Murillo-Esparza v. Bar 20 Dairy Farms LLC ( 2024 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JOSE MURILLO-ESPARZA, Case No. 1:24-cv-01354-SAB 12 Plaintiff, ORDER SCREENING COMPLAINT GRANTING PLAINTIFF LEAVE TO 13 v. AMEND 14 BAR 20 DAIRY FARMS LLC, (ECF No. 1) 15 Defendant. THIRTY-DAY DEADLINE 16 17 18 Jose Murillo-Esparza (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this 19 action on November 6, 2024. Plaintiff’s complaint is currently before the Court for screening. 20 I. 21 SCREENING REQUIREMENT 22 Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court may dismiss a case at any 23 time if the Court determines the complaint “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim 24 on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune 25 from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); see Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 26 2000) (section 1915(e) applies to all in forma pauperis complaints, not just those filed by 27 prisoners); Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (dismissal required of in forma pauperis proceedings which seek monetary relief from immune defendants); Cato v. United 1 States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995) (district court has discretion to dismiss in forma 2 pauperis complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 3 1998) (affirming sua sponte dismissal for failure to state a claim). 4 In determining whether a complaint fails to state a claim, the Court uses the same 5 pleading standard used under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). A complaint must contain “a 6 short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief…” Fed. R. 7 Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the 8 elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 9 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 10 544, 555 (2007)). 11 In reviewing the pro se complaint, the Court is to liberally construe the pleadings and 12 accept as true all factual allegations contained in the complaint. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 13 94 (2007); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[W]here the 14 petitioner is pro se, particularly in civil rights cases, [courts should] construe the pleadings 15 liberally and … afford the petitioner the benefit of any doubt” (quoting Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 16 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010)).). Although a court must accept as true all factual allegations contained 17 in a complaint, a court need not accept a plaintiff’s legal conclusions as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 18 678. “[A] complaint [that] pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability 19 … ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.’ ” Id. 20 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Therefore, the complaint must contain sufficient factual 21 content for the court to draw the reasonable conclusion that the defendant is liable for the 22 misconduct alleged. Id. Leave to amend may be granted to the extent that the deficiencies of the 23 complaint can be cured by amendment. Cato v. U.S., 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995). 24 II. 25 COMPLAINT ALLEGATIONS 26 The Court accepts Plaintiff’s allegations in the complaint as true only for the purpose of 27 the sua sponte screening requirement under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. 1 Plaintiff states the basis for jurisdiction is federal question jurisdiction. (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff lists 2 “wrongful termination, labor laws” as the federal statutes at issue in this action. (Id.) Despite 3 indicating the case arises under federal question jurisdiction, Plaintiff also completes the amount 4 in controversy form question for diversity jurisdiction. (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff states the amount in 5 controversy is “$1.5 million worked for over 20+ years, + 1 year of no employment w/o 6 employment.” (Id.) (unedited). 7 Under statement of claim, Plaintiff writes: “1) wrongful termination; 2) emotional 8 distress[;] 3) pain and suffering job was given to a relative of supervisor with less experience, 9 Racism.” (Id.) (unedited). 10 III. 11 DISCUSSION 12 A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 13 Pursuant to Rule 8(a), a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim 14 showing that the pleader is entitled to relief[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “Such a statement must 15 simply give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which 16 it rests.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002) (citations and quotations 17 omitted). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements 18 of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. 19 at 678 (citation omitted). This is because, while factual allegations are accepted as true, legal 20 conclusions are not. Id.; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-57; Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 21 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). Therefore, Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, 22 accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 23 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads 24 factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 25 for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). 26 Plaintiff’s allegations consist of vague and conclusory statements of “wrongful 27 termination” and racism. As currently pled, Plaintiff’s complaint does not contain enough 1 liable for any misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Significantly, after naming Bar 20 2 Dairy LLC as a defendant, Plaintiff does not state any specific action that the entity Defendant 3 took relating to the alleged wrongful termination, violation of unspecified labor laws, racism, or 4 other misconduct.1 For these reasons, Plaintiff's complaint does not comply with the 5 requirements of Rule 8(a)(2). The Court will grant Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint to 6 allow Plaintiff to provide additional and specific factual details to the Court to state a cognizable 7 claim. 8 B. Diversity Jurisdiction and Federal Question Jurisdiction 9 Rule 8(a)(1) also requires a short and plain statement of the grounds for the Court’s 10 jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1). Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and their 11 power to adjudicate is limited to that granted by Congress. U.S. v. Sumner, 226 F.3d 1005, 1009 12 (9th Cir. 2000). Federal courts are presumptively without jurisdiction over civil actions, and the 13 burden to establish the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. 14 Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Generally, there are two bases for subject 15 matter jurisdiction: federal question jurisdiction and diversity jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 16 1332. Here, Plaintiff indicates his claims arise under federal question jurisdiction. However, 17 Plaintiff also partially completed the portion of the form complaint for claims proceeding under 18 diversity jurisdiction. The Court will therefore address each in turn. 19 1. Diversity Jurisdiction 20 District courts have original jurisdiction of all civil actions between citizens of different 21 States in which “the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of 22 interest and costs.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). This requires complete diversity of citizenship and the 23 presence “of a single plaintiff from the same State as a single defendant deprives the district 24 court of original diversity jurisdiction over the entire action.” Abrego Abrego v. The Dow 25 Chemical Co., 443 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted). 26 Here, Plaintiff alleges the amount in controversy is $1.5 million, which exceeds the 27 1 Plaintiff also alleges “emotional distress” and “pain and suffering”; however, it appears these allegations are 1 $75,000 threshold requirement for diversity jurisdiction. (ECF No. 1 at 5.) However, Plaintiff 2 alleges that he is a citizen of California and indicates that Bar 20 Dairy LLC is located in 3 California. (ECF No. 1 at 2.) The Court notes that “a limited liability company ‘is a citizen of 4 every state of which its owners/members are citizens,’ not the state in which it was formed or 5 does business.” NewGen, LLC v. Safe Cig, LLC, 840 F.3d 606, 612 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting 6 Johnson v. Columbia Props. Anchorage, LP, 437 F.3d 894, 899 (9th Cir. 2006)). Thus, the 7 citizenship of each owner or member of Bar 20 Dairy LLC is required to establish diversity 8 jurisdiction. As currently plead, diversity jurisdiction does not exist because Plaintiff and 9 Defendant Bar 20 Dairy LLC are both alleged to be citizens of the same state. 10 2. Federal Question Jurisdiction 11 Plaintiff also indicates jurisdiction in this action is based on a federal question. Pursuant 12 to 28 U.S. C. § 1331, federal courts have original jurisdiction over “all civil actions arising under 13 the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. “A case ‘arises under’ federal law either 14 where federal law creates the cause of action or where the vindication of a right under state law 15 necessarily turns on some construction of federal law.” Republican Party of Guam v. Gutierrez, 16 277 F.3d 1086, 1088 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal punctuation omitted) (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. 17 v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1983) (citations omitted)). “[T]he 18 presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the ‘well-pleaded complaint 19 rule,’ which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on 20 the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint.” Republican Party of Guam, 277 F.3d at 21 1089 (citations omitted). 22 Here, Plaintiff alleges federal question jurisdiction arises under “wrongful termination, 23 labor laws.” (ECF No. 1 at 4.) Plaintiff’s complaint falls far short of complying with the well- 24 pleaded complaint rule. However, should Plaintiff choose to amend his complaint, the Court 25 provides the following legal standards pertaining to wrongful termination and discrimination. 26 Under Title VII, an employer is prohibited from discriminating against any individual 27 because of the individual's race or color. Cornwell v. Electra Cent. Credit Union, 439 F.3d 1019, 1 1217, 1219 (9th Cir. 1998), as amended (Aug. 11, 1998) (noting California law under California 2 Fair Employment and Housing Act, California Government Code §§ 12900-12996 mirrors 3 federal law under Title VII, thus a plaintiff can bring claims under both Title VII and FEHA). 4 To establish a prima facie case under Title VII and FEHA, a plaintiff must show that (1) he is a 5 member of a protected class; (2) he was qualified for the position; (3) he suffered an adverse 6 employment action; and (4) similarly situated individuals outside his protected class were treated 7 more favorably. Fonseca v. Sysco Food Services of Arizona, Inc., 374 F.3d 840, 847 (9th Cir. 8 2004). 9 Plaintiff's complaint contains insufficient facts and fails to state any cognizable claim for 10 violation of Plaintiff's federal rights. 11 IV. 12 CONCLUSION AND ORDER 13 Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a cognizable claim for relief. 14 The Court will grant Plaintiff an opportunity to amend the complaint to cure the above-identified 15 deficiencies to the extent Plaintiff is able to do so in good faith. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 16 1130 (9th Cir. 2000). 17 Plaintiff’s amended complaint should be brief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), but it must state what 18 each named defendant did that led to the deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, Iqbal, 19 556 U.S. at 678-79. Although accepted as true, the “[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] to 20 raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations 21 omitted). Additionally, Plaintiff may not change the nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated 22 claims in his first amended complaint. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (no 23 “buckshot” complaints). 24 Plaintiff is advised that an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. Lacey 25 v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 927. Therefore, Plaintiff’s first amended complaint must be 26 “complete in itself without reference to the prior or superseded pleading.” Local Rule 220. 27 Plaintiff’s first amended complaint must be filed within thirty (30) days, and is subject to the 1 Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 2 1. The Clerk of the Court shall send Plaintiff a civil rights complaint form; 3 2. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff shall file a 4 first amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the Court in this 5 order; 6 3. The first amended complaint, including attachments, shall not exceed twenty-five 7 (25) pages in length; and 8 4. If Plaintiff fails to comply with this order, the Court will recommend to □□□ 9 District Judge that this action be dismissed, for failure to prosecute and failure to 10 comply with a court order. 11 0 IT IS SO ORDERED. FA. ee 13 | Dated: _ November 13, 2024 STANLEY A. BOONE 14 United States Magistrate Judge 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28