Estate of Sherrano Stingley v. County of Sacramento ( 2024 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ESTATE OF SHERRANO STINGLEY, No. 2:23-cv-00255 TLN AC DYMIN STINGLEY, S.S., and ANNETTE 12 HILBURN, 13 Plaintiffs, ORDER 14 v. 15 COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO, et al., 16 Defendants. 17 18 This matter is before the court on a motion to enforce or amend/modify the stipulated 19 protective order (ECF No. 18) that was approved by the undersigned on August 17, 2023. ECF 20 No. 19. This discovery motion was referred to the magistrate judge pursuant to E.D. Cal. 21 R. 302(c)(1). The matter was taken under submission on the papers. ECF No. 36. The parties 22 submitted the required joint statement. ECF No. 50. For the reasons stated below, the court 23 GRANTS the motion. 24 I. Relevant Background 25 This case arises from the death of Sherrano Stingley, a 48-year-old disabled Black man 26 who struggled with mental health issues and periodically experienced mental health episodes. 27 ECF No. 1 at 4. According to the complaint, Mr. Stingley was experiencing mental health 28 symptoms, including confusion and paranoia, on December 6, 2022, when he attempted to enter a 1 vehicle and a home he mistakenly believed to belong to his daughter. Id. Police were called and 2 arrived around 5:45 a.m. Id. at 5. An encounter ensued which led to Mr. Stingley being 3 restrained on the ground, with pressure applied to his back and neck by officers. Id. at 10. Mr. 4 Stingley became unconscious and stopped breathing. Id. at 10-11. When officers could not 5 awaken Mr. Stingley, they called the fire department and waited for them to arrive on scene. Id. 6 at 12. Mr. Stingley died on December 16, 2022, because of his injuries. Id. at 13. 7 Plaintiffs sought the personnel files for involved officers through a Request for 8 Production. ECF No. 40-1 at 11 (RFP No. 18). On August 17, 2023, the undersigned approved 9 the parties’ stipulated protective order specific to personnel files. ECF No. 19. The stipulated 10 protective order stated that the covered information included: “1. Personnel Files of Freddy 11 Martinez (Bates DEF 01667 – DEF 01748)[;] 2. Personnel Files of Rachell Villegas (Bates DEF 12 01749 – DEF 01792)[;] 3. Personnel Files of Brittany Linde (Bates DEF 01577 – DEF 01666).” 13 ECF No. 18 at 3. Defendants produced the personnel files on September 6, 2023. ECF No. 40-1 14 at 3. Separately, plaintiffs issued a Request for Production seeking records related to all 15 “instances of discipline against the tree officers present when Sherrano Stingley was encountered, 16 placed into a prone position, and handcuffed on December 6, 2022[.]” ECF No. 40-1 at 12 (RFP 17 No. 26). 18 Following meet and confer efforts, defendants produced documents responsive to RFP 19 No. 26 on October 6, 2023. Id. at 3. The documents were produced under a “confidential” 20 designation and Bates labeled DEF 01805-02510. Id. Plaintiffs are currently seeking leave to file 21 an Amended Complaint, that would include some of the information contained in that production 22 of documents. ECF No. 34. That motion is pending before the District Judge assigned to this 23 case. Id. Defendants object to inclusion of information contained in DEF 01805-02510 24 appearing in an amended complaint, and ask the undersigned “to find that the discipline records at 25 issue are subject to the existing Protective Order. In the alternative, if the Court concludes that 26 the existing Protective Order does not cover the discipline records at issue, Defendants request 27 that the Court amend the Protective order to include the records.” ECF No. 40 at 2. 28 //// 1 II. Motion 2 The existing stipulated protective order, which was approved by the undersigned, is 3 unusually specific. It is so specific as to expressly limit its application to documents by identified 4 Bates number. By its own very clear terms, the existing stipulated protective order does not apply 5 to documents that are Bates labeled DEF 01805-02510. ECF No. 18 at 3. The court will not infer 6 broader application where the parties took the unusual step of drafting such a narrow protective 7 order. However, the court agrees with defendants that the protective order should be modified to 8 incorporate application to the documents Bates labeled DEF 01805-02510. 9 Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the method available to limit the breadth or 10 use of a discovery request is a motion for a protective order under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c). This rule 11 states in relevant part: “A party or any person from whom discovery is sought may move for a 12 protective order in the court where the action is pending[.] The motion must include a 13 certification that the movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with other affected 14 parties in an effort to resolve the dispute without court action. The court may, for good cause, 15 issue an order to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue 16 burden or expense[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c). Options available to the court include, in part, 17 “forbidding the disclosure or discovery; [ ] forbidding inquiry into certain matters, or limiting the 18 scope of disclosure or discovery to certain matters.” Id. District courts have broad discretion to 19 determine whether a protective order is appropriate and, if so, what degree of protection is 20 warranted. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 36 (1984); see also Phillips ex rel. 21 Estates of Byrd v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1211–12 (9th Cir. 2002). 22 The party seeking to limit discovery has the burden of proving “good cause,” which 23 requires a showing “that specific prejudice or harm will result” if the protective order is not 24 granted. In re Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland, 661 F.3d 417, 424 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing 25 Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2003)). In this case, the 26 stipulated protective order approved by the court was poorly drafted to be unnecessarily narrow in 27 its application. The order entered by the undersigned specifically contemplates that the order can 28 //// 1 | be modified with the court’s approval, including through means of a motion such as the one at 2 | bar. ECF No. 19 at 2. 3 As a preliminary matter, the court acknowledges and rejects plaintiffs arguments that the 4 || production of the documents renders them presumptively public, and that defendants’ error in 5 || failing to seek a protective order before producing the documents prevents them from seeking a 6 || protective order now. ECF No. 40 at 13-16. The court agrees that defendants should not have 7 || presumed application of the existing narrow protective order, but will not allow this error in 8 | judgment to prevent them from seeking to remedy the situation. Turning to the merits, the court 9 || finds that there is good cause to modify the existing protective order to include the documents at 10 | DEF 01805-02510. These discipline records clearly pertain to highly confidential personnel 11 || matters that are typically covered by protective orders. ECF No. 40 at 11. Further, plaintiffs do 12 || not appear able to dispute defendants’ contention that these disciplinary records relate only to 13 || inflammatory information not clearly related to the fact pattern at issue in this case, and making 14 || these records public appears to serve no other purpose than to humiliate the deputies involved. 15 || The court thus finds good cause to amend the protective order to include these documents. 16 Ill. Conclusion 17 Defendants’ motion to modify the protective order (ECF No. 35) is GRANTED and the 18 || protective order issued in this case through the order at ECF No. 19 is hereby MODIFIED to 19 | apply to the following produced documents: DEF 01805-02510. 20 IT IS SO ORDERED. 21 || DATED: January 17, 2024 . 22 Hthren— Lhor—e_ 3 ALLISON CLAIRE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 24 25 26 27 28