Beyard v. Pentagon Federal Credit Union ( 2024 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 | Denise Beyard et al., No. 1:21-cv-01063-KJM-SAB 12 Plaintiffs, ORDER 13 Vv. Pentagon Federal Credit Union et al., 1S Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiffs request to seal two exhibits to a declaration related to defendant’s motion to 18 | dismiss. The court denies the request without prejudice to renewal. 19 “[T]he courts of this country recognize a general right to inspect and copy public records 20 | and documents, including judicial records and documents.” Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, 21 | 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978) (footnotes omitted). Although that right is not absolute, “‘a strong 22 | presumption in favor of access’ is the starting point.” Kamakana v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 23 | 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 24 | 1122, 1135 (9th Cir. 2003)). This presumption “is ‘based on the need for federal courts, although 25 | independent—indeed, particularly because they are independent—to have a measure of 26 | accountability and for the public to have confidence in the administration of justice.’” Ctr. for 27 | Auto Safety v. Chrysler Grp., LLC, 809 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. 28 | Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044, 1048 (2d Cir. 1995)). 1 For these reasons, courts grant requests to seal records in civil cases in only limited 2 circumstances, such as to protect against “gratif[ication of] private spite or promot[ion of] public 3 scandal” or to preclude court dockets from being “reservoirs of libelous statements” or “sources 4 of business information that might harm a litigant’s competitive standing.” Nixon, 435 U.S. at 5 597 (citations omitted). When a party moves to seal a record, the court determines whether the 6 underlying filing is “more than tangentially related to the merits of a case.” Ctr. for Auto Safety, 7 809 F.3d at 1101. If so, then a party seeking to seal the record must satisfy the “stringent” 8 compelling-reasons standard. Id. at 1096. Here, the exhibits to the declaration are related to 9 defendant’s dispositive motion. See Mot. at 1, ECF No. 81. Materials related to dispositive 10 motions, as is the case here, carry a stronger presumption of access than non-dispositive motions. 11 See Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179. 12 Applying this standard to the plaintiffs’ request, “a court may seal records only when it 13 finds ‘a compelling reason and articulate[s] the factual basis for its ruling, without relying on 14 hypothesis or conjecture,’” and “then ‘conscientiously balance[s] the competing interests of the 15 public and the party who seeks to keep certain judicial records secret.’” Ctr. for Auto Safety, 16 809 F.3d at 1096−97 (first alteration in original) (quoting Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179). The 17 compelling-reasons standard applies even if the contents were previously filed under seal or are 18 covered by a generalized protective order, as is the case here. See Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1136; 19 Stipulated Protective Order, ECF No. 45. 20 The Eastern District of California has also adopted rules to clarify procedures for parties’ 21 compliance with the law reviewed above. Local Rule 141 provides that documents may be sealed 22 only by a written order of the court after a particularized request to seal has been made. E.D. Cal. 23 L.R. 141(a). A mere request to seal is not enough under the local rules. Local Rule 141(b) 24 expressly requires that “[t]he ‘Request to Seal Documents’ shall set forth the statutory or other 25 authority for sealing, the requested duration, the identity, by name or category, of persons to be 26 permitted access to the document, and all relevant information.” The court’s own Standing 27 Order, available on its web page, emphasizes the requirement that parties comply with the law 28 and the rules in making any sealing request, which they should do lightly and only rarely if at all. 1 | While the court should not have to remind a party of its orders setting out essential ground rules 2 | of acase, or set forth its local rules in such detail, or review the controlling authority from which 3 | the rules derive, it does so here in light of the unjustified request to seal presented by plaintiffs. 4 Plaintiffs’ request provides a brief and insufficient explanation of the specific prejudice or 5 | harm that will result absent sealing. Mot. at 1. The party’s reliance on a discovery protective 6 | order does not alone offer “a compelling reason to overcome the presumption in favor of access.” 7 | Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1138 (9th Cir. 2003). Plaintiffs also cite 8 | to FullView, Inc. v. Polycom, Inc., 635 F. Supp. 3d 917 (N.D. Cal. 2022) (subsequent history 9 | omitted) in support of their request. Mot. at 1. The court in Fu//View explained “[l]itigants may 10 | file under seal documents reflecting confidential, trade secret, and proprietary information,” 11 | FullView, 635 F. Supp 3d at 929, but plaintiffs offer no evidence the exhibits fall into any of these 12 | categories. As such, this court finds the request to fall significantly short of the applicable 13 | compelling-reasons standard. 14 The request to seal is denied without prejudice for renewal. 15 IT IS SO ORDERED. 16 DATED: November 13, 2024. 17 18 19 NITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE