Stoglin v. Merit Systems Protection Board , 640 F. App'x 864 ( 2016 )


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  •        NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    ______________________
    COREY DEMOND STOGLIN,
    Petitioner
    v.
    MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD,
    Respondent
    ______________________
    2015-3215
    ______________________
    Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection
    Board in Nos. SF-3330-13-1464-B-1, SF-3330-13-1464-I-1.
    ______________________
    Decided: January 13, 2016
    ______________________
    COREY DEMOND STOGLIN, Minneapolis, MN, pro se.
    KATRINA LEDERER, Office of the General Counsel,
    Merit Systems Protection Board, Washington, DC, for
    respondent. Also represented by BRYAN G. POLISUK.
    ______________________
    Before DYK, WALLACH, and HUGHES, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM.
    2                            STOGLIN   v. MERIT SYS. PROT. BD.
    Petitioner Corey Stoglin appeals the final decision of
    the Merit Systems Protection Board (“the Board”) dis-
    missing his appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
    See Stoglin v. Dep’t of Air Force, No. SF-3330-13-1464-B-
    1, 
    2015 WL 4166462
     (M.S.P.B. July 9, 2015). For the
    reasons set forth below, this court affirms.
    BACKGROUND
    Mr. Stoglin applied for the position of Equal Employ-
    ment Manager with the Hawaii Air National Guard
    (“HANG”) that was announced under the authority set
    forth in 
    32 U.S.C. § 709
     (2012). 1 After the Office of Per-
    sonnel Management (“OPM”) 2 referred its initial selection
    of eligible candidates to the HANG, it reevaluated wheth-
    er awarding a veteran employment preference was appro-
    priate because 
    32 U.S.C. § 709
    (g) precludes awarding
    veteran’s preference. Resp’t’s App. 33–34; see 
    32 U.S.C. § 709
    (g) (“Sections 2108, 3502, 7511, and 7512 of title 5 do
    not apply to a person employed under this section.”); 
    5 U.S.C. § 2108
     (veteran’s preference statute). Based on its
    reevaluation, OPM determined the job announcement was
    incorrect. Resp’t’s App. 33. As a result, OPM released
    “[a] new Vacancy Announcement . . . without mention of
    veteran’s preference, and the pool of candidates was re-
    rated without veteran’s preference.” Id. at 34 (citation
    omitted). In January 2011, OPM notified Mr. Stoglin that
    his application was received, but that he was not among
    the best-qualified candidates and his name was not
    referred to the HANG for consideration.
    1   The record does not disclose the date that Mr.
    Stoglin filed his application.
    2   Mr. Stoglin stated in his Petition for Appeal that
    “OPM conducted a search on behalf of [the] [HANG].”
    Resp’t’s App. 11 (first alteration in original) (citation
    omitted).
    STOGLIN   v. MERIT SYS. PROT. BD.                       3
    In July 2013, Mr. Stoglin filed an appeal with the
    Board regarding his non-selection, which was construed
    as a claim under the Veterans Employment Opportunities
    Act of 1998 (“VEOA”). See Stoglin v. Dep’t of Air Force,
    No. SF-3330-13-1464-I-1 (M.S.P.B. Dec. 6, 2013) (Resp’t’s
    App. 31–42). During an August 2013 telephonic confer-
    ence call, Mr. Stoglin also suggested his appeal was a
    Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment
    Rights Act (“USERRA”) claim. Mr. Stoglin alleged “his
    veteran status [as a traditional reservist] should have
    given him a hiring preference, and because it was not
    applied, a nonveteran was hired instead.” Resp’t’s App.
    33.
    Initially, an administrative judge within the Board
    determined that the Board did not have jurisdiction under
    the USERRA or the VEOA and dismissed Mr. Stoglin’s
    appeal. See generally id. at 34–37. However, Mr. Stoglin
    sought review of the administrative judge’s dismissal, and
    the Board granted his petition and remanded the case for
    further proceedings on Mr. Stoglin’s USERRA claim. 3 See
    Stoglin v. Dep’t of Air Force, No. SF-3330-13-1464-I-1
    (M.S.P.B. Sept. 23, 2014) (Resp’t’s App. 21–30). The
    Board determined that, while Mr. Stoglin’s allegations
    were conclusory, they were “sufficient to establish Board
    jurisdiction over his USERRA claim.” Resp’t’s App. 29
    (citation omitted).
    On remand, the administrative judge granted the
    United States Department of the Air Force’s (“Agency”)
    motion to dismiss for lack of Board jurisdiction. See
    Stoglin v. Dep’t of Air Force, No. SF-3330-13-1464-B-1
    (M.S.P.B. Jan. 21, 2015) (Resp’t’s App. 8–20). The admin-
    istrative judge determined that, “[a]lthough not raised in
    the [i]nitial [a]ppeal, the [A]gency’s motion on [r]emand
    3   Mr. Stoglin’s VEOA claim was ultimately dis-
    missed for being untimely filed. See Resp’t’s App. 23–28.
    4                            STOGLIN   v. MERIT SYS. PROT. BD.
    raises a fundamental question of whether [Mr. Stoglin’s]
    USERRA claims concerning actions within the authority
    of the [HANG] . . . fall within the Board’s jurisdiction or
    should properly be within the jurisdiction of the state
    court.” Resp’t’s App. 11. In considering this question, the
    administrative judge quoted the applicable provision of
    USERRA, which states in relevant part that
    (A) Except as provided in subparagraphs (B) and
    (C), the term “employer’’ means any person,
    institution, organization, or other entity that
    pays salary or wages for work performed or
    that has control over employment opportuni-
    ties, including— . . . (ii) the Federal Govern-
    ment; (iii) a State; . . . (v) a person,
    institution, organization, or other entity that
    has denied initial employment in violation of
    section 4311.
    (B) In the case of a National Guard technician
    employed under section 709 of title 32, the
    term “employer” means the adjutant general
    of the state in which the technician is em-
    ployed.
    Id. at 11–12 (quoting 
    38 U.S.C. § 4303
    (4)(A), (B)). The
    administrative judge determined “under a plain reading
    of the statute, the USERRA claim by a National Guard
    Technician [] against the employing state agency is
    properly before the appropriate state court where the
    state agency is located.” Id. at 12. Thus, Mr. Stoglin’s
    “USERRA [claim] would properly be before the state
    courts of Hawaii, not the Board.” Id.
    Mr. Stoglin appealed the administrative judge’s re-
    mand decision to the Board, which affirmed the adminis-
    trative judge’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction over Mr.
    Stoglin’s USERRA claim. See Stoglin, 
    2015 WL 4166462
    at *2. The Board noted the position Mr. Stoglin applied
    for with the HANG “was advertised as a nondual status
    STOGLIN   v. MERIT SYS. PROT. BD.                          5
    position.” 
    Id.
     (citations omitted). It observed that “[t]he
    employment of such nondual status employees is author-
    ized by 
    10 U.S.C. § 10217
    (a), and the incumbents are
    civilian employees.” 
    Id.
     (citing 
    10 U.S.C. § 10217
    (a)). The
    Board further noted that, “[a]lthough they are employees
    of the Department of Defense, and thus considered federal
    employees for most purposes, National Guard civilian
    technicians are considered state employees for USERRA
    purposes.” 
    Id.
     As a result, the Board held that Mr.
    Stoglin’s “USERRA claim against the [HANG] [was] not
    properly before the Board and [] dismiss[ed] it for lack of
    jurisdiction.” 
    Id.
    The Board found support for its conclusion in the
    United States Department of Labor’s regulations that
    implement USERRA. It observed that “‘[a] National
    Guard civilian technician is considered a State employee
    for USERRA purposes, although he or she is considered a
    Federal employee for most other purposes.’” 
    Id.
     (altera-
    tion in original) (quoting 
    20 C.F.R. § 1002.306
    ). The
    Board stated these regulations explain that “‘[a]n action
    brought against a State Adjutant General, as an employer
    of a civilian National Guard technician, is considered an
    action against a State for purposes of determining which
    court has jurisdiction.’” 
    Id.
     (alteration in original) (quot-
    ing 
    20 C.F.R. § 1002.305
    (d)). Thus, the Board concluded
    that “an action under USERRA against a state ‘may be
    brought in a State court of competent jurisdiction accord-
    ing to the laws of the State.’” 
    Id.
     (quoting 
    20 C.F.R. § 1002.305
    (b)).
    Mr. Stoglin timely appealed. This court possesses ju-
    risdiction to review the Board’s final decision pursuant to
    
    28 U.S.C. § 1295
    (a)(9) (2012).
    6                            STOGLIN   v. MERIT SYS. PROT. BD.
    DISCUSSION
    I. Standard of Review
    “Whether the Board has jurisdiction to adjudicate a
    particular appeal is a question of law, which we review de
    novo.” Herman v. Dep’t of Justice, 
    193 F.3d 1375
    , 1378
    (Fed. Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). However, “we are
    bound by the [administrative judge’s] factual determina-
    tions [that form the basis of the jurisdiction determina-
    tion] unless those findings are not supported by
    substantial evidence.” Bolton v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 
    154 F.3d 1313
    , 1316 (Fed. Cir. 1998). “Substantial evidence is
    more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evi-
    dence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
    support a conclusion.” Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 
    305 U.S. 197
    , 217 (1938) (citations omitted).
    II. The Board Did Not Possess Jurisdiction over Mr.
    Stoglin’s USERRA Claim
    Mr. Stoglin argues the “USERRA was not applied as
    liberally as Congress intended . . . [and the Board] failed
    to apply the law correctly and never addressed many of
    the issues of [his] case . . . .” Pet’r’s Br. 1. Mr. Stoglin
    also contends the Board’s decision failed to consider “[t]he
    fact that the adverse action taken by the [A]gency was a
    result of retaliation by an [A]gency official who violated
    USERRA.” 
    Id.
    The Board did not err in its determination that it
    lacked jurisdiction to hear Mr. Stoglin’s USERRA claims.
    As explained by the Board, the USERRA explicitly states
    “‘[i]n the case of a National Guard technician employed
    under section 709 of [T]itle 32 [of the United States Code],
    the term ‘employer’ means the adjutant general of the
    State in which the technician is employed.’” Stoglin, 
    2015 WL 4166462
     at *2 (first alteration in original) (quoting 
    38 U.S.C. § 4303
    (4)(B)). In Mr. Stoglin’s case, the position he
    applied for with the HANG was announced “under the
    STOGLIN   v. MERIT SYS. PROT. BD.                          7
    authority set forth in 
    32 U.S.C. § 709
    ,” thus, the “employ-
    er” was the State Adjutant General of Hawaii. Resp’t’s
    App. 33; see also id. at 11 (discussing the job announce-
    ment submitted with Mr. Stoglin’s Petition for Appeal to
    the Board).
    This court has previously stated the procedure for
    “‘[e]nforcement of [USERRA] rights with respect to a
    State or private employer’ is set out in 
    38 U.S.C. § 4323
    ,
    which provides for district court jurisdiction over actions
    against a state commenced by the United States, and
    state court jurisdiction over actions against a state com-
    menced by a person.” Asatov v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 595
    F. App’x 979, 982 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (unpublished) (altera-
    tions in original). This court has also stated “[t]he Na-
    tional Guard federal regulations explain that ‘[a]n action
    brought against a State Adjutant General, as an employer
    of a civilian National Guard technician, is considered an
    action against a State for purposes of determining which
    court has jurisdiction.’” 
    Id.
     (second alteration in original)
    (quoting 
    20 C.F.R. § 1002.305
    (d)).
    Because Mr. Stoglin’s claim is against the State Adju-
    tant General of Hawaii, as the employer of civilian Na-
    tional Guard technicians, he must seek resolution of his
    claim in Hawaii state court. See Asatov, 595 F. App’x at
    982 (“[T]he scheme of the National Guard Technicians Act
    is to create the technicians as nominal federal employees
    for a very limited purpose and to recognize the military
    authority of the states through their Governors and
    Adjutants General to employ, command and discharge
    them.” (citation omitted)); 
    38 U.S.C. § 4323
    (b)(2).
    CONCLUSION
    Because the Board properly determined that it did not
    possess jurisdiction over Mr. Stoglin’s USERRA claims,
    we need not address his arguments as to the merits of his
    case. For the reasons set forth above, the final decision of
    8                            STOGLIN   v. MERIT SYS. PROT. BD.
    the Merit Systems Protection Board dismissing Mr.
    Stoglin’s case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is
    AFFIRMED
    COSTS
    Each party shall bear its own costs.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2015-3215

Citation Numbers: 640 F. App'x 864

Judges: Dyk, Wallach, Hughes

Filed Date: 1/13/2016

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024