United States v. Marble Mountain Ranch ( 2024 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 ----oo0oo---- 11 12 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 2:21-cv-02391 WBS DMC 13 Plaintiff, 14 v. ORDER DENYING MOTION TO INTERVENE1 15 MARBLE MOUNTAIN RANCH, INC.; DOUGLAS T. COLE; HEIDI A. COLE; 16 NORMAN D. COLE; and CAROLYN T. COLE, 17 Defendants. 18 19 ----oo0oo---- 20 The United States government brought this action 21 pertaining to fire suppression costs and other damages caused by 22 the Marble Fire. (See Docket No. 1.) The parties settled the 23 case on July 14, 2023. (See Docket No. 29.) On February 1, 24 2024, Konrad Fisher moved pro se to permissively intervene in 25 this case, stating that the Marble Fire damaged his property and 26 27 1 This matter was taken under submission without oral argument pursuant to Local Rule 230(g). The scheduled April 1, 28 2024 hearing on the motion is hereby VACATED. 1 that he is concerned the settlement between the parties will 2 leave inadequate insurance funds to cover his damages, which he 3 is already pursuing in a pending state court action. (See Docket 4 Nos. 38, 42.) 5 Pursuant to Rule 24(b), “[o]n timely motion, the court 6 may permit anyone to intervene who . . . has a claim or defense 7 that shares with the main action a common question of law or 8 fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(1). “If the court finds that the 9 motion to intervene was not timely, it need not reach any of the 10 remaining elements of Rule 24,” and therefore a “finding of 11 untimeliness defeats a motion for permissive intervention.” See 12 United States v. State of Wash., 86 F.3d 1499, 1507 (9th Cir. 13 1996). In determining whether a motion to intervene is timely, 14 the court considers the totality of the circumstances, including 15 “(1) the stage of the proceeding at which an applicant seeks to 16 intervene; (2) the prejudice to other parties; and (3) the reason 17 for and length of the delay.” Smith v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. 18 Dist., 830 F.3d 843, 854 (9th Cir. 2016). 19 The court finds that Mr. Fisher’s motion is not timely 20 given the stage of this case, where the parties reached a 21 settlement nearly seven months prior to Mr. Fisher’s motion, 22 following more than two years of litigation. Allowing 23 intervention at this stage could “jeopardize[e] [the] settlement, 24 to the potential prejudice of all the parties concerned in the 25 underlying action, for the sake of a proposed intervenor who 26 waited [to move to intervene] until the original parties had 27 already reached an agreement to settle.” See Empire Blue Cross & 28 Blue Shield v. Janet Greeson’s A Place For Us, Inc., 62 F.3d eee en een een I IE I I EI ED EE 1 1217, 1221 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Cosgrove v. Nat’l Fire & 2 Marine Ins. Co., 770 F. App’x 793, 795 (9th Cir. 2019) (affirming 3 denial of permissive intervention “because the case had been 4 | dismissed pursuant to a settlement of the parties” and permitting 5 intervention could have “the potential effect of negating the 6 settlement”). 7 Accordingly, the motion to intervene (Docket No. 38) is 8 DENTED. In light of the parties’ stipulation to dismiss the case 9 (Docket No. 41), the Clerk of Court is instructed to close this 10 case. 11 IT IS SO ORDERED. . « 12 | Dated: February 28, 2024 allem Hh ah be WILLIAM B. SHUBB 13 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28