Edwards v. Merit Systems Protection Board , 610 F. App'x 991 ( 2015 )


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  •        NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    ______________________
    CHARLES EDWARDS,
    Petitioner
    v.
    MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD,
    Respondent
    ______________________
    2015-3020
    ______________________
    Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection
    Board in No. PH-0752-13-0303-I-1.
    ______________________
    Decided: April 14, 2015
    ______________________
    CHARLES EDWARDS, Seattle, WA, pro se.
    STEPHEN FUNG, Office of the General Counsel, Merit
    Systems Protection Board, Washington, DC, for respond-
    ent. Also represented by BRYAN G. POLISUK.
    ______________________
    Before PROST, Chief Judge, BRYSON, and HUGHES, Circuit
    Judges.
    2                                         EDWARDS   v. MSPB
    PER CURIAM.
    After untimely submitting his petition for review of
    the Merit Systems Protection Board’s initial decision,
    Charles D. Edwards asked the Board to waive its timely
    filing requirement for good cause. The Board denied
    Mr. Edwards’s request, finding that he did not show that
    the new evidence he submitted was sufficient to change
    the outcome, or that a medical condition prevented him
    from timely filing. Because the Board’s decision was not
    an abuse of discretion, we affirm.
    I
    The Department of the Navy terminated Mr. Edwards
    from his position, and he appealed to the Merit Systems
    Protection Board. On June 21, 2013, Mr. Edwards and
    the Department agreed to mediate his appeal through the
    Board’s Mediation Appeals Program. During mediation,
    the parties entered into a settlement agreement, which
    was forwarded to the Administrative Judge assigned to
    Mr. Edwards’s appeal. On August 19, 2013, the Board
    issued an initial decision dismissing Mr. Edwards’s ap-
    peal due to the settlement agreement. In its Notice of
    Decision, the Board informed Mr. Edwards that he had
    until September 23, 2013 to file a petition for review of
    the Board’s initial decision.
    On November 4, 2013—over seventy days after issu-
    ance of the initial decision—Mr. Edwards filed a petition
    for review of the Board’s initial decision. On November
    25, 2013, the Board acknowledged receipt of the petition
    for review, and stated that the petition was untimely.
    The Board issued a deadline of December 10, 2013 for
    Mr. Edwards to file a motion to accept the filing as timely
    or to waive the time limit.
    On December 3, 2013, Mr. Edwards filed a motion to
    waive his December 10, 2013 deadline. This motion
    stated that Mr. Edwards was “requesting time for the
    EDWARDS   v. MSPB                                        3
    lawyers [to] look over the paperwork.” Resp’t’s Appendix
    at 53.
    On December 17, 2013, Mr. Edwards filed a motion to
    waive the September 23, 2013 deadline for a petition to
    review the initial decision. Even though the deadline to
    submit such a motion was December 10, 2013, because of
    Mr. Edwards’s December 3, 2013 motion, the Board
    accepted the motion as timely in a December 18, 2013
    order.
    On August 27, 2014, the Board denied the motion.
    The Board held that Mr. Edwards did not show why the
    new evidence he submitted after the initial decision
    warranted an outcome different from the initial decision.
    The Board also found that although Mr. Edwards had
    included some medical evidence in his motions to waive
    the time limit, it did not show why Mr. Edwards’s medical
    problems prevented him from timely filing.
    Mr. Edwards appeals. We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1295
    (a)(9).
    II
    Our review of Board decisions is limited. See 
    5 U.S.C. § 7703
    (c). We cannot reverse a Board’s decision unless it
    is (1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
    otherwise not in accordance with the law; (2) obtained
    without procedures required by law, rule or regulation
    having been followed; or (3) unsupported by substantial
    evidence. 
    Id.
    A petition for review of an administrative judge’s de-
    cision must be filed with the Board within 35 days.
    
    5 C.F.R. § 1201.114
    (e). The Board has discretion to waive
    this requirement if a party requests waiver and shows
    good cause. 
    5 C.F.R. §§ 1201.12
     and 1201.114(f), (g).
    Petitioners seeking a waiver must file “[a] specific and
    detailed description of the circumstances causing the late
    filing, accompanied by supporting documentation or other
    4                                         EDWARDS   v. MSPB
    evidence.” Ford-Clifton v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 
    661 F.3d 655
    , 659 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citation omitted).
    When considering a motion to waive the timely filing
    requirement for good cause, the Board considers the
    length of the delay, the appellant’s notice of the time
    limit, the existence of circumstances beyond the appel-
    lant’s control, the appellant’s negligence, any excusable
    neglect, unavoidable casualty or misfortune, and the
    extent and nature of prejudice to the agency. Walls v.
    Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 
    29 F.3d 1578
    , 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
    (citation omitted). “[W]hether the regulatory time limit
    for an appeal should be waived based upon a showing of
    good cause is a matter committed to the Board’s discretion
    and this court will not substitute its own judgment for
    that of the Board.” Mendoza v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 
    966 F.2d 650
    , 653 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (en banc). Accordingly, an
    appellant bears a “heavy burden” to overturn the Board’s
    determination that good cause has not been shown for an
    untimely filing. Turman-Kent v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 
    657 F.3d 1280
    , 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (internal quotation
    omitted).
    Mr. Edwards first asserts that the Board’s December
    18, 2013 order already accepted his petition for review as
    timely filed. However, he misunderstands the Board’s
    order. The Board did not find that the petition for review
    was timely filed, but, rather, that the motion to waive the
    time limit for filing the petition was timely filed.
    We also find no error in the Board’s finding that
    Mr. Edwards did not show good cause. While he did
    submit new evidence after the initial decision, he does not
    explain how this new evidence would change the outcome.
    Thus, the Board did not abuse its discretion in finding
    that the new evidence did not justify Mr. Edwards’s
    untimely filing. See Armstrong v. Dep’t of Treasury, 
    591 F.3d 1358
    , 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“[W]e cannot say that it
    was wrong for the MSPB to consider whether [the peti-
    EDWARDS   v. MSPB                                        5
    tioner’s] new evidence was of sufficient weight to warrant
    a different outcome from that of the initial decision.”)
    (internal quotation omitted).
    Additionally, substantial evidence supports the
    Board’s finding that Mr. Edwards’s medical evidence does
    not show good cause for the delay, because it does not
    show that he was ill throughout the entire period of delay
    or that this illness prevented him from timely filing. See
    Ford-Clifton, 
    661 F.3d at 659
     (affirming the Board’s
    denial of a motion to waive the timely filing requirement
    where the petition did not “affirmatively identify medical
    evidence that addresses the entire period of delay and
    explain how the illness prevented a timely filing”). One of
    the medical documents is dated June 26, 2013, and does
    not implicate the relevant delay period. And although the
    other is dated during the relevant time period, it actually
    suggests that Mr. Edwards was healthy and able to
    timely file a petition.
    We have considered Mr. Edwards’s other arguments
    and find them unpersuasive. Accordingly, we conclude
    that Mr. Edwards has not met his heavy burden of show-
    ing reversible error in the Board’s decision not to waive
    the timely filing requirement.
    AFFIRMED
    No costs.