(SS) Bayma v. Commissioner of Social Security ( 2024 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 KARA MARET BAYMA, No. 2:22-cv-02321 CKD 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 MARTIN O’MALLEY, Commissioner of Social Security, 15 Defendant. 16 17 18 Plaintiff seeks judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security 19 (“Commissioner”) denying an application for Disability Income Benefits (“DIB”) under Title II 20 of the Social Security Act (“Act”). The parties have consented to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction to 21 conduct all proceedings in the case, including the entry of final judgment. For the reasons 22 discussed below, the court will deny plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and grant the 23 Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment. 24 BACKGROUND 25 Plaintiff, born in 1968, applied on June 26, 2019 for DIB, alleging disability beginning 26 April 1, 2019. Administrative Transcript (“AT”) 29, 323-329. Plaintiff alleged she was unable to 27 work due to depression, anxiety, degenerative disc disease, spondylitis, slipped disc, obsessive- 28 compulsive disorder, bulimia, substance abuse disorder, dysthymic disorder, and trichomania. 1 AT 131. In a decision dated March 1, 2021, the ALJ determined that plaintiff was not disabled.1 2 AT 151-170. Plaintiff requested review by the Appeals Council, which remanded plaintiff’s case 3 for a new hearing, held on June 1, 2022. AT 39-69, 171-176. On June 27, 2022, the ALJ issued a 4 second unfavorable decision, again concluding that plaintiff was not disabled. AT 15-30. In the 5 2022 decision now under review, the ALJ made the following findings (citations to 20 C.F.R. 6 omitted): 7 1. The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through December 31, 2024. 8 2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since 9 April 1, 2019, the alleged onset date. 10 1 Disability Insurance Benefits are paid to disabled persons who have contributed to the 11 Social Security program, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. Supplemental Security Income is paid to 12 disabled persons with low income. 42 U.S.C. § 1382 et seq. Both provisions define disability, in part, as an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity” due to “a medically 13 determinable physical or mental impairment. . . .” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(a) & 1382c(a)(3)(A). A parallel five-step sequential evaluation governs eligibility for benefits under both programs. 14 See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 404.1571-76, 416.920 & 416.971-76; Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-142, 107 S. Ct. 2287 (1987). The following summarizes the sequential evaluation: 15 Step one: Is the claimant engaging in substantial gainful 16 activity? If so, the claimant is found not disabled. If not, proceed to step two. 17 Step two: Does the claimant have a “severe” impairment? If 18 so, proceed to step three. If not, then a finding of not disabled is appropriate. 19 Step three: Does the claimant’s impairment or combination 20 of impairments meet or equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R., Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App.1? If so, the claimant is automatically determined 21 disabled. If not, proceed to step four. 22 Step four: Is the claimant capable of performing his past work? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step five. 23 Step five: Does the claimant have the residual functional 24 capacity to perform any other work? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, the claimant is disabled. 25 Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 828 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995). 26 27 The claimant bears the burden of proof in the first four steps of the sequential evaluation process. Bowen, 482 U.S. at 146 n.5, 107 S. Ct. at 2294 n.5. The Commissioner bears the 28 burden if the sequential evaluation process proceeds to step five. Id. 1 3. The claimant has the following severe combination of impairments: degenerative disc disease; sacroiliitis; affective 2 disorders; adjustment disorder; anxiety disorder; body dysmorphic disorder; personality disorder; alcohol use disorder; post-traumatic 3 stress disorder; attention deficit disorder; obsessive compulsive disorder; hypothyroid disorder; trichotillomania. 4 4. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of 5 impairments that meets or medically equals one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. 6 5. After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned 7 finds that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform light work except she can occasionally climb ramps or stairs, but can 8 never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. She can occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. She is limited to occasional 9 rotation, extension, and flexion of her neck independently of her torso. She must avoid concentrated exposure to unprotected heights 10 and hazardous machinery. She can perform simple, routine, repetitive tasks, but not in a fast-paced, production-driven 11 environment. She can make simple, work-related decisions. She can tolerate few, if any, changes in the workplace. She can occasionally 12 interact with coworkers, supervisors, and the public. 13 6. The claimant is unable to perform any past relevant work. 14 7. The claimant was born [in] 1968 and was 51 years old, which is defined as an individual closely approaching advanced age on the 15 alleged disability onset date. 16 8. The claimant has at least a high-school education. 17 9. Transferability of job skills is not material to the determination of disability because using the Medical-Vocational Rules as a 18 framework supports a finding that the claimant is ‘not disabled’ whether or not the claimant has transferable job skills. 19 10. Considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and 20 residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant can perform.2 21 11. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the 22 Social Security Act, from April 1, 2019 through the date of this decision. 23 24 AT 18-30. 25 ISSUES PRESENTED 26 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ committed the following error in finding plaintiff not 27 2 The ALJ relied on vocational expert (VE) testimony to conclude that plaintiff could work as a 28 housekeeper, mailroom clerk, or merchandise marker. AT 30. 1 disabled: The ALJ failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for discounting plaintiff’s 2 subjective symptom testimony. 3 LEGAL STANDARDS 4 The court reviews the Commissioner’s decision to determine whether (1) it is based on 5 proper legal standards pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and (2) substantial evidence in the record 6 as a whole supports it. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). Substantial 7 evidence is more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Connett v. Barnhart, 340 8 F.3d 871, 873 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). It means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable 9 mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th 10 Cir. 2007), quoting Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). “The ALJ is 11 responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical testimony, and resolving 12 ambiguities.” Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). 13 “The court will uphold the ALJ’s conclusion when the evidence is susceptible to more than one 14 rational interpretation.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008). 15 The record as a whole must be considered, Howard v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 1484, 1487 (9th 16 Cir. 1986), and both the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the ALJ’s 17 conclusion weighed. See Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985). The court may not 18 affirm the ALJ’s decision simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence. Id.; see 19 also Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989). If substantial evidence supports the 20 administrative findings, or if there is conflicting evidence supporting a finding of either disability 21 or nondisability, the finding of the ALJ is conclusive, see Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 22 1229-30 (9th Cir. 1987), and may be set aside only if an improper legal standard was applied in 23 weighing the evidence. See Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1338 (9th Cir. 1988). 24 ANALYSIS 25 The ALJ found that plaintiff’s “statements concerning the intensity, persistence and 26 limiting effects of [her] symptoms are not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other 27 evidence in the record for the reasons explained in this decision.” AT 23. The ALJ proceeded to 28 discuss the evidence relating to both physical and mental limitations, comparing it to plaintiff’s 1 allegations. AT 24-26. Plaintiff claims that the reasons the ALJ gave for discounting both her 2 physical and mental allegations, insofar as these were not reflected in the assessed residual 3 functional capacity (RFC), were not “clear and convincing.” Specifically, plaintiff argues that the 4 ALJ should have credited her testimony that she was unable to perform full-time work. ECF No. 5 16 at 10. 6 The ALJ determines whether a disability applicant is credible, and the court defers to the 7 ALJ’s discretion if the ALJ used the proper process and provided proper reasons. See, e.g., 8 Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 522 (9th Cir. 1995). If credibility is critical, the ALJ must make an 9 explicit credibility finding. Albalos v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 871, 873-74 (9th Cir. 1990). “Without 10 affirmative evidence showing that the claimant is malingering, the Commissioner’s reasons for 11 rejecting the claimant’s testimony must be clear and convincing.” Morgan v. Commissioner of 12 Social Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999). 13 In evaluating whether subjective complaints are credible, the ALJ should first consider 14 objective medical evidence and then consider other factors. Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 15 344 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc). If there is objective medical evidence of an impairment, the ALJ 16 then may consider the nature of the symptoms alleged, including aggravating factors, medication, 17 treatment and functional restrictions. See id. at 345-47. The ALJ also may consider: (1) the 18 applicant’s reputation for truthfulness, prior inconsistent statements or other inconsistent 19 testimony, (2) unexplained or inadequately explained failure to seek treatment or to follow a 20 prescribed course of treatment, and (3) the applicant’s daily activities. Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 21 1273, 1284 (9th Cir. 1996); see generally SSR 96-7P, 61 FR 34483-01; SSR 95-5P, 60 FR 55406- 22 01; SSR 88-13. When discounting subjective testimony, an ALJ must provide “specific, clear, 23 and convincing reasons for doing so.” Wade v. Saul, 850 F. App’x 568, 569 (9th Cir. 2021) 24 (emphasis in original), citing Lambert v. Saul, 980 F.3d 1266, 1277–78 (9th Cir. 2020). This 25 standard does “not require ALJs to perform a line-by-line exegesis of the claimant’s testimony[.]” 26 Lambert, 980 F.3d at 1277. However, an ALJ’s detailed overview of the claimant’s medical 27 history—coupled with a nonspecific boilerplate conclusion that her testimony is “not entirely 28 consistent” with her medical treatment—is not enough to satisfy the minimal requirements for 1 assessing credibility. Id. at 1277–78. 2 At the first step of the required credibility analysis, the ALJ found objective evidence of 3 medical impairment, finding several mental and physical impairments to be severe. As to 4 physical impairments, specifically spine-related conditions, the ALJ found plaintiff’s testimony 5 that these impairments were disabling inconsistent with her “generally mild” clinical findings and 6 her response to “conservative treatment” consisting of physical therapy. AT 23-24; see, e.g., AT 7 646-647 (March 2019 treatment note that, per plaintiff, “her [low back and neck] pain always 8 responded to physical therapy”). Similarly, the ALJ found that plaintiff’s claims of disabling 9 mental symptoms were inconsistent with her “mild abnormal findings” and “unremarkable” 10 mental status examinations, as reflected “throughout the record.” AT 24. The ALJ cited a May 11 2021 note by plaintiff’s treating psychiatrist that, on examination, she had “no apparent serious 12 mental status abnormalities,” though she was diagnosed with Major Depressive Disorder and 13 other mental health conditions. AT 1301-1302. 14 The ALJ further found that plaintiff made prior inconsistent statements about “the severity 15 and limiting effects of her symptoms,” writing: 16 Despite alleging disability based on a number of conditions, the claimant has continued to work, on a part-time basis, as a public 17 health nurse since her alleged onset date. Such activity demonstrates her ability to perform work-related functions in a job that is 18 characterized as skilled by a vocational expert. 19 AT 25; see also AT 20 (“[D]espite the claimant’s claims of extreme anxiety, she reportedly was 20 working in a public contact position as a public health nurse throughout the period at issue”), 21 citing AT 383. The ALJ also found plaintiff’s alleged inability to work inconsistent with her 22 stated plans to join a gym, do more hiking, return to work (though with a shorter workday), and 23 travel to Australia, during the alleged period of disability. AT 25-26. The ALJ found further 24 inconsistencies between plaintiff’s hearing testimony and her statements at other stages of the 25 disability proceedings. AT 26. 26 Finally, the ALJ found plaintiff’s reported daily activities inconsistent with the level of 27 disability she claimed. The ALJ cited “activities . . . requiring sustained attention and 28 concentration, including driving, shopping, and managing finances,” along with “work[ing] 1 || throughout the relevant period as a public health nurse.” AT 20-21. 2 Thus, while the ALJ included both mental and physical limitations in the RFC, he did not 3 | find plaintiff to be precluded from work, as she alleged. Because the ALJ used the proper process 4 || and provided proper reasons, the undersigned defers to his discretion in the credibility 5 || determination. 6 | CONCLUSION 7 For the reasons stated herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 8 1. Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 16) is denied; 9 2. The Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 20) is granted; 10 || and 11 3. Judgment is entered for the Commissioner. 12 | Dated: January 30, 2024 / aa / x ly a 13 CAROLYN K DELANEY 14 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 15 16 17 18 || 2/bayma2321.dib.ckd 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28