Automated Tracking Solutions v. the Coca-Cola Company ( 2018 )


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  •        NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    ______________________
    AUTOMATED TRACKING SOLUTIONS, LLC,
    Plaintiff-Appellant
    v.
    THE COCA-COLA COMPANY,
    Defendant-Appellee
    ______________________
    2017-1494
    ______________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the
    Northern District of Georgia in No. 1:15-cv-04348-WSD,
    Judge William S. Duffey, Jr.
    ______________________
    Decided: February 16, 2018
    ______________________
    ROBERT EVAN SOKOHL, Sterne Kessler Goldstein &
    Fox, PLLC, Washington, DC, argued for plaintiff-
    appellant. Also represented by NIRAV DESAI, LORI A.
    GORDON, PAULINE PELLETIER.
    SCOTT J. PIVNICK, Alston & Bird LLP, Washington,
    DC, argued for defendant-appellee. Also represented by
    ALAN SHANE NICHOLS, SIRAJ M. ABHYANKAR, Atlanta, GA.
    ______________________
    2        AUTOMATED TRACKING SOLS., LLC   v. THE COCA-COLA CO.
    Before MOORE, WALLACH, and STOLL, Circuit Judges.
    STOLL, Circuit Judge.
    The Coca-Cola Company moved for judgment on the
    pleadings that Automated Tracking Solutions, LLC’s
    (“ATS’s”) asserted claims are not directed to patent-
    eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). The
    district court granted Coca-Cola’s motion and ATS ap-
    peals. Given the specific facts in the record before us,
    including the patentee’s admissions, we affirm the district
    court’s judgment of ineligibility.
    BACKGROUND
    Dr. Fred H. Sawyer is the founder and owner of ATS
    and the sole named inventor on all four patents ATS
    asserts against Coca-Cola: U.S. Patent Nos. 7,551,089;
    7,834,766; 8,842,013; and 8,896,449 (collectively, “Assert-
    ed Patents”). As defined in ATS’s own complaint, the
    patents are directed to “inventory control.” J.A. 225 ¶ 11;
    see J.A. 225–34 (“Am. Compl.”). ATS argued that, conven-
    tionally, inventory control processes had been performed
    by hand or not all. 
    Id. ¶¶ 11,
    12. Dr. Sawyer sought to
    integrate radio frequency identification (“RFID”) technol-
    ogy into these manual processes. To this end, he “de-
    signed and built an operable system for performing
    [inventory control] functions” that was the genesis of the
    Asserted Patents. 
    Id. ¶ 14.
       All four Asserted Patents are titled “Method and Ap-
    paratus for Tracking Objects and People” and share a
    common specification. 1 As ATS explains in its complaint,
    1  The ’013 and ’449 patents are continuations of the
    applications that led to the ’766 patent, which in turn is a
    continuation of the application that led to the ’089 patent.
    For ease of reference, we cite the ’089 patent when dis-
    cussing the common specification.
    AUTOMATED TRACKING SOLS., LLC   v. THE COCA-COLA CO.       3
    the Asserted Patents relate to processes and systems to
    perform the functions of “identification, tracking, location,
    and/or surveillance of tagged objects anywhere in a facili-
    ty or area.” 
    Id. ¶¶ 14.
    The common specification states
    that prior art inventory control systems had significant
    drawbacks and that the claimed invention “reduce[s]
    human responsibility” and provides “an automatic locat-
    ing and tracking system.” ’089 patent col. 1 ll. 48, 63.
    To achieve this, Dr. Sawyer incorporated RFID tech-
    nology into his claimed invention. RFID is “a means of
    storing and retrieving data through electromagnetic
    transmission to a radio frequency compatible integrated
    circuit.” 
    Id. at col.
    3 ll. 8–10. As to hardware, an RFID
    system could be as simple as just three components: a
    scanner, 2 a transponder, and a computer. 
    Id. at col.
    3
    ll. 10–12. Indeed, at the time of the invention, various
    companies, including Microchip, SCS, Intermec, and
    Texas Instruments, were already manufacturing RFID
    products and providing a great deal of explanatory mate-
    rial. 
    Id. at col.
    3 ll. 5–7. According to the specification,
    the inventions used RFID technology, computer pro-
    gramming, database applications, networking technolo-
    gies, and hardware elements to achieve the stated goal of
    locating, identifying, tracking, and surveilling objects. 
    Id. at col.
    2 ll. 45–50.
    With this understanding of the common specification,
    we turn to the claims. In a § 101 analysis, courts may
    evaluate representative claims. See Content Extraction &
    Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n,
    
    776 F.3d 1343
    , 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2014). To that end, ATS
    identified four representative claims in its Opposition to
    Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings—one
    independent claim to represent each patent: claim 49 of
    2  ATS uses “reader” and “scanner” interchangeably.
    See Appellant Br. 5 n.3.
    4       AUTOMATED TRACKING SOLS., LLC   v. THE COCA-COLA CO.
    the ’089 patent; claim 1 of the ’766 patent; claim 1 of the
    ’013 patent; and claim 1 of the ’449 patent. 3 J.A. 1168–70.
    The district court, however, adopted Coca-Cola’s pro-
    posal to select only two of the above claims as representa-
    tive claims: (1) claim 49 of the ’089 patent to represent the
    claims of the ’089 and ’013 patents; and (2) claim 1 of the
    ’766 patent to represent the claims of the ’766 and ’449
    patents. ATS conceded at oral argument that the district
    court’s selection of these two representative claims was
    proper. Oral Arg. at 35:25–32, http://oralarguments.cafc.
    uscourts.gov/default.aspx?fl=2017-1494.mp3.        ATS also
    conceded that the district court’s decision not to analyze
    ATS’s two additional proposed representative claims
    (claim 1 of the ’013 patent and claim 1 of the ’449 patent)
    did not affect the § 101 analysis. 
    Id. at 35:32–42.
    Accord-
    ingly, we restrict our analysis to the claims ATS agrees
    are representative: claim 49 of the ’089 patent and claim 1
    of the ’766 patent.
    Representative claim 1 of the ’766 patent recites:
    1. A system for locating, identifying and/or track-
    ing of an object, the system comprising:
    a first transponder associated with the ob-
    ject;
    a reader that is configured to receive first
    transponder data via a radio frequency
    (RF) signal from the first transponder;
    3   ATS’s complaint lists its asserted claims as “in-
    cluding, but not limited to” these four enumerated claims.
    The parties have not disputed that invalidation of these
    four asserted claims—or even the two analyzed claims
    discussed below—would support the district court’s grant
    of judgment on the pleadings in this case.
    AUTOMATED TRACKING SOLS., LLC   v. THE COCA-COLA CO.      5
    an antenna in communication with the
    reader and having a first coverage area;
    a processor coupled to the reader, wherein
    the processor is configured to receive the
    first transponder data from the reader and
    to generate detection information based on
    the received first transponder data, the
    detection information comprising first
    sighting and last sighting of the first tran-
    sponder in the first coverage area; and
    a storage device that is configured to store
    the detection information.
    ’766 patent col. 20 l. 58 – col. 21 l. 6 (emphases added). 4
    The district court granted Coca-Cola’s motion for judg-
    ment on the pleadings that all asserted claims are patent-
    ineligible under § 101. Automated Tracking Sols., LLC v.
    Coca-Cola Co., 
    223 F. Supp. 3d 1278
    , 1292 (N.D. Ga.
    2016) (“Ineligibility Op.”) (citing Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS
    Bank Int’l, 
    134 S. Ct. 2347
    , 2355 (2014)). Under Alice
    step one, the district court concluded that the representa-
    tive claims were directed to the patent-ineligible abstract
    idea of “collecting data, analyzing it, and determining the
    results based on the analysis of data.” 
    Id. at 1289.
    The
    district court determined under Alice step two that the
    claims lacked an inventive concept because nothing in the
    claim limitations or their ordered combination was suffi-
    cient to transform the abstract idea into a patent-eligible
    application. 
    Id. at 1290.
    Accordingly, the district court
    held all four patents ineligible under § 101.
    ATS appeals.      We have jurisdiction pursuant to
    28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).
    4   For reasons explained below, we do not recite rep-
    resentative claim 49 of the ’089 patent in full here.
    6      AUTOMATED TRACKING SOLS., LLC   v. THE COCA-COLA CO.
    DISCUSSION
    We apply the procedural law of the regional circuit
    when reviewing a district court’s grant of a motion for
    judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil
    Procedure 12(c). Merck & Co. v. Hi–Tech Pharmacal Co.,
    
    482 F.3d 1317
    , 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2007). The Eleventh
    Circuit reviews a grant of judgment on the pleadings de
    novo. Cannon v. City of W. Palm Beach, 
    250 F.3d 1299
    ,
    1301 (11th Cir. 2001). “Judgment on the pleadings is
    appropriate where there are no material facts in dispute
    and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
    of law.” Perez v. Wells Fargo N.A., 
    774 F.3d 1329
    , 1335
    (11th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citation
    omitted). “In determining whether a party is entitled to
    judgment on the pleadings, we accept as true all material
    facts alleged in the non-moving party’s pleading, and we
    view those facts in the light most favorable to the non-
    moving party.” 
    Id. We must
    deny a judgment on the
    pleadings if a comparison of the averments in the compet-
    ing pleadings reveals a material dispute of fact. 
    Id. Patent eligibility
    under § 101 is a question of law that
    may contain underlying issues of fact. See Berkheimer v.
    HP Inc., No. 2017-1437, 
    2018 WL 774096
    , at *5 (Fed. Cir.
    Feb. 8, 2018) (citing Mortg. Grader, Inc. v. First Choice
    Loan Servs. Inc., 
    811 F.3d 1314
    , 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2016)).
    We review the district court’s ultimate conclusion on
    patent eligibility de novo. See Intellectual Ventures I LLC
    v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 
    850 F.3d 1332
    , 1338 (Fed. Cir.
    2017). We look to the test articulated in Alice to deter-
    mine whether a claim is eligible for patenting under
    § 101. 
    See 134 S. Ct. at 2355
    . Pursuant to Alice’s two-
    part test, we decide first “whether the claims at issue are
    directed to” a patent-ineligible concept, namely a law of
    nature, natural phenomena, or abstract idea. 
    Id. at 2354–
    55. If the answer is yes, we then consider the claim
    elements, both individually and as an ordered combina-
    tion, to determine whether they contain an “inventive
    AUTOMATED TRACKING SOLS., LLC    v. THE COCA-COLA CO.     7
    concept” sufficient to “‘transform the nature of the claim’
    into a patent-eligible application.” 
    Id. at 2355
    (quoting
    Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc.,
    
    566 U.S. 66
    , 72–73, 78 (2012)).
    This case reminds us that we are a “court of review,
    not of first view.” Cutter v. Wilkinson, 
    544 U.S. 709
    , 718
    n.7 (2005). As a general rule, we cannot consider claims
    and arguments that were not presented to the district
    court. See Singleton v. Wulff, 
    428 U.S. 106
    , 120 (1976).
    As discussed above, ATS limited its eligibility arguments
    to certain representative independent claims, agreeing
    that eligibility of the remaining claims would stand and
    fall with those representative claims. See In re Kaslow,
    
    707 F.2d 1366
    , 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Thus, we must
    confine our review to these representative claims.
    I
    The Alice step-one analysis requires us to consider the
    claims “in their entirety to ascertain whether their char-
    acter as a whole is directed to excluded subject matter.”
    Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 
    790 F.3d 1343
    , 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015). On their face, the repre-
    sentative claims are directed to systems “for locating,
    identifying and/or tracking of” an object using RFID
    components. ’766 patent, claim 1; ’089 patent, claim 49.
    The common specification further describes the back-
    ground of the invention as related to “locating and track-
    ing” objects, and that the claimed invention “reduce[s]
    human responsibility” and provides “an automatic locat-
    ing and tracking system.” ’089 patent col. 1 l. 15 – col. 2
    l. 22. As discussed further below, the claims achieve this
    by collecting data from sensors, analyzing that data, and
    determining results based on the analysis of data. For
    the reasons that follow, we conclude that the claims are
    directed to an abstract idea under Alice step one.
    ATS’s primary argument is that the representative
    claims are analogous to the patent-eligible claims in
    8      AUTOMATED TRACKING SOLS., LLC   v. THE COCA-COLA CO.
    Thales Visionix Inc. v. United States, 
    850 F.3d 1343
    (Fed.
    Cir. 2017). There, the claims recited a system for tracking
    the motion of an object relative to a moving reference
    frame, comprising inertial sensors mounted on the
    tracked object and the moving reference frame, and a
    third element to receive the sensors’ signals and deter-
    mine the orientation of the object. See 
    id. at 1345–46.
    We
    found the claims patent-eligible under Alice step one
    because they were “directed to systems and methods that
    use inertial sensors in a non-conventional manner to
    reduce errors in measuring the relative position and
    orientation of a moving object on a moving reference
    frame.” 
    Id. at 1348–49;
    see 
    id. at 1347
    (explaining that
    claims that function differently from “conventional”
    technologies may be found non-abstract under step one
    and citing Enfish LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 
    822 F.3d 1327
    ,
    1337 (Fed. Cir. 2016)).
    ATS argues that, like the claimed arrangement of
    sensors in Thales, the claims here “specify a particular
    configuration for using the electromagnetically transmit-
    ted data to more accurately and systematically determine
    the location, identity, and movement of transponders
    among antenna coverage areas using specially pro-
    grammed readers, storage devices, and processors config-
    ured to perform those functions.” Appellant Br. 42
    (emphases added). Our problem with ATS’s argument
    does not lie with its contention that claims directed to
    specialized components of an RFID system or a special-
    ized arrangement of components in an RFID system
    should be patent-eligible. Rather, our concerns lie with
    ATS’s portrayal of the breadth of the representative
    claims. The representative claims simply do not require a
    particular configuration or arrangement of RFID system
    components. Nor do the representative claims require
    multiple antenna coverage areas. Some of the dependent
    claims may well recite such elements, but our review is
    limited to the representative claims.
    AUTOMATED TRACKING SOLS., LLC   v. THE COCA-COLA CO.       9
    For example, representative claim 1 of the ’766 patent
    is directed to an RFID system that detects and stores
    transponder IDs and associated detection information to
    determine the “first sighting and last sighting of the first
    transponder in the first coverage area.” ’766 patent
    col. 20 l. 57 – col. 21 l. 6 (claim 1). The system comprises
    just a few elements: an antenna with a first coverage
    area, a first transponder, a reader, a processor, and a
    storage device. The claim does not recite any “particular
    configuration” or specialized arrangement of the RFID
    system components. It does not specify the relative
    location of the claimed components. It only requires a
    single antenna, and does not specify a particular configu-
    ration for the antenna to achieve the allegedly more
    systematic determination of the location, identity, and
    movement of the transponders. See Appellant Br. 42. At
    oral argument, ATS even conceded that all RFID anten-
    nas have coverage areas, and that the claimed antenna in
    representative claim 1 does not differ from conventional
    RFID antennas in that regard. Oral Arg. at 6:23–50. For
    these reasons, we conclude that claim 1 of the ’766 patent
    is directed to an abstract idea under Alice step one.
    As to the second representative claim, claim 49 of the
    ’089 patent, ATS concedes that it does not claim a “cover-
    age area.” Oral Arg. at 6:23–50. Nor does claim 49 recite
    any additional elements beyond those found to be directed
    to an abstract idea under our analysis of claim 1 of the
    ’766 patent. We thus conclude that claim 49 is also di-
    rected to an abstract idea under Alice step one. Given the
    record and ATS’s concession that the two claims analyzed
    by the district court are representative of all the claims in
    all four patents, we do not see any error in the district
    court’s conclusion that the asserted claims are directed to
    an abstract idea.
    10      AUTOMATED TRACKING SOLS., LLC   v. THE COCA-COLA CO.
    II
    Under the second step of the Alice analysis, we exam-
    ine the claim limitations “more microscopically,” Electric
    Power Group, LLC v. Alstom S.A., 
    830 F.3d 1350
    , 1354
    (Fed. Cir. 2016), to determine whether they contain
    “additional features” sufficient to “‘transform the nature
    of the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.” 
    Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355
    , 2357 (quoting 
    Mayo, 566 U.S. at 78
    ).
    “Mere recitation of concrete, tangible components is
    insufficient to confer patent eligibility to an otherwise
    abstract idea. Rather, the components must involve more
    than performance of well-understood, routine, conven-
    tional activit[ies] previously known to the industry.” In re
    TLI Commc’ns LLC Patent Litig., 
    823 F.3d 607
    , 613 (Fed.
    Cir. 2016) (citing 
    Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2359
    (internal quota-
    tions omitted)).
    Our analysis of the representative claims here uncov-
    ers no inventive concept in the individual claim limita-
    tions or their ordered combination. The representative
    claims are quite broad, reciting uses of RFID system
    components recognized in the specification to be routine
    and conventional. The claims do not use these conven-
    tional RFID components in a non-conventional combina-
    tion or arrangement. Instead, the claims merely disclose
    collecting data from a particular source—RFID tran-
    sponders—and analyzing that data. Whether we view the
    claim elements individually or as an ordered combination,
    the claims do not contain an inventive concept sufficient
    to confer patent eligibility.
    ATS argues that, at the time of the invention, RFID
    was a developing technology and that the district court
    erred in resolving a disputed fact question—whether the
    claims recite routine and conventional uses of an RFID
    system—in Coca-Cola’s favor. We have held that “wheth-
    er a claim element or combination of elements is well-
    understood, routine and conventional to a skilled artisan
    AUTOMATED TRACKING SOLS., LLC   v. THE COCA-COLA CO.    11
    in the relevant field is a question of fact.” Berkheimer,
    
    2018 WL 774096
    , at *5. Furthermore, we must accept all
    plausible factual allegations in ATS’s complaint as true.
    See FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 
    839 F.3d 1089
    , 1097 (Fed. Cir. 2016). But the complaint alleges
    nothing to support ATS’s contention that RFID was a
    developing technology. See generally Am. Compl. Nor
    does the complaint allege that any of the hardware com-
    ponents in the representative claims—either alone or in
    combination as a system—are anything but well-
    understood, routine, and conventional. See 
    id. Nor does
    the specification support ATS’s contention
    that there is a factual dispute regarding whether the
    claims recite routine and conventional RFID components.
    We acknowledge that the specification states that “the
    RFID technology employed by the present invention is a
    rapidly developing technology.” ’089 patent col. 3 ll. 4–5.
    But the specification also more pointedly indicates that
    the recited components of the claimed RFID system were
    conventional. 
    Id. at col.
    3 ll. 4–5, 10–12. Indeed, the
    specification states that a conventional “simple RFID
    system may be composed of three components: a scanner,
    a transponder, and a computer.” 
    Id. at col.
    3 ll. 10–12.
    These are the same conventional components recited in
    the representative claims. On the record before us, it was
    not improper for the district court to conclude that the
    claims were ineligible on the pleadings. The complaint at
    issue has no allegations, which when accepted as true,
    would even create a factual issue, and ATS’s specification
    indicates that the components of the claimed invention
    are conventional.
    Because representative claim 49 of the ’089 patent is
    broader than representative claim 1, we conclude that it
    also does not add an inventive concept under Alice step
    two. Given the record and ATS’s concession that the two
    claims analyzed by the district court are representative of
    all the claims in all four patents, we do not see any error
    12      AUTOMATED TRACKING SOLS., LLC   v. THE COCA-COLA CO.
    in the district court’s conclusion that the asserted claims
    do not possess an inventive concept sufficient to confer
    patent eligibility. Nor do we see any error in the district
    court’s ultimate conclusion that the asserted claims are
    directed to patent-ineligible subject matter under § 101.
    CONCLUSION
    We have considered ATS’s remaining arguments and
    find them unpersuasive. Our analysis in this appeal rests
    heavily on ATS’s selection of representative claims and
    admissions in oral argument. On these unique facts, we
    affirm the district court’s grant of Coca-Cola’s motion for
    judgment on the pleadings that the asserted claims of
    ATS’s Asserted Patents are ineligible under § 101 because
    they are directed to unpatentable subject matter.
    AFFIRMED
    COSTS
    Costs to Appellee.