(PC) Quang v. Alamosa ( 2024 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 THANH QUANG, No. 2:22-CV-01704-DAD-DMC-P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 S. ALAMOSA, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 18 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s first amended complaint, ECF No. 18. 19 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 20 against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. 21 § 1915A(a). This provision also applies if the plaintiff was incarcerated at the time the action was 22 initiated even if the litigant was subsequently released from custody. See Olivas v. Nevada ex rel. 23 Dep’t of Corr., 856 F.3d 1281, 1282 (9th Cir. 2017). The Court must dismiss a complaint or 24 portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can 25 be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 26 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that 27 complaints contain a “. . . short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 28 entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This means that claims must be stated simply, 1 concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to 2 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied if the complaint gives the defendant fair notice 3 of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon which it rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 4 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because Plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of particularity 5 overt acts by specific defendants which support the claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail 6 to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is impossible for the Court to conduct the screening 7 required by law when the allegations are vague and conclusory. 8 9 I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS 10 Plaintiff names the following as defendants: (1) “C.M.F. Prison of California” and 11 (2) S. Alameda. See ECF No. 18, pgs. 1-2. Plaintiff claims that he asked for help with his foot 12 problems in 2020 “but was denied.” Id. at 3. Plaintiff states that, as of 2023, he was “told to wait 13 & still I did not get any help.” Id. According to Plaintiff, he requires a “working boot” to be able 14 to attend his job. See id. at 4. Plaintiff states that “they” told him he’s on the list but still hasn’t 15 received the required footwear. See id. Plaintiff states that his foot is hurting all the time. See id. 16 17 II. DISCUSSION 18 As with Plaintiff’s original complaint, the amended complaint suffers from the 19 same defects. First, state prisons are immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. Second, 20 though Plaintiff names S. Alameda as a defendant, the amended complaint contains no mention of 21 this individual and thus fails to establish a causal link between the named defendant and a 22 constitutional violation. 23 A. Eleventh Amendment Immunity 24 The Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from hearing suits brought 25 against a state both by its own citizens, as well as by citizens of other states. See Brooks v. 26 Sulphur Springs Valley Elec. Coop., 951 F.2d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 1991). This prohibition 27 extends to suits against states themselves, and to suits against state agencies. See Lucas v. Dep’t 28 of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th 1 Cir. 1989). A state’s agency responsible for incarceration and correction of prisoners is a state 2 agency for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment. See Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 3 (1978) (per curiam); Hale v. Arizona, 993 F.2d 1387, 1398-99 (9th Cir. 1993) (en banc). 4 To the extent “C.M.F. Prison of California” refers to the California Medical 5 Facility, which is a prison within the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation 6 system, Plaintiff cannot proceed as against this entity, which is immune from suit. This defect 7 cannot be cured. 8 B. Causal Link 9 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege an actual 10 connection or link between the actions of the named defendants and the alleged deprivations. See 11 Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). “A 12 person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of 13 § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts, or omits to perform 14 an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” 15 Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations 16 concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See 17 Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Rather, the plaintiff must set forth 18 specific facts as to each individual defendant’s causal role in the alleged constitutional 19 deprivation. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988). 20 The only individual named in the amended complaint is S. Alameda. The 21 amended complaint, however, is devoid of any allegations specific to this individual. Plaintiff’s 22 references to “they” is insufficient to put Defendant Alameda on notice. In the interest of justice, 23 the Court will permit Plaintiff one additional opportunity to amend to cure this defect. 24 / / / 25 / / / 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 III. CONCLUSION 2 Because it is possible that some of the deficiencies identified in this order may be 3 cured by amending the complaint, Plaintiff is entitled to leave to amend prior to dismissal of the 4 entire action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Plaintiff 5 is informed that, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See 6 Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Thus, following dismissal with leave to 7 amend, all claims alleged in the original complaint which are not alleged in the amended 8 complaint are waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). Therefore, if 9 Plaintiff amends the complaint, the Court cannot refer to the prior pleading in order to make 10 Plaintiff's amended complaint complete. See Local Rule 220. An amended complaint must be 11 complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. See id. 12 If Plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, Plaintiff must demonstrate how the 13 conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See 14 Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how 15 each named defendant is involved, and must set forth some affirmative link or connection 16 between each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. See May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 17 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 18 Because some of the defects identified in this order cannot be cured by 19 amendment, Plaintiff is not entitled to leave to amend as to such claims. Plaintiff, therefore, now 20 has the following choices: (1) Plaintiff may file an amended complaint which does not allege the 21 claims identified herein as incurable, in which case such claims will be deemed abandoned and 22 the Court will address the remaining claims; or (2) Plaintiff may file an amended complaint which 23 continues to allege claims identified as incurable, in which case the Court will issue findings and 24 recommendations that such claims be dismissed from this action, as well as such other orders 25 and/or findings and recommendations as may be necessary to address the remaining claims. 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 / / / ] Finally, Plaintiff is warned that failure to file an amended complaint within the 2 || time provided in this order may be grounds for dismissal of this action. See Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 3 || 1260-61; see also Local Rule 110. Plaintiff is also warned that a complaint which fails to comply 4 | with Rule 8 may, in the Court’s discretion, be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(b). 5 || See Neviyel v. North Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1981). 6 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 7 1. Plaintiff's first amended complaint is dismissed with leave to amend; and 8 2. Plaintiff shall file a second amended complaint within 30 days of the date 9 || of service of this order. 10 11 | Dated: January 25, 2024 Ss..c0_, DENNIS M. COTA 13 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28