Lopez v. United States ( 2022 )


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  • Case: 22-2096    Document: 10     Page: 1    Filed: 10/18/2022
    NOTE: This order is nonprecedential.
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    ______________________
    ARTHUR LOPEZ,
    Plaintiff-Appellant
    v.
    UNITED STATES,
    Defendant-Appellee
    ______________________
    2022-2096
    ______________________
    Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims
    in No. 1:22-cv-00259-MCW, Senior Judge Mary Ellen Cos-
    ter Williams.
    ______________________
    PER CURIAM.
    ORDER
    In their responses to this court’s August 18, 2022, show
    cause order, the United States supports dismissal and Ar-
    thur Lopez opposes dismissal. We conclude that we lack
    jurisdiction and therefore dismiss the appeal.
    After the government failed to timely respond to Mr.
    Lopez’s complaint, the United States Court of Federal
    Claims entered default under Rule 55(a) of the Rules of the
    Court of Federal Claims (“RCFC”). The United States re-
    sponded the next day, seeking vacatur of the entry of
    Case: 22-2096     Document: 10     Page: 2    Filed: 10/18/2022
    2                                                 LOPEZ   v. US
    default. The Court of Federal Claims granted the govern-
    ment’s request in an order issued on July 1, 2022. Mr.
    Lopez appeals from that order.
    This court only has jurisdiction over a “final decision”
    by the Court of Federal Claims, 
    28 U.S.C. § 1295
    (a)(3), and
    an order vacating entry of default does not “end the litiga-
    tion on the merits and leave nothing for the court to do but
    execute the judgment,” Haggart v. United States, 
    943 F.3d 943
    , 951 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (cleaned up); see Haw. Carpenters’
    Tr. Funds v. Stone, 
    794 F.2d 508
    , 512 (9th Cir. 1986); cf.
    Parks By & Through Parks v. Collins, 
    761 F.2d 1101
    , 1103–
    04 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding that even an order setting aside
    a default judgment “was interlocutory . . . and thus nonap-
    pealable” at the time it was entered).
    Mr. Lopez argues that we have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1292
    (d)(2), * but that provision requires that the
    appealed-from order include “a statement that a control-
    ling question of law is involved with respect to which there
    is a substantial ground for difference of opinion and that
    an immediate appeal from that order may materially ad-
    vance the ultimate termination of the litigation.” There is
    no such statement in the order vacating entry of default,
    Dkt. No. 17, and thus, this provision does not apply. Mr.
    Lopez’s reliance on TCI Group Life Insurance Plan v.
    Knoebber, 
    244 F.3d 691
    , 695 n.1 (9th Cir. 2001), is mis-
    placed because that case addressed certification under Fed-
    eral Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), not § 1292, which was
    found to be unnecessary because the district court “re-
    solve[d] all claims with regard to all parties” such that the
    *   Mr. Lopez, proceeding pro se, makes this argument
    based on § 1292(c), but that subsection relates to our juris-
    diction of certain non-final orders from district courts. Sec-
    tion 1292(d)(2) applies to certain non-final orders from the
    Court of Federal Claims.
    Case: 22-2096    Document: 10       Page: 3   Filed: 10/18/2022
    LOPEZ   v. US                                              3
    “appeal [wa]s not premature.” Here, no such final judg-
    ment has been entered.
    Mr. Lopez also attempts to invoke the collateral order
    doctrine, but we do not agree that the Court of Federal
    Claims’ order vacating entry of default “conclusively deter-
    mine[d a] disputed question,” “resolve[d] an important is-
    sue completely separate from the merits of the action,” or
    is “effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judg-
    ment,” Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 
    727 F.3d 1214
    ,
    1220 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks and cita-
    tion omitted). Cf. Wiggins v. Universal Prot. Servs., LLC,
    No. 21-2652, 
    2021 WL 7287368
    , at *1 (3d Cir. Nov. 3, 2021)
    (holding that an order vacating entry of default is not an
    appealable collateral order at least because “the order will
    be reviewable on appeal from a final judgment” (citing
    Adult Film Ass’n of Am. v. Thetford, 
    776 F.2d 113
    , 115 (5th
    Cir. 1985))).
    We have considered each of Mr. Lopez’s arguments and
    find them to be without merit.
    Accordingly,
    IT IS ORDERED THAT:
    (1) The appeal is dismissed.
    (2) Any pending motions are denied as moot.
    (3) Each party shall bear its own costs.
    FOR THE COURT
    October 18, 2022                    /s/ Peter R. Marksteiner
    Date                           Peter R. Marksteiner
    Clerk of Court