Welcome v. Merit Systems Protection Board , 542 F. App'x 940 ( 2013 )


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  •        NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    ______________________
    JAMES R. WELCOME,
    Petitioner,
    v.
    MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD,
    Respondent.
    ______________________
    2013-3093, -3094
    ______________________
    Petitions for review of the Merit Systems Protection
    Board in Nos. AT0752120317-I-1 and AT0752120469-I-1.
    ______________________
    Decided: October 16, 2013
    ______________________
    JAMES R. WELCOME, of Pensacola, Florida, pro se.
    MICHAEL A. CARNEY, General Attorney, Office of the
    General Counsel, Merit Systems Protection Board, of
    Washington, DC, argued for respondent. With him on the
    brief was BRYAN G. POLISUK, General Counsel.
    ______________________
    Before DYK, O’MALLEY, and WALLACH, Circuit Judges.
    2                                         WELCOME   v. MSPB
    PER CURIAM
    James R. Welcome appeals the Merit Systems Protec-
    tion Board’s (“Board”) decisions holding that his removal
    appeal was moot and his involuntary retirement appeal
    was outside the Board’s jurisdiction. This court affirms.
    BACKGROUND
    Before his retirement, Mr. Welcome was employed by
    the Department of the Navy (“the Agency”) as a Work and
    Family Life Supervisor, GS-0101-11. Mr. Welcome went
    on approved sick leave status on February 14, 2011. Over
    eight months later, on October 28, 2011, the Agency asked
    for a written and signed release from Mr. Welcome’s
    doctor, and requested that Mr. Welcome return to duty by
    November 14, 2011. When he did not return as request-
    ed, the Agency issued a Notice of Proposed Removal on
    January 6, 2012. After considering Mr. Welcome’s writ-
    ten response, the Agency removed Mr. Welcome from
    service, effective February 7, 2012. It explained the
    removal was “based on [Mr. Welcome’s] excessive ap-
    proved absence for which there has been given no end in
    sight.” Respondent’s Appendix (“App’x”) at 28.
    Mr. Welcome appealed his removal to the Board, ar-
    guing removal could not be based on approved sick leave.
    In the meantime, however, he applied for voluntary
    retirement with an effective date of February 3, 2012, four
    days before the removal. When Mr. Welcome notified the
    Administrative Judge (“AJ”) of this development, the AJ
    explained in a status conference that voluntary retire-
    ment predating removal could nullify the removal and
    thus moot Mr. Welcome’s appeal. The Agency then ap-
    proved Mr. Welcome’s retirement application, cancelled
    the removal, and eliminated all information concerning
    the removal from Mr. Welcome’s Official Personnel Fold-
    er.
    WELCOME   v. MSPB                                        3
    On March 14, 2012, the Agency moved to dismiss Mr.
    Welcome’s appeal. The AJ ordered Mr. Welcome to show
    cause why his appeal should not be dismissed as moot.
    The order explained that an appeal becomes moot when
    “the agency completely rescinds the action being appealed
    by returning appellant to the status quo ante.” App’x at
    50. It also noted that even if Mr. Welcome’s removal
    appeal was moot, he had the option of filing a new appeal
    alleging involuntary retirement if he believed the Agency
    had coerced him to retire.
    Following Mr. Welcome’s response, the AJ dismissed
    the removal appeal on April 8, 2012. It held the action
    appealed was completely rescinded by the Agency, be-
    cause “the undisputed evidence shows that the agency
    canceled the appellant’s removal and deleted all refer-
    ences to that action from his [Official Personnel File].”
    App’x at 9. The AJ noted that Mr. Welcome’s response
    had not argued against mootness, but instead alleged
    involuntary retirement.     In particular, Mr. Welcome
    argued the Agency lacked any legitimate basis to remove
    him, and that the removal threatened his retirement
    annuity and forced him to retire.
    Soon after the dismissal of Mr. Welcome’s first appeal,
    the AJ sua sponte docketed a separate appeal to address
    Mr. Welcome’s alleged involuntary retirement. However,
    after considering the parties’ written submissions, the AJ
    dismissed the second appeal, saying Mr. Welcome failed
    to show involuntary retirement. The AJ explained that
    retirement is presumed voluntary, and that Mr. Wel-
    come’s decision to retire rather than be removed, without
    more, did not rebut that presumption. The AJ rejected
    Mr. Welcome’s argument that a federal agency cannot
    remove an employee for taking authorized sick leave.
    Although an earlier Board decision had stated such a rule,
    Holderness v. Defense Commissary Agency, 
    75 M.S.P.R. 401
     (1997), it was overruled by McCauley v. Department
    of the Interior, 
    116 M.S.P.R. 484
     (2011), where the Board
    4                                          WELCOME   v. MSPB
    held that excessive absenteeism may be a ground for
    removal, regardless of the type of leave. The AJ also
    found that even if Mr. Welcome had been removed, “he
    still could have retired without losing his annuity.” App’x
    at 111.
    Mr. Welcome petitioned the full Board for review of
    both dismissals. The Board denied the petitions, holding
    Mr. Welcome had identified no erroneous findings of
    material fact, no erroneous statement of law or applica-
    tion of law to fact, nor any other basis for granting the
    petition. Welcome v. Dep’t of the Navy, MSPB Docket No.
    AT-0752-12-0317-I-1 (Feb. 5 2013); Welcome v. Dep’t of the
    Navy, MSPB Docket No. AT-0752-12-0469-I-1 (Feb. 5,
    2013). Mr. Welcome filed this timely appeal. This court
    has jurisdiction pursuant to 
    5 U.S.C. §§ 7121
    (f) and 7703.
    DISCUSSION
    This court must affirm the Board unless its decision is
    “(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or other-
    wise not in accordance with law; (2) obtained without
    procedures required by law, rule or regulation having
    been followed; or (3) unsupported by substantial evi-
    dence.” 
    5 U.S.C. § 7703
    (c). The employee bears the bur-
    den to prove jurisdiction by a preponderance of the
    evidence. 
    5 C.F.R. § 1201.56
    (a)(2)(i).        “Whether the
    [B]oard has jurisdiction over an appeal is a question of
    law that this court reviews de novo.” Johnston v. Merit
    Sys. Prot. Bd., 
    518 F.3d 905
    , 909 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
    The Board has jurisdiction over an appeal from the
    Agency’s removal of an employee. See 
    5 U.S.C. § 7512
    (1)
    (enumerating specific adverse actions over which the
    Board has jurisdiction); see also 
    5 U.S.C. § 7513
    (d).
    Accordingly, the Board properly exercised jurisdiction
    over Mr. Welcome’s first appeal challenging his removal.
    However, an appeal is rendered moot when the agency
    cancels the appealed action and returns the employee to
    the status quo ante. Cooper v. Dep’t of the Navy, 108 F.3d
    WELCOME   v. MSPB                                        5
    324, 326 (Fed. Cir. 1997). In this case, the Board found
    the Agency returned Mr. Welcome to the status quo ante
    by canceling his removal and eliminating all mention of it
    from his Official Personnel File.
    On appeal, Mr. Welcome argues the Agency failed to
    meet its burden to justify his removal. Petitioner’s Br. at
    9 (“The Agency has the burden of providing the prepon-
    derance of evidence (51%) to support the charge.”). How-
    ever, as held by the Board and not challenged on appeal,
    Mr. Welcome’s retirement cancelled the removal, so there
    was no remaining adverse action for the Agency to justify.
    Accordingly, the Board correctly dismissed Mr. Welcome’s
    first appeal as moot.
    Mr. Welcome’s second appeal alleged jurisdiction
    based on involuntary retirement. Retirement is presumed
    to be voluntary, and the Board lacks jurisdiction over
    voluntary retirement. Staats v. U.S. Postal Serv., 
    99 F.3d 1120
    , 1123–24 (Fed. Cir. 1996). However, an involuntary
    or coerced retirement is tantamount to a removal for
    purposes of Board jurisdiction. Garcia v. Dep’t of Home-
    land Sec., 
    437 F.3d 1322
    , 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2006). To rebut
    the presumption of voluntariness, “an employee must
    show that the agency effectively imposed the terms of the
    employee’s resignation or retirement, that the employee
    had no realistic alternative but to resign or retire, and
    that the employee’s resignation or retirement was the
    result of improper acts by the agency.” Terban v. Dep’t of
    Energy, 
    216 F.3d 1021
    , 1024 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (quoting
    Staats, 
    99 F.3d at 1124
    ).
    The Board stated that retirement due to threatened
    removal “may be considered coerced if the employee can
    show that the agency had no reasonable grounds for
    threatening to take the removal action.” App’x at 109
    (citing Lamb v. U.S. Postal Serv., 
    46 M.S.P.R. 470
    , 475
    (1990)). However, the Board rejected Mr. Welcome’s
    argument that excessive authorized sick leave was not a
    6                                        WELCOME   v. MSPB
    reasonable grounds for removal. App’x at 110–112 (citing
    McCauley, 116 M.S.P.R. at 484). Additionally, the Board
    held Mr. Welcome “did in fact have a choice” of whether or
    not to retire. Even if Mr. Welcome had appealed his
    removal and lost, the Board found he could have retired
    without losing his annuity. App’x at 111 (citing Cooper,
    
    108 F.3d 324
    ).
    On appeal, Mr. Welcome argues the Agency’s removal
    was meant to force him to retire by leaving him “no life
    lines of support.” U.S. Ct. of Appeals for the Fed. Cir.,
    Form 11, INFORMAL BRIEF OF JAMES R. WELCOME at 1
    (2013). He argues the Board improperly sought to remove
    him on grounds of misconduct, which, according to Mr.
    Welcome, would have made him ineligible for his retire-
    ment annuity. Petitioner’s Br. at 1–8, 10–12. Mr. Wel-
    come cites 
    5 U.S.C. § 8336
    (d)(1) to show that removal
    based on misconduct renders an employee ineligible for
    his retirement annuity. However, this subsection applies
    to employees that have either completed 25 years of
    service or are over 50 and completed 20 years of service.
    At the time of his separation, Mr. Welcome was over 55
    and had completed over 30 years of service, and was thus
    eligible for his annuity regardless of the reason for his
    separation. See 
    5 U.S.C. § 8336
    (a) (stating that an em-
    ployee meeting these requirements “is entitled to an
    annuity”). In light of this provision, the Board correctly
    concluded that Mr. Welcome had realistic alternatives to
    retirement. The Board did not err in holding Mr. Wel-
    come failed to rebut the presumption that his retirement
    was voluntary and not appealable.
    CONCLUSION
    This court has considered Mr. Welcome’s remaining
    arguments and finds them unpersuasive. For the forego-
    ing reasons, this court affirms the Board’s decisions
    dismissing Mr. Welcome’s removal appeal as moot and his
    involuntary retirement appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
    WELCOME   v. MSPB              7
    AFFIRMED
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2013-3093, 2013-3094

Citation Numbers: 542 F. App'x 940

Judges: Dyk, O'Malley, Per Curiam, Wallach

Filed Date: 10/16/2013

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/6/2024