Chittenden v. United States , 663 F. App'x 934 ( 2016 )


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  •        NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    ______________________
    GENE CHITTENDEN, ALLEN D. HALL,
    Plaintiffs-Appellants
    v.
    UNITED STATES,
    Defendant-Appellee
    ______________________
    2016-2148
    ______________________
    Appeal from the United States Court of Federal
    Claims in No. 1:14-CV-00632, Judge Elaine Kaplan.
    ______________________
    Decided: October 27, 2016
    ______________________
    GENE CHITTENDEN, Auburn, CA, pro se.
    ALLEN D. HALL, North San Juan, CA, pro se.
    ERIKA KRANZ, Environment and Natural Resources
    Division, United States Department of Justice, Washing-
    ton, DC, for defendant-appellee. Also represented by JOHN
    C. CRUDEN.
    ______________________
    2                                         CHITTENDEN   v. US
    Before PROST, Chief Judge, TARANTO and HUGHES,
    Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM.
    Gene Chittenden and Allen Hall hold mining claims
    on two lode mines located in the Tahoe National Forest in
    California. After the United States Forest Service in-
    stalled bat gates on the shaft and portal of the two mines,
    Mr. Chittenden and Mr. Hall sought damages for, among
    other things, an uncompensated taking in violation of the
    Fifth Amendment. The Court of Federal Claims granted
    summary judgment in favor of the government after
    determining that the installation of the bat gates did not
    deprive claimants of the ability to develop their mining
    claims and therefore no taking occurred. Because we find
    that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the Court
    of Federal Claims did not err in ruling that the govern-
    ment was entitled to summary judgment and thus we
    affirm.
    I
    Mr. Chittenden and Mr. Hall (claimants) hold mining
    claims on two lode mines—the Roye Sum lode mine and
    the Dolliegeek lode mine—located in the Tahoe National
    Forest in California. In November 2009, the Forest
    Service received a report that the Roye Sum mine con-
    tained a bat colony. Dave Brown, an Assistant Minerals
    Officer for the Forest Service, asked Mr. Hall if he would
    be willing to allow a bat biologist access to the mine to
    conduct an assessment. Mr. Hall denied the request.
    Nevertheless, the District Biologist and the Regional Bat
    Coordinator visited the Roye Sum mine on July 6, 2010,
    and recommended that the Forest Service install bat-
    friendly gates on the mine portal and the mine shaft.
    Based on this recommendation, the Forest Service in-
    stalled two bat gates in the Roye Sum mine on October
    12, 2010. The bat gate covering the mine shaft was made
    CHITTENDEN   v. US                                       3
    of five 36-inch steel bars. Beneath the gate, the Forest
    Service also installed a short length of 36-inch diameter
    pipe (or “culvert”) inside the mine shaft. The gate across
    the mine portal was made of four vertical steel bars
    anchored into a concrete base and seven removable hori-
    zontal steel bars. In November 2010, Mr. Brown provided
    Mr. Hall with a key to remove the horizontal bars so that
    he could access the mine.
    On July 21, 2014, claimants filed suit against the
    United States in the Court of Federal Claims seeking
    $50,000,000 in damages alleging, among other things,
    that the installation of the bat gates resulted in an un-
    compensated taking under the Fifth Amendment. The
    Court of Federal Claims granted summary judgment in
    favor of the government after determining that no taking
    occurred.
    Claimants appeal. 1    We have jurisdiction under 28
    U.S.C. § 1295(a).
    II
    This Court reviews the Court of Federal Claims’
    grant of summary judgment de novo. M & J Coal Co. v.
    United States, 
    47 F.3d 1148
    , 1152 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Spe-
    cifically, we review the record de novo to determine
    whether any genuine issue of material fact exists, and if
    not, whether the movant is entitled to judgment as a
    matter of law. 
    Id. “To encourage
    private development of mineral depos-
    its, federal law permits private parties to discover, ex-
    plore, and reclaim mineral deposits in federally-owned
    lands.” Kunkes v. United States, 
    78 F.3d 1549
    , 1550 (Fed.
    1    The Court of Federal Claims dismissed claimants’
    due process and tort claims for lack of jurisdiction. These
    claims have not been appealed.
    4                                          CHITTENDEN   v. US
    Cir. 1996). Therefore, pursuant to the Mining Act of
    1872, claimants “have the exclusive right of possession
    and enjoyment of all the surface included within the lines
    of their locations, and of all veins, lodes, and ledges
    throughout their entire depth . . . .” 30 U.S.C. § 26.
    Acquiring an interest in federal land for mining pur-
    poses is known as an “unpatented mining claim,” which is
    “an interest in only the minerals in the land and not in
    the land’s surface; the government retains fee title to the
    land.” Ford v. United States, 
    101 Fed. Cl. 234
    , 238 n.6
    (2011). Therefore, “[a]lthough unpatented mining claims
    are fully recognized possessory interests, they partake
    more of the character of use rights.” 
    Kunkes, 78 F.3d at 1554
    (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
    The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitu-
    tion provides that private property shall not “be taken for
    public use without just compensation.” U.S. Const.
    amend. V, cl. 4. To evaluate whether a governmental
    action constitutes a taking of private property without
    just compensation, we must first determine “whether the
    claimant has established a ‘property interest’ for purposes
    of the Fifth Amendment.” Maritrans Inc. v. United
    States, 
    342 F.3d 1344
    , 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see also M &
    J Coal 
    Co., 47 F.3d at 1153
    –54. If a valid property inter-
    est exists, we then determine if a taking occurred. 
    Id. Claimants assert
    that they possess a cognizable prop-
    erty interest in their unpatented mining claims. Alt-
    hough unpatented mining claims are protected by the
    Fifth Amendment against uncompensated takings, see
    
    Kunkes, 78 F.3d at 1551
    , they are only “valid against the
    United States if there has been a discovery of mineral
    within the limits of the claim, if the lands are still miner-
    al, and if other statutory requirements have been met.”
    Best v. Humboldt Placer Min. Co., 
    371 U.S. 334
    , 336
    (1963). “The [Bureau of Land Management] has primary
    jurisdiction to determine the validity of mining claims[.]”
    CHITTENDEN   v. US                                        5
    Freeman v. United States, 
    83 Fed. Cl. 530
    , 533 (2008).
    Here, the Bureau of Land Management has not conducted
    a validity determination, but for purposes of this analysis,
    we assume that claimants’ mining claims are valid.
    Therefore, we must determine if a taking has occurred.
    Claimants allege that an uncompensated taking has
    occurred because the installation of the two bat gates
    constitutes a “permanent physical occupation” and denies
    them “meaningful access.” 2 Pet. Br. 8–9. Generally, a
    permanent physical occupation of an owner’s property,
    authorized by the government, is a taking for which just
    2     Claimants also allege that the Forest Service did
    not have authority to install the bat gates because the
    Forest Service may not conduct activities that endanger
    or materially interfere with mining, or related operations
    or activities on the mining claim. Pet. Br. 13–18. Howev-
    er, a “claimant must concede the validity of the govern-
    ment action which is the basis of the taking claim to bring
    suit under the Tucker Act[.]” Tabb Lakes, Ltd. v. United
    States, 
    10 F.3d 796
    , 802 (Fed. Cir. 1993). This is because
    “an uncompensated taking and an unlawful government
    action constitute two separate wrongs that give rise to
    two separate causes of action,” and therefore, “a property
    owner is free either to sue in district court for asserted
    improprieties committed in the course of the challenged
    action or to sue for an uncompensated taking in the Court
    of Federal Claims.” Rith Energy, Inc. v. United States,
    
    247 F.3d 1355
    , 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (internal quotation
    marks and citation omitted). By alleging that an improp-
    er taking occurred, claimants must litigate their takings
    claim on the assumption that the Forest Service had the
    proper authority to install the bat gates, and therefore,
    any arguments related to the Forest Service’s authority to
    install the bat gates are irrelevant in determining wheth-
    er or not a taking occurred.
    6                                           CHITTENDEN   v. US
    compensation is due under the Fifth Amendment. See
    Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 
    458 U.S. 419
    , 426 (1982). Here, however, the United States retains
    fee title in the property and claimants have a possessory
    interest in the mining claims. Neither Loretto nor other
    authority cited by claimants supports treating the place-
    ment of the bat gates as a permanent physical occupation
    sufficient for compensation under the Fifth Amendment.
    Additionally, a physical taking may occur if the gov-
    ernment denies meaningful access to claimants’ mining
    claims. See Washoe Cty., Nev. v. United States, 
    319 F.3d 1320
    , 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2003). However, the United States,
    “as owner of the underlying fee title to the public domain,
    maintains broad powers over the terms and conditions
    upon which the public lands can be used, leased, and
    acquired.” United States v. Locke, 
    471 U.S. 84
    , 104
    (1985). “Claimants thus must take their mineral inter-
    ests with the knowledge that the Government retains
    substantial regulatory power over those interests.” 
    Id. at 105.
        Therefore, claimants’ property interest is limited by
    the regulations issued by the United States Forest Ser-
    vice. See 30 U.S.C. § 612(b) (mining claims “shall be
    subject, prior to issuance of patent therefor, to the right of
    the United States to manage and dispose of the vegetative
    surface resources thereof and to manage other surface
    resources thereof (except mineral deposits subject to
    location under the mining laws of the United States)”).
    Under 36 C.F.R. § 228.4(a), claimants must submit “a
    notice of intent to operate” for “operations which might
    cause significant disturbance of surface resources.”
    However, claimants have not submitted a notice of intent,
    and therefore their operations are limited to those that
    will not cause significant surface disturbance, which
    includes “prospecting and sampling . . . [that] will not
    involve removal of more than a reasonable amount of
    mineral deposit for analysis and study,” 36 C.F.R.
    CHITTENDEN   v. US                                       7
    § 228.4(a)(1)(ii), and “[o]perations which will not involve
    the use of mechanized earthmoving equipment, such as
    bulldozers or backhoes, or the cutting of trees,” 
    id. § 228.4(a)(1)(vi).
        Here, claimants assert that the bat gates have denied
    them meaningful access to their mining claims because
    they cannot conduct “ordinary mining activities” or use
    “modern mining machinery,” Pet. Br. at 9, 21, and have
    thus been “deprived of all economic use of the mines,” 
    id. at 9.
    However, claimants, at this time, may not conduct
    “ordinary mining activities,” or use “modern mining
    machinery” because they are limited to those activities
    permissible before submission of the notice of intent.
    Moreover, the undisputed declaration of Mr. Brown, the
    Assistant Minerals Officer for the Forest Service, stated
    that the bat gates installed at the Roye Sum mine “do not
    prevent Mr. Chittenden and Mr. Hall from performing
    underground operations that will not cause a significant
    surface resource disturbance.” Appx. 83.
    Because there is no genuine issue of material fact re-
    garding whether the bat gates constitute a permanent
    physical occupation or deny claimants meaningful access
    to the mines for the purposes of conducting the limited,
    permissible activities, the Court of Federal Claims did not
    err in ruling that the government was entitled to sum-
    mary judgment.
    AFFIRMED
    No costs.