Bush v. United States , 627 F. App'x 928 ( 2016 )


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  •        NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    ______________________
    BMICHELLE BUSH,
    Plaintiff-Appellant
    v.
    UNITED STATES,
    Defendant-Appellee
    ______________________
    2015-5104
    ______________________
    Appeal from the United States Court of Federal
    Claims in No. 1:15-cv-00446-JFM, Senior Judge James F.
    Merow.
    ______________________
    Decided: January 8, 2016
    ______________________
    BMICHELLE BUSH, Washington, DC, pro se.
    WILLIAM PORTER RAYEL, Commercial Litigation
    Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of
    Justice, Washington, DC, for defendant-appellee. Also
    represented by BENJAMIN C. MIZER, ROBERT E.
    KIRSCHMAN, JR., DONALD E. KINNER.
    ______________________
    Before NEWMAN, CHEN, and STOLL, Circuit Judges.
    2                                                BUSH   v. US
    PER CURIAM.
    Ms. Bush appeals from an order of the United States
    Court of Federal Claims (“CFC”) dismissing her complaint
    for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Because the CFC
    properly dismissed Ms. Bush’s claims, we affirm.
    BACKGROUND
    Ms. Bush filed a complaint seeking to invoke the
    CFC’s Tucker Act jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1491.
    The complaint identified as parties the Social Security
    Administration, U.S. Department of Education, U.S. FMS
    Treasury, U.S. HHS, U.S. CMS, U.S. Contractors, Bank of
    America, and W.C. Smith & Co. Ms. Bush sought relief
    for purported false imprisonment, a Social Security bene-
    fit dispute, civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1985,
    Privacy Act violations under 5 U.S.C. § 522a(g), and
    federal conspiracy criminal conduct under 18 U.S.C.
    § 371. The CFC dismissed Ms. Bush’s complaint sua
    sponte for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Ms. Bush
    subsequently submitted a letter to the CFC’s clerk’s office
    that the CFC construed as a motion for relief from judg-
    ment under Rule 60(b) of the Rules of the Court of Federal
    Claims. Her motion attempted to establish jurisdiction
    through a purported violation of the Rehabilitation Act,
    29 U.S.C. § 794(a), and the Fourteenth Amendment for
    failure to appoint her counsel. The motion further indi-
    cated that Ms. Bush did not seek disability benefits, but
    rather compensation for nineteen months of “unjust
    imprisonment.” A. 19.
    The CFC denied Ms. Bush’s motion and she appealed
    to us. Reiterating some of the jurisdictional bases from
    her complaint and Rule 60(b) motion, Ms. Bush’s appeal
    also cites, without elaboration, “False Profile Identity
    Records,” “‘to sublease’ under the Fair Housing Act,” and
    “the Federal Consumer Leasing Act.” Appellant Br. 1.
    We have jurisdiction to review under 28 U.S.C.
    § 1295(a)(3).
    BUSH   v. US                                             3
    DISCUSSION
    We review the CFC’s dismissal for lack of subject-
    matter jurisdiction de novo. See Kam-Almaz v. United
    States, 
    682 F.3d 1364
    , 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Because Ms.
    Bush filed her documents pro se, we hold her filings to
    “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted
    by lawyers.” See Haines v. Kerner, 
    404 U.S. 519
    , 520–21
    (1972). However, even a pro se litigant “bears the burden
    of proving that the Court of Federal Claims possessed
    jurisdiction over [her] complaint.” Sanders v. United
    States, 
    252 F.3d 1329
    , 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
    The CFC is a court of limited jurisdiction, largely es-
    tablished by the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491. United
    States v. Testan, 
    424 U.S. 392
    , 397–98 (1976). The Tucker
    Act “is itself only a jurisdictional statute; it does not
    create any substantive right enforceable against the
    United States for money damages.” In re United States,
    
    463 F.3d 1328
    , 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (quoting 
    Testan, 424 U.S. at 398
    ). Rather, a “substantive right must be
    found in some other source of law, such as ‘the Constitu-
    tion, or any Act of Congress, or any regulation of an
    executive department.’” United States v. Mitchell,
    
    463 U.S. 206
    , 216 (1983) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1491).
    The CFC does not have Tucker Act jurisdiction over
    any of the purported causes of action brought by
    Ms. Bush. We have held that the CFC does not have
    jurisdiction to hear claims for: Social Security benefits,
    Marcus v. United States, 
    909 F.2d 1470
    , 1471 (Fed. Cir.
    1990); civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1985, Gant
    v. United States, 
    63 Fed. Cl. 311
    , 316 (2004), aff’d, 
    417 F.3d 1328
    (Fed. Cir. 2005); Fourteenth Amendment
    violations, LeBlanc v. United States, 
    50 F.3d 1025
    , 1028
    (Fed. Cir. 1995); or infractions of the federal criminal
    code, Joshua v. United States, 
    17 F.3d 378
    , 379 (Fed. Cir.
    1994), which includes conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 371.
    Likewise, we agree with the CFC’s prior holdings that it
    4                                                 BUSH   v. US
    does not have jurisdiction over claims for Privacy Act
    violations under 5 U.S.C. § 522a(g), Treece v. United States,
    
    96 Fed. Cl. 226
    , 232 (2010), or Fair Housing Act violations,
    Fennie v. United States, No. 12-272C, 
    2013 WL 151685
    ,
    at *1 (Fed. Cl. Jan. 4, 2013).
    There is no jurisdiction for Ms. Bush’s Federal Con-
    sumer Leasing Act claim because that Act provides the
    federal district courts, not the CFC, with jurisdiction.
    15 U.S.C. § 1667d(c); see United States v. Bormes, 
    133 S. Ct. 12
    , 18 (2012) (“The Tucker Act is displaced . . .
    when a law assertedly imposing monetary liability on the
    United States contains its own judicial remedies.”).
    Ms. Bush’s false imprisonment claim also does not estab-
    lish jurisdiction, as recovery in the CFC for false impris-
    onment under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1495, 2513 requires a
    conviction and subsequent reversal or pardon. Here, Ms.
    Bush only presented evidence that a criminal indictment
    against her was dismissed. And because Ms. Bush pro-
    vided no explanation, we presume her reference to “False
    Profile Identity Records” relates to her false imprison-
    ment claim and, thus, this alleged ground also does not
    provide jurisdiction.
    Finally, Ms. Bush has not shown that her case is one
    of the “exceedingly restricted circumstances” in which
    there is a constitutional right to civil counsel. Lariscey v.
    United States, 
    861 F.2d 1267
    , 1270 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
    Ms. Bush’s invocation of the Rehabilitation Act in connec-
    tion with this claim does nothing to alter the result, as the
    Rehabilitation Act only pertains to programs of the execu-
    tive, not judicial, branch. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). A court’s
    refusal to appoint civil counsel is an act of the judicial—
    not executive—branch and, thus, the Rehabilitation Act
    does not apply here.
    Thus, Ms. Bush has not presented any claims for
    which the CFC has jurisdiction. Therefore, we affirm the
    CFC’s dismissal of her complaint.
    BUSH   v. US              5
    AFFIRMED
    COSTS
    No costs.