Case: 21-2262 Document: 38 Page: 1 Filed: 02/10/2022
NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
ROBERT SEAN ROSS,
Petitioner
v.
MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD,
Respondent
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY,
Intervenor
______________________
2021-2262
______________________
Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection
Board in No. NY-0752-21-0008-I-1.
______________________
Decided: February 10, 2022
______________________
ROBERT SEAN ROSS, Ronkonkoma, NY, pro se.
KATRINA LEDERER, Office of General Counsel, United
States Merit Systems Protection Board, Washington, DC,
for respondent. Also represented by TRISTAN L. LEAVITT,
KATHERINE MICHELLE SMITH.
KELLY GEDDES, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil
Case: 21-2262 Document: 38 Page: 2 Filed: 02/10/2022
2 ROSS v. MSPB
Division, United States Department of Justice, Washing-
ton, DC, for intervenor. Also represented by BRIAN M.
BOYNTON, DEBORAH ANN BYNUM, PATRICIA M. MCCARTHY.
______________________
Before LOURIE, BRYSON, and CUNNINGHAM, Circuit
Judges.
PER CURIAM.
Petitioner Robert Sean Ross seeks review of an order of
the Merit Systems Protection Board (“MSPB” or “Board”)
dismissing his Individual Right of Action (“IRA”) appeal for
lack of jurisdiction. We affirm.
I
Mr. Ross was employed by the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice (“IRS”) as an Internal Revenue Agent. On October 18,
2019, the IRS proposed removing Mr. Ross from his posi-
tion based on conduct not at issue in this appeal. Supp.
App’x 39–40. In settlement of that action, Mr. Ross, with
the assistance of his union representative, entered into a
Last Chance Agreement (“LCA”) with the IRS. The agree-
ment was executed on March 4, 2020. Id. at 2.
Under the terms of the LCA, Mr. Ross would be sus-
pended for 30 days, after which Mr. Ross was not to exhibit
a lack of candor or fail to observe written regulations, or-
ders, rules, or IRS procedures for two years. Id. at 85. As
part of the LCA, Mr. Ross agreed that the IRS could termi-
nate him if he breached the LCA. Id. at 86. The LCA fur-
ther included a waiver of Mr. Ross’s appeal rights in the
event of termination, with the exception that Mr. Ross
could appeal to the MSPB “for the sole purpose of challeng-
ing the Agency's factual determination that he breached”
the LCA. Id. Finally, the LCA provided that Mr. Ross
“freely and willingly” entered into the LCA “without coer-
cion or duress.” Id. at 87.
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ROSS v. MSPB 3
On June 19, 2020, Mr. Ross sent an email containing
the last names of multiple taxpayers to five IRS staff mem-
bers and to George Greenberg, his union representative.
Supp. App’x at 74, 76. Mr. Ross sent the email to Mr.
Greenberg’s unencrypted Gmail account because, accord-
ing to Mr. Ross, Mr. Greenberg could not access his IRS
email account due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Pet’r’s Br.
4.
On September 11, 2020, Mr. Ross attempted to send an
email to an accountant working on one of his cases. Id. at
31. That email included a taxpayer’s name and Social Se-
curity number. Id. The IRS’s IT security system inter-
cepted the message because it contained personally
identifiable information and was sent to a non-IRS email
address. Id. at 64.
On October 9, 2020, the IRS informed Mr. Ross that he
was being terminated because those two email messages
evidenced a breach of the LCA. Id. at 58–59. Specifically,
the IRS noted that Mr. Ross had violated Internal Revenue
Manual (“IRM”) 3.42.9.2.2, which states that “[e]mployees
may not use e-mail to transmit SBU [sensitive but unclas-
sified] data unless they use IRS secure messaging system.”
Office of Disclosure, IRM 3.42.9.2.2(6) (Jan. 1, 2019). Un-
der IRS rules, “personal data of taxpayers” or “Personally
Identifiable Information (PII)” is a type of sensitive infor-
mation that is covered by the IRM. Secure Messaging &
Encryption, IRM 1.10.3.2.1(2) (Nov. 17, 2016). The IRM
adds that “taxpayer, SBU, or PII information” should not
be included “in email messages or attachments” unless
IRS-approved encryption technology is used. Id. at
1.10.3.2.1(3). Because the two emails sent by Mr. Ross in-
cluded taxpayer names, and in one case, a Social Security
number, the IRS determined that Mr. Ross had not com-
plied with IRS procedures and therefore breached the LCA.
Supp. App’x 58–59.
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4 ROSS v. MSPB
After receiving notice of his termination, Mr. Ross
timely appealed his termination to the MSPB. Id. at 46.
The administrative judge subsequently issued an order di-
recting the parties to submit statements addressing the
Board’s jurisdiction. Id. at 36. Because the LCA included
a waiver of appeal rights, the administrative judge re-
quired Mr. Ross to nonfrivolously allege at least one of the
following: (1) that he complied with the LCA; (2) that the
agency materially breached the LCA or acted in bad faith;
(3) that he did not voluntarily enter into the LCA; or (4)
that the LCA was the product of fraud or mutual mistake.
Id. (citing Bruhn v. Dep’t of Agric.,
124 M.S.P.R. 1, 6
(2016)).
First, Mr. Ross argued that he complied with the LCA.
As to the June 19 email, Mr. Ross asserted that taxpayers’
last names alone are not PII, and therefore the email did
not violate agency policy. Supp. App’x. 31. Mr. Ross also
contended that the failure of the IRS’s IT security system
to block the email was evidence that the email did not con-
tain PII.
Id. As to the September 11 email, Mr. Ross ar-
gued that he did not actually violate IRS policy because the
email was intercepted by the IT security system, and there-
fore was never transmitted outside of the agency.
Id. The
administrative judge was not persuaded by these argu-
ments and found that the emails “were in violation of the
rules relating to the transmission of email outside the IRS.”
Id. at 5.
Second, Mr. Ross argued that he did not voluntarily en-
ter into the LCA because “the union told him that he did
not have a choice but to sign it.”
Id. The administrative
judge found that argument to be unpersuasive in view of
the fact that the LCA explicitly stated that Mr. Ross en-
tered the agreement “freely and willingly . . . without coer-
cion or duress on the part of anyone.”
Id. (quoting Supp.
App’x 87).
Case: 21-2262 Document: 38 Page: 5 Filed: 02/10/2022
ROSS v. MSPB 5
Third, Mr. Ross argued that the LCA resulted from
fraud because his union representative told him that “en-
tering into the LCA would result in his being reassigned to
a different manager upon his return to work.” Supp. App’x
5. The administrative judge found this argument unper-
suasive because the LCA did not state that Mr. Ross would
be reassigned to a different manager, and thus the agency
did not breach the agreement with Mr. Ross or fraudu-
lently mislead him.
Id.
Finding that Mr. Ross had not raised any non-frivolous
grounds for challenging the LCA or the IRS’s decision to
remove him for violation of the LCA, the administrative
judge concluded that the Board lacked jurisdiction over Mr.
Ross’s appeal. Mr. Ross then appealed to this court.
II
Under
5 U.S.C. § 7703(c), we must affirm the decision
of the MSPB unless it is (1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse
of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (2)
obtained without procedures required by law, rule or regu-
lation having been followed; or (3) unsupported by substan-
tial evidence. See also Hayes v. Dep’t of the Navy,
727 F.2d
1535, 1537 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
To overcome a waiver of appeal rights in a last chance
agreement, an employee must show that (1) he complied
with the agreement; (2) the agency materially breached the
agreement; or (3) he did not enter into the agreement
knowingly and voluntarily. Buchanan v. Dep’t of Energy,
247 F.3d 1333, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Copeland v. Dep’t of
Army, 847 F. App’x 919, 920 (Fed. Cir. 2021).
A
First, Mr. Ross raises several arguments that appear
to be directed to whether he complied with the LCA. For
example, he argues that “a last name does not give the tax-
payer’s identity out,” apparently suggesting that a last
name does not constitute PII. Pet’r’s Reply 1. Additionally,
Case: 21-2262 Document: 38 Page: 6 Filed: 02/10/2022
6 ROSS v. MSPB
he claims that he acted in reliance on a statement from a
union official that he should “send an email.” Id. at 2. Fi-
nally, he alleges that the circumstances surrounding the
COVID-19 pandemic left him with no choice but to contact
Mr. Greenberg at his Gmail account. Pet’r’s Br. 4.
Mr. Ross’s arguments fail to account for other evidence
that he breached the LCA. Even if a taxpayer’s last name
does not constitute PII (an assertion that the IRS disputes),
he does not address on appeal the fact that the September
11 email contained a taxpayer’s Social Security number.
Mr. Ross also argued to the administrative judge that be-
cause the IRS’s IT security system intercepted the mes-
sage, he did not violate any IRS procedures regarding the
use of PII in emails. Supp. App’x 31. The agency, however,
reasonably concluded that Mr. Ross had violated its policy
against using email to transmit sensitive information. The
IRM prohibits “includ[ing] taxpayer, SBU, or PII infor-
mation in email messages” without using IRS-approved en-
cryption technology. Secure Messaging & Encryption, IRM
1.10.3.2.1(2) (Nov. 17, 2016). The IRM does not distinguish
between messages that actually reach the intended recipi-
ent and those that do not. See id. Accordingly, the admin-
istrative judge was not required to credit Mr. Ross’s
argument that the interception of his email by the IRS’s IT
security system meant that there was no violation of the
IRM.
Mr. Ross’s assertion that he had no choice but to send
the June 19 email to Mr. Greenberg’s Gmail account is sim-
ilarly unavailing. Even assuming that Mr. Ross had no
other way to contact Mr. Greenberg, he has not explained
why it was necessary to include taxpayer names in the
email that he sent.
Mr. Ross further argues that other IRS employees in-
cluded the same taxpayer information in other emails in
violation of the IRM. Pet’r’s Reply 1–2. Even if true, an
assertion that another employee violated IRS policy is not
Case: 21-2262 Document: 38 Page: 7 Filed: 02/10/2022
ROSS v. MSPB 7
evidence that Mr. Ross did not himself violate the policy.
Mr. Ross adds that he had not completed the “updated
training” regarding IRS internal policy. Pet’r’s Br. 4. But
Mr. Ross’s assertion that he was not aware of the agency’s
policy does not preclude a finding that he violated that pol-
icy.
In view of the record evidence, the administrative judge
was fully justified in concluding that Mr. Ross failed to
make a non-frivolous showing that he did not breach the
LCA.
B
Second, Mr. Ross argues that he did not voluntarily en-
ter into the LCA. Specifically, he argues that his union
representative “forced [him] into signing” the LCA. Pet’r’s
Br. 4. He adds that he “was told that [he] was being re-
moved from the Service unless [he] signed the agreement.”
Pet’r’s Reply 1. Aside from his own assertions, Mr. Ross
points to no evidence in the record supporting those claims.
The administrative judge explicitly considered Mr. Ross’s
assertions and concluded that they did not outweigh the
representation in the LCA that Mr. Ross “freely and will-
ingly” entered into the LCA “without coercion or duress on
the part of anyone.” Supp. App’x 5 (quoting Supp. App’x
87). We therefore uphold the administrative judge’s find-
ing that Mr. Ross failed to make a non-frivolous showing
that he was forced to enter into the LCA. See Jones v. Dep’t
of Interior, 321 F. App’x 925, 927 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
C
Third, Mr. Ross appears to argue that the agency en-
gaged in fraud or acted in bad faith, which are factors that
the Board considered in its analysis. See Supp. App’x 2.
Mr. Ross contends that his manager “constantly harassed”
him and “never [gave him] a chance to improve to her
standards,” despite his satisfactory performance under
previous managers. Pet’r’s Br. 4. In Mr. Ross’s view, this
Case: 21-2262 Document: 38 Page: 8 Filed: 02/10/2022
8 ROSS v. MSPB
was evidence that the IRS “had intent to remove [him].” Id.
The administrative judge was not required to treat that ev-
idence as indicative of bad faith, especially given the ad-
ministrative judge’s finding that Mr. Ross engaged in
conduct that violated the LCA.
Relatedly, Mr. Ross argued before the Board that his
union representative told him he would be transferred to a
different manager after returning to work. Supp. App’x 4.
The administrative judge considered that argument and
rejected it because “the [LCA] did not state that [Mr. Ross]
would be reassigned to another manager.” Id. at 5.
We therefore conclude that Mr. Ross has not made a
non-frivolous showing that the IRS acted in bad faith or
that the LCA was the product of fraud on the part of the
agency.
III
We have considered Mr. Ross’s remaining arguments
and find them unpersuasive. Accordingly, the Board’s dis-
missal of Mr. Ross’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction is af-
firmed.
AFFIRMED
COSTS
No costs.
