In Re MODERN FONT APPLICATIONS LLC ( 2021 )


Menu:
  • Case: 21-138   Document: 13     Page: 1    Filed: 05/04/2021
    NOTE: This order is nonprecedential.
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    ______________________
    In re: MODERN FONT APPLICATIONS LLC,
    Petitioner
    ______________________
    2021-138
    ______________________
    On Petition for Writ of Mandamus to the United States
    District Court for the District of Utah in No. 2:19-cv-561-
    DBB-CMR, Judge David Barlow.
    ______________________
    ON PETITION
    ______________________
    Before PROST, Chief Judge, O’MALLEY and WALLACH, Cir-
    cuit Judges.
    PROST, Chief Judge.
    ORDER
    Modern Font Applications LLC (MFA)’s petition chal-
    lenges the United States District Court for the District of
    Utah’s March 2, 2021 order requiring MFA to turn over cer-
    tain documents in discovery. We deny the petition.
    MFA brought this suit against Alaska Airlines alleging
    infringement of 
    U.S. Patent No. 9,886,421
    . Alaska re-
    quested discovery of settlement agreements between MFA
    and other parties relating to the patent. MFA rejected
    turning over the agreements, claiming they were protected
    Case: 21-138    Document: 13      Page: 2    Filed: 05/04/2021
    2                       IN RE: MODERN FONT APPLICATIONS LLC
    under the common interest privilege. * Alaska moved to
    compel production of all settlement agreements as relevant
    to determining a reasonable royalty. The district court
    judge, agreeing with the magistrate’s order, ruled that the
    documents were not privileged. MFA now petitions for a
    writ of mandamus challenging the ruling.
    Mandamus is a “drastic and extraordinary” remedy
    “reserved for really extraordinary causes.” Cheney v. U.S.
    Dist. Ct. for D.C., 
    542 U.S. 367
    , 380 (2004) (internal quota-
    tion marks and citation omitted). In seeking a writ of man-
    damus, MFA must establish a “clear and indisputable”
    right to relief and that it has “no other adequate means to
    attain the relief” it seeks. 
    Id.
     at 380–81 (internal quotation
    marks and citations omitted). And, “even if the first two
    prerequisites have been met, the issuing court, in the exer-
    cise of its discretion, must be satisfied that the writ is ap-
    propriate under the circumstances.” 
    Id. at 381
    . MFA has
    not satisfied those requirements for relief.
    To begin, MFA has not established that it has no alter-
    native means to obtain meaningful relief on this matter. In
    accordance with Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter, 
    558 U.S. 100
    , 109 (2009) and other Supreme Court precedent,
    we have recognized that mandamus is ordinarily unavail-
    able for immediate review of pretrial discovery rulings be-
    cause a post-judgment appeal generally is an adequate
    remedy for asserting privilege violations. See Waymo LLC
    *    By the common interest privilege, we understand
    MFA to be invoking the general exception to the ordinary
    attorney-client privilege waiver rule when attorneys for
    different clients are pursuing a common legal cause to com-
    municate with each other. See generally In re Regents of
    Univ. of Cal., 
    101 F.3d 1386
    , 1390 (Fed. Cir. 1996). MFA
    also relies heavily on the fact that the parties to the agree-
    ments also entered into confidentiality agreements.
    Case: 21-138     Document: 13      Page: 3     Filed: 05/04/2021
    IN RE: MODERN FONT APPLICATIONS LLC                                 3
    v. Uber Techs., Inc., 
    870 F.3d 1350
    , 1357–58 (Fed. Cir.
    2017). Although we have recognized that mandamus may
    be available to review particularly injurious or novel privi-
    lege rulings, 
    id. at 1358
    , we cannot say that MFA has
    shown those circumstances exist here.
    As to injury, MFA fails to identify any specific or
    unique harm or prejudice that would occur in this case if
    MFA were required to wait to seek vacatur of the ruling
    and remand for a new trial in a post-judgment appeal. In-
    stead, it relies only on the general argument that “[o]nce
    disclosed, the privileged materials could not be unseen by
    Alaska’s counsel (and Alaska itself),” and “later exclusion
    from evidence would not prevent the privileged materials
    from being improperly used against MFA[.]” Reply at 14–
    15. Such allegations, however, are generally insufficient to
    establish the need for mandamus review. See Waymo, 870
    F.3d at 1358 (rejecting same general argument).
    Nor has MFA raised a particularly novel issue. In In
    re MSTG, Inc., 
    675 F.3d 1337
    , 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2012), this
    court declined to recognize a common law privilege that
    would prevent discovery of litigation settlement negotia-
    tions and other communications. That issue had split both
    circuit courts and district courts. 
    Id.
     at. 1342. While MFA
    argues that MSTG did not expressly address application of
    the attorney-client privilege and common interest doctrine
    to the settlement agreements themselves, that issue is not
    one that involves any apparent disagreement among trial
    courts that might warrant immediate resolution.
    Moreover, MFA shows no clear and indisputable error
    on the part of the district court in rejecting its claim of priv-
    ilege. In concluding in MSTG that settlement communica-
    tions were not privileged, we emphasized the fact that
    Congress had elected not to protect both settlement agree-
    ments and settlement communications from discovery in
    Rule 408 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. See 
    id. at 1344
    .
    We further explained that “to the extent we need to protect
    Case: 21-138     Document: 13     Page: 4    Filed: 05/04/2021
    4                        IN RE: MODERN FONT APPLICATIONS LLC
    the sanctity of settlement discussions and promote the
    compromise and settlement of dispute[s], there are other
    effective methods to limit the scope of discovery to achieve
    those ends,” including granting motions for protective or-
    ders to restrict the use of information. 
    Id. at 1346
    . For
    those same reasons, we cannot say that MFA has estab-
    lished a clear and indisputable right to relief.
    Even putting aside this court’s holding in MSTG,
    MFA’s arguments concerning the attorney-client privilege
    and common interest doctrine are insufficient on their own
    terms to establish mandamus relief. “[T]o invoke the com-
    mon interest doctrine, a party first must demonstrate the
    elements of [the] privilege[.]” Waymo, 870 F.3d at 1360 (ci-
    tation omitted). But MFA fails to explain how the agree-
    ments themselves constitute “‘communications by a client
    to an attorney made in order to obtain legal assistance’
    from the attorney in his capacity as a legal advisor.” In re
    Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Issued on June 9,
    1982, 
    697 F.2d 277
    , 278 (10th Cir.1983) (quoting Fisher v.
    United States, 
    425 U.S. 391
    , 403 (1976)). Furthermore,
    MFA has identified no legal authority establishing a clear
    and indisputable right against imposing the ordinary
    waiver principles of sharing alleged privileged communica-
    tions under the circumstances presented here.
    Accordingly,
    IT IS ORDERED THAT:
    The petition for mandamus is denied.
    FOR THE COURT
    May 04, 2021            /s/ Peter R. Marksteiner
    Date                 Peter R. Marksteiner
    Clerk of Court
    s28
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 21-138

Filed Date: 5/4/2021

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 5/4/2021