Lacy v. Turner ( 2024 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 JANICE LACY, Case No. 1:23-cv-01763-NODJ-EPG 11 Plaintiff, ORDER FOR PLAINTIFF TO SHOW CAUSE WHY THIS CASE SHOULD NOT BE 12 v. DISMISSED 13 TURNER, (ECF No. 1) 14 Defendant. ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO ISSUE ONLY PRO SE INFORMATIONAL 15 ORDER 16 THIRTY-DAY DEADLLINE 17 18 On December 26, 2023, Plaintiff Janice Lacy, proceeding pro se, filed this civil action. 19 (ECF No. 1). Generally, Plaintiff seeks a temporary restraining order prohibiting Defendant, 20 Sergeant Turner, from enforcing a California criminal protective order that requires Plaintiff to 21 stay away from a property in Yokuts Valley, California. Because Plaintiff’s complaint implicates 22 two doctrines—Younger abstention and Rooker-Feldman1—that prevent Federal courts from 23 interfering with state court matters under certain circumstances, the Court will order Plaintiff to file a response within thirty days of the issuance of this order, explaining why this case should not 24 be dismissed. 25 \\\ 26 27 1 See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); D.C. Ct. of 28 Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). 1 I. SUMMARY OF THE COMPLAINT 2 Plaintiff asserts that she is “the legal spouse of LeeAnn E. Lacy, who died in a house fire 3 at 33919 Otter Lane, Squaw Valley aka Yokuts Valley, CA 93675.”2 Plaintiff states that there 4 were CPOs, which the Court understands to mean criminal protective orders, “on file in both directions.” Plaintiff asserts that it is a legal fact that a CPO dissolves upon death. 5 On December 21, 2023, Plaintiff was woken up and forced to leave the Otter Lane 6 property. She later found out that this was done at the direction of Defendant Turner. Plaintiff 7 called a detective, who told her that Turner said “there is an RO on the property,” which the Court 8 understands to mean a restraining order. Plaintiff claims that “[t]he Sheriff is legally wrong to 9 enforce a deceased person’s restraining order.” And she states that “[t]heir legal advice is flawed 10 and I cannot even go on calendar in the criminal case.” 11 Plaintiff attached a variety of documents to the complaint, including a citizen complaint 12 form, reporting that Defendant told Plaintiff “that he and his deputies will continue to enforce 13 deceased spouse LeeAnn E. Lacy’s DVRO,” which the Court understands to mean a domestic 14 violence restraining order. The form also states, “I want a court to replace what I am losing in 15 another jurisdiction and have false arrests removed.” Plaintiff also attaches case information from 16 the Fresno County Superior Court website regarding criminal charges against her, which include 17 “[r]esisting [e]xecutive [o]fficer” and “[b]attery [o]n peace [o]fficer.” 18 The Court takes judicial notice of a different charge—for domestic violence in Case 19 Number F21900281—against Plaintiff on the Fresno County Superior Court website 20 (https://www.fresno.courts.ca.gov/online-services/case-information). See Lee v. City of Los 21 Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 690 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that a court can take judicial notice of another 22 court’s opinion, but not for the truth of the facts therein, but for the existence of the opinion). 23 Notably, the summary of events for this domestic violence case indicates that a criminal protective order was issued and that Plaintiff was given probation. Under Cal. Penal Code 24 § 1203.097(a)(2), probation for domestic violence requires as a term of probation “[a] criminal 25 court protective order protecting the victim from further acts of violence, threats, stalking, sexual 26 27 2 For readability, minor alterations have been made to some of Plaintiff’s quotations without indicating 28 each change. 1 abuse, and harassment, and, if appropriate, containing residence exclusion or stay-away 2 conditions.” 3 II. DISCUSSION 4 A. Legal Standards At issue here are two doctrines that, under certain circumstances, prevent a Federal court 5 from interfering with state court proceedings. The first is a doctrine called Younger abstention, 6 which is rooted in the “desire to permit state courts to try state cases free from interference by 7 federal courts.” Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43 (1971). Thus, “[a]bsent extraordinary 8 circumstances, interests of comity and federalism instruct federal courts to abstain from 9 exercising our jurisdiction in certain circumstances when asked to enjoin ongoing state 10 enforcement proceedings.” Page v. King, 932 F.3d 898, 901 (9th Cir. 2019) (alterations, citation, 11 and internal quotation marks omitted). 12 Younger abstention is appropriate when: (1) there is an ongoing state judicial 13 proceeding; (2) the proceeding implicates important state interests; (3) there is an adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to raise constitutional challenges; 14 and (4) the requested relief seeks to enjoin or has the practical effect of enjoining the ongoing state judicial proceeding. 15 Arevalo v. Hennessy, 882 F.3d 763, 765 (9th Cir. 2018) (alterations, citation, and internal 16 quotation marks omitted). 17 Typically, dismissal is required for Younger abstention. Aiona v. Judiciary of State of 18 Hawaii, 17 F.3d 1244, 1248 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that, when abstaining under Younger, “a 19 district court must dismiss the federal action . . . [and] there is no discretion to grant injunctive 20 relief”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). But “federal courts should not dismiss 21 actions where damages are at issue; rather, damages actions should be stayed until the state 22 proceedings are completed.” Gilbertson v. Albright, 381 F.3d 965, 968 (9th Cir. 2004). Lastly, 23 “Federal courts will not abstain under Younger in extraordinary circumstances where irreparable 24 injury can be shown.” Page, 932 F.3d at 902 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 25 “[B]ad faith and harassment” are “the usual prerequisites” to show “the necessary irreparable 26 injury.” Younger, 401 U.S. at 53. 27 The next doctrine is known as the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which “takes its name from 28 two Supreme Court cases: Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 1 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 2 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983).” Carmona v. Carmona, 603 F.3d 1041, 1050 (9th Cir. 2010). Under this 3 doctrine, lower federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction in “cases brought by state-court 4 losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the [federal] district court proceedings commenced and inviting [federal] district court review and rejection of 5 those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). 6 “The purpose of the doctrine is to protect state judgments from collateral federal attack. Because 7 district courts lack power to hear direct appeals from state court decisions, they must decline 8 jurisdiction whenever they are ‘in essence being called upon to review the state court decision.”’ 9 Doe & Associates Law Offices v. Napolitano, 252 F.3d 1026, 1030 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing 10 Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482 n.16). 11 B. Analysis 12 It appears from the face of the complaint that Plaintiff is challenging actions related to 13 either ongoing or past California state court matters. Specifically, Plaintiff has a California 14 criminal protective order against her, which likely stems from her criminal domestic violence 15 case, which requires her to stay away from the Otter Lane property. And Plaintiff seeks an order 16 prohibiting enforcement of the criminal protective order, which has the potential to interfere with 17 ongoing or concluded state court matters. 18 Notably, in analogous circumstances, courts have concluded that plaintiffs were 19 improperly trying to obtain Federal court intervention in state court matters. See Malberg v. 20 McCracken, No. 5:22-CV-01713-EJD, 2023 WL 2769095, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2023) (“For 21 the purposes of the second Rooker-Feldman element, it is difficult to envision a clearer example 22 of a plaintiff attempting to blatantly end run an adverse state court judgment. Several federal 23 courts in California have also used the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to dismiss complaints with remarkably similar allegations challenging California domestic violence restraining orders.”); 24 Ervin v. California, No. 3:18-CV-00442-GPC-RBB, 2018 WL 3375058, at *4 (S.D. Cal. July 11, 25 2018) (“Essentially, plaintiff is asking this court to overturn the state court’s order issuing the 26 protective order and the gun prohibition, making this a de facto appeal of the state court order that 27 is prohibited under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.”); Steinmetz v. Steinmetz, No. CIV 08-0629 28 1 | JB/WDS, 2008 WL 5991009, at *10 (D.N.M. Aug. 27, 2008) (dismissing complaint under 2 | Younger abstention due to ongoing state-court domestic violence, divorce, and custody 3 || proceedings). 4 Accordingly, it appears that the Court should abstain from addressing the substance of the 5 | complaint under the Younger abstention and Rooker-Feldman doctrines. 6 I. ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 7 Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED as follows: 8 1. Within thirty days from the date of issuance of this order, Plaintiff shall show cause why 9 this action should not be dismissed pursuant to the Younger abstention and Rooker- Feldman doctrines. 8 2. Plaintiff is advised that failure to respond to this order may result in the dismissal of this case. 2 3. The Clerk of Court is directed to issue only the Court’s standard pro se informational 13 order, which provides general information helpful to Plaintiff in connection with this case. 14 15 | IT IS SO ORDERED. ‘6 Dated: _ February 1, 2024 [sf ey 17 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28