the claimant was again in no distress, admitted he was doing well on his medications, and agreed to transition to a lower level of care, suggesting his 13 symptoms were well managed (7F, 37). His examination findings were again normal, his risk level was still low, and it was noted he continued to manage his 14 symptoms (7F, 37, 39, 42, 45). At his yearly evaluation, he had an anxious/irritable 15 mood but otherwise normal exam findings (7F, 52-54). It was opined the claimant had moderate impairment in social relationships and vocational/educational 16 prospects and only mild impairment in independent living and physical care (7F, 46). . . . 17 As the longitudinal record shows, the claimant’s symptoms are well managed and 18 not as severe as alleged. This is also supported by the claimant’s own admissions of functionality. He admits he is independent in his personal care and activities of 19 daily living, prepares meals, cleans, does laundry and all household chores 20 required, shops via computer, uses a cell phone, can count change, goes to the fair, helped his friend build a fence, has a girlfriend, and watches television (6E; 4F, 4- 21 6; hearing testimony). 22 As such, the undersigned has accommodated the claimant’s mental signs and symptoms in the RFC with the mental limitations. Because of a lack of more 23 severe findings upon examination and because of the claimant’s own admissions 24 of functionality, no further limitation is warranted (4F-8F). (A.R. 20-22). 25 First, the ALJ reasonably relied on medical evidence indicating that Plaintiff’s “mental 26 symptoms [were] well managed” to discount the severity of symptoms that Plaintiff alleged. See 27 Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 600 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Citing the conflict 28 2 record, and noting the ALJ’s personal observations, the ALJ provided specific and substantial 3 reasons that undermined Morgan’s credibility.”). Among these, records from medical 4 appointments occurring from February 2020 to January 2021 generally showed Plaintiff was in no 5 distress, his risk level of dangerous behaviors and hospitalization was low, and Plaintiff admitted 6 he was doing well. (See, e.g., AR 423 – February 2020 exam reporting alert consciousness, good 7 eye contact, and unremarkable behavior; AR 531 – April 2020 record reporting low risk for 8 dangerous behaviors and hospitalization; A.R. 597 – January 2021 record where Plaintiff stated 9 “he is doing well on his medications and states he will be transitioning to a lower level of care 10 and is in agreement to this”). 11 Likewise, the ALJ reasonably concluded that the “lack of more severe findings upon 12 examination” did not support further limitations. (A.R. 22). See Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 13 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001) (“While subjective pain testimony cannot be rejected on the sole ground 14 that it is not fully corroborated by objective medical evidence, the medical evidence is still a 15 relevant factor in determining the severity of the claimant’s pain and its disabling effects.”). 16 Further, the ALJ was correct to note that Plaintiff’s social activities—such as attending his 17 son’s graduation, working with his friend to build a fence, and having a girlfriend suggested that 18 his subjective complaints about interacting with others were not as severe as claimed. (A.R. 21). 19 See Smartt, 53 F.4th at 499 (noting that inconsistencies between activities and alleged severity of 20 limitations is a clear and convincing reason to discount subjective complaints). Plaintiff asserts 21 that these activities predate the relevant onset period and there is “no evidence that Plaintiff 22 engaged in any such activities after the alleged onset date.” (ECF No. 16, p. 12). However, this 23 argument fails. Plaintiff alleged disability beginning on February 21, 2020, and the cited 24 activities appear in a mental health assessment dated February 12, 2020. While medical evidence 25 predating the onset period is generally not relevant, the short time difference here between the 26 assessment and onset date, combined with the fact that the evidence was relevant as part of the 27 longitudinal history of Plaintiff’s impairments, makes the information sufficiently relevant. See 28 Ovando v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:21-CV-00030-SAB, 2022 WL 2974654, at *3 (E.D. Cal. 2 connection with assessing “the longitudinal history of Plaintiff’s impairments” appeared 3 “permissible in law”). Notably, in support of his own arguments, Plaintiff’s brief cites the same 4 February 2020 assessment. (See ECF No. 16, pp. 14-15 – citing A.R. 417). But even assuming 5 that the ALJ should not have relied on the February 2020 assessment, Plaintiff’s January 2021 6 reassessment (which the ALJ also cited (A.R. 22)) states that Plaintiff reported a “stable” 7 relationship with family members, that he had “the support of his friend Mike, mother, and 8 father,” and that there were no changes from the February 2020 portion of the assessment where 9 he reported having a girlfriend. (A.R. 606-08). Thus, there is evidence in the record showing his 10 continuing ability to properly interact with others during the relevant period. 11 Lastly, it is worth noting that the ALJ also relied on state agency consultants in 12 formulating the RFC. (A.R. 23). Among other things, they opined that Plaintiff was moderately 13 limited in his ability to get along with coworkers or peers without exhibiting behavioral extremes 14 and he was not significantly limited in his ability to accept instructions and respond appropriately 15 to criticism from supervisors, ultimately concluding that Plaintiff was not disabled. (A.R. 60-62, 16 74-75). The ALJ deemed their opinions persuasive because “they were supported by specific 17 references to the record and are consistent with other medical opinions and the relatively normal 18 examination findings.” (A.R. 23). 19 The Court recognizes that Plaintiff criticizes the ALJ’s opinion for not discussing certain 20 portions of the record that Plaintiff argues supports his position. However, a review of the ALJ’s 21 opinion in light of the record as a whole reveals that the ALJ sufficiently addressed the substance 22 of Plaintiff’s complaints, but ultimately determined that they could not be fully credited in light of 23 other evidence. The Court cannot conclude that the ALJ erred by failing to say more or interpret 24 the evidence differently. See Lambert v. Saul, 980 F.3d 1266, 1277 (9th Cir. 2020) (“Our cases do 25 not require ALJs to perform a line-by-line exegesis of the claimant’s testimony, nor do they 26 require ALJs to draft dissertations when denying benefits.”); Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 27 679 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Where evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, it is 28 the ALJ’s conclusion that must be upheld.”). 1 Accordingly, the Court concludes that the RFC is supported by substantial evidence and 2 | that the ALJ provided legally sufficient reasons for not giving full weight to Plaintiff's subjective 3 | complaints. 4} I. CONCLUSION AND ORDER 5 For the reasons given, the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is affirmed. 6 | And the Clerk of the Court is directed to close this case. 7 8 IT IS SO ORDERED. ° | Dated: _ February 6, 2023 [see hey □□ 10 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28