(PC) Eddington v. Jackson ( 2024 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MELVIN LAVERN EDDINGTON JR., Case No. 1:21-cv-01165-HBK (PC) 12 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 13 v. (Doc. No. 31) 14 KELVIN JACKSON, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for appointment of counsel filed on 18 February 1, 2024. (Doc. No. 31). Plaintiff, Melvin Eddington Jr., a prisoner, is proceeding pro se 19 and in forma pauperis on his civil rights complaint alleging an Eight Amendment excessive use 20 of force claim against various correctional officers in their individual capacities arising out of an 21 incident that occurred at Wasco State Prison on July 31, 2019. Plaintiff seeks appointment 22 counsel due to his indigent, incarcerated, and restricted housing status, his limited education, his 23 belief the issues are complex, and his inability to obtain counsel on his own. 24 At the outset, the United States Constitution does not require appointment of counsel in 25 civil cases. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 354 (1996) (explaining Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 26 817 (1996), did not create a right to appointment of counsel in civil cases). Under 28 U.S.C. § 27 1915, this court has discretionary authority to appoint counsel for an indigent individual to 28 commence, prosecute, or defend a civil action. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) (stating the court has 1 authority to appoint counsel for people unable to afford counsel); see also United States v. 2 McQuade, 519 F.2d 1180 (9th Cir. 1978) (addressing relevant standard of review for motions to 3 appoint counsel in civil cases) (other citations omitted). The Court grants motions to appoint 4 counsel in civil cases only in “exceptional circumstances.” Id. at 1181. Factors the court 5 considers when determining if exceptional circumstances warrant appointment of counsel are 6 many and include, inter alia, proof of indigence, the likelihood of success on the merits, and the 7 ability of the plaintiff to articulate his claims pro se considering the complexity of the legal issues 8 involved. Id.; see also Rand v. Rowland, 113 F.3d 1520, 1525 (9th Cir. 1997), withdrawn in part 9 on other grounds on reh’g en banc, 154 F.2d 952 (9th Cir. 1998). 10 Plaintiff has not met his “burden of demonstrating exceptional circumstances.” Jones v. 11 Chen, 2014 WL 12684497, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2014). Plaintiff’s indigence does not qualify 12 “as an exceptional circumstance in a prisoner civil rights case.” Montano v. Solomon, 2010 WL 13 2403389, at *2 (E.D. Cal. June 11, 2010); Callender v. Ramm, 2018 WL 6448536, at *3 (E.D. 14 Cal. Dec. 10, 2018). Further, Plaintiff’s claim that he lacks legal skills or has a limited education 15 “are typical of almost every pro se prisoner civil rights plaintiff and alone” are insufficient to 16 satisfy the “exceptional circumstances” standard required to justify appointment of counsel. 17 Torres v. Jorrin, 2020 WL 5909529, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 6, 2020)(quoting Thompson v. Paramo, 18 No. 16CV951-MMA (BGS), 2018 WL 4357993, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 2018)); see also Jones 19 v. Kuppinger, 2015 WL 5522290, at *3-4 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2015) (“Circumstances common to 20 most prisoners, such as a deficient general education, lack of knowledge of the law, mental illness 21 and disability, do not in themselves establish exceptional circumstances warranting appointment 22 of voluntary civil counsel.”). 23 While Plaintiff’s access to a law library may be restricted, “[p]risoners have a right to 24 meaningful access to the courts, but there is no absolute right to use a prison law library.” 25 Springfield v. Khalit, 2018 WL 5980155, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2018) (citing Lewis v. Casey, 26 518 U.S. 343, 346 (1996)). And contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion, the Court does not find that the 27 issues are “so complex that due process violations will occur absent the presence of counsel.” 28 Bonin v. Vasquez, 999 F.2d 425, 428–29 (9th Cir. 1993). Nor is Plaintiff’s inability to find 1 | counsel “a proper factor for the Court to consider in determining whether to request counsel.” 2 | Howard v. Hedgpeth, 2010 WL 1641087, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 2010). 3 Furthermore, Defendants recently filed a motion to stay this action before any discovery 4 | has been undertaken due to Plaintiff's parallel criminal prosecution (Kern County Superior Court 5 | Case No. DF0O15108A) stemming from the same alleged facts. Consequently, due to this 6 | development, it is difficult for the Court to determine Plaintiffs likelihood of success on the 7 | merits. Wilborn vy. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986); see also Reed v. Paramo, 8 | 2020 WL 2767358, at *1 (S.D. Cal. May 28, 2020) (holding it was too early to determine 9 | plaintiff's likelihood of success on the merits before fact discovery has been completed). 10 Accordingly, it is ORDERED: 11 Plaintiff's motion for appointment of counsel (Doc. No. 31) is DENIED. Dated: _ February 12, 2024 Mihaw. Wh. arch Yack 13 HELENA M. BARCH-KUCHTA 4 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28