McKesson Technologies Inc. v. Epic Systems Corp. ( 2011 )


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  •   United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    __________________________
    MCKESSON TECHNOLOGIES INC. (formerly
    McKesson Information Solutions, LLC),
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    EPIC SYSTEMS CORPORATION,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    __________________________
    2010-1291
    __________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the
    Northern District of Georgia in case no. 06-CV-2965,
    Chief Judge Jack T. Camp.
    __________________________
    Decided: April 12, 2011
    __________________________
    PAUL D. CLEMENT, King & Spalding LLP, of Washing-
    ton, DC, argued for plaintiff-appellant. With him on the
    brief were DARYL JOSEFFER; and TIMOTHY G. BARBER and
    ADAM M. CONRAD, of Charlotte, North Carolina.
    STEVEN D. MOORE, Kilpatrick Stockton LLP, of At-
    lanta, Georgia, argued for defendants-appellees. With
    him on the brief were WILLIAM H. BOICE, RUSSELL A.
    KORN, D. CLAY HOLLOWAY, and JASON D. GARDNER; and
    ADAM H. CHARNES of Winston-Salem, North Carolina.
    MCKESSON TECH   v. EPIC SYSTEMS                            2
    __________________________
    Before NEWMAN, BRYSON, and LINN, Circuit Judges.
    Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge LINN. Con-
    curring opinion filed by Circuit Judge BRYSON. Dissent-
    ing opinion filed by Circuit Judge NEWMAN.
    LINN, Circuit Judge.
    McKesson Technologies Inc. (“McKesson”) appeals the
    district court’s grant of Epic Systems Corporation’s
    (“Epic”) renewed motion for summary judgment of nonin-
    fringement of claims 1-10, 12-14, and 16-18 of U.S. Patent
    No. 6,757,898 (the “’898 patent”). McKesson Info. Solu-
    tions LLC v. Epic Sys. Corp., No. 06-cv-2965, 
    2009 WL 2915778
    (N.D. Ga. Sept. 8, 2009) (“Summary Judgment
    Order”). Because McKesson is unable to attribute the
    performance of all the steps of the asserted method claims
    to a single party—namely, Epic’s healthcare-provider
    customers—this court affirms the finding of noninfringe-
    ment.
    BACKGROUND
    I. The Technology and Nature of the Dispute
    McKesson’s ’898 patent is directed to an electronic
    method of communication between healthcare providers
    and patients involving personalized web pages for doctors
    and their patients. See ’898 patent col.4 ll.3-44. This
    solution facilitates direct communication between pa-
    tients and their doctors. See 
    id. col.4 ll.24-40.
    For exam-
    ple, the ’898 patent discloses a system whereby a patient
    can access visit-specific content online following every
    doctor visit. 
    Id. col.4 ll.57-63.
    This online content “offers
    the patient significantly more information than he/she
    could have absorbed during a typical visit with the physi-
    cian.” 
    Id. col.4 ll.63-65.
    This solution also increases
    efficiencies for both doctors and patients. See 
    id. col.4 3
                          MCKESSON TECH   v. EPIC SYSTEMS
    ll.24-40. For example, patients may submit appointment
    and prescription refill requests online and physicians may
    respond to these requests and manage callbacks at their
    convenience. 
    Id. col.4 l.65–col.5
    l.3; col.9 ll.37-39.
    Epic is a privately owned software development com-
    pany that licenses software to healthcare providers. One
    such product is the accused MyChart software. MyChart
    allows healthcare providers to associate medical records
    with a patient’s personalized web page. MyChart also
    allows the patients to communicate with their healthcare
    provider online through these personalized MyChart web
    pages. In this way, patients are given access to their own
    medical records, treatment information, scheduling
    information, and other material.
    Epic itself does not use the MyChart software.
    Rather, Epic licenses the MyChart software to healthcare
    providers. These licensed healthcare providers choose
    whether to offer MyChart as an option for their patients’
    use and none of these healthcare providers requires their
    patients to actually use the MyChart software. If a
    patient chooses to utilize the MyChart software, that
    patient “initiates a communication” to the provider by
    logging on to the healthcare provider’s MyChart web
    page. Once authenticated, the patient is then presented
    with a personalized web page from which that patient
    may access his or her medical records and other such
    information.
    II. Proceedings Before the District Court
    On December 6, 2006, McKesson sued Epic in the
    United States District Court for the Northern District of
    Georgia alleging that Epic induced infringement of claims
    1-10, 12-14, and 16-18 of the ’898 patent by licensing
    MyChart to healthcare providers who subsequently
    MCKESSON TECH   v. EPIC SYSTEMS                         4
    offered it to their patients. Claim 1 is representative of
    the asserted claims and reads as follows:
    1. A method of automatically and electronically
    communicating between at least one health-care
    provider and a plurality of users serviced by the
    health-care provider, said method comprising the
    steps of:
    initiating a communication by one of the plu-
    rality of users to the provider for information,
    wherein the provider has established a preexisting
    medical record for each user;
    enabling communication by transporting the
    communication . . . ;
    electronically comparing content of the com-
    munication . . . ;
    returning the response to the communication
    automatically . . . ;
    said provider/patient interface providing a
    fully automated mechanism for generating a per-
    sonalized page or area within the provider’s Web
    site for each user serviced by the provider; and
    said patient-provider interface service center
    for dynamically assembling and delivering cus-
    tomer content to said user.
    ’898 patent col.44 l.60–col.45 l.24 (emphasis added).
    Epic first moved for summary judgment of nonin-
    fringement on January 14, 2008, on the issue of joint
    infringement. The parties do not dispute that Epic’s
    customers do not directly perform the first step of the
    asserted method claims, the “initiating a communication”
    step. The district court, in denying Epic’s motion, relied
    on BMC Resources, Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 
    498 F.3d 1373
    (Fed. Cir. 2007), and found “questions of material
    5                        MCKESSON TECH   v. EPIC SYSTEMS
    fact remain as to whether the providers using Epic’s
    MyChart software direct and control the user to perform
    the first step of the method” based upon an expert decla-
    ration filed by McKesson. McKesson Info. Solutions LLC
    v. Epic Sys. Corp., No. 06-cv-2965 (N.D. Ga. May 19,
    2008).
    Following claim construction and the close of discov-
    ery, Epic renewed its motion for summary judgment of
    noninfringement on the issue of joint infringement, citing
    both Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 
    532 F.3d 1318
    (Fed. Cir. 2008), and McKesson’s withdrawal of its expert
    declaration. Epic argued that because its customers
    neither directly perform the “initiating a communication”
    step of the asserted method claims nor exercise control or
    direction over another who performs this step, McKesson
    failed to demonstrate that a single party directly infringes
    the ’898 patent and, accordingly, could not have succeeded
    on its claim of indirect infringement. The district court
    agreed and granted Epic’s renewed motion for summary
    judgment of noninfringement on September 8, 2009.
    Summary Judgment Order.
    McKesson appealed and this court has jurisdiction
    under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).
    DISCUSSION
    This court reviews summary judgment of nonin-
    fringement without deference to ascertain whether genu-
    ine issues of material fact exist. BMC 
    Res., 498 F.3d at 1378
    . Summary judgment is appropriate only “if the
    pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file,
    and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as
    to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to
    judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In
    assessing the evidence, all reasonable inferences are
    drawn in favor of the non-movant. Del. Valley Floral
    MCKESSON TECH   v. EPIC SYSTEMS                           6
    Grp., Inc. v. Shaw Rose Nets, LLC, 
    597 F.3d 1374
    , 1379
    (Fed. Cir. 2010).
    McKesson alleged induced infringement, which re-
    quires a direct infringer. BMC 
    Res., 498 F.3d at 1379
    . A
    method claim is directly infringed only if each step of the
    claimed method is performed by a single party. 
    Id. at 1378-79.
    McKesson and Epic agree that no single party
    performs every step of the asserted method claims. Thus,
    the sole issue presented by this appeal relates to whether
    the relationship between Epic’s customers (MyChart
    providers) and the MyChart users is such that perform-
    ance of the “initiating a communication” step may be
    attributed to the MyChart providers.
    In both BMC Resources and Muniauction, this court
    confronted the situation where the actions of multiple
    parties combined to perform the steps of a claimed
    method, but no single party performed every step of the
    claimed method. This court concluded that “where the
    actions of multiple parties combine to perform every step
    of a claimed method, the claim is directly infringed only if
    one party exercises ‘control or direction’ over the entire
    process such that every step is attributable to the control-
    ling party.” 
    Muniauction, 532 F.3d at 1329
    (citing BMC
    
    Res., 498 F.3d at 1380-81
    ). “[T]he ‘control or direction’
    standard is satisfied in situations where the law would
    traditionally hold the accused direct infringer vicariously
    liable for the acts committed by another party that are
    required to complete performance of a claimed method.”
    
    Id. at 1330
    (citing BMC 
    Res., 498 F.3d at 1379
    ).
    Recently, in Akamai Technologies, Inc. v. Limelight
    Networks, Inc., 
    629 F.3d 1311
    (Fed. Cir. 2010), the pat-
    entee sought to attribute the actions of multiple parties,
    each performing a subset of the claimed method steps, to
    a single party for a finding of direct infringement.
    Akamai’s asserted method claims were directed towards a
    7                         MCKESSON TECH    v. EPIC SYSTEMS
    content delivery service that permitted a content provider
    to outsource the storage and delivery of discrete portions
    of its website content. 
    Id. at 1351.
    It was undisputed
    that Limelight performed all but the “tagging” and “serv-
    ing” steps of the asserted method claims. 
    Id. at 1317.
    Limelight instead provided a service to its customers
    along with the information necessary for its customers to
    perform the “tagging” and “serving” steps themselves. 
    Id. Additionally, Limelight’s
    standard customer contract,
    while not obligating Limelight’s customers to perform the
    “tagging” or “serving” steps, explained that the customer
    would have to perform this step itself if the customer
    decided to take advantage of Limelight’s service. 
    Id. at 1321.
         The court in Akamai held “there can only be joint in-
    fringement when there is an agency relationship between
    the parties who perform the method steps or when one
    party is contractually obligated to the other to perform
    the steps.” 
    Id. at 1320.
    The court concluded that Lime-
    light’s customers were not performing any of the claimed
    method steps as agents for Limelight nor were they
    contractually obligated to perform any of the claimed
    method steps. 
    Id. Because Limelight
    did not perform all
    of the steps of the asserted method claims and there was
    no basis to attribute to Limelight the actions of its cus-
    tomers who carried out the remaining steps, this court
    affirmed the district court’s judgment as a matter of law
    of noninfringement. 
    Id. at 1322.
        In this case, nothing indicates that MyChart users are
    performing any of the claimed method steps as agents for
    the MyChart providers. Nor does McKesson argue an
    agency relationship existed here. Indeed, McKesson
    faulted the district court for applying this court’s control
    or direction test as one “that is satisfied only . . . through
    an employment or other agency relationship, such that
    MCKESSON TECH   v. EPIC SYSTEMS                             8
    the other acts out of obligation rather than consent.”
    McKesson Br. 27. McKesson instead argues that the
    special nature of the doctor-patient relationship is some-
    thing more than a mere arms length relationship and is
    sufficient to provide attribution, because “[t]he phrase
    ‘doctor’s orders’ says it all” and because of the existence of
    a doctor-patient privilege. 
    Id. at 18,
    31. This argument
    misses the mark. A doctor-patient relationship does not
    by itself give rise to an agency relationship or impose on
    patients a contractual obligation such that the voluntary
    actions of patients can be said to represent the vicarious
    actions of their doctors.
    Nor is there anything indicating that MyChart users
    were contractually obligated to perform any of the
    claimed method steps on behalf of the MyChart providers.
    These facts are undisputed.       MyChart users choose
    whether or not to initiate communications with their
    providers and are under no obligation to do so. As in both
    Akamai and Muniauction, MyChart providers simply
    control the users’ access to MyChart. 
    Akamai 629 F.3d at 1321
    (finding Limelight’s customers chose whether to
    perform the “tagging” or “scanning” steps); 
    Muniauction, 532 F.3d at 1330
    (finding that although the accused
    infringer controlled access to its system and instructed
    bidders on its use, that was insufficient to incur liability
    for direct infringement). Here, as in Akamai, MyChart
    users “acted principally for their own benefit and under
    their own control.” 
    Akamai 629 F.3d at 1321
    .
    McKesson has identified no viable legal theory under
    which the actions of MyChart users may be attributed to
    Epic’s customers. Without an agency relationship or
    contractual obligation, the MyChart users’ actions cannot
    be attributed to the MyChart providers, Epic’s customers.
    Thus, McKesson has failed to demonstrate that any single
    party directly infringes the ’898 patent. Absent direct
    infringement, Epic cannot be liable for indirect infringe-
    9                        MCKESSON TECH   v. EPIC SYSTEMS
    ment. BMC 
    Res., 498 F.3d at 1379
    (stating “[i]ndirect
    infringement requires, as a predicate, a finding that some
    party amongst the accused actors has committed the
    entire act of direct infringement.”).
    McKesson argues that this court’s precedents contra-
    vene ordinary principles of law involving concerted action.
    Specifically, McKesson compares this court’s precedents
    with joint tortfeasor liability and vicarious copyright
    liability. Under tort law, according to McKesson, joint
    liability attaches “where the acts of each of two or more
    parties, standing alone, would not be wrongful, but to-
    gether they cause harm to the plaintiff.” McKesson Br. 20
    (citing Prosser & Keeton on Torts § 52, at 354 (5th ed.
    1984)). Similarly, McKesson cites various copyright cases
    where courts have found vicarious copyright liability
    stemming from a defendant’s decision to profit from
    infringement “while declining to exercise a right to stop or
    limit it.” McKesson Br. 23 (quoting Metro-Goldwyn-
    Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 
    545 U.S. 913
    , 930
    (2005)).
    This court finds McKesson’s invitation to depart from
    our precedents unpersuasive, let alone beyond our author-
    ity as a three-judge panel. See Newell Cos. v. Kenney Mfg.
    Co., 
    864 F.2d 757
    , 765 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“This court has
    adopted the rule that prior decisions of a panel of the
    court are binding precedent on subsequent panels unless
    and until overturned in banc.”). Patent law is a creature
    of statute and “expanding the rules governing direct
    infringement to reach independent conduct of multiple
    actors would subvert the statutory scheme for indirect
    infringement.” BMC 
    Res., 498 F.3d at 1381
    . The notion
    of indirect patent infringement, encompassing contribu-
    tory and induced infringement, already addresses the
    joint tortfeasor problem. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(b), (c).
    Indeed, an indirect infringer is a type of joint tortfeasor
    MCKESSON TECH   v. EPIC SYSTEMS                           10
    because, while his actions alone do not harm the patentee,
    his actions along with another cause a single harm to the
    plaintiff. See Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement
    Co., 
    377 U.S. 476
    , 500 (1964). That “single harm,” how-
    ever, is direct patent infringement, a strict-liability of-
    fense limited to those who practice each and every
    element of the claimed invention. BMC 
    Res., 498 F.3d at 1381
    ; Jurgens v. CBK, Ltd., 
    80 F.3d 1566
    , 1570 n.2 (Fed.
    Cir. 1996). Absent direct infringement, the patentee has
    not suffered a compensable harm. BMC 
    Res., 498 F.3d at 1379
    ; cf. 
    Grokster, 545 U.S. at 930
    (stating “[o]ne infringes
    contributorily by intentionally inducing or encouraging
    direct infringement and infringes vicariously by profiting
    from direct infringement while declining to exercise a
    right to stop or limit it.” (citations omitted) (emphases
    added)). Finally, in patent law, unlike in other areas of
    tort law, the patentee specifically defines the boundaries
    of his or her exclusive rights and provides notice to the
    public to permit avoidance of infringement. This stands
    in sharp contrast to the circumstances surrounding a joint
    tort where the victim has no ability to define the injurious
    conduct upfront and where, absent joint liability, the
    victim would stand uncompensated as a consequence.
    McKesson also relies upon Peerless Equipment Co. v.
    W.H. Miner, Inc., 
    93 F.2d 98
    (7th Cir. 1937), in arguing
    that the regional courts of appeals have affirmed liability
    where one party performed most of the patented method
    and simply handed it over to another party to complete
    the method. 
    Id. at 105
    (finding liability where a seller of
    gears knowingly left it to customers to flatten the gears’
    crown, thereby “completing the final step of the [patented]
    process.”). The Peerless opinion is neither binding nor
    persuasive. This court has time and again rejected liabil-
    ity where one party performed most of the patented
    method and left it to another party to complete the
    method in the absence of any contractual obligation or
    11                       MCKESSON TECH   v. EPIC SYSTEMS
    agency relationship that would vicariously attribute the
    acts of the one party to the other. See 
    Akamai 629 F.3d at 1322
    ; 
    Muniauction, 532 F.3d at 1330
    ; BMC 
    Res., 498 F.3d at 1381
    -82. Nor is this court persuaded by the conclusory
    reasoning in Peerless affirming the district court’s finding
    of contributory infringement. See 
    Peerless, 93 F.2d at 105
    (stating “we think that finding is correct.”).
    CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, this court affirms the dis-
    trict court’s grant of Epic’s renewed motion for summary
    judgment of noninfringement of the ’898 patent.
    AFFIRMED
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    __________________________
    MCKESSON TECHNOLOGIES INC. (formerly
    McKesson Information Solutions, LLC),
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    EPIC SYSTEMS CORPORATION,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    __________________________
    2010-1291
    __________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the
    Northern District of Georgia in Case No. 06-CV-2965,
    Chief Judge Jack T. Camp.
    __________________________
    BRYSON, Circuit Judge, concurring.
    I agree that the decision in this case is correct in light
    of this court’s decisions in BMC Resources, Muniauction,
    and Akamai Technologies. Whether those decisions are
    correct is another question, one that is close enough and
    important enough that it may warrant review by the en
    banc court in an appropriate case.
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    __________________________
    MCKESSON TECHNOLOGIES INC. (formerly
    McKesson Information Solutions, LLC),
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    EPIC SYSTEMS CORPORATION,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    __________________________
    2010-1291
    __________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the
    Northern District of Georgia in Case No. 06-CV-2965, Chief
    Judge Jack T. Camp.
    __________________________
    NEWMAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
    The court again departs from the “prior panel rule,”
    which requires appellate panels to conform to the earlier of
    conflicting panel precedent. Instead, the court again selec-
    tively applies some newly minted panel rulings while ignor-
    ing others, adding to the conflict with precedent. Our
    obligation is either to obtain en banc resolution of divergent
    statements in various panel opinions, or to follow the earlier
    MCKESSON TECH   v. EPIC SYSTEMS                              2
    panel holding, as do the other circuits. 1 The court does
    neither. I must, respectfully, dissent.
    The question is whether there can be infringement of a
    patented method, when a step of the method is performed
    by an entity that is not “controlled or directed” by the same
    entity that performs the other steps. Interactive methods
    have been enabled by advances in computer-based technol-
    ogy. In the McKesson method, a patient initiates inquiry
    into various kinds of information relating to the patient and
    maintained by the patient’s physician; the panel majority
    holds that even if every step of the claimed method is per-
    formed there can be no infringement, on the theory that
    there is no direct infringement and thus no indirect in-
    fringement. Some recent panel holdings are of similar vein,
    holding that neither collaboration nor joint action nor facili-
    tation nor authorization nor invitation can overcome the
    immutable barrier to infringement when all of the partici-
    pating entities are not under the “control or direction” of a
    mastermind infringer.
    According to the panel majority today, there can be no
    infringement of this interactive patent, on the theory that
    the physician does not control or direct the patient who
    performs the step of entering the system maintained by the
    physician. The court thus eliminates the patent incentive
    from such interactive procedures, rendering McKesson’s
    new method, and all such interactive methods, open for
    infringement without redress. However, other panels of this
    court, and the Supreme Court, have held that there can be
    infringement liability when steps of the claimed method are
    performed by different entities. This new retrenchment of
    1   See Newell Cos., Inc. v. Kenney Mfg. Co., 
    864 F.2d 757
    , 765 (Fed. Cir. 1988); cf. Teague v. City of Flower
    Mound, Tex., 
    179 F.3d 377
    , 383 (5th Cir. 1999) (referring to
    the “rule of orderliness”).
    3                            MCKESSON TECH   v. EPIC SYSTEMS
    the patent grant disserves commerce, fairness, and the
    innovation incentive.
    The patent in suit, U.S. Patent No. 6,757,898, is di-
    rected to “a communication system for providing automated,
    electronic communications between at least one health-care
    provider and a plurality of users of the health-care pro-
    vider.” ‘898 patent, abstract. The ‘898 patent describes the
    operation of personalized web pages for patients. The
    patent states that “once the patient has logged into his/her
    own Web page,” the patient can access data in the practitio-
    ner’s scheduling and billing systems and a variety of prac-
    tice-based services including “appointment requests and
    updates, prescription refills, online triage, health search
    information and the like.” Col.4 ll.50-56.
    Computer-implemented methods that are new, useful,
    nonobvious, described, enabled, and particularly claimed,
    are not excluded from the patent system simply because
    their performance involves more than one entity. Here the
    patient initiates the interaction with the health-care pro-
    vider, by performing the first step of claim 1:
    1. A method of automatically and electronically
    communicating between at least one health-care
    provider and a plurality of users serviced by the
    health-care provider, said method comprising the
    steps of:
    initiating a communication by one of the plural-
    ity of users to the provider for information, wherein
    the provider has established a preexisting medical
    record for each user;
    enabling communication by transporting the
    communication through a provider/patient interface
    over an electronic communication network to a Web
    MCKESSON TECH   v. EPIC SYSTEMS                              4
    site which is unique to the provider, whereupon the
    communication is automatically reformatted and
    processed or stored on a central server, said Web
    site supported by or in communication with the cen-
    tral server through a provider-patient interface ser-
    vice center;
    electronically comparing content of the commu-
    nication with mapped content, which has been pre-
    viously provided by the provider to the central
    server, to formulate a response as a static or dy-
    namic object, or a combined static and dynamic ob-
    ject; and
    returning the response to the communication
    automatically to the user’s computer, whereupon
    the response is read by the user or stored on the
    user’s computers
    said provider/patient interface providing a fully
    automated mechanism for generating a personalized
    page or area within the provider’s Web site for each
    user serviced by the provider; and
    said patient-provider interface service center for
    dynamically assembling and delivering custom con-
    tent to said user.
    All but the first step are performed by or controlled or
    directed by the health-care provider. The court today holds
    that the claim cannot be infringed as a matter of law, on the
    theory that a “single-entity rule” is violated because the
    provider does not control or direct the patient who initiates
    the communication, in that the patient is neither the agent
    of the health-care provider nor contractually obligated to
    initiate the communication. Maj. Op. at 8-9. There is no
    such rule of law. Even the recent creation of a “single-entity
    rule” by this court does not go that far.
    5                            MCKESSON TECH   v. EPIC SYSTEMS
    Interactive methods that meet all of the conditions and
    requirements of the Patent Act are fully entitled to partici-
    pate in the patent system. The court’s removal of interac-
    tive methods from the purview of the patent system,
    through its newly minted and now enlarged “single-entity
    rule,” is contrary to law and policy. Conflicts in precedent
    require resolution, not enlargement, for inconsistent prece-
    dent is as much a deterrent to innovation as is elimination
    of the patent right entirely.
    I
    CONFLICT WITH PRECEDENT
    Precedent requires that: “For infringement of a process
    invention, all of the claimed steps of the process must be
    performed.” EMI Grp. N. Am., Inc. v. Intel Corp., 
    157 F.3d 887
    , 896 (Fed. Cir. 1998). The panel majority now rules
    that: “A method claim is directly infringed only if each step
    of the claimed method is performed by a single party.” Maj.
    Op. at 6. Since the user (patient), not the provider (physi-
    cian), decides whether to initiate the communication, the
    court holds that the provider does not “control or direct”
    whether the user takes this initiating step. Thus the court
    holds, first, that the method claim cannot be directly in-
    fringed, as a matter of law. The court then holds that
    without direct infringement there cannot be indirect in-
    fringement, such as induced or contributory infringement,
    as a matter of law. Thus the court concludes that the claims
    can never be infringed, although the patent meets every
    requirement of patentability and every step of the claimed
    method is practiced. These rulings and conclusion are
    contrary to statute and precedent.
    The patent statute grants to every patentee the right to
    exclude others from practicing the patented invention:
    MCKESSON TECH   v. EPIC SYSTEMS                              6
    35 U.S.C. §154(a)(1) Every patent shall contain a
    short title of the invention and a grant to the pat-
    entee, his heirs and assigns, of the right to exclude
    others from making, using, offering for sale, or sell-
    ing the invention . . . .
    35 U.S.C. §154(a)(1) (2006). “The franchise which the
    patent grants, consists altogether in the right to exclude
    every one from making, using, or vending the thing pat-
    ented, without the permission of the patentee.” Bloomer v.
    McQuewan, 
    55 U.S. 539
    , 549 (1852); see also Crown Die &
    Tool Co. v. Nye Tool & Machine Works, 
    261 U.S. 24
    , 36
    (1923). The present statute codifies this right:
    35 U.S.C. §271(a) Except as otherwise provided in
    this title, whoever without authority makes, uses or
    sells any patented invention, within the United
    States during the term of the patent therefor, in-
    fringes the patent.
    35 U.S.C. §271(a) (2006). A patent that can never be in-
    fringed is not a patent in the definition of the law, for a
    patent that cannot be infringed does not have the “right to
    exclude.” This court’s elimination of infringement, by
    creating a new but far-reaching restriction, is inappropriate.
    “[C]ourts ‘should not read into the patent laws limitations
    or conditions which the legislature has not expressed.’”
    Bilski v. Kappos, 
    130 S. Ct. 3218
    , 3226 (2010) (quoting
    Diamond v. Diehr, 
    450 U.S. 175
    , 182 (1981)).
    These fundamental principles have not changed; they
    are the foundation of the patent system.
    As technology advanced, the variety of invention and
    modes of infringement has been accommodated by statute,
    by precedent, and if needed by legislation, in fidelity to the
    7                             MCKESSON TECH   v. EPIC SYSTEMS
    purposes and policy of patent law. For example, the liability
    of “participants” in infringement was summarized by Pro-
    fessor Robinson:
    The nature of the act of infringement is indi-
    cated by that of the exclusive right which it invades.
    . . . [E]very method by which the invention can be
    made available for the benefit of the infringer, and
    any person who participates in any wrongful appro-
    priation of the invention becomes thereby a violator
    of the rights protected by the patent.
    3 William C. Robinson, The Law of Patents for Useful Inven-
    tions §897 (1890) (reprint 1972). This foundation is violated
    by the introduction of an absolute bar to enforcement of
    patents that are directed to information-age electronic
    methods, simply because more than one entity is involved.
    Neither statute nor precedent supports this court’s pro-
    nouncement that the patentee’s right to exclude is limited to
    situations in which a single entity performs or controls or
    directs every step of the claimed method, whatever the
    method and whatever the relationship among the partici-
    pants. Precedent elaborating on direct and indirect in-
    fringement had evolved to accommodate, not to limit, the
    patentee’s right to exclude.
    The district court deemed itself bound by this court’s
    aberrant “single entity” decisions, although not without
    remarking on the flaws:
    [T]he single entity rule and BMC’s interpretation
    thereof severely limits the protection provided for
    patents which would otherwise be valid and en-
    forceable. . . . As long as the sale of a product con-
    stitutes an arms length transaction between the
    customer and the infringing company, which is in-
    sufficient to create vicarious liability, the patent
    MCKESSON TECH   v. EPIC SYSTEMS                              8
    holder would likely have no redress against the in-
    fringer. This result weakens the policy of providing
    protection to those who devote the time and re-
    sources to develop otherwise novel and patentable
    methods.
    McKesson Info. Solutions LLC v. Epic Sys. Corp., No. 06-cv-
    2965, 
    2009 WL 2915778
    , at *7 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 8, 2009). The
    district court referred to BMC Resources, Inc. v. Paymen-
    tech, L.P., 
    498 F.3d 1373
    (Fed. Cir. 2007), Muniauction, Inc.
    v. Thomson Corp., 
    532 F.3d 1318
    (Fed. Cir. 2007), and
    Global Patent Holdings, LLC v. Panthers BRHC LLC, 586 F.
    Supp. 2d 1331 (S.D. Fla. 2008), aff’d, 318 F. App’x 908 (Fed.
    Cir. 2009) (Table), and stated that these cases “compel” its
    flawed decision.
    In BMC Resources the defendant was one of three inde-
    pendent entities needed to perform the claim steps of debit
    network, financial institution, and payment services pro-
    vider; the court observed that the defendant payment ser-
    vices provider did not control or direct either the debit
    networks or the financial institutions that performed the
    other steps. In Muniauction this court held that the defen-
    dant, who controlled access to its auction system and in-
    structed bidders on its use, was not liable for direct
    infringement, but did not hold that indirect infringement
    was barred. In Global Patent a district court applied the
    evolving “single-entity rule” and held that the patentee
    could not state a claim for either direct or indirect infringe-
    ment although the defendant “puts Javascript programs on
    the remote user’s computer to allow the process to 
    begin.” 586 F. Supp. 2d at 1335
    . Although the BMC Resources
    decision is supportable on its facts, the enlargement of its
    holding is not.
    9                             MCKESSON TECH    v. EPIC SYSTEMS
    Applying these decisions to the ‘898 patent, the district
    court held that because the patient independently initiates
    the interaction with the physician’s records, there can be no
    joint infringement and thus no direct infringement of the
    claim. Applying the rule that there must be direct in-
    fringement before there can be indirect infringement, see
    Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., Inc., 
    377 U.S. 476
    , 483 (1964) (referring to “the fundamental precept
    that there can be no contributory infringement in the ab-
    sence of a direct infringement.”), the court held that McKes-
    son could not enforce its patent against anyone. This court
    agrees, although it is not disputed every major step of the
    patented process is practiced by a single entity, with author-
    ized initiation by the patient.
    This court’s error is the pronouncement of the “single-
    entity rule” as an absolute rule of law—for the multiple
    independent entities required to carry out the claimed
    method in BMC Resources could have led to a fact-based
    decision of non-liability on application of the ordinary rules
    of tort liability. Instead, the “control or direction” require-
    ment is announced as extending to all interactive situations,
    whatever the relationship of the participants and whatever
    their participation. Here, for example, the “uncontrolled”
    entity, the patient, initiates the process by accessing the
    physician’s system using the access code provided by the
    physician; the physician’s office then performs the other
    steps of the method. The court today holds that such a
    claim cannot be infringed, whether on a theory of joint or
    collaborative or induced infringement. However, no rule of
    law, no precedent, prohibits patenting and enforcing a
    method that is performed by interacting entities. The cases
    from which the court created this theory do not require
    otherwise.
    MCKESSON TECH   v. EPIC SYSTEMS                            10
    Indeed, the cases cited for support in BMC Resources
    and Muniauction do not deal with the form of interactive
    situation to which they are now being applied. These cases
    include Canton Bio-Med., Inc. v. Integrated Liner Technolo-
    gies., Inc., 
    216 F.3d 1367
    , 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (explaining
    that the “all-elements rule” of the doctrine of equivalents
    applies to method claims); General Foods Corp. v. Studi-
    engesellschaft Kohle mbH, 
    972 F.2d 1272
    , 1274 (Fed. Cir.
    1992) (explaining that “each claim is an entity which must
    be considered as a whole,” and reversing invalidity of
    method claims for double patenting (emphases omitted));
    Joy Technologies, Inc. v. Flakt, Inc., 
    6 F.3d 770
    , 773 (Fed.
    Cir. 1993) (“[T]he sale of equipment to perform a process is
    not a sale of the process within the meaning of section
    271(a)”); Dynacore Holdings Corp. v. U.S. Philips Corp., 
    363 F.3d 1263
    , 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“Indirect infringement,
    whether inducement to infringe or contributory infringe-
    ment, can only arise in the presence of direct infringement,
    though the direct infringer is typically someone other than
    the defendant accused of indirect infringement”); NTP, Inc.
    v. Research in Motion, 
    418 F.3d 1282
    , 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
    (“[A] process cannot be used ‘within’ the United States as
    required by section 271(a) unless each of the steps is per-
    formed within this country”). I am surprised at my col-
    leagues’ holding that these cases require an absolute
    “single-entity rule” of infringement, for none of these cases
    turned on whether different entities independently or
    interactively perform different steps of a method claim.
    My colleagues mention the Aro cases on contributory in-
    fringement as requiring that there can never be joint or
    collaborative infringement. That interpretation is inapt.
    In Aro Manufacturing Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement
    Co., Inc., 
    365 U.S. 336
    (1961) the Court held that car owners
    did not directly infringe claims directed to a convertible top
    when the car owners replaced the fabric. In Aro Manufac-
    11                            MCKESSON TECH    v. EPIC SYSTEMS
    turing Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., Inc., 
    377 U.S. 476
    (1964), the Court drew upon common-law principles, not
    a new “rule of law,” in stating that “a contributory infringer
    is a species of joint-tortfeasor, who is held liable because he
    has contributed with another to the causing of a single harm
    to the plaintiff.” 
    Id. at 500.
    There was no issue of single
    entities or of control or direction. Earlier cases recognized
    the tortious nature of infringement, and the foundation of
    tort remedy. See, e.g., Carbice Corp. of Am. v. Am. Patents
    Dev. Corp., 
    283 U.S. 27
    , 33 (1931) (“Infringement, whether
    direct or contributory, is essentially a tort, and implies
    invasion of some right of the patentee.”); Dowagiac Mfg. Co.
    v. Minnesota Moline Plow Co., 
    235 U.S. 641
    , 648 (1915)
    (“[T]he exclusive right conferred by the patent was property,
    and the infringement was a tortious taking of a part of that
    property.”).
    The complainant here is not attempting to sue all pa-
    tients and physicians who use the patented system, but is
    seeking to enforce the patent against the purveyor of the
    system, on a theory of inducement to infringe. The pat-
    entee’s position is that the patent is directly infringed
    jointly, and that the purveyor of the claimed method thereby
    induces direct infringement. The common-law concept of
    joint tortfeasor has long been established in the patent
    arena and in its application the cases have turned on their
    particular facts, not on some indefeasible “single entity” bar
    created as a new rule of law. Questions of joint liability
    turned on participation, collaboration, or other relevant
    facts, as courts applied the experience of the common law in
    a variety of factual situations. The state of the law of joint
    infringement was summarized in a jury instruction in On
    Demand Machine Co. v. Ingram Industries, Inc., 
    442 F.3d 1331
    (Fed. Cir. 2006), as follows:
    MCKESSON TECH   v. EPIC SYSTEMS                                12
    It is not necessary for the acts that constitute in-
    fringement to be performed by one person or entity.
    When infringement results from the participation
    and combined action(s) of more than one person or
    entity, they are all joint infringers and jointly liable
    for patent infringement. Infringement of a patented
    process or method cannot be avoided by having an-
    other perform one step of the process or method.
    Where the infringement is the result of the partici-
    pation and combined action(s) of one or more per-
    sons or entities, they are joint infringers and are
    jointly liable for the 
    infringement. 442 F.3d at 1344-45
    . This court stated that “[w]e discern no
    flaw in this instruction as a statement of law,” although the
    court concluded as to that case that “no reasonable jury
    could find infringement, on the correct claim construction.”
    
    Id. at 1345.
    The present disregard of precedent is reflected in an-
    other recent decision, where the court held that when the
    two entities “formed a strategic partnership, enabled [none-
    theless] their two programs to work together, and collabo-
    rated to sell the two programs as a unit,” there could be no
    infringement of the asserted method claims, as a matter of
    law. Golden Hour Data Sys., Inc. v. emCharts, Inc., 
    614 F.3d 1367
    , 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2010). The court, reversing the
    jury verdict, found that “the evidence of control or direction
    was insufficient as a matter of law to uphold a finding of
    joint infringement.” 
    Id. at 1380.
    Other recent rulings of this court are inconsistent. In
    Cross Medical Products v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, 
    424 F.3d 1293
    (Fed. Cir. 2005) the apparatus claim required
    that an orthopedic implant is in contact with bone inside the
    body; the court held that the implant before installation did
    13                            MCKESSON TECH   v. EPIC SYSTEMS
    not directly infringe the apparatus claim, and that the
    implant provider’s liability for direct infringement could not
    turn on the act of a surgeon installing the implant as di-
    rected, because the surgeon was not an agent of the pro-
    vider; nonetheless, this court remanded for determination of
    whether the provider was liable for indirect infringement.
    In Fantasy Sports Properties v. Sportsline.com, Inc., 
    287 F.3d 1108
    (Fed. Cir. 2002) the claim was for a computer-
    simulated football game with certain features; the district
    court held that a defendant-vendor of the software/game
    could not be liable for contributory infringement because the
    plaintiff-patentee did not prove that any users operated the
    software in an infringing manner. However, in contrast
    with the present holding, the court left open the possibility
    that the vendor was liable for direct infringement, rejecting
    the vendor’s argument that it could not be liable for direct
    infringement because the software was operated by users on
    their own computers, outside of the control and direction of
    the vendor. The court held that “[t]he users of the [accused]
    product therefore access the necessary software to play
    fantasy football at [the vendor’s] server on the Internet, and
    thus that software is maintained and controlled by [the
    vendor].” 
    Id. at 1119.
    Again in contrast with these principles, in Akamai
    Technologies, Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 
    629 F.3d 1311
    (Fed. Cir. 2010), a panel of the court proposed to promote a
    version of these aberrant holdings to “Federal Circuit law,”
    stating:
    This court therefore holds as a matter of Federal
    Circuit law that there can only be joint infringement
    when there is an agency relationship between the
    parties who perform the method steps or when one
    party is contractually obligated to the other to per-
    form the steps.
    MCKESSON TECH   v. EPIC SYSTEMS                                
    14 629 F.3d at 1320
    . However, if this change of law is to be “a
    matter of Federal Circuit law,” conflicting holdings must be
    overturned en banc, not by a three-judge panel. In confus-
    ing contrast, in Centillion Data Systems, LLC v. Qwest
    Communications International, Inc., 
    631 F.3d 1279
    (Fed.
    Cir. 2011), a panel of this court, citing NTP, Inc. v. Research
    in Motion, Ltd., 
    418 F.3d 1282
    (Fed. Cir. 2005), held that,
    unlike a claim to an interactive “method,” direct infringe-
    ment of a claim to an interactive “system,” wherein ele-
    ments of the system are physically controlled by different
    entities such as an independent “user,” is not subject to a
    “single-entity rule”:
    By causing the system as a whole to perform this
    processing and obtaining the benefit of the result,
    the customer has ‘used’ the system under §271(a).
    It makes no difference that the back-end processing
    is physically possessed by [the defendant]. The cus-
    tomer is a single ‘user’ of the system and because
    there is a single user, there is no need for the vicari-
    ous liability analysis from BMC or Cross 
    Medical. 631 F.3d at 1285
    . And in Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft
    Corp., 
    632 F.3d 1292
    (Fed. Cir. 2011) this court wrote “[t]hat
    other parties are necessary to complete the environment in
    which the claimed element functions does not necessarily
    divide the infringement between the necessary 
    parties.” 632 F.3d at 1309
    . The panel majority’s ruling today further
    adds to the confusion of “use” of interactive inventions, as
    the panel majority holds that an interactive “method” is
    only used when a single entity performs or controls or
    directs every step of the claimed method, even if, as here, a
    single entity “cause[s] the [process] as a whole to perform ...
    and obtain[s] the benefit of the result.” 
    Centillion, 631 F.3d at 1285
    . As “Congress did not use technical or occult
    15                             MCKESSON TECH   v. EPIC SYSTEMS
    phrases” in “defining the extent of the rights and privileges
    secured to the patentee,” Bauer & Cie v. O’Donnell, 
    229 U.S. 1
    , 11 (1913), we too should avoid “technical or occult” inter-
    pretations of §271(a). Panels of this court distinguishing
    between practice of an element of a system, and practice of
    an element of a method, does not add clarity or predictabil-
    ity to patent law.
    Earlier cases applied the law of infringement as a
    straightforward matter of tortious responsibility. For
    example, in Fromson v. Advance Offset Plate, Inc., 
    720 F.2d 1565
    (Fed. Cir. 1985), the court held that contributory
    infringement was possible when a step of a method claim
    was practiced by the customer, and explained that “because
    [the manufacturer’s] customers, not [the manufacturer],
    applied the diazo coating, [the manufacturer] cannot be
    liable for direct infringement with respect to those plates
    but could be liable for contributory infringement.” 
    Id. at 1568.
    This has been the law. It has never had en banc
    reversal.
    II
    THE MCKESSON CLAIMS
    McKesson argues that there is joint infringement even
    on the “control or direction” theory, stating that the health-
    care provider does exercise control or direction of the use of
    the MyChart system by patients. McKesson states that:
    Before patients can even use MyChart, healthcare
    providers enter into a broader doctor-patient rela-
    tionship, enroll patients in the program, and create
    personalized webpages for the patients, in order to
    facilitate the healthcare providers’ provision of ser-
    vices to patients. Only enrolled patients with user-
    names and passwords may access their personalized
    webpages created by the healthcare providers,
    MCKESSON TECH    v. EPIC SYSTEMS                              16
    which are linked to medical records created by pro-
    viders for each patient. Patients enter into a con-
    tractual agreement covering their use of MyChart.
    The healthcare providers provide instructions on
    every aspect of using the webpages. They can end a
    patient’s use of the system at any time. And they
    even formulate some communications for patients.
    McKesson Br. 16-17 (internal citations omitted). My col-
    leagues deem this relationship irrelevant, ruling that it is
    the patient’s choice whether to initiate a communication,
    and use of the system is not required by the physician.
    McKesson argues that the doctor-patient relationship is
    far from the “arms-length cooperation” that was held inade-
    quate to provide joint infringement in Muniauction or in
    BMC Resources, and that the control-or-direction test must
    be read in light of general principles of tort liability, citing
    Restatement Second of Torts §875 (“Each of two or more
    persons whose tortious conduct is a legal cause of a single
    and indivisible harm to the injured party is subject to liabil-
    ity to the injured party for the entire harm.”); §876(a) (“For
    harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of
    another, one is subject to liability if he does a tortious act in
    concert with the other or pursuant to a common design with
    him”); §877(c) (“For harm resulting to a third person from
    the tortious conduct of another, one is subject to liability if
    he permits the other to act upon his premises or with his
    instrumentalities, knowing or having reason to know that
    the other is acting or will act tortuously”).
    No patent principle or public policy, and no statutory
    requirement, warrants departure from these common law
    principles. See PharmaStem Therapeutics, Inc. v. ViaCell,
    Inc., 
    491 F.3d 1342
    , 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“The 1952 Act did
    not make a substantive change in the law of contributory
    17                            MCKESSON TECH   v. EPIC SYSTEMS
    infringement, but it divided the judicially created category
    of contributory infringement into two statutory subsec-
    tions.”). The question is that “of identifying the circum-
    stances in which it is just to hold one individual accountable
    for the actions of another.” Sony Corp. Am. v. Universal
    City Studios, Inc., 
    464 U.S. 417
    , 435 (1984) (discussing
    copyright infringement). To the extent that recent panel
    rulings including BMC Resources, Muniauction, Golden
    Hour, and Akamai appear to stand for an absolute require-
    ment that there must be direct infringement by a single
    entity who performs or controls or directs every step of the
    claimed method before there can be indirect infringement,
    these rulings are contravened by precedent.
    This case does not raise the specter of a patentee
    “impermissibly broaden[ing] the physical or temporal scope
    of the patent . . . in a manner that has anticompetitive
    effects,” in the words of Princo Corp. v. ITC, 
    616 F.3d 1318
    ,
    1328 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). To the contrary, this is a
    case of new technology adapted to public benefit—an ad-
    vance supported by patent policy. Today’s holding, and the
    few recent cases on which it builds, have the curious effect
    of removing from patent eligibility the burgeoning body of
    interactive computer-managed advances.
    A patent that cannot be enforced on any theory of in-
    fringement, is not a statutory patent right. It is a cynical,
    and expensive, delusion to encourage innovators to develop
    new interactive procedures, only to find that the courts will
    not recognize the patent because the participants are inde-
    pendent entities. From the error, confusion, and unfairness
    of this ruling, I respectfully dissent.