(PC) Fields v. Macomber ( 2024 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MARCUS BRENT FIELDS, No. 2:23-cv-02488-CKD P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 JEFFERY LYNCH, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se. Plaintiff seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 18 § 1983 and has requested leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. This 19 proceeding was referred to this court by Local Rule 302 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 20 Plaintiff has submitted a declaration that makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. 21 § 1915(a). Accordingly, the request to proceed in forma pauperis will be granted. 22 Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 28 U.S.C. 23 §§ 1914(a), 1915(b)(1). By this order, plaintiff will be assessed an initial partial filing fee in 24 accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). By separate order, the court will direct 25 the appropriate agency to collect the initial partial filing fee from plaintiff’s trust account and 26 forward it to the Clerk of the Court. Thereafter, plaintiff will be obligated for monthly payments 27 of twenty percent of the preceding month’s income credited to plaintiff’s prison trust account. 28 These payments will be forwarded by the appropriate agency to the Clerk of the Court each time 1 the amount in plaintiff’s account exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C. 2 § 1915(b)(2). 3 I. Motion to Appoint Counsel 4 Plaintiff has also filed a motion for the appointment of counsel. ECF No. 9. District 5 courts lack authority to require counsel to represent indigent prisoners in section 1983 cases. 6 Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 298 (1989). In exceptional circumstances, the 7 court may request an attorney to voluntarily represent such a plaintiff. See 28 U.S.C. § 8 1915(e)(1); Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991); Wood v. Housewright, 900 9 F.2d 1332, 1335-36 (9th Cir. 1990). When determining whether “exceptional circumstances” 10 exist, the court must consider plaintiff’s likelihood of success on the merits as well as the ability 11 of the plaintiff to articulate his claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues 12 involved. Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009) (district court did not abuse 13 discretion in declining to appoint counsel). The burden of demonstrating exceptional 14 circumstances is on the plaintiff. Id. Circumstances common to most prisoners, such as lack of 15 legal education and limited law library access, do not establish exceptional circumstances that 16 warrant a request for voluntary assistance of counsel. 17 Having considered the factors under Palmer, the court finds that plaintiff has failed to 18 meet his burden of demonstrating exceptional circumstances warranting the appointment of 19 counsel at this time. 20 II. Screening Requirement 21 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 22 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 23 court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 24 “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek 25 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 26 A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 27 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th 28 Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an 1 indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 2 490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully 3 pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th 4 Cir. 1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227. 5 A complaint, or portion thereof, should only be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon 6 which relief may be granted if it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in 7 support of the claim or claims that would entitle him to relief. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 8 U.S. 69, 73 (1984) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)); Palmer v. Roosevelt 9 Lake Log Owners Ass’n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981). In reviewing a complaint under 10 this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question, Hosp. 11 Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp. Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the pleading in the light 12 most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor, Jenkins v. 13 McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). 14 III. Allegations in the Complaint 15 At all times relevant to the allegations in the complaint, plaintiff was an inmate at 16 California State Prison-Sacramento (“CSP-Sac”). Named as defendants are the Secretary of the 17 California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, the Warden of CSP-Sac, a correctional 18 sergeant, and a prison psychologist. 19 In his first two claims for relief, plaintiff generally challenges his placement in a cell with 20 a homosexual inmate who had AIDS and Hepatitis C. Plaintiff contends that this threatened his 21 physical and mental health. In claim three, plaintiff contends that he was denied adequate 22 medical care after falling off the top bunk of his cell on two occasions. It took a “week or weeks” 23 to see a doctor. In claim four, plaintiff asserts that he was denied access to the courts because the 24 prison law library was short staffed. As a result, plaintiff lost all of his civil cases. 25 The only defendants linked to any specific conduct are Sergeant Meadows and Dr. 26 Andrichuks. Defendant Meadows served as plaintiff’s staff assistant at his classification hearing 27 and said nothing to prevent plaintiff’s double celling. Defendant Andrichuks was a member of 28 the committee that determined plaintiff’s mental health treatment needs and his custody 1 placement. Plaintiff alleges that defendant Andrichuks did “zero to help….” ECF No. 1 at 7. 2 IV. Legal Standards 3 The following legal standards are provided based on plaintiff’s pro se status as well as the 4 nature of the allegations in the complaint. 5 A. Linkage 6 The civil rights statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the 7 actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See 8 Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 9 (1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects' another to the deprivation of a 10 constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates 11 in another's affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that 12 causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th 13 Cir. 1978) (citation omitted). In order to state a claim for relief under section 1983, plaintiff must 14 link each named defendant with some affirmative act or omission that demonstrates a violation of 15 plaintiff's federal rights. 16 B. Supervisory Liability 17 Government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their 18 subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677 (2009) 19 (“In a § 1983 suit ... the term “supervisory liability” is a misnomer. Absent vicarious liability, 20 each Government official, his or her title notwithstanding is only liable for his or her own 21 misconduct.”). When the named defendant holds a supervisory position, the causal link between 22 the defendant and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged; that is, a 23 plaintiff must allege some facts indicating that the defendant either personally participated in or 24 directed the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights or knew of the violations and failed to act 25 to prevent them. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 26 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978). 27 C. Deliberate Indifference 28 Denial or delay of medical care for a prisoner’s serious medical needs may constitute a 1 violation of the prisoner’s Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 2 97, 104-05 (1976). An individual is liable for such a violation only when the individual is 3 deliberately indifferent to a prisoner’s serious medical needs. Id.; see Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 4 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006); Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 744 (9th Cir. 2002); Lopez v. 5 Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2000). 6 In the Ninth Circuit, the test for deliberate indifference consists of two parts. Jett, 439 7 F.3d at 1096, citing McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050 (9th Cir. 1991), overruled on other 8 grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). First, the 9 plaintiff must show a “serious medical need” by demonstrating that “failure to treat a prisoner’s 10 condition could result in further significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of 11 pain.’” Id., citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104. “Examples of serious medical needs include ‘[t]he 12 existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of 13 comment or treatment; the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an 14 individual’s daily activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain.’” Lopez, 203 F. 3d 15 at 1131-1132, citing McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059-60. 16 Second, the plaintiff must show the defendant’s response to the need was deliberately 17 indifferent. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. This second prong is satisfied by showing (a) a purposeful act 18 or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need and (b) harm caused by the 19 indifference. Id. Under this standard, the prison official must not only “be aware of facts from 20 which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,” but that person 21 “must also draw the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). This “subjective 22 approach” focuses only “on what a defendant’s mental attitude actually was.” Id. at 839. A 23 showing of merely negligent medical care is not enough to establish a constitutional violation. 24 Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1130 (9th Cir. 1998), citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-106. A 25 difference of opinion about the proper course of treatment is not deliberate indifference, nor does 26 a dispute between a prisoner and prison officials over the necessity for or extent of medical 27 treatment amount to a constitutional violation. See, e.g., Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1058 28 (9th Cir. 2004); Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989). Furthermore, mere delay of 1 medical treatment, “without more, is insufficient to state a claim of deliberate medical 2 indifference.” Shapley v. Nev. Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985). 3 Where a prisoner alleges that delay of medical treatment evinces deliberate indifference, the 4 prisoner must show that the delay caused “significant harm and that Defendants should have 5 known this to be the case.” Hallett, 296 F.3d at 745-46; see McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060. 6 D. Access to Courts 7 Plaintiff has a constitutional right of access to the courts and prison officials may not 8 actively interfere with his right to litigate. Silva v. Vittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1101-02 (9th Cir. 9 2011). Prisoners also enjoy some degree of First Amendment rights in their legal 10 correspondence. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 824-25 (1977). However, to state a viable 11 claim for relief, plaintiff must allege he suffered an actual injury, which is prejudice with respect 12 to contemplated or existing litigation, such as the inability to meet a filing deadline or present a 13 non-frivolous claim. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996). 14 V. Analysis 15 The court finds the allegations in plaintiff’s complaint fail to state a claim for relief upon 16 which relief may be granted. Plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of particularity overt 17 acts which defendants engaged in that support plaintiff's claim. Id. Plaintiff fails to adequately 18 link any named defendant to the asserted constitutional violations involving his double celling 19 and lack of access to the law library. Moreover, supervisory liability is not an adequate basis to 20 state a claim against defendants Macomber and Lynch. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677 21 (2009). For all these reasons, the complaint must be dismissed. The court will, however, grant 22 plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint. 23 If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the conditions 24 complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Ellis v. 25 Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). Also, the complaint must allege in specific terms how 26 each named defendant is involved. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there 27 is some affirmative link or connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. 28 Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); 1 Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Furthermore, vague and conclusory 2 allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient. Ivey v. Bd. of 3 Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 4 In addition, plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to 5 make plaintiff’s amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an amended 6 complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is because, as a 7 general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 8 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original pleading no 9 longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original 10 complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged. 11 VI. Plain Language Summary for Pro Se Party 12 The following information is meant to explain this order in plain English and is not 13 intended as legal advice. 14 The court has reviewed the allegations in your complaint and determined that they do not 15 state any claim against the defendants. Your complaint is being dismissed, but you are being 16 given the chance to fix the problems identified in this screening order. 17 Although you are not required to do so, you may file an amended complaint within 30 18 days from the date of this order. If you choose to file an amended complaint, pay particular 19 attention to the legal standards identified in this order which may apply to your claims. 20 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 21 1. Plaintiff’s motions for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF Nos. 2, 7) are granted. 22 2. Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. Plaintiff 23 is assessed an initial partial filing fee in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. 24 § 1915(b)(1). All fees shall be collected and paid in accordance with this court’s order to the 25 Director of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation filed concurrently 26 herewith. 27 3. Plaintiff’s motion to appoint counsel (ECF No. 9) is denied without prejudice. 28 4. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed. 1 5. Plaintiff is granted thirty days from the date of service of this order to file an amended 2 || complaint that complies with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the Federal Rules of Civil 3 || Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice; the amended complaint must bear the docket number 4 || assigned this case and must be labeled “Amended Complaint”. 5 6. Failure to file an amended complaint in accordance with this order will result in a 6 || recommendation that this action be dismissed. 7 | Dated: January 11, 2024 / a8 } i | Ld , a ce CAROLYNK. DELANEY 9 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 10 1] 12 13 14 15 /fiel2488.14. new 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28