- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 THOMAS TARBUTTON, Case No. 2:23-cv-02043-JDP (PC) 12 Plaintiff, ORDER 13 v. DIRECTING THE CLERK OF COURT TO ASSIGN A DISTRICT JUDGE TO THIS 14 N. ZEYAAD, et al., ACTION 15 Defendants. SCREENING ORDER FINDING THAT THE AMENDED COMPLAINT FAILS TO 16 STATE A COGNIZABLE CLAIM 17 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 18 THAT THIS ACTION BE DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO STATE A COGNIZABLE 19 CLAIM 20 ECF No. 10 21 22 Plaintiff, a state prisoner, brings this action against four defendants: (1) defendant Zeyaad, 23 the deputy clerk of the Sacramento County Superior Court; (2) John Doe number one, a clerk or 24 deputy clerk at the Sacramento County Superior Court; (3) John Doe number two, a supervisor at 25 the California Department of Financial Protection and Innovation (“DFPI”); and Alicia G. 26 Boomer, a deputy attorney general with the California Attorney General’s office. He alleges that 27 these defendants violated his rights by unlawfully interfering with a civil rights action he filed 28 against DFPI in the Sacramento County Superior Court. ECF No. 10 at 11-14. The complaint 1 fails to state a viable claim and, given that plaintiff has already been afforded an opportunity to 2 amend, I now recommend this action be dismissed for failure to state a claim. 3 Screening Order 4 I. Screening and Pleading Requirements 5 A federal court must screen a prisoner’s complaint that seeks relief against a governmental 6 entity, officer, or employee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must identify any cognizable 7 claims and dismiss any portion of the complaint that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a 8 claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is 9 immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1), (2). 10 A complaint must contain a short and plain statement that plaintiff is entitled to relief, 11 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and provide “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 12 face,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The plausibility standard does not 13 require detailed allegations, but legal conclusions do not suffice. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 14 662, 678 (2009). If the allegations “do not permit the court to infer more than the mere 15 possibility of misconduct,” the complaint states no claim. Id. at 679. The complaint need not 16 identify “a precise legal theory.” Kobold v. Good Samaritan Reg’l Med. Ctr., 832 F.3d 1024, 17 1038 (9th Cir. 2016). Instead, what plaintiff must state is a “claim”—a set of “allegations that 18 give rise to an enforceable right to relief.” Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1264 19 n.2 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (citations omitted). 20 The court must construe a pro se litigant’s complaint liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 21 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam). The court may dismiss a pro se litigant’s complaint “if it 22 appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which 23 would entitle him to relief.” Hayes v. Idaho Corr. Ctr., 849 F.3d 1204, 1208 (9th Cir. 2017). 24 However, “‘a liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements 25 of the claim that were not initially pled.’” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 26 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)). 27 28 1 II. Analysis 2 As stated above, plaintiff’s allegations concern the handling of a civil case he filed with 3 the Sacramento County Superior Court. ECF No. 10 at 11-14. As before, he alleges that he filed 4 a limited civil action against DFPI for the purpose of obtaining documents in the agency’s 5 possession. Id. at 11. He did so after attempts at obtaining the documents by formal request 6 failed to generate a response. Id. 7 After the civil action was filed, plaintiff received a letter response from defendant Boomer 8 informing him that he had failed to comply with “any authorized method of serving a complaint 9 on DFPI.” Id. at 36. The letter also responded to his initial requests for documents by stating that 10 the audit reports sought by plaintiff were not subject release under the California Public Records 11 Act. Id. at 36-37. 12 Unsatisfied with defendant Boomer’s letter, plaintiff maintained his civil suit and, on 13 April 10, 2023, after DFPI failed to answer his complaint, he requested entry of default judgment. 14 Id. at 12. He claims, without alleging any specific supporting facts, that one of the defendant 15 clerks of court, Zeyaad or Doe, “communicated or conveyed” his request for default judgment to 16 DFPI. Id. He claims that one or both of these clerks then purposefully withheld entering default 17 judgment against DFPI in order to assist the agency and defendant Boomer. Id. Thereafter, DFPI 18 filed an answer to his complaint, which plaintiff unsuccessfully attempted to strike. Id. at 12-13. 19 Plaintiff now alleges that these actions violated his federal right to access the courts, his 20 due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, his equal protection rights, and 42 U.S.C. 21 § 1986. These allegations should be dismissed for failure to state a cognizable claim. First, the 22 entirety of the complaint is premised on the notion that defendants enacted some conspiracy to 23 frustrate his litigation. He has offered no concrete, specific allegations in support of this 24 somewhat far-fetched idea. Second, as I explained previously, these allegations impermissibly 25 ask this court to weigh in on the propriety of state court operations and decisions. The Supreme 26 Court has unambiguously held that “lower federal courts possess no power whatever to sit in 27 direct review of state court decisions.” Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive 28 Engineers, 398 U.S. 281, 296 (1970). It may be, as plaintiff argues in his memorandum that is 1 attached to the complaint, that there is, as yet, no final state court decision, the de facto appeal 2 from which would run afoul of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.1 But if that is the case, then his 3 claims are barred by the abstention doctrine in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1971). 4 Under Younger, a federal court should abstain from hearing claims where: (1) the state 5 proceedings are ongoing; (2) the proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) the state 6 proceedings provide an adequate opportunity to litigate the plaintiff's federal constitutional 7 claims. Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982). 8 Here, plaintiff appears to state that the proceedings are ongoing. California has important state 9 interests in civil litigation occurring in its state courts. Finally, if plaintiff has evidence of 10 procedural wrongdoing affecting his pending case, there appears to be no impediment to 11 presenting those arguments to the relevant state courts. Granting him relief in this case would 12 necessarily enjoin or call into question the legitimacy of those state court proceedings. If 13 impropriety has occurred in a lower state court, the appropriate venue for relief and redress lies in 14 the state appellate process, not in federal intervention. No further chances to amend are 15 warranted, as plaintiff cannot state a viable claim without changing the fundamental basis of his 16 litigation. 17 Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall assign a district judge to this 18 action. 19 Further, it is RECOMMENDED that the amended complaint, ECF No. 10, be 20 DISMISSED without leave to amend for failure to state a cognizable claim. 21 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 22 assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 23 after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 24 objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 25 “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any response to the 26 27 1 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits federal courts from exercising appellate review over final state court judgments. Henrichs v. Valley View Dev., 474 F.3d 609, 613 (9th Cir. 28 2007). 1 | objections shall be served and filed within fourteen days after service of the objections. The 2 | parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to 3 | appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez 4 | v. Yist, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 5 6 IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: _ May 13, 2024 Q————. 8 JEREMY D. PETERSON 9 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
Document Info
Docket Number: 2:23-cv-02043
Filed Date: 5/14/2024
Precedential Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 6/20/2024