(PC) Casity v. Amador County Superior Court ( 2024 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 RICHARD D. CASITY, No. 2:24-cv-0450 AC P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER AND FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 14 AMADOR COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 18 has requested leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. 19 I. Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis 20 Plaintiff has submitted a declaration that makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. 21 § 1915(a). ECF Nos. 2, 5. Accordingly, the request to proceed in forma pauperis will be granted. 22 Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 28 U.S.C. 23 §§ 1914(a), 1915(b)(1). By this order, plaintiff will be assessed an initial partial filing fee in 24 accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). By separate order, the court will direct 25 the appropriate agency to collect the initial partial filing fee from plaintiff’s trust account and 26 forward it to the Clerk of the Court. Thereafter, plaintiff will be obligated for monthly payments 27 of twenty percent of the preceding month’s income credited to plaintiff’s prison trust account. 28 These payments will be forwarded by the appropriate agency to the Clerk of the Court each time 1 the amount in plaintiff’s account exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C. 2 § 1915(b)(2). 3 II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints 4 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against “a 5 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). 6 The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are 7 “frivolous, malicious, or fail[] to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,” or that “seek[] 8 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). 9 A claim “is [legally] frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” 10 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th 11 Cir. 1984). “[A] judge may dismiss . . . claims which are ‘based on indisputably meritless legal 12 theories’ or whose ‘factual contentions are clearly baseless.’” Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 13 640 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327), superseded by statute on other grounds as 14 stated in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000). The critical inquiry is whether a 15 constitutional claim, however inartfully pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. 16 Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227-28 (citations omitted). 17 “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only ‘a short and plain statement of the 18 claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of 19 what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 20 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (alteration in original) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). 21 “Failure to state a claim under § 1915A incorporates the familiar standard applied in the context 22 of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Wilhelm v. Rotman, 23 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). In order to survive dismissal for failure 24 to state a claim, a complaint must contain more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a 25 cause of action;” it must contain factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the 26 speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). “[T]he pleading must contain 27 something more . . . than . . . a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion [of] a legally 28 cognizable right of action.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur 1 R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216 (3d ed. 2004)). 2 “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to 3 relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting 4 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual 5 content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 6 misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). In reviewing a complaint under this 7 standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question, Hosp. Bldg. 8 Co. v. Trs. of the Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976) (citation omitted), as well as construe the 9 pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor, 10 Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969) (citations omitted). 11 III. Complaint 12 The complaint alleges that defendants Amador County Superior Court, Superior Court 13 Judge Day, and Amador County District Attorney Riebe violated plaintiff’s rights when the court 14 issued an unauthorized sentence of four years and four months instead of the proper sentence of 15 sixteen months. ECF No. 1 at 3-4. Plaintiff claims that the Third District Court of Appeals has 16 already concluded that his sentence was unauthorized. Id. at 3. Plaintiff seeks compensatory 17 damages. Id. at 5. 18 IV. Failure to State a Claim 19 The Supreme Court has held that judges acting within the course and scope of their 20 judicial duties are absolutely immune from liability for damages under § 1983. Pierson v. Ray, 21 386 U.S. 547, 553-54 (1967). “A judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he 22 took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority; rather, he will be 23 subject to liability only when he has acted in the ‘clear absence of all jurisdiction.’” Stump v. 24 Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978) (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 351 25 (1871)). A judge’s jurisdiction is quite broad and its scope is determined by the two-part test 26 articulated in Stump: 27 The relevant cases demonstrate that the factors determining whether an act by a judge is a “judicial” one relate to [1] the nature of the act 28 itself, i.e., whether it is a function normally performed by a judge, 1 and [2] to the expectations of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity. 2 3 Id. at 362. 4 The imposition of a criminal sentence falls squarely within the scope of functions 5 “normally performed by a judge” and was done while Judge Day acting in the capacity of a judge. 6 Judge Day is therefore absolutely immune from liability under § 1983 and the claims against her 7 must be dismissed without leave to amend. 8 Prosecutors are similarly entitled to absolutely immune from liability when performing the 9 traditional functions of an advocate and acts that are “intimately associated with the judicial phase 10 of the criminal process.” Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 125 (1997) (quoting Imbler v. 11 Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976)). Though plaintiff makes no specific allegations against 12 Riebe, any claims against him based on his participation in plaintiff’s sentencing proceedings 13 would be barred because sentencing is “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the 14 criminal process.” Id.; Demery v. Kupperman, 735 F.2d 1139, 1144 (9th Cir. 1984) 15 (“[P]rosecutors are absolutely immune from civil suits alleging wrongdoing with regard to post- 16 litigation as well as pre-litigation handling of a case.”). 17 To the extent plaintiff is attempting to bring claims against the Amador County Superior 18 Court, those claims are barred by sovereign immunity. “[A]n unconsenting State is immune from 19 suits brought in federal courts by her own citizens as well as by citizens of another State.” 20 Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1974) (citations omitted). This immunity extends to 21 state courts, which are state agencies. Hyland v. Wonder, 117 F.3d 405, 413 (9th Cir. 1997) 22 (“[S]tate case law and constitutional provisions make clear that the [California Superior] Court is 23 a state agency.” (alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). “Section 24 1983 provides a federal forum to remedy many deprivations of civil liberties, but it does not 25 provide a federal forum for litigants who seek a remedy against a State for alleged deprivations of 26 civil liberties.” Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989). Accordingly, any 27 claims against the state court must be dismissed. 28 Finally, a claim to recover monetary damages is not cognizable under § 1983 if success on 1 the claim “would necessarily imply the invalidity of [the plaintiff’s] conviction or sentence.” 2 Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994). In order to recover damages, “a § 1983 plaintiff 3 must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by 4 executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or 5 called into question by a federal court’s issuance of writ of habeas corpus.” Id. at 486-87. In this 6 case, though plaintiff represents that the state court of appeal has already found in his favor, the 7 docket for the appeal he cites indicates that the appeal is still in the process of being briefed.1 See 8 United States ex rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 9 (9th Cir. 1992) (the court “may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and 10 without the federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue” 11 (citations omitted)); Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2) (court may take judicial notice of facts that are 12 capable of accurate determination by sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned). 13 Because plaintiff’s criminal appeal remains pending, the Heck bar applies. 14 V. Scope of Section 1983 15 State prisoners may not attack the validity of the fact of their confinement in a section 16 1983 action and “habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy” for such claims. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 17 411 U.S. 475, 490 (1973); Nettles v. Grounds, 830 F.3d 922, 933 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) 18 (“habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy to attack the legality of the conviction or sentence”). 19 Accordingly, to the extent plaintiff seeks to challenge his sentence, he fails to state a claim. The 20 court further declines to offer plaintiff the option to convert his complaint to a habeas petition 21 because it appears his claims have not been exhausted. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) (a petition for 22 writ of habeas corpus “shall not be granted unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted the 23 remedies available in the courts of the State; or there is an absence of available State corrective 24 process” or circumstances render the process ineffective). A search of the California Supreme 25 Court’s case information website shows no cases filed by plaintiff. Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 26 1 Third District Court of Appeals Docket, Case C097719, 27 https://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov/search/case/dockets.cfm?dist=3&doc_id=2467918&doc_n o=C097719&request_token=NiIwLSEnXkw9W1AtSCMtUEtIMEQ6UTxbKiMuWztRICAgCg% 28 3D%3D [https://perma.cc/T2XU-ZTV2]. 1 1083, 1086 (9th Cir. 1985) (the exhaustion requirement is met by providing the highest state court 2 with a full and fair opportunity to consider all claims before presenting them to the federal court). 3 VI. No Leave to Amend 4 Leave to amend should be granted if it appears possible that the defects in the complaint 5 could be corrected, especially if a plaintiff is pro se. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 6 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). However, if, after careful consideration, it is clear that a complaint 7 cannot be cured by amendment, the court may dismiss without leave to amend. Cato v. United 8 States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1105-06 (9th Cir. 1995). 9 The undersigned finds that, as set forth above, the complaint fails to state a claim upon 10 which relief may be granted and that given the nature of the claims, amendment would be futile. 11 The complaint should therefore be dismissed without leave to amend. 12 VII. Plain Language Summary of this Order for a Pro Se Litigant 13 Your request to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. That means you do not have to pay 14 the entire filing fee now. You will pay it over time, out of your trust account. 15 It is being recommended that your complaint be dismissed without leave to amend 16 because the defendants are immune from suit and you cannot bring a claim based on your 17 sentence being unauthorized until that sentence has been overturned. 18 CONCLUSION 19 In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 20 1. Plaintiff’s request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) is GRANTED. 21 2. Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. Plaintiff 22 is assessed an initial partial filing fee in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. 23 § 1915(b)(1). All fees shall be collected and paid in accordance with this court’s order to the 24 appropriate agency filed concurrently herewith. 25 3. The Clerk of the Court shall randomly assign a United States District Judge to this 26 action. 27 IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the complaint be dismissed without leave to 28 amend for failure to state a claim. ] These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 2 || assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).. Within twenty-one days 3 || after being served with these findings and recommendations, plaintiff may file written objections 4 || with the court. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judges Findings 5 || and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the specified 6 || time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. YIst, 951 F.2d 1153 7 | (th Cir. 1991). 8 | DATED: February 28, 2024 ~ 9 Hthren— Lhor—e_ ALLISON CLAIRE 10 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28