Mares v. McDonough ( 2021 )


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  • Case: 20-1627   Document: 45     Page: 1   Filed: 05/10/2021
    NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    ______________________
    ANTHONY D. MARES,
    Claimant-Appellant
    v.
    DENIS MCDONOUGH, SECRETARY OF
    VETERANS AFFAIRS,
    Respondent-Appellee
    ______________________
    2020-1627
    ______________________
    Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for
    Veterans Claims in No. 18-3159, Judge Joseph L. Toth.
    ______________________
    Decided: May 10, 2021
    ______________________
    SEAN A. RAVIN, Miami, FL, for claimant-appellant.
    NATHANAEL YALE, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil
    Division, United States Department of Justice, Washing-
    ton, DC, for respondent-appellee. Also represented by
    JEFFREY B. CLARK, MARTIN F. HOCKEY, JR., ROBERT
    EDWARD KIRSCHMAN, JR.; EVAN SCOTT GRANT, BRIAN D.
    GRIFFIN, Office of General Counsel, United States Depart-
    ment of Veterans Affairs, Washington, DC.
    ______________________
    Case: 20-1627    Document: 45     Page: 2    Filed: 05/10/2021
    2                                     MARES   v. MCDONOUGH
    Before DYK, LINN, and O’MALLEY, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM.
    Appellant Anthony D. Mares (“Mares”) appeals a deci-
    sion of the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (“Vet-
    erans Court”), affirming a decision of the Board of
    Veterans’ Appeals (“Board”), which denied his claim for en-
    titlement to service connection for diabetes mellitus and
    erectile dysfunction. Mares v. Wilkie, No. 18-3159, 
    2019 WL 6885044
     (Vet. App. Dec. 18, 2019). We dismiss for lack
    of jurisdiction.
    I. BACKGROUND
    A. Legal Framework
    “During the Vietnam War, herbicides were applied
    near the Korean DMZ [Demilitarized Zone] from April
    1968 to July 1969.” McKinney v. McDonald, 
    796 F.3d 1377
    ,
    1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Congress, by statute, and the De-
    partment of Veterans Affairs (“VA”), by regulation, have
    created a number of presumptions with respect to veterans’
    exposure to herbicides and certain diseases or conditions
    associated with that exposure.
    Relevant to this appeal, there is a presumption of ex-
    posure to herbicides during service for veterans who
    “served between April 1, 1968, and August 31, 1971, in a
    unit that, as determined by the Department of Defense, op-
    erated in or near the Korean DMZ in an area in which herb-
    icides are known to have been applied during that period.”
    
    39 U.S.C. § 3.307
    (a)(6)(iv). Although herbicide use near
    the Korean DMZ ended in 1969, the VA extended the cov-
    ered period of the regulation through August 1971 to ac-
    count for residual exposure. See Herbicide Exposure and
    Veterans With Covered Service in Korea, 
    76 Fed. Reg. 4,245
    , 4,245 (Jan. 25, 2011) (“We believe it is reasonable
    and consistent with the intent of Congress to concede expo-
    sure for veterans who served in or near the Korean DMZ
    Case: 20-1627     Document: 45     Page: 3    Filed: 05/10/2021
    MARES   v. MCDONOUGH                                        3
    after herbicide application ceased, because of the potential
    for exposure to residuals of herbicides applied in that
    area.”). 1
    A veteran who meets the requirements of
    § 3.307(a)(6)(iv) is presumed to have been exposed to herb-
    icides during service, and may obtain service connection on
    a presumptive basis for any disease found to be associated
    with such exposure. See 
    38 C.F.R. § 3.309
    (e). A veteran
    who does not qualify for the presumption may still pursue
    direct service connection for the same disability. See
    Combee v. Brown, 
    34 F.3d 1039
    , 1043–44 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
    To prove direct service connection, as opposed to presump-
    tive service connection, a veteran must show: “‘(1) the ex-
    istence of a present disability; (2) in-service incurrence or
    aggravation of a disease or injury; and (3) a causal relation-
    ship between the present disability and the disease or in-
    jury incurred or aggravated during service’—the so-called
    ‘nexus’ requirement.” Holton v. Shinseki, 
    557 F.3d 1362
    ,
    1366 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting Shedden v. Principi, 
    381 F.3d 1163
    , 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
    B. Factual Background
    Mares served in the United States Army from 1962 to
    1982. His service included two tours on the Korean Penin-
    sula: (1) from September 18, 1964 to August 17, 1965; and
    (2) from May 14, 1972 to June 12, 1973. Mares, 
    2019 WL 1
       The Blue Water Navy Vietnam Veterans Act of
    2019 subsequently codified this regulatory presumption for
    veterans who “served in or near the Korean [DMZ] during
    the period beginning on September 1, 1967, and ending on
    August 31, 1971.” 38 U.S.C. § 1116B. This provision went
    into effect January 1, 2020—after the Veterans Court is-
    sued its decision in this appeal. As the court noted, how-
    ever, “the period specified still does not cover the veteran’s
    service.” Mares, 
    2019 WL 6885044
    , at *1 n.1.
    Case: 20-1627    Document: 45     Page: 4    Filed: 05/10/2021
    4                                     MARES   v. MCDONOUGH
    6885044, at *1. Accordingly, he did not serve in the DMZ
    during the time period specified in 
    39 C.F.R. § 3.307
    (a)(6)(iv).
    In 2011, Mares filed a claim seeking service connection
    for diabetes mellitus—a herbicide-associated disease—and
    erectile dysfunction as secondary to his diabetes mellitus.
    In his claim, Mares stated that, during his second period of
    service in Korea (between 1972 and 1973), he was a facility
    engineer “responsible for a variety of construction projects
    north of the Imjin River, both within the DMZ and directly
    south of the DMZ fence.” Mares, 
    2019 WL 6885044
    , at *1.
    He stated that he “was in the area that had been defoliated
    constantly.” 
    Id.
     In a subsequent submission, Mares stated
    that he had been informed by a veteran’s service organiza-
    tion representative that he “may have been exposed to de-
    foliant chemicals in Korea and especially in the area of the
    DMZ.” 
    Id.
    A VA examiner confirmed Mares’ diagnosis of diabetes
    mellitus, but did not opine on a link between the disease
    and alleged herbicide exposure. In an April 2012 memo-
    randum, the VA regional office coordinator with the Joint
    Services Records Research Center determined that Mares’
    “assignments to Korea preceded and followed the dates
    when Agent Orange is conceded to have been used at the
    Korean DMZ.” Id. at *2.
    In August 2012, the VA regional office denied Mares’
    diabetes mellitus and erectile dysfunction claims. Mares
    timely appealed that decision to the Board.
    In May 2019, the Board denied Mares’ claims for ser-
    vice connection for diabetes and erectile dysfunction. The
    Board recognized that VA regulations presume exposure to
    herbicide agents for veterans who served between April 1,
    1968 and August 31, 1971, in a unit that operated in or
    near the Korean DMZ where herbicides are known to have
    been applied. J.A. 19. The Board found that, because
    Mares’ service department records indicate that he was not
    Case: 20-1627    Document: 45      Page: 5    Filed: 05/10/2021
    MARES   v. MCDONOUGH                                       5
    in Korea during that time frame, “the legal presumption of
    exposure to herbicide agents is not available.” Id. The
    Board further found that Mares “did not submit any evi-
    dence stating how he was allegedly exposed to herbicide
    agents and the record otherwise contains no basis upon
    which to find exposure to herbicide agents on an actual ba-
    sis.” Id. Because there was no showing of actual or pre-
    sumed exposure to herbicides, the Board denied service
    connection for diabetes mellitus on a presumptive basis.
    Id.
    The Board then considered whether Mares had estab-
    lished direct service connection for diabetes mellitus. Be-
    cause the record contained no indication that Mares’ “post-
    service diabetes is causally related to his active service or
    any incident therein,” and “absent probative evidence of in-
    service Agent Orange exposure,” the Board denied service
    connection on a direct basis. J.A. 20. Given its denial of
    the diabetes claim, the Board also denied Mares’ secondary
    erectile dysfunction claim. Id. Mares appealed to the Vet-
    erans Court.
    In the December 18, 2019 decision at issue on appeal,
    the Veterans Court affirmed the Board’s decision denying
    service connection. Before the Veterans Court, Mares did
    not challenge the Board’s finding that the regulatory pre-
    sumption of herbicide exposure was inapplicable to his
    claim because his service fell outside the specified pre-
    sumptive period. Mares, 
    2019 WL 6885044
    , at *3. Instead,
    Mares argued that the Board erred in finding “no evidence
    of alleged exposure to herbicide agents.” Id. at *2. Specif-
    ically, he argued that the Board failed to analyze his state-
    ments that he was actually exposed to Agent Orange in the
    course of carrying out his construction duties in the Korean
    DMZ. Id. The Veterans Court disagreed. First, it pointed
    to the Board’s finding that neither Mares “nor the record
    more generally, provided a ‘basis upon which to find expo-
    sure to herbicide agents on an actual basis.’” Id. at *3. The
    court agreed with this assessment, finding that “nowhere
    Case: 20-1627    Document: 45      Page: 6    Filed: 05/10/2021
    6                                      MARES   v. MCDONOUGH
    in the record does the veteran allege that herbicides were
    actually sprayed or deployed while he was serving in Ko-
    rea, or that he had knowledge of otherwise coming into di-
    rect contact with them.” Id.
    Next, the Veterans Court found that the herbicide ex-
    posure Mares asserts “is residual in nature” because herb-
    icide usage in the Korean DMZ ceased in 1969—almost
    three years before his second period of Korean service be-
    gan in 1972. Id. The court found that this assertion “runs
    headlong into the regulation” because the VA already con-
    sidered the potential for exposure to residuals of herbicides
    applied in the Korean DMZ when it defined the presump-
    tive period. Id. at *3. Specifically, the VA extended the
    regulation’s presumptive period end date to August 31,
    1971 to account for residual exposure. Id. In other words,
    the VA “already determined that the period permitting a
    presumption of exposure to herbicide residuals ended in
    August 1971.” Id. at *4. Given this framework, the Veter-
    ans Court found that Mares’ lay statements were “no more
    than assertions that he was presumptively exposed to
    herbicide residuals when his second service period began
    in May 1972, eight and a half months after the ‘reasonable
    outside date for residual exposure.’” Id. at *4.
    The Veterans Court concluded that the Board offered a
    sufficient explanation for denying service connection for di-
    abetes mellitus. Id. And, because Mares’ argument for re-
    mand of the erectile dysfunction claim turned on the
    disposition of his diabetes appeal, the court affirmed that
    portion of the Board’s decision as well. Id.
    Mares timely appealed, alleging jurisdiction pursuant
    to 
    38 U.S.C. § 7292
    (a).
    II. DISCUSSION
    This court’s jurisdiction to review decisions of the Vet-
    erans Court is limited by statute. We have “exclusive ju-
    risdiction to review and decide any challenge to the validity
    Case: 20-1627    Document: 45      Page: 7    Filed: 05/10/2021
    MARES   v. MCDONOUGH                                       7
    of any statute or regulation or any interpretation thereof .
    . . and to interpret constitutional and statutory provisions,
    to the extent presented and necessary to a decision.” 
    38 U.S.C. § 7292
    (c). Absent a constitutional issue, however,
    we may not review the Veterans Court’s factual findings or
    its application of law to facts. 
    38 U.S.C. § 7292
    (d); see Bo-
    zeman v. McDonald, 
    814 F.3d 1354
    , 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
    (explaining that the Veterans Court’s “application of law to
    fact” is “a question over which we lack jurisdiction”).
    On appeal, Mares contends that the Veterans Court
    erred when it held that he “was precluded from establish-
    ing entitlement to a benefit based on a theory of direct ser-
    vice connection for a disorder in which presumptive service
    connection is available.” Appellant’s Br. 10. Mares main-
    tains that he never argued that his exposure should be pre-
    sumed. Instead, Mares “claimed entitlement to service
    connection for diabetes mellitus based on actual exposure
    to Agent Orange as part of his construction duties in the
    Korean [DMZ].” Id. at 15. According to Mares, the Board
    was required “to analyze his lay statements to determine
    whether his allegation of actual exposure to Agent Orange
    was competent, credible, and persuasive,” and it failed to
    do so. Id. at 17. We disagree with Mares’ characterization
    of the Board’s conclusions.
    As the government points out, the crux of Mares’ ap-
    peal involves a straight-forward challenge to a factual find-
    ing—whether Mares provided evidence of actual exposure
    to herbicides to demonstrate service connection. The Board
    found that he did not, and the Veterans Court found no er-
    ror in that determination. J.A. 19 (“[T]he Board finds that
    service connection for diabetes mellitus based on actual or
    presumed exposure to herbicide agents is not warranted.”);
    Mares, 
    2019 WL 6885044
    , at *3 (agreeing with the Board
    that “nowhere in the record does the veteran allege that
    herbicides were actually sprayed or deployed while he was
    serving in Korea, or that he had knowledge of otherwise
    coming into direct contact with them”). The Board did not
    Case: 20-1627     Document: 45     Page: 8    Filed: 05/10/2021
    8                                       MARES   v. MCDONOUGH
    conclude that Mares could not prove actual exposure due
    to the residual presence of herbicides. It only concluded
    that the timing of Mares’ service in the Korean DMZ and
    speculation that he may have been exposed to residual
    herbicides at that time were insufficient to do so.
    On appeal, Mares argues, as he did before the Veterans
    Court, that his lay statements establish actual herbicide
    exposure. But these allegations merely challenge the
    Board’s findings of fact and the sufficiency of the evidence
    leading to the Board’s decision, as well as the Veterans
    Court’s review of that decision. Those issues are not within
    our jurisdiction. 
    38 U.S.C. § 7292
    (d)(2).
    Mares attempts to frame his argument as a legal one
    regarding the interpretation of 
    38 U.S.C. § 1154
    (a). Specif-
    ically, he contends that the Veterans Court “misinter-
    preted section 1154(a) when it held that under 
    38 C.F.R. § 3.307
    (a)(6)(iv) . . . the Board is not obligated to consider
    entitlement under the theory of direct service connection
    because residual exposure is not actual exposure to Agent
    Orange.” Appellant’s Br. 3–4. This argument lacks merit.
    Contrary to Mares’ assertion, the Veterans Court nei-
    ther cited nor interpreted 
    38 U.S.C. § 1154
    (a). See Forshey
    v. Principi, 
    284 F.3d 1335
    , 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (en banc),
    superseded on other grounds by statute, Veterans Benefits
    Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–330, § 402(a), 
    116 Stat. 2820
    ,
    2832 (“[A]n interpretation of a statute or regulation occurs
    when its meaning is elaborated by the court.”). It did not
    say that residual exposure is not “actual exposure.” Ra-
    ther, the Veterans Court affirmed the Board’s finding that
    the evidence did not support Mares’ claim of actual herbi-
    cide exposure, residual or otherwise. Mares’ arguments
    merely challenge the weight given to the evidence, which
    we lack jurisdiction to review. See Maxson v. Gober, 
    230 F.3d 1330
    , 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“The weighing of this ev-
    idence is not within our appellate jurisdiction.”).
    Case: 20-1627    Document: 45       Page: 9   Filed: 05/10/2021
    MARES   v. MCDONOUGH                                       9
    III. CONCLUSION
    Because Mares’ arguments on appeal concern only
    challenges to factual determinations, we lack jurisdiction.
    See 
    38 U.S.C. § 7292
    (d)(2). We therefore dismiss this ap-
    peal.
    DISMISSED
    COSTS
    No costs.