(PC) Duncan v. California Healthcare Receivership Corp. ( 2024 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 DIONTAE JOHAN DUNCAN, Case No. 1:20-cv-01288-KES-SKO (PC) 12 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 13 v. Doc. 109 14 CALIFORNIA HEALTHCARE RECEIVERSHIP CORP., et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff Diontae Johan Duncan is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil 18 rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has filed a motion (Doc. 109) that 19 the court construes as a motion for reconsideration of the court’s prior order at Doc. 80 dismissing 20 certain claims and defendants. 21 I. RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY 22 On April 13, 2023, the court issued findings and recommendations to dismiss certain 23 claims and defendants from plaintiff’s second amended complaint following screening. Doc. 75. 24 The assigned magistrate judge found, in relevant part: 25 Plaintiff’s second amended complaint names “T. Taylor” in the caption. (Doc. 52 at 1.) Subsequently, under the heading “III. 26 Defendants” in the complaint form, Plaintiff identifies “T. Taylor” as “employed as E.O.P. Supervisor.” (Id. at 3.) Later, Plaintiff provides 27 an additional handwritten page with a heading titled “III. Defendan[t]s continued” wherein he states “Taylor, is employed as 28 Licensed Clinical Social Worker at KVSP.” (Id. at 4.) Nevertheless, 1 it is clear from the factual content of the claims asserted there is but one Defendant Taylor. 2 Id. at 5, n.1. The magistrate judge recommended plaintiff’s second amended complaint proceed 3 only on his Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to serious medical needs claims (Claim I) 4 against defendants Marciel, Graywall,1 Taylor, Gerderal and Jane Does #1 and #2, that the 5 remaining claims against all named defendants be dismissed, and that defendants California 6 Healthcare Receivership Corp., Warden P. Phiffer, and Psychologist Rubbish be dismissed from 7 the action. Id. at 15-16. 8 Plaintiff filed objections to the findings and recommendations on April 21, 2023. 9 Doc. 77. On June 1, 2023, the then-assigned district judge issued an order adopting the findings 10 and recommendations. Doc. 80. Noting plaintiff’s objections, the court found “Plaintiff appears 11 to request the Court to adopt in full the Magistrate Judge’s findings and recommendations and 12 explains how the alleged actions in his complaint impact his wellbeing today.” Id. at 2. The 13 findings and recommendations were adopted in full, the action was ordered to “proceed only on 14 the Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to serious medical needs claims pursuant to 42 15 U.S.C. § 1983 against defendant[s] Marciel, Graywall, Taylor, Gerderal, and Jane Does #1 and #2 16 (Claim I) in Plaintiff’s second amended complaint,” the remaining claims were dismissed, and 17 defendants California Healthcare Receivership Corp., Warden P. Phiffer, and Psychologist 18 Rubbish were dismissed. Id. at 3. 19 The magistrate judge issued an order finding service appropriate on June 6, 2023. 20 Doc. 81. Defendants Marciel, Graywall, Taylor and Gerderal III were to be served pursuant to 21 the court’s e-service pilot program. Id. at 1-2. Relevant here, service was to be effected on: “T. 22 Taylor, allegedly employed as a licensed clinical social worker (LCSW) and/or EOP supervisor at 23 Kern Valley State Prison between 2017 and 2020.” Id. at 2. 24 On July 20, 2023, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) 25 filed its notice of intent to waive service concerning defendants J. Marciel and T. Taylor. 26 27 1 Later, Defendant Graywall’s correct surname was identified as “Grewal” and Defendant Gerderal’s correct surname was identified as Gallienne III.” See Doc. 98. 28 1 Doc. 87. Defendant Taylor is specifically identified as “Tristan Taylor, Clinical Social Worker.” 2 Id. On August 21, 2023, the waiver of service was returned executed as to those individuals. 3 Doc. 94. 4 On November 15, 2023, defendant Taylor filed a motion to dismiss the claim asserted 5 against him in plaintiff’s second amended complaint. Doc. 101. Plaintiff filed an opposition to 6 the motion on November 27, 2023 (Doc. 104) and defendant Taylor replied on December 6, 2023 7 (Doc. 108).2 8 On December 6, 2023, plaintiff filed a document titled “Motion – Regarding an error done 9 by the court, regarding the identifications of two defendants and the waiver of service of these 10 two defendants,” Doc. 109, which the court construes as a motion for reconsideration of the 11 court’s order at Doc. 80. On January 9, 2024, defendants filed an opposition to plaintiff’s motion. 12 Doc. 111. Plaintiff replied to defendants’ opposition. Doc. 113. 13 II. DISCUSSION 14 In his motion, plaintiff contends his second amended complaint includes a “documented 15 account … of (TWO) defendants by the name of T. Taylor.” Doc. 109 at 1, emphasis omitted. 16 He states the first T. Taylor is an “EOP Supervisor and is a psychologist” and the second T. 17 Taylor “is a clinical social worker and his full name is Tristen Taylor CSW.” Plaintiff states “the 18 court appears to have a hard time identifying if there are (two) T. Taylors are [sic] just (one).” Id. 19 at 2. He “assures the court that there are (two) T. Taylors.” Id. Plaintiff asserts the T. Taylor 20 employed as an EOP Supervisor and Psychologist was involved in the March 2017 events and the 21 T. Taylor employed as a Licensed Clinical Social Worker was involved in the May 2018 events. 22 Id. Plaintiff asserts he “wrote about these two separate T. Taylors actions in [his] opposition to 23 defendant T. Taylor’s motion to dismiss [originally] yet upon looking back to record I noticed 24 that the court had trouble [if] there were [one] or [two] T. Taylors.” Id. at 3. He states that “the 25 court further only waived service to [one] T. Taylor and plaintiff is unsure now what T. Taylor 26 was served and waived services.” Id. Plaintiff asserts he “would like to plead against both T. 27 28 2 The motion to dismiss is pending before the magistrate judge. 1 Taylors.” Id. He asks the court to accept “this informational motion to keep up proceedings 2 accordingly as court deems judicial economical” and “feels both defendants T. Taylor” claims 3 should proceed. Id. at 4. 4 In their opposition, defendants contend that “[a]lthough not entirely clear, Plaintiff’s 5 Motion appears to seek reconsideration of the court’s April 13, 2023 screening order … which 6 found that Plaintiff stated a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim against only one defendant 7 named T. Taylor.” Doc. 111 at 2. Defendants rely on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) in 8 asserting the motion for reconsideration should be denied. Id. They assert plaintiff has failed to 9 set forth facts or law “of a strongly convincing nature such that the Court should reverse its prior 10 decision.” Id. at 3. Defendants contend plaintiff’s only argument is that the court erred when it 11 ordered service of process on only one “T. Taylor.” Id. Defendants note that plaintiff’s 12 objections to the court’s April 13, 2023, findings and recommendations did not address the 13 “recommendation that only one defendant named T. Taylor be served.” Id. Defendants assert 14 plaintiff’s motion should be denied. Id. 15 Plaintiff does not assert a statutory or common law basis for his motion. Defendants cite 16 to Rule 60(b), but that rule authorizes requests for reconsideration only of “a final judgment, 17 order or proceeding.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). 18 “A motion for reconsideration should not be granted, absent highly unusual 19 circumstances, unless the district court is presented with newly discovered evidence, committed 20 clear error, or if there is an intervening change in the controlling law,” and it “may not be used to 21 raise arguments or present evidence for the first time when they could reasonably have been 22 raised earlier in the litigation.” Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc. v. Mucos Pharma GmbH & Co., 571 23 F.3d 873, 880 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotations marks & citations omitted). Reconsideration of 24 a prior order is an extraordinary remedy “to be used sparingly in the interests of finality and 25 conservation of judicial resources.” Kona Enters., Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 F. 3d 877, 890 26 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted); see also Harvest v. Castro, 531 F.3d 737, 749 (9th Cir. 2008) 27 (addressing reconsideration under Rule 60(b)). In seeking reconsideration, the moving party 28 “must demonstrate both injury and circumstances beyond his control.” Harvest, 531 F.3d at 749 1 (internal quotation marks & citation omitted). 2 Further, Local Rule 230(j) requires, in relevant part, that a movant show “what new or 3 different facts or circumstances are claimed to exist which did not exist or were not shown” 4 previously, “what other grounds exist for the motion,” and “why the facts or circumstances were 5 not shown” at the time the substance of the order which is objected to was considered. 6 Plaintiff fails to demonstrate any circumstances warranting reconsideration of the court’s 7 prior order. Plaintiff presents neither newly discovered evidence nor an intervening change in the 8 controlling law. At most, plaintiff presents an argument for the first time that could reasonably 9 have been raised earlier in the litigation. Plaintiff did not object to the magistrate judge’s 10 conclusion that only one individual named T. Taylor was named in his second amended 11 complaint. Plaintiff’s objections to the findings and recommendations made no mention of the 12 alleged discrepancy or error of which he now complains. See Doc. 77. Motions for 13 reconsideration “may not be used to raise arguments or present evidence for the first time when 14 they could reasonably have been raised earlier in the litigation.” Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc., 571 15 F.3d at 880. Moreover, a review of plaintiff’s second amended complaint confirms that the prior 16 order’s conclusion that plaintiff’s pleading referenced a single “Taylor” defendant is a reasonable 17 interpretation of plaintiff’s allegations. See Doc. 52. 18 In sum, plaintiff's motion does not identify any basis for reconsideration of the court’s 19 order that plaintiff’s second amended complaint identified claims against only one Taylor 20 defendant. Therefore, plaintiff's motion for reconsideration (Doc. 109) is denied. See Kona 21 Enters., Inc., 229 F. 3d at 890 (reconsideration of a prior order is an extraordinary remedy “to be 22 used sparingly in the interests of finality and conservation of judicial resources”). 23 /// 24 /// 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 1 | IN. CONCLUSION AND ORDER 2 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff's motion filed December 6, 2023 3 | (Doc. 109) is DENIED. 4 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. _ 6 Dated: _ October 11, 2024 4h UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28