(PC) Taylor v. Jiminez ( 2024 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 SHAUNTAE TAYLOR, Case No. 1:19-cv-00068-JLT-BAM (PC) 12 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR SANCTIONS AGAINST CALIFORNIA 13 v. ATTORNEY GENERAL, REQUEST FOR HIPPA HEARING, AND REQUEST FOR 14 JIMINEZ, et al., APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 15 Defendants. (ECF No. 80) 16 17 Plaintiff Shauntae Taylor (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma 18 pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This action proceeds on 19 Plaintiff’s first amended complaint against Defendants Jimenez, Rodriguez, Huckleberry, Rye, 20 and Hernandez for deliberate indifference in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 21 Currently before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for sanctions against the California 22 Attorney Generals, request for a HIPPA hearing to enable the Court to review Plaintiff’s mental 23 health file to establish the fact that he is a class member of Coleman/Plata/Armstrong, and request 24 for appointment of counsel, filed April 26, 2024. (ECF No. 80.) Defendants filed an opposition 25 on April 30, 2024. (ECF No. 81.) Plaintiff has not yet had the opportunity to file a reply brief, 26 but the Court finds a reply unnecessary. The motion is deemed submitted. Local Rule 230(l). 27 In his motion, Plaintiff states that the California Attorney General’s Office is aware that 28 Plaintiff is in the Enhanced Outpatient Program (“EOP”), CDCR’s highest level of outpatient 1 mental health care for people who are unable to function or care for themselves in a regular 2 general population or segregated housing setting. (ECF No. 80.) Plaintiff suffers from serious 3 manic depression disorder and sometimes goes into spells of depression to the point where he 4 does not want to or cannot function properly. His psychotropic medication only pushes him so 5 far through each day, and he usually shuts down after 12:00 p.m. Plaintiff argues that under 6 Armstrong v. Newsom, he is a class member and has to have a 1.100 ADA Hearing before we 7 move forward, the D.A. and P.D. have to inform the Court, and the Court has to conduct this 8 hearing before it can move forward. (Id.) 9 Defendants oppose the request for sanctions because Plaintiff fails to provide any legal or 10 factual basis for the request, and fails to allege any misconduct by the California Office of the 11 Attorney General which would provide a basis to impose sanctions. (ECF No. 81.) Defendants 12 are unaware of any legal basis for a “1.100 ADA hearing” in federal court, and further explain 13 that while the Coleman class includes all inmates with serious mental disorders who are or will be 14 confined within the California Department of Corrections, mental illness is not a ground for 15 inclusion in the Armstrong class. (Id. at 2.) Defendants further take no position on Plaintiff’s 16 request for the appointment of counsel. (Id.) 17 Plaintiff’s requests for sanctions and for a “HIPPA hearing” to establish his membership 18 in any class action are denied. Plaintiff has not alleged that the Attorney General’s Office has 19 taken any action, or failed to take any action, such that sanctions are warranted. Similarly, the 20 Court is not aware of any requirement to hold a hearing under HIPAA—the Health Insurance 21 Portability and Accountability Act—or any other federal rule or statute, to determine whether 22 Plaintiff is a member of the Plata, Coleman, or Armstrong classes. 23 To the extent Plaintiff’s motion can be construed as a request for appointment of counsel, 24 Plaintiff is reminded that he does not have a constitutional right to appointed counsel in this 25 action, Rand v. Rowland, 113 F.3d 1520, 1525 (9th Cir. 1997), rev’d in part on other grounds, 26 154 F.3d 952, 954 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998), and the court cannot require an attorney to represent 27 plaintiff pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of Iowa, 28 490 U.S. 296, 298 (1989). However, in certain exceptional circumstances the court may request 1 the voluntary assistance of counsel pursuant to section 1915(e)(1). Rand, 113 F.3d at 1525. 2 Without a reasonable method of securing and compensating counsel, the Court will seek 3 volunteer counsel only in the most serious and exceptional cases. In determining whether 4 “exceptional circumstances exist, a district court must evaluate both the likelihood of success on 5 the merits [and] the ability of the [plaintiff] to articulate his claims pro se in light of the 6 complexity of the legal issues involved.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 7 The Court has considered Plaintiff’s request for the appointment of counsel, but does not 8 find the required exceptional circumstances. Even if it is assumed that Plaintiff is not well versed 9 in the law and that he has made serious allegations which, if proved, would entitle him to relief, 10 his case is not exceptional. This Court is faced with similar cases filed by prisoners receiving 11 mental health services almost daily. These prisoners also must conduct legal research and 12 prosecute claims without the assistance of counsel. 13 Furthermore, at this stage in the proceedings, the Court cannot make a determination that 14 Plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits. Although Plaintiff is proceeding on cognizable claims 15 this does not mean that there is a likelihood of success on the merits. Finally, based on a review 16 of the record in this case, the Court does not find that Plaintiff cannot adequately articulate his 17 claims. 18 Accordingly, Plaintiff’s request for sanctions, request for HIPPA hearing, and request for 19 appointment of counsel, (ECF No. 80), is HEREBY DENIED. 20 IT IS SO ORDERED. 21 22 Dated: May 1, 2024 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _ UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 23 24 25 26 27 28