Escobedo v. Thuong ( 2024 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 JOSE ESCOBEDO, 9 Case No. 1:24-cv-01081-JLT-SKO Plaintiff, 10 ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE RE v. 11 SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION QUE T. THUONG dba Pho Paradise Restaurant, 12 et al., 14 DAY DEADLINE 13 Defendants. 14 15 On September 12, 2024, Plaintiff Jose Escobedo (“Plaintiff”) filed his complaint against 16 Defendants Que T. Thuong, doing business as Pho Paradise Restaurant; Truong Van Pham, doing 17 business as Pho Paradise Restaurant; and TC Property Management, LTD (“Defendants”), alleging 18 claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act 19 (“Unruh Act”), and California’s Health and Safety Code. (Doc. 1). These claims stem from alleged 20 barriers Plaintiff encountered (such as lack of proper pavement markings and excessive slopes in 21 paths of travel) while he visited “Pho Paradise Restaurant,” a facility owned, operated, or leased by 22 Defendants. (See id.) 23 Based upon the Ninth Circuit opinion in Vo v. Choi, the Court will order Plaintiff to show 24 cause why the Court should not decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state 25 law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c); Vo v. Choi, 49 F.4th 1167 (9th Cir. 2022) (holding the district 26 court properly declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction in a joint Unruh Act and ADA case). 27 28 1 In the Unruh Act, a state law cause of action expands the remedies available in a private 2 action. California, in response to the resulting substantial volume of claims asserted under the Unruh 3 Act and the concern that high-frequency litigants may be using the statute to obtain monetary relief 4 for themselves without accompanying adjustments to locations to assure accessibility to others, 5 enacted filing restrictions designed to address that concern. Arroyo v. Rosas, 19 F.4th 1202, 1211– 6 12 (9th Cir. 2021). These heightened pleading requirements apply to actions alleging a 7 “construction-related accessibility claim,” which California law defines as “any civil claim in a civil 8 action with respect to a place of public accommodation, including but not limited to, a claim brought 9 under Section 51, 54, 54.1, or 55, based wholly or in part on an alleged violation of any construction- 10 related accessibility standard.” Cal. Civ. Code § 55.52(a)(1). The requirements apply to claims 11 brought under the Unruh Act as well as to related claims under the California Health & Safety Code. 12 See Gilbert v. Singh, No. 1:21cv1338-AWI-HBK, 2023 WL 2239335, *2 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2023). 13 California imposes additional limitations on “high-frequency litigants,” defined as: 14 A plaintiff who has filed 10 or more complaints alleging a construction-related accessibility violation within the 12-month period immediately preceding the 15 filing of the current complaint alleging a construction-related accessibility violation. 16 17 Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.55(b)(1). The definition of “high-frequency litigant” also extends to 18 attorneys. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.55(b)(2). “High-frequency litigants” are subject to a 19 special filing fee and further heightened pleading requirements. See Cal. Gov. Code § 70616.5; Cal. 20 Civ. Proc. Code § 425.50(a)(4)(A). By enacting restrictions on the filing of construction-related 21 accessibility claims, California has expressed a desire to limit the financial burdens California’s 22 businesses may face for claims for statutory damages under the Unruh Act and the California Health 23 & Safety Code . See Arroyo, 19 F.4th at 1206-07, 1212; Gilbert, 2023 WL 2239335, *2. The Ninth 24 Circuit has also expressed “concerns about comity and fairness” by permitting plaintiffs to 25 circumvent “California’s procedural requirements.” Vo, 49 F.4th at 1171. Plaintiffs who file these 26 actions in federal court evade these limits and pursue state law damages in a manner inconsistent 27 with the state law’s requirements. See generally, Arroyo, 19 F.4th at 1211–12; Vo v, 49 F.4th at 28 1171–72. 1 In an action in which a district court possesses original jurisdiction, that court “shall have 2 supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such 3 original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the 4 United States Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Even if supplemental jurisdiction exists, 5 however, district courts have discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. 6 § 1367(c). Such discretion may be exercised “[d]epending on a host of factors” including “the 7 circumstances of the particular case, the nature of the state law claims, the character of the governing 8 state law, and the relationship between the state and federal claims.” City of Chicago v. Int’l Coll. 9 of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 173 (1997). 10 A review of Plaintiff Jose Escobedo’s prior cases from this District reveals that he has filed 11 ten or more complaints alleging a construction-related accessibility violation within the twelve- 12 month period immediately preceding the filing of the current complaint.1 See Jacobsen v. Mims, 13 No. 1:13-CV-00256-SKO-HC, 2013 WL 1284242, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2013) (“The Court may 14 take judicial notice of court records.”). 15 Accordingly, Plaintiff is ORDERED to show cause, in writing, within fourteen (14) days 16 of service of this order, why the Court should not decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction 17 over Plaintiff’s state law claims. Plaintiff is warned that a failure to respond may result in a 18 recommendation to dismiss of the entire action without prejudice. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) (stating that 19 dismissal is warranted “[i]f the plaintiff fails to . . . comply with . . . a court order”); see also Hells 20 Canyon Pres. Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 403 F.3d 683, 689 (9th Cir. 2005). An inadequate 21 response may result in a recommendation that supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law 22 claims be declined and that they be dismissed without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). 23 IT IS SO ORDERED. 24 25 Dated: September 16, 2024 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto . UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 26 27 1 Indeed, Plaintiff recently filed a response in another case on September 9, 2024, acknowledging that he would be considered a high-frequency litigant under California law. See Escobedo v. Sumrein, 1:24-cv-00990-KES-SKO (Doc. 28 5, p. 2: “Plaintiff acknowledges that he would be considered a high-frequency litigant under California law as he filed