MeadWestVaco Corp. v. Rexam Beauty & Closures, Inc. ( 2013 )


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  •   United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    ______________________
    MEADWESTVACO CORPORATION AND
    MEADWESTVACO CALMAR, INC.,
    Plaintiffs-Appellees,
    v.
    REXAM BEAUTY AND CLOSURES, INC. AND
    REXAM DISPENSING SYSTEMS S.A.S.,
    Defendants-Appellants,
    AND
    VALOIS OF AMERICA, INC.,
    Defendant-Appellant,
    AND
    VALOIS S.A.S.,
    Defendant.
    ______________________
    2012-1518, -1527
    ______________________
    Appeals from the United States District Court for the
    Eastern District of Virginia in No. 10-CV-0511, Judge
    Gerald Bruce Lee.
    ______________________
    Decided: September 26, 2013
    ______________________
    2              MEADWESTVACO CORPORATION    v. REXAM BEAUTY
    ANTHONY J. VIOLA, Edwards Wildman Palmer, LLP, of
    New York, New York, argued for plaintiffs-appellees.
    With him on the brief were SCOTT D. WOFSY, of Stamford,
    Connecticut and ADAM P. SAMANSKY, of Boston, Massa-
    chusetts. Of counsel was PETER CUOMO, of Boston, Mas-
    sachusetts.
    GENE S. WINTER, St. Onge Steward Johnston &
    Reens, LLC, of Stamford, Connecticut, argued for defend-
    ant-appellant Rexam Beauty and Closures, Inc., et al.
    With him on the brief were BENJAMIN J. LEHBERGER and
    MICHAEL J. KOSMA.
    CONSTANTINE L. TRELA, JR., Sidley Austin, LLP, of
    Chicago, Illinois, argued for defendant-appellant Valois of
    America, Inc. With him on the brief was HUGH A.
    ABRAMS. Of counsel was SCOTT BORDER, of Washington,
    DC.
    ______________________
    Before PROST, O’MALLEY, and TARANTO, Circuit Judges.
    PROST, Circuit Judge.
    Rexam Beauty and Closures, Inc. and Rexam Dis-
    pensing Systems S.A.S. (collectively “Rexam”) and Valois
    of America, Inc. and Valois S.A.S. (collectively “Valois”)
    appeal from a final judgment of the United States District
    Court for the Eastern District of Virginia based on: (1) the
    construction of several terms in U.S. Patent Nos.
    7,718,132 (“’132 patent”) and 7,722,819 (“’819 patent”); (2)
    the district court’s grant of summary judgment of nonob-
    viousness; (3) the district court’s denial of summary
    judgment of indefiniteness; (4) the district court’s denial
    of Rexam’s motion to exclude expert testimony; (5) and
    the district court’s finding, after a bench trial, of in-
    fringement of claims 15 and 19 of the ’132 patent. See
    MeadWestVaco Corp. v. Rexam PLC, 
    807 F. Supp. 2d 537
    MEADWESTVACO CORPORATION    v. REXAM BEAUTY              3
    (E.D. Va. 2011) (“Claim Op.”), MeadWestVaco Corp. v.
    Rexam PLC, 
    809 F. Supp. 2d 463
     (E.D. Va. 2011) (“Summ.
    J. Op.”); MeadWestVaco Corp. v. Rexam PLC, No. 1:10-cv-
    511, ECF No. 597 (E.D. Va. April 12, 2012) (“Trial Op.”).
    We find that the district court erred in granting summary
    judgment of nonobviousness in favor of plaintiffs
    MeadWestVaco Corporation and MeadWestVaco Calmar,
    Inc. (collectively “MWV”), the assignees of the ’132
    and ’819 patents, and therefore vacate the summary
    judgment of nonobviousness. However, we affirm the
    district court’s claim constructions, denial of Rexam’s
    motion to exclude, and findings of infringement. We also
    find that Rexam and Valois waived their indefiniteness
    arguments by failing to pursue them at trial. According-
    ly, we affirm-in-part, vacate-in-part, and remand for
    further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
    BACKGROUND
    I. Technology
    Rexam, Valois, and MWV are competitors in the per-
    fume packaging industry. Each company designs, manu-
    factures, and assembles custom-made “dispenser
    assemblies,” i.e., spray pumps with an attached dip tube, 1
    for dispensing fragrances. Each of these companies sells
    spray pumps to its customers, fragrance houses such as
    Estee Lauder and Chanel, who in turn incorporate the
    pumps into bottles of perfume for sale to retailers and
    consumers.
    1   The dip tube extends from the pump into the liq-
    uid fragrance in a perfume container and draws liquid
    from the container into the pump.
    4             MEADWESTVACO CORPORATION      v. REXAM BEAUTY
    A. MWV’s Patented Dip Tubes
    MWV developed an “invisible” dip tube for perfumes
    that appears to disappear when immersed in liquid,
    enhancing the aesthetic appearance of the perfume bottle.
    The inventors of the ’132 and ’819 patents investigated
    various materials that had the properties necessary for an
    invisible dip tube. In doing so, they recognized the need
    for a transparent material with a refractive index 2 close
    to that of the perfume liquid so that the tube would
    appear invisible. For the most part, perfumes have a
    refractive index of 1.37 to 1.39.
    In 2003, Daikin Industries, a plastics supplier, began
    promoting the fluoropolymer EFEP. 3 EFEP is a highly
    transparent fluoropolymer with a refractive index of 1.38.
    The inventors experimented with using EFEP, but their
    original tubes were hazy and brittle. To improve the
    tubes, they tried different production techniques, includ-
    ing a quenching process. Quenching, which is typically
    performed by immersing extruded plastic into a cool
    water bath, is a well-known manufacturing technique.
    Over the course of several months, the inventors opti-
    mized their manufacturing processes to produce a dip
    tube with their desired properties, which they called the
    NoC® (pronounced “no-see”) tube. In 2005, they filed
    patent applications claiming fluid pumps with invisible
    dip tubes. The patent applications eventually issued as
    the ’819 and ’132 patents. The ’132 patent is a continua-
    tion of the ’819 patent. All of the claims of the ’819 patent
    are specific to fragrance dispensers; some of the claims of
    2 The refractive index of a material is a measure of
    how much light bends as it passes through the material.
    3   A polymer is commonly thought of as a plastic. A
    fluoropolymer is a polymer that includes fluorine within
    its chemical structure.
    MEADWESTVACO CORPORATION       v. REXAM BEAUTY                5
    the ’132 patent are specific to fragrance dispensers and
    others are directed to generic dispensers. See ’819 patent
    col. 7 l. 40-col. 8 l. 65; ’132 patent col. 7 l. 24-col. 8 l. 59.
    Claims 15 and 19 of the ’132 patent, the generic dis-
    penser claims at issue, read:
    15. A dispenser assembly for dispensing a liquid
    comprising:
    a transport assembly; and,
    a tube connected to the transport assem-
    bly;
    wherein the tube consists essentially of an
    extruded and quenched crystalline fluoro-
    polymer having an XRD crystallinity not
    greater than about 13%, the tube has a
    transparency of about 80% or more,
    and the tube has a refractive index of from
    about 1.36 to about 1.38.
    19. The dispenser assembly of claim 15, wherein
    the fluoropolymer is ethylene tetrafluoroethylene.
    ’132 patent col. 8 ll. 14-22, 56-57 (emphasis added).
    B. Rexam’s V1 and V2 Tubes
    After MWV began marketing the NoC® tube in late
    2005, Rexam obtained a sample from one of its customers.
    Rexam analyzed the sample and obtained the commercial-
    ly available EFEP from Daikin. In May 2006, Rexam
    launched its first invisible tube, the “V1” tube. In 2008,
    after learning of MWV’s patent applications, and in
    particular the claims’ crystallinity limitations, Rexam
    worked to develop a tube with an XRD crystallinity high-
    er than 13%. It eventually settled on blending together
    different grades of EFEP to produce the “V2” tube, which
    Rexam contends has an XRD crystallinity of greater than
    13%. See Trial Op. at 24-26.
    6             MEADWESTVACO CORPORATION    v. REXAM BEAUTY
    C. Valois’s “Old” and “New” Tubes
    Valois learned about the NoC® tube from a customer
    in March 2006. It then sent samples of the NoC® tube to
    its tube supplier, who then began making EFEP tubes
    using a water-quenching process. The water-quenched
    tubes are referred to as the “Old” tubes. Once Valois
    learned about MWV’s patent applications, it instructed its
    supplier to investigate ways to design around the patents.
    Eventually, Valois and the supplier concluded that ex-
    truding the tubes without water quenching was the best
    option. The redesigned “New” tube is cooled by running
    the tube through an air chamber. In the bottom of the
    chamber, below the tube, a pump recirculates chilled
    water to maintain the air temperature in the chamber.
    Summ. J. Op., 
    809 F. Supp. 2d
     at 471.
    II. Procedural history
    MWV brought suit against Valois and Rexam in May
    2011, accusing each defendant of infringing the ’819
    and ’132 patents. In response, Valois and Rexam counter-
    claimed for declaratory judgments of noninfringement
    and invalidity. On August 17, 2011, the district court
    issued its claim construction opinion, construing seven
    terms including “quenched,” “transparency,” “XRD crys-
    tallinity,” and “crystalline content.” Claim Op., 807 F.
    Supp. 2d 537. Thereafter the court decided various sum-
    mary judgment motions filed by the parties. The court
    granted MWV summary judgment of nonobviousness and
    denied Rexam’s and Valois’s motions for summary judg-
    ment of indefiniteness. Summ. J. Op., 
    809 F. Supp. 2d 463
    .
    MWV waived its right to seek monetary damages, and
    after a thirteen-day bench trial, the district court found
    that Valois and Rexam did not infringe the asserted
    perfume-specific claims of the ’819 and ’132 patents, but
    did infringe the generic dispenser claims of the ’132
    patent. Trial Op. at 36. The district court then entered a
    MEADWESTVACO CORPORATION     v. REXAM BEAUTY               7
    permanent injunction against Valois of America, Inc. and
    Rexam Beauty and Closures, Inc. MeadWestVaco Corp. v.
    Rexam PLC, No. 1:10-cv-511, 
    2012 WL 2153165
     (E.D. Va.
    June 12, 2012) (“Inj. Op.”). Valois and Rexam appeal. We
    have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1292 and 1295.
    DISCUSSION
    This appeal presents a variety of issues. First, both
    defendants argue that the district court erred in granting
    summary judgment of nonobviousness. Second, Valois
    argues that the court erred in construing the term
    “quenched” and in finding that the “New” tubes are
    quenched under the court’s or Valois’s construction.
    Third, Valois also argues that the court erred in constru-
    ing the term “transparency” and in finding infringement
    under a correct construction. Fourth, Rexam argues that
    the court erred in allowing MWV’s expert to testify on the
    “XRD crystallinity” limitation and in finding infringement
    based on XRD crystallinity. Finally, both Valois and
    Rexam argue that the district court erred in its opinion
    denying their motions for summary judgment of indefi-
    niteness. We address each of these issues in turn.
    I. Obviousness
    Prior to trial, MWV moved for, and the district court
    granted, summary judgment of nonobviousness of the
    asserted claims of both patents. Summ. J. Op., 809 F.
    Supp. 2d at 474. Valois and Rexam both opposed sum-
    mary judgment, arguing that material issues of fact
    necessitated a trial.
    A patent claim is invalid as obvious “if the differences
    between the subject matter sought to be patented and the
    prior art are such that the subject matter would have
    been obvious at the time the invention was made to a
    person having ordinary skill in the art to which said
    subject matter pertains.” 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Obvious-
    ness is a question of law based on specific factual findings,
    8             MEADWESTVACO CORPORATION      v. REXAM BEAUTY
    including (1) the scope and content of the prior art;
    (2) differences between the claimed invention and the
    prior art; (3) the level of ordinary skill in the art; and
    (4) any relevant secondary considerations, including
    commercial success, long-felt but unsolved needs, and the
    failure of others. Graham v. John Deere Co., 
    383 U.S. 1
    ,
    17-18 (1966). To establish invalidity, the supporting facts
    must be shown by clear and convincing evidence. WMS
    Gaming, Inc. v. Int’l Game Tech., 
    184 F.3d 1339
    , 1355
    (Fed. Cir. 1999).
    Summary judgment is appropriate if “the movant
    shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material
    fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
    law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. The court draws all reasonable
    inferences in favor of the nonmovant. Monarch Knitting
    Mach. Corp. v. Sulzer Morat GmbH, 
    139 F.3d 877
    , 880
    (Fed. Cir. 1998). We review the grant of a summary
    judgment motion de novo. Abbott Labs. v. Baxter Pharm.
    Prods., Inc., 
    334 F.3d 1274
    , 1277 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
    The district court found that Valois and Rexam “can-
    not establish that Plaintiffs’ patents are obvious through
    clear and convincing evidence because the Graham factors
    weigh in favor of MWV.” Summ. J. Op., 
    809 F. Supp. 2d
    at 474. Notably, the court’s obviousness analysis repeat-
    edly emphasized that it would not have been obvious to
    use EFEP in a fragrance product. For example, the court
    pointed to evidence of some belief that fluoropolymers
    were carcinogenic and therefore should not be used with a
    fragrance product. Id. at 475 (“[F]luoropolymers were
    unsafe for use in personal beauty products because such
    materials were thought to be carcinogenic.”). The court
    also credited evidence advanced to show long-felt need
    and commercial success specific to the perfume industry.
    Id. (“Plaintiffs fulfilled a need because the visibility of a
    dip tube detracted from the overall aesthetics of a per-
    fume bottle for perfume manufacturers. Plaintiffs have
    won industry-wide acclaim for the invisible dip
    MEADWESTVACO CORPORATION     v. REXAM BEAUTY               9
    tube . . . .”). Finally, the court pointed to evidence that
    Valois and Rexam reverse-engineered their own invisible
    tubes from MWV’s NoC® tube. Id. (“Both Defendants
    attempted to create an invisible dip tube, but succeeded
    only after . . . Defendants obtained samples of MWV’s
    tube from perfume manufacturers.”).
    The central problem with the district court’s analysis
    is that it fails to treat claims 15 and 19, which are not
    limited to fragrance products, differently from the assert-
    ed fragrance-specific claims. 4 Obviousness, like other
    grounds of invalidity, must be analyzed on a claim-by-
    claim basis. Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Smith, 
    959 F.2d 936
    ,
    942 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (concluding that all grounds of inva-
    lidity must be evaluated against individual claims, as
    required by the plain language of 35 U.S.C. § 282). The
    district court’s analysis of the secondary considerations of
    nonobviousness involved only fragrance-specific uses, but
    the claims now at issue are not fragrance-specific, and
    “‘objective evidence of non-obviousness must be commen-
    surate in scope with the claims which the evidence is
    offered to support.’” Asyst Techs., Inc. v. Emtrak, Inc., 
    544 F.3d 1310
    , 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting In re Grasselli,
    
    713 F.2d 731
    , 743 (Fed. Cir. 1983)). MWV did not present
    evidence teaching away from using EFEP in general
    purpose liquid-dispenser tubing or showing that EFEP
    4    While it is true that at the summary judgment
    phase the court had not yet concluded that the fragrance-
    specific claims were not infringed, Valois called claim 15
    to the court’s attention by separately arguing that claim
    15 was anticipated by various Daikin sales presentations
    related to EFEP.
    10            MEADWESTVACO CORPORATION      v. REXAM BEAUTY
    tubing enjoyed commercial success or met any long-felt
    need. 5
    In addition to not analyzing claims 15 and 19 sepa-
    rately from the fragrance-specific claims, the district court
    resolved material issues of fact in favor of MWV, which is
    inappropriate at the summary judgment stage. See
    Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk
    Contractors USA, Inc., 
    617 F.3d 1296
    , 1305 (Fed. Cir.
    2010) (reversing grant of summary judgment of nonobvi-
    ousness for failure to view facts in the light most favora-
    ble to the nonmoving party).          For example, Valois
    presented evidence contradicting MWV’s claims of com-
    mercial success. Valois Br. 47 (explaining that at least
    one large customer elected not to use the more expensive
    invisible tube). Valois also cast doubt on MWV’s teaching
    away evidence by presenting evidence that EFEP was
    marketed for use in “water purification systems, bio-
    medical tubing, catheters, and food products.” Id. at 43-
    44 (citing Daikin presentation materials). Finally, Valois
    put forth evidence that one of ordinary skill in the art—a
    polymer engineer—would not have believed EFEP was
    carcinogenic. Id. (noting that MWV’s evidence of teaching
    away did not come from polymer scientists, but from
    5  That is not to say that Valois and Rexam will nec-
    essarily prevail on obviousness on remand. MWV has
    argued that the only Daikin EFEP tubing disclosed in the
    prior art is a multilayer tube. J.A. 4553, 4561, 6527.
    Claim 15 requires a tube “consisting essentially of” a
    fluoropolymer having specific properties, and dependent
    claim 19 limits the fluoropolymer to ethylene tetrafluoro-
    ethylene. At trial, MWV will have the opportunity to
    argue that it would not have been obvious to one of ordi-
    nary skill in the art to make a tube “consisting essentially
    of” extruded and quenched material meeting the claims’
    requirements.
    MEADWESTVACO CORPORATION    v. REXAM BEAUTY              11
    marketing and business executives, and presenting doc-
    uments that Valois’s and Rexam’s engineers did not
    perceive a carcinogen risk).
    In sum, Valois’s evidence created material issues of
    fact inappropriate for resolution on summary judgment,
    which necessitates a remand. Because the district court
    erred in granting summary judgment of nonobviousness,
    we vacate and remand for a trial on that issue.
    II. Quenching
    Claim 15 requires an “extruded and quenched” crys-
    talline fluoropolymer tube. Valois disputes the construc-
    tion of “quenched” and the district court’s finding that
    Valois’s “New” tube is quenched. 6
    A. Claim Construction
    Claim construction is a question of law reviewed de
    novo. Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 
    138 F.3d 1448
    ,
    1451 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc). The words of the claim
    ‘‘are generally given their ordinary and customary mean-
    ing,’’ which ‘‘is the meaning that term would have to a
    person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time
    of the invention.’’ Phillips v. AWH Corp., 
    415 F.3d 1303
    ,
    1312-13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
    Below, Valois and MWV submitted competing con-
    structions for the term “quenched.” Valois proposed “a
    process by which a plastic tube is subjected to rapid
    cooling by immersion into a cooling liquid” and MWV
    proposed “rapidly cooled.” Claim Op., 807 F. Supp. 2d at
    541. The district court adopted MWV’s construction,
    finding that “rapidly cooled” is consistent with the ordi-
    6   Valois conceded that the water-quenched “Old”
    tube infringes the ’132 patent. Summ. J. Op., 809 F.
    Supp. 2d at 471.
    12            MEADWESTVACO CORPORATION     v. REXAM BEAUTY
    nary meaning of quenched and that nothing in the pa-
    tents limited the cooling medium to a liquid instead of air.
    Id. Valois now argues that the district court should have
    construed quenching as “rapid cooling by immersion in a
    cooling medium.” Valois Br. 51. 7
    As noted by the district court at the claim construc-
    tion stage, “[t]he term ‘immersion’ is immaterial because
    the tube can either be immersed in either air or water;
    the cooling medium restriction is the material argument
    set forth by Valois.” Claim Op. at 541 n.1. We agree with
    the district court that “quenching” is not limited to “rapid
    cooling by immersion into a cooling liquid” but encom-
    passes rapid cooling “by any cooling medium.” Id. at 541.
    Despite Valois’s protests, there is no dispute that the
    “New” tube is “immersed” in air; Valois’s dispute is over
    whether the air in the tank is a “cooling medium,” an
    issue relevant to infringement, not claim construction.
    We therefore affirm the court’s construction of “quenched”
    as “rapidly cooled.”
    B. Infringement
    On appeal from a bench trial, this court reviews the
    district court’s conclusions of law de novo and findings of
    fact for clear error. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v.
    Philip Morris Inc., 
    229 F.3d 1120
    , 1123 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
    A determination of infringement, whether literal or under
    the doctrine of equivalents, is a question of fact and is
    7  On appeal, Valois also argues that the district
    court “redefined” the term “quenched” post-trial. Valois
    Br. 53. We are not persuaded. The court was merely
    comparing different examples of quenching in its in-
    fringement analysis and providing further support of its
    decision to credit MWV’s expert over Valois’s, not adopt-
    ing a new construction of the term “quenched.” See Trial
    Op. at 46.
    MEADWESTVACO CORPORATION     v. REXAM BEAUTY               13
    reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. Golden
    Blount, Inc. v. Robert H. Peterson Co., 
    365 F.3d 1054
    ,
    1058 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
    Applying the construction of quenched used at trial,
    “rapidly cooled,” we find no clear error in the district
    court’s finding of infringement.
    Valois’s primary argument is that the “New” tube is
    “freely extruded into warm ambient air,” Valois Br. 52,
    and cools substantially more slowly than the quenching
    process disclosed in the ’132 patent.
    First, we reject Valois’s position that the air surround-
    ing the extruded tube is merely “warm ambient air.” As
    discussed above, Valois’s “New” tube is extruded and then
    passed through a “‘cooling tank,’ which uses a constant
    flow of chilled water that removes heat from the tube via
    the air in the tank.” Summ. J. Op., 809 F.Supp.2d at 471.
    We also note that although the air in the tank is hotter
    than ambient air, the water used in the quenching pro-
    cess disclosed in the ’132 patent is kept at 80ºF to
    90ºF. ’132 patent col. 5 ll. 7-17. This is essentially the
    same temperature as the air in Valois’s chamber.
    Second, we note that “rapidly cooled” does not require
    a specific cooling rate. Trial Op. at 47. We see no clear
    error in the district court’s conclusion that a tube is
    “rapidly cooled” when it cools from a temperature of 500
    degrees to 75 degrees in 3.5 seconds. Summ. J. Op., 
    809 F. Supp. 2d
     at 481 (denying Valois’s motion for summary
    judgment of noninfringement).
    Because Valois has failed to point to any clear error in
    the district court’s infringement analysis regarding
    “quenching,” we affirm the court’s finding that Valois’s
    “New” tube infringes claims 15 and 19 of the ’132 patent.
    14            MEADWESTVACO CORPORATION      v. REXAM BEAUTY
    III. Transparency
    Claim 15 requires a tube having “a transparency of
    about 80% or more.” Valois argues that the district court
    erred in construing the term “transparency” and that
    under Valois’s proposed construction MWV did not prove
    infringement. Valois Br. 55-56.
    Valois argues that “transparency” should be construed
    as “a measurement of the percent transmission of light
    having a wavelength of 500 microns passing through a
    3 mm thick sample,” based on an alleged definition in the
    specification. Claim Op., 807 F. Supp. 2d at 542; ’132
    patent col. 4 ll. 33-36. The district court rejected Valois’s
    argument and construed “transparency” using the Cam-
    bridge Dictionary of American English’s definition of the
    adjective ‘‘transparent,’’ to wit, “allowing visible light
    through so that objects can be clearly seen through it.”
    Claim Op., 807 F. Supp. 2d at 542.
    MWV defends the district court’s plain meaning con-
    struction and accuses Valois of attempting to limit the
    claims to a specific embodiment. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at
    1323.
    We agree with MWV that the ’132 patent does not de-
    fine transparency, and that the district court correctly
    construed the term using its plain meaning. See Claim
    Op., 807 F. Supp. 2d at 542 (finding that the court’s
    construction “is the ordinary and plain meaning of the
    term.”). The passage of the specification cited by Valois is
    not a special definition. The passage refers to “one em-
    bodiment” of the dip tube, and other portions of the speci-
    fication discussing transparency are not tied to Valois’s
    purported definition. Compare ’132 patent col. 4 l. 33
    (“according to one embodiment”) with col. 2 ll. 5-17 (dis-
    cussing “substantially transparent” perfume containers)
    and col. 5 ll. 6-25 (discussing “high transparency” tubes).
    MEADWESTVACO CORPORATION    v. REXAM BEAUTY              15
    Because the district court did not err in construing
    the term “transparency,” we need not address Valois’s
    noninfringement arguments based on its overly narrow
    construction.
    IV. XRD Crystallinity
    Claim 15 requires a fluoropolymer tube “having an
    XRD crystallinity not greater than about 13%.” A brief
    discussion of X-ray diffraction (XRD) crystallinity is
    necessary to understand Rexam’s infringement argu-
    ments.
    XRD testing is one method of measuring the crystal-
    line content of a material. An XRD test is conducted by
    striking a sample of the material with a monochromatic
    X-ray beam and examining the pattern of X-rays formed
    on a detection surface as the X-rays are scattered by the
    electrons of the atoms within the sample. The X-ray
    scattering is dependent on the atomic arrangement within
    the sample, and a more ordered pattern indicates a more
    ordered atomic structure. X-rays that diffract off of a
    crystalline polymer produce a ring-like pattern on the
    detection surface. X-rays that diffract off of an amor-
    phous, or noncrystalline, structure appear as a “relatively
    broad amorphous ‘halo’” on the detection surface. Trial
    Op. at 18. The crystalline content of the polymer is then
    measured by comparing the relative intensities of the
    diffraction patterns.
    The construction of the terms “XRD crystallinity” and
    “crystalline content” is not in dispute. Rexam and MWV
    stipulated to construing the XRD terms as “crystallinity
    as measured by x-ray diffraction (XRD) using at least the
    XRD characterization parameters identified in the ’132
    patent at column 4, line 66 to column 5, line 6.” Claim
    Op., 807 F. Supp. 2d at 543. The parameters referenced
    in the patent are:
    16            MEADWESTVACO CORPORATION     v. REXAM BEAUTY
    Voltage: 45 kV, Current: 40 mA, XRD Machine:
    Bruker D8 Discover w/Gadds Detector, 0.3 mm
    slit, 0.3 mm collimation, Cu Radiation, Goebel
    Mirror (parallel beams), 0.5 mm oscillation along
    tube length, 5 frames (~15°/frame), 72 sec-
    onds/frame, Omega=7°, midpoint for detection
    frames=14°, 29°, 44°, 59°, 74°.
    ’132 patent col. 5 ll. 1-6. The parties agree that the pa-
    rameters listed in the ’132 patent are inadequate to fully
    describe an XRD test. For example, “[t]he patent specifi-
    cation does not provide the sample-to-detector distance,
    nor does it specify the software for the analysis of the
    XRD data and the calculation of the XRD crystallinity.”
    Trial Op. at 22.
    At trial on the issue of infringement, Rexam and
    MWV engaged in a battle of the experts on XRD crystal-
    linity. Rexam’s expert, Dr. Ortega, placed his samples
    15 cm away from the XRD detector and used the TOPAS
    software to analyze his results. Trial Op. at 38. MWV’s
    expert, Dr. Reibenspies, placed his samples 5 cm away
    from the XRD detector and used the GADDS Full Method
    software to analyze his results. Trial Op. at 41. Unsur-
    prisingly, the experts arrived at different conclusions. Dr.
    Reibenspies found that Rexam’s V1 and V2 tubes had an
    XRD crystallinity of 8 to 9%, and therefore infringed
    the ’132 patent. Dr. Ortega opined that the crystallinity
    was 23 to 24%, and therefore concluded Rexam did not
    infringe the ’132 patent. Trial Op. at 38, 41.
    On appeal, Rexam argues that the district court erred
    in allowing testimony from MWV’s expert, Dr. Reiben-
    spies, because he did not follow all of the testing parame-
    ters set forth in the ’132 patent. Rexam also argues that
    the court erred in finding infringement based on Dr.
    Reibenspies’s testimony. Finally, Rexam argues that the
    XRD crystallinity terms, as construed, are indefinite. We
    MEADWESTVACO CORPORATION    v. REXAM BEAUTY             17
    address Rexam’s first two arguments below. Indefinite-
    ness is addressed at Part V, infra.
    A. Expert Testimony
    Rexam asked the district court to exclude infringe-
    ment testimony from Dr. Reibenspies. MeadWestVaco
    Corp. v. Rexam PLC, 1:10-cv-511, ECF No. 411 (E.D. Va.
    Aug. 22, 2011) (Rexam Mot. to Exclude). The court al-
    lowed the testimony, finding it “relevant and admissible.”
    J.A. 7712. Here, Rexam argues again that this testimony
    should have been excluded because Dr. Reibenspies did
    not follow all of the XRD parameters listed in the ’132
    patent. Therefore, according to Rexam, his testimony is
    legally irrelevant to proving infringement. Rexam Br. 55;
    see also Rexam Mot. to Exclude 3 (citing cases precluding
    testimony which tends to contradict a court’s claim con-
    struction). MWV counters that any differences between
    Dr. Reibenspies’s testing and the claims goes to proof of
    infringement, not admissibility. MWV Br. 59.
    Evidentiary rulings are reviewed under the law of the
    regional circuit. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc. v.
    Medtronic, Inc., 
    265 F.3d 1294
    , 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2001). In
    the Fourth Circuit, the denial of an evidentiary motion in
    limine is reviewed for abuse of discretion. United States
    v. White, 
    405 F.3d 208
    , 212 (4th Cir. 2005); Malone v.
    Microdyne Corp., 
    26 F.3d 471
    , 480 (4th Cir. 1994) (review-
    ing ruling on motion in limine for abuse of discretion).
    We agree with MWV that Rexam’s arguments go to
    infringement and not admissibility. Dr. Reibenspies’s
    testimony was not an attempt to apply a new claim con-
    struction to the XRD crystallinity terms. Dr. Reibenspies
    opined that using his testing parameters, which differed
    slightly from the claim construction, he was able to con-
    clude that the V1 and V2 tubes infringed the ’132 patent
    when applying the court’s construction. Dr. Reibenspies’s
    deviations from the claim construction, discussed in more
    detail below, gave Rexam an opportunity to cast doubt
    18            MEADWESTVACO CORPORATION     v. REXAM BEAUTY
    upon his infringement conclusions, which Rexam did
    through cross-examination and opposing expert testimo-
    ny. But it did not make Dr. Reibenspies’s testimony
    legally irrelevant. Rexam does not raise any other basis
    for excluding Dr. Reibenspies’s testimony.          Because
    Rexam failed to show that the district court abused its
    discretion in allowing Dr. Reibenspies to testify, we affirm
    the court’s denial of Rexam’s motion to exclude.
    B. Infringement
    Rexam’s noninfringement case centered solely on the
    XRD crystallinity limitation. The district court found
    that Rexam’s V1 and V2 tubes had an XRD crystallinity of
    less than 13%, and therefore infringed claims 15 and 19 of
    the ’132 patent. Trial Op. at 57.
    As discussed above, the XRD crystallinity limitation
    came down to a battle of the experts. The district court
    credited MWV’s expert and found Rexam’s expert unreli-
    able. Trial Op. at 39-40. The trial court is given “broad
    discretion in determining credibility because the court
    saw the witnesses and heard their testimony.” Energy
    Capital Corp. v. United States, 
    302 F.3d 1314
    , 1329 (Fed.
    Cir. 2002). Rexam makes no effort to dislodge the court’s
    credibility findings. Instead, Rexam urges us to disregard
    Dr. Reibenspies’s testimony as legally irrelevant to in-
    fringement. We decline to do so.
    The court found that Dr. Reibenspies did not use the
    0.3 mm slit, Goebel mirror or oscillator as required by the
    claim construction. Trial Op. at 41. At trial, Rexam
    cross-examined Dr. Reibenspies on each of differences
    between his test protocol and the claims. The testimony
    revealed that Dr. Reibenspies used alternate equipment
    to mimic the results achieved by claim parameters. For
    example, the combination of the 0.3 mm slit and Goebel
    mirror produce parallel X-ray beams 0.3 mm apart. Dr.
    Reibenspies used a graphite monochromator with a fixed
    slit to produce the same X-ray arrangement. See MWV
    MEADWESTVACO CORPORATION     v. REXAM BEAUTY              19
    Br. 56 (citing Dr. Reibenspies’s testimony); Trial Op. at
    42. The same is true with regard to oscillation. Dr.
    Reibenspies’s XRD machine did not have an oscillator, so
    he manually repositioned the samples to mimic oscilla-
    tion. Trial Op. at 41.
    The court found that Dr. Reibenspies’s testing “devia-
    tions were insignificant and could not have substantially
    affected the test results.” Trial Op. at 42. Rexam coun-
    ters that “MWV presented no evidence quantifying how
    much the differences impacted the XRD crystallinity
    results.” Rexam Reply Br. 12. While it is true that MWV
    did not quantify the differences, MWV did present testi-
    mony that Dr. Reibenspies’s protocol “would have had
    only a minor effect on the test results.” Trial Op. at 42.
    The court credited this testimony as “reasonable,” id., and
    Rexam has not pointed to any clear error in that conclu-
    sion. We find no reversible error in the district court’s
    analysis, and therefore affirm the finding of infringement.
    V. Indefiniteness
    Rexam and Valois moved for summary judgment of
    indefiniteness based on the terms “XRD crystallinity” and
    “quenched,” respectively. The district court denied both
    motions, stating that “Plaintiff’s patent is not indefinite
    as a matter of law . . . .” Summ. J. Op., 
    809 F. Supp. 2d
     at
    478 (XRD crystallinity), 484 (quenched).
    The district court’s holding that the “patent is not in-
    definite as a matter of law” can be interpreted in one of
    two ways. First, the court could mean that the moving
    party failed to meet the summary judgment standard. In
    other words, they failed to show that the patents were
    “indefinite as a matter of law.” On the other hand, the
    court could mean that “as a matter of law the claims are
    not indefinite,” sua sponte granting summary judgment of
    definiteness in favor of MWV.
    20            MEADWESTVACO CORPORATION     v. REXAM BEAUTY
    We construe the court’s denial of Rexam’s motion for
    summary judgment of indefiniteness as a denial for the
    failure to meet the summary judgment standard. The
    court listed six reasons for its ruling on this point, the
    concluding one being that “there are material issues of
    fact remaining for the jury, and it will be the finder of
    fact’s responsibility to determine whether there was
    sufficient information to test for crystallinity.” Summ. J.
    Op. at 477-78. 8
    This reading is also supported by the parties’ sum-
    mary judgment briefing on the issue. MWV’s Brief in
    Opposition Summary Judgment begins by noting “MWV
    need only show that there are genuine issues of material
    fact which would preclude a finding by this Court that the
    patents are indefinite as a matter of law.” MeadWestVaco
    Corp. v. Rexam PLC, No. 1:10-cv-511, ECF No. 318 at 7
    (E.D. Va. June 27, 2011) (MWV Br. in Opp. to Summ. J.
    by Rexam). MWV’s argument section begins with the
    statement that “[t]here is no question that there are
    disputed facts . . . that preclude summary judgment.” Id.
    at 16. MWV’s conclusion contains a similar statement.
    Id. at 33 (“[T]here are numerous genuine fact issues that
    8  We also note that the district court seems to have
    relied heavily on the proposition that the claims “are
    amenable to construction because the parties have al-
    ready stipulated to their meaning.” Summ. J. Op., 809 F.
    Supp. 2d at 478-480. This is not an accurate statement of
    our law on indefiniteness. “The fact that [a patentee] can
    articulate a definition supported by the specification . . .
    does not end the inquiry. Even if a claim term’s definition
    can be reduced to words, the claim is still indefinite if a
    person of ordinary skill in the art cannot translate the
    definition into meaningfully precise claim scope.” Halli-
    burton Energy Servs., Inc. v. M-I LLC, 
    514 F.3d 1244
    ,
    1251 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
    MEADWESTVACO CORPORATION      v. REXAM BEAUTY              21
    preclude a finding that Rexam has met its heavy burden
    of proving indefiniteness as a matter of law.”).
    We reach the same resolution regarding the court’s
    denial of Valois’s motion for summary judgment. Here,
    the court again stated that “Plaintiffs’ patent is not indef-
    inite as a matter of law . . . .” Summ. J. Op., 
    809 F. Supp. 2d
     at 484. The court identified four reasons for denying
    the motion “after viewing the evidence in the light most
    favorable to the nonmovant.” Id. MWV, not Valois, was
    the nonmoving party. If the court were sua sponte grant-
    ing summary judgment to MWV, it would have been
    legally erroneous to view the facts in favor of MWV.
    Thus, we can only conclude that the court again found
    that Valois failed to meet the summary judgment stand-
    ard and left the issue open for trial. 9
    9    Regardless of waiver, on appeal, Valois’s primary
    argument in support of indefiniteness is that the district
    court’s construction “‘does not restrict the actual cooling
    rate or cooling medium.’” Valois Br. 60 (quoting Trial Op.
    at 47). The district court however is not required to place
    a numerical limit (i.e., a cooling rate) on the claims where
    it is not warranted by the specification. Exxon Research
    & Eng’g Co. v. United States, 
    265 F.3d 1371
    , 1381 (Fed.
    Cir. 2001). Similarly, the court correctly declined to limit
    the “cooling medium” because the specification did not so
    require. Valois’s surprise that its design-around failed
    does not render the claim indefinite. SmithKline Bee-
    cham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 
    403 F.3d 1331
    , 1340-41 (Fed.
    Cir. 2005) (“The test for indefiniteness does not depend on
    a potential infringer’s ability to ascertain the nature of its
    own accused product to determine infringement, but
    instead on whether the claim delineates to a skilled
    artisan the bounds of the invention.”).
    22            MEADWESTVACO CORPORATION     v. REXAM BEAUTY
    Although the parties proffered Findings of Fact and
    Conclusions of Law suggesting that the indefiniteness
    issue was final, the district court did not adopt those
    findings. Following the bench trial, the district court
    never entered final judgment on the issue of indefinite-
    ness, suggesting that it believed the matter was not
    pursued by either party during trial and was abandoned.
    At the summary judgment stage, MWV clearly believed
    there were issues to be resolved by the fact-finder, and the
    district court appeared to agree. Because it is improper to
    appeal a denial of summary judgment, see, e.g., Glaros v.
    H.H. Robertson Co., 
    797 F.2d 1564
    , 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
    (“a denial of summary judgment is not properly reviewa-
    ble on an appeal from the final judgment entered after
    trial”), we conclude that Rexam and Valois waived the
    issue of indefiniteness by failing to raise it at the bench
    trial.
    CONCLUSION
    For the reasons set forth above, we vacate the district
    court’s grant of summary judgment of nonobviousness;
    affirm the district court’s claim constructions, denial of
    Rexam’s motion to exclude, and findings of infringement;
    find that indefiniteness was waived; and remand for
    further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
    AFFIRMED-IN-PART, VACATED-IN-PART, AND
    REMANDED