In Re: Ddmb, Inc. , 681 F. App'x 919 ( 2017 )


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  •        NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    ______________________
    IN RE: DDMB, INC.,
    Appellant
    ______________________
    2016-2037
    ______________________
    Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark
    Office, Trademark Trial and Appeal Board in No.
    86/312,296.
    ______________________
    Decided: March 8, 2017
    ______________________
    MATTHEW R. GROTHOUSE, Saper Law Offices, LLC,
    Chicago, IL, for appellant.
    NATHAN K. KELLEY, Office of the Solicitor, United
    States Patent and Trademark Office, Alexandria, VA, for
    appellee Michelle K. Lee. Also represented by THOMAS L.
    CASAGRANDE.
    ______________________
    Before LOURIE, REYNA, and CHEN, Circuit Judges.
    LOURIE, Circuit Judge.
    DDMB, Inc. (“DDMB”) appeals from a decision of the
    U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) Trademark
    Trial and Appeal Board (“Board”) affirming the Examin-
    2                                          IN RE: DDMB, INC.
    ing Attorney’s rejection of the mark EMPORIUM
    ARCADE BAR and Design, absent a disclaimer of the
    term EMPORIUM. See In re DDMB Inc., No. 86312296,
    
    2016 WL 552609
     (T.T.A.B. Jan. 29, 2016) (“Decision”).
    For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
    BACKGROUND
    DDMB sought registration on the Principal Register
    of the mark EMPORIUM ARCADE BAR and Design (“the
    mark”), as depicted below:
    DDMB sought to register the mark in International Class
    41 (for “providing video and amusement arcade services”)
    and International Class 43 (for “bar services; bar services
    featuring snacks”). See Decision, 
    2016 WL 552609
    , at *2.
    The Examining Attorney refused registration under
    
    15 U.S.C. § 1056
    , on the ground that the terms
    EMPORIUM and ARCADE BAR are merely descriptive
    and must be disclaimed. DDMB agreed to disclaim
    ARCADE BAR but not EMPORIUM. Thus, the Examin-
    ing Attorney issued a final refusal, which DDMB ap-
    pealed to the Board.
    The Board affirmed the Examining Attorney’s refusal
    to register the mark absent a disclaimer of the term
    EMPORIUM. The Board found that the term
    EMPORIUM is descriptive of “video and amusement
    arcade services,” “bar services,” and “bar services featur-
    ing snacks.” See Decision, 
    2016 WL 552609
    , at *5. The
    Board cited several dictionary definitions of EMPORIUM,
    IN RE: DDMB, INC.                                           3
    including: (1) “a large retail store, especially one selling a
    great variety of articles”; (2) “a large store with a wide
    variety of things for sale”; and (3) “a place of commerce;
    trading center; marketplace.” Id. at *2. Based on those
    definitions, the Board found that EMPORIUM “con-
    not[ed]” the attributes of “size, variety of merchandise,
    and trading activity” and noted that both “[a]rcades and
    bars contain elements of these attributes.” Id.
    The Board also examined the dictionary definitions of
    “arcade” and “bar” and concluded that: (1) “[a]n arcade is
    an emporium in the sense that it provides the visitor with
    multiple opportunities to play a variety of different video
    games”; and (2) “[a] bar is an emporium in the sense that
    it is a retail outlet serving a variety of different alcoholic
    beverages.” Id. Thus, the Board found that EMPORIUM
    is descriptive of both arcade and bar services. The Board
    noted that the combination of EMPORIUM with ARCADE
    BAR does not give rise to a “unitary phrase”—which
    would indicate that EMPORIUM is not descriptive as
    used in the mark—but rather, each of the two terms
    “create[s] [a] separate and distinct commercial impres-
    sion[].” Id. at *3.
    Finally, the Board cited seven third-party registra-
    tions for marks containing the term EMPORIUM, regis-
    tered for restaurant, catering, and bar services, wherein
    EMPORIUM had been disclaimed. The Board explained
    that such third-party registrations, while not binding
    precedent, are useful as evidence, similar to a dictionary
    definition, to show the meaning of the term. See id. at *4.
    Thus, the Board concluded that EMPORIUM, as it relates
    to video and amusement arcade services and bar services,
    is merely descriptive and a disclaimer for that term is
    required. Id.
    DDMB timely appealed to this court. We have juris-
    diction pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1295
    (a)(4)(B).
    4                                          IN RE: DDMB, INC.
    DISCUSSION
    We review the Board’s legal conclusions de novo, In re
    Int’l Flavors & Fragrances Inc., 
    183 F.3d 1361
    , 1365 (Fed.
    Cir. 1999), and the Board’s factual findings for substantial
    evidence, On-Line Careline, Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 
    229 F.3d 1080
    , 1085 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Substantial evidence is
    defined as “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
    might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” In re
    Pacer Tech., 
    338 F.3d 1348
    , 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
    Whether a mark is descriptive is a fact question that we
    review for substantial evidence. In re TriVita, Inc., 
    783 F.3d 872
    , 874 (Fed. Cir. 2015). A mark is descriptive if it
    “‘consist[s] merely of words descriptive of the qualities,
    ingredients or characteristics of’ the goods or services
    related to the mark,” and, thus, “immediately conveys
    knowledge of a quality or characteristic of the product.”
    In re Oppedahl & Larson LLP, 
    373 F.3d 1171
    , 1173 (Fed.
    Cir. 2004) (alteration in original) (quoting Estate of P.D.
    Beckwith, Inc. v. Comm’r of Patents, 
    252 U.S. 538
    , 543
    (1920)).
    The Lanham Act provides that the PTO can “require
    the applicant to disclaim an unregistrable component of a
    mark otherwise registrable.” 
    15 U.S.C. § 1056
    (a). A mark
    or component is unregistrable if, “when used on or in
    connection with the goods of the applicant,” it is “merely
    descriptive . . . of them.” 
    15 U.S.C. § 1052
    (e)(1). Thus,
    the PTO “may require a disclaimer as a condition of
    registration if the mark is merely descriptive for at least
    one of the products or services involved.” In re Stereotax-
    is, Inc., 
    429 F.3d 1039
    , 1041 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
    On appeal, DDMB argues that the term EMPORIUM,
    when used in connection with “bar services” and “video
    and amusement arcade services,” is not descriptive, but
    rather is suggestive.  DDMB argues that the term
    EMPORIUM does not “immediately convey” knowledge of
    arcade and bar services “without resort to analysis or
    IN RE: DDMB, INC.                                         5
    speculation.” Appellant’s Br. 8. DDMB argues that the
    dictionary definitions of EMPORIUM, including “market-
    place,” “trading center,” and “retail store,” are “broad and
    vague” and “encompass[] such a broad sweep of commer-
    cial establishments” that the term cannot immediately
    convey knowledge of DDMB’s services with any “degree of
    particularity.” Id. at 8, 11. DDMB also argues that
    EMPORIUM, defined as a “retail store,” connotes a place
    of commerce for off-site consumption of the goods or
    services sold; in contrast, DDMB’s video/arcade and bar
    services are for on-site consumption of the goods and
    services provided. Id. at 14.
    Moreover, DDMB argues, the terms EMPORIUM and
    ARCADE BAR form a single “unitary mark,” for which no
    disclaimer can be required. See, e.g., Dena Corp. v. Belve-
    dere Int’l, Inc., 
    950 F.2d 1555
    , 1560–61 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
    DDMB argues that both (1) the “incongruous” use of the
    term EMPORIUM as an adjective modifying ARCADE
    BAR, instead of a noun, and (2) the “redundancy” of using
    EMPORIUM and ARCADE BAR, nouns with “overlap-
    ping” meanings, for video/arcade and bar services is so
    “unique” and “strange” that it renders the combination a
    “unitary mark” with no significant meaning beyond
    identifying DDMB’s services. See, e.g., Appellant’s Br. 21,
    22, 24. DDMB argues that the “incongruous redundancy”
    of the mark would “cause the average consumer to inter-
    pret the three words as one unitary phrase.” 
    Id.
     at 22–24.
    The PTO responds that the word EMPORIUM is de-
    scriptive for DDMB’s services because it immediately
    conveys the information of a commercial establishment
    featuring a variety of beverages and video arcade games.
    Appellee’s Br. 17. The PTO points to the dictionary
    definitions of EMPORIUM, including a “place of com-
    merce” or a “retail shop,” and argues that bars are a type
    of “retail outlet” because they “sell drinks” and that
    arcades, similarly, “provide games . . . when customers
    place coins in them.” 
    Id.
     Furthermore, the PTO argues
    6                                          IN RE: DDMB, INC.
    that EMPORIUM cannot connote only off-site consump-
    tion of goods or services because one of the dictionary
    definitions relied upon by the Board cited “pizza empori-
    um” as an example, and pizza would likely be consumed
    on-site at such an establishment. Finally, the PTO ar-
    gues that EMPORIUM combined with ARCADE BAR
    does not form a unitary mark because the composite mark
    does not possess a “distinct meaning of its own.” Id. at 30.
    The question before us is whether substantial evi-
    dence supports the Board’s findings that, as applied to
    DDMB’s services, EMPORIUM is merely descriptive and
    does not form a unitary mark in combination with
    ARCADE BAR. We agree with the PTO that substantial
    evidence supports the Board’s determinations.
    First, the Board found that EMPORIUM was descrip-
    tive of “video and amusement arcade services” and “bar
    services.” See Decision, 
    2016 WL 552609
    , at *2. That
    finding was based on, inter alia: (1) dictionary definitions
    of EMPORIUM indicating that the term connotes the
    “attributes” of “size, variety of merchandise, and trading
    activity”; (2) dictionary definitions of “arcade” and “bar,”
    which indicate that arcades and bars contain elements of
    those same attributes; (3) the example of “pizza empori-
    um,” provided by the Merriam-Webster dictionary defini-
    tion of “emporium,” indicating that goods or services may
    be consumed on-site at an emporium; and (4) seven third-
    party registrations disclaiming the term EMPORIUM for
    restaurant, catering, and bar services, as evidence, simi-
    lar to a dictionary definition, of the meaning of that term.
    
    Id.
     at *2–3. We conclude that the foregoing constitutes
    substantial evidence that supports the Board’s finding.
    Second, the Board found that EMPORIUM ARCADE
    BAR is not a unitary mark and, thus, EMPORIUM is not
    arbitrary as used in the mark. See id. at *3. The Board
    rejected DDMB’s “incongruous redundancy” argument,
    explaining that there is no redundancy—“‘emporium’ does
    IN RE: DDMB, INC.                                       7
    not overlap with ‘bar’” because “the two words are not
    synonyms.” Id. The Board also explained that the so-
    called “incongruous” use of EMPORIUM to modify the
    generic term ARCADE BAR does not, in and of itself,
    render EMPORIUM arbitrary. Id. And the Board found
    that the two terms do not form a unitary mark because
    each term “create[s] [a] separate and distinct commercial
    impression[].” Id.
    We find the Board’s determination to be supported by
    substantial evidence. For a composite mark to qualify as
    a “unitary mark,” the elements of the composite must be
    “inseparable.” Dena Corp., 950 F.3d at 1561. A unitary
    mark must have “a distinct meaning of its own independ-
    ent of the meaning of its constituent elements.” Id. (em-
    phasis added). For example, our predecessor court held
    that the composite mark SUGAR & SPICE is not descrip-
    tive of bakery products. See Application of Colonial
    Stores, Inc., 
    394 F.2d 549
    , 552–53 (C.C.P.A. 1968). There,
    the court explained that while, individually, both SUGAR
    and SPICE are descriptive of ingredients in bakery prod-
    ucts, the composite SUGAR & SPICE possessed a “remi-
    niscent, suggestive or associative connotation” due to the
    well-known nursery rhyme—“sugar and spice and every-
    thing nice”—and, thus, a “distinctive nature,” above and
    beyond the individual components. 
    Id. at 553
    . Unlike
    SUGAR & SPICE, which has a meaning all its own,
    “independent of the meaning of its constituent elements,”
    Dena Corp., 950 F.3d at 1561, EMPORIUM ARCADE
    BAR possesses no such independent significance. Thus,
    the composite mark is not a unitary mark that renders
    EMPORIUM, otherwise descriptive, exempt from a dis-
    claimer requirement.
    We note that DDMB agreed to disclaim ARCADE
    BAR as descriptive of its services. Thus, the argument
    that EMPORIUM is “redundant”—referring to DDMB’s
    “incongruous redundancy” argument—with ARCADE
    BAR would seem to be an admission that EMPORIUM is
    8                                       IN RE: DDMB, INC.
    also descriptive of those same services. Nevertheless,
    because we find the Board’s findings to be supported by
    substantial evidence, we need not reach the issue of
    whether DDMB’s argument constitutes an admission.
    We thus conclude that the Board’s findings that
    EMPORIUM is descriptive of DDMB’s services and that
    EMPORIUM ARCADE BAR is not a unitary mark are
    supported by substantial evidence.
    CONCLUSION
    We have considered DDMB’s remaining arguments
    but find them to be unpersuasive. For the foregoing
    reasons, we affirm the decision of the Board.
    AFFIRMED