(PS) Rigor v. Mercy Pedlers ( 2024 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 SORAYA MARIA RIGOR, Case No. 2:23-cv-02048-TLN-JDP (PS) 12 Plaintiff, AMENDED ORDER 13 v. GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S APPLICATION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS, 14 MERCY PEDLERS, et al., SCREENING HER FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT, AND GRANTING LEAVE TO 15 Defendants. AMEND 16 ECF Nos. 2 & 3 17 18 Plaintiff seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Her 19 declaration makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(a)(1) and (2). See ECF No. 2. 20 Accordingly, the request to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). 21 Under § 1915(e)(2), the court must dismiss the case at any time if it determines that the 22 allegation of poverty is untrue, or that the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on 23 which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against an immune defendant. As discussed 24 below, plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim. I will grant her one more opportunity to amend 25 before recommending dismissal of this action. 26 27 28 1 Screening and Pleading Requirements 2 A federal court must screen the complaint of any claimant seeking permission to proceed 3 in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). The court must identify any cognizable claims and 4 dismiss any portion of the complaint that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon 5 which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such 6 relief. Id. 7 A complaint must contain a short and plain statement that plaintiff is entitled to relief, 8 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and provide “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 9 face,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The plausibility standard does not 10 require detailed allegations, but legal conclusions do not suffice. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 11 662, 678 (2009). If the allegations “do not permit the court to infer more than the mere 12 possibility of misconduct,” the complaint states no claim. Id. at 679. The complaint need not 13 identify “a precise legal theory.” Kobold v. Good Samaritan Reg’l Med. Ctr., 832 F.3d 1024, 14 1038 (9th Cir. 2016). Instead, what plaintiff must state is a “claim”—a set of “allegations that 15 give rise to an enforceable right to relief.” Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1264 16 n.2 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (citations omitted). 17 The court must construe a pro se litigant’s complaint liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 18 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam). The court may dismiss a pro se litigant’s complaint “if it 19 appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which 20 would entitle him to relief.” Hayes v. Idaho Corr. Ctr., 849 F.3d 1204, 1208 (9th Cir. 2017). 21 However, “‘a liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements 22 of the claim that were not initially pled.’” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 23 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)). 24 Analysis 25 The complaint alleges that as part of plaintiff’s senior class project at California State 26 University, Sacramento, she was tasked with creating a public relations plan for Loaves and 27 Fishes, a non-profit in Sacramento. ECF No. 3 at 7-8. At the time, defendant Sister Libby 28 Fernandez was the executive director of Loaves and Fishes. Id. Plaintiff claims that defendant 1 Fernandez used this plan to incorporate a new non-profit called “Mercy Pedlars.” Id. According 2 to the complaint, defendant Fernandez stole this idea from plaintiff, gave her and her classmates 3 no credit for the idea, and received compensation in the form of donations to Mercy Pedlars. Id. 4 Plaintiff seeks to hold defendant Fernandez liable for using her intellectual property. Id. To do 5 so, plaintiff has asserted numerous state and federal law claims, including discrimination, 6 defamation, wire fraud, copyright infringement, and RICO. Id. at 8-11. However, the complaint 7 as it stands fails to assert a cognizable claim. 8 Plaintiff’s claim that defendant Fernandez used her idea without permission does not 9 amount to a copyright infringement. “To prove copyright infringement, a plaintiff must 10 demonstrate (1) ownership of the allegedly infringed work and (2) copying of the protected 11 elements of the work by the defendant.” Pasillas v. McDonald’s Corp., 927 F.2d 440, 442 (9th 12 Cir. 1991). As to the first element, there is no allegation that plaintiff holds a valid copyright over 13 her plan. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (“[N]o civil action for infringement of the copyright in any United 14 States work shall be instituted until preregistration or registration of the copyright claim has been 15 made in accordance with this title.”); see Unicolors, Inc. v. Urban Outfitters, Inc., 853 F.3d 980, 16 984 (9th Cir. 2017) (stating that the plaintiff was “required to show registration as an element of 17 an infringement claim”). 18 Moreover, copyright protection is available for “original works of authorship fixed in any 19 tangible medium of expression,” such as literary, musical, dramatic, and graphic works. 17 20 U.S.C. § 102(a). Copyright protection is limited, such that it does not “extend to any idea, 21 procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of 22 the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.” 17 U.S.C. 23 § 102(b). Copyright protection is “given only to the expression of the idea—not the idea itself.” 24 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954). Plaintiff’s plan is therefore not covered under 25 copyright law. 26 Plaintiff also attempts to assert several criminal statues as basis for her claims. However, 27 criminal statutes “generally do not give rise to private rights of action.” Robertson v. Cath. Cmty. 28 Servs. of W. Wash., No. 22-35965, 2023 WL 3597383, at *1 (9th Cir. May 23, 2023) (citing Cent. 1 || Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 190 (1994)). Only 2 || where “Congress intended to create, [e1]ther expressly or by implication, a private cause of 3 || action” will a civil claim be recognized. Valero v. Bac Home Loans Servicing, LP, 667 F. App’x 4 || 255, 255 (2016) (quoting Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575 (1979)). Courts 5 || may not “infer a private right of action from ‘a bare criminal statute.”” Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 6 || U.S. at 190. Accordingly, the federal statutes on which plaintiff relies upon do not confer a basis 7 || for civil liability. See Valero, 667 F. App’x at 255 (affirming dismissal of civil claims asserted 8 | under Title 18 “because there is no private right of action provided by those criminal statutes’’). 9 Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that: 10 1. Plaintiffs request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, ECF No. 2, is granted. 11 2. Plaintiff is granted thirty days from the date of service of this order to file an amended 12 || complaint. The amended complaint must bear the docket number assigned to this case and must 13 || be labeled “Second Amended Complaint.” Failure to timely file an amended complaint in 14 || accordance with this order will result in a recommendation this action be dismissed. 15 16 IT IS SO ORDERED. 17 ( 1 St = Dated: _ September 4, 2024 ———- 18 JEREMY D. PETERSON 19 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28