Personalized Media Communications, LLC v. Apple Inc. ( 2023 )

Case: 21-2275 Document: 49 Page: 1 Filed: 01/20/2023
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
PERSONALIZED MEDIA COMMUNICATIONS, LLC,
Plaintiff-Appellant
v.
APPLE INC.,
Defendant-Appellee
______________________
2021-2275
______________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Texas in No. 2:15-cv-01366-JRG-RSP,
Chief Judge J. Rodney Gilstrap.
______________________
Decided: January 20, 2023
______________________
KEVIN PAUL MARTIN, Goodwin Procter LLP, Boston,
MA, argued for plaintiff-appellant. Also represented by
GERARD JUSTIN CEDRONE, DOUGLAS J. KLINE, LANA S.
SHIFERMAN; WILLIAM M. JAY, Washington, DC; SIDNEY
CALVIN CAPSHAW, III, Capshaw DeRieux LLP, Gladewater,
TX.
JOHN C. O'QUINN, Kirkland & Ellis LLP, Washington,
DC, argued for defendant-appellee. Also represented by
NATHAN S. MAMMEN; GREG AROVAS, New York, NY; LUKE
DAUCHOT, ELLISEN SHELTON TURNER, Los Angeles, CA;
MARCUS EDWARD SERNEL, Chicago, IL.
Case: 21-2275 Document: 49 Page: 2 Filed: 01/20/2023
2 PERSONALIZED MEDIA COMMUNICATIONS, LLC v. APPLE INC.
JEFFREY A. LAMKEN, MoloLamken LLP, Washington,
DC, for amicus curiae Fair Inventing Fund. Also repre-
sented by RAYINER HASHEM.
______________________
Before REYNA, CHEN, and STARK, Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge REYNA.
Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge STARK.
REYNA, Circuit Judge.
Personalized Media Communications, LLC appeals the
final judgment of the District Court for the Eastern District
of Texas that U.S. Patent No. 8,191,091 is unenforceable
based on prosecution laches. The district court determined
that Personalized Media Communications successfully em-
ployed an inequitable scheme to extend its patent rights.
Because the district court did not abuse its discretion in
finding the patent unenforceable, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
In 2015, Personalized Media Communications (“PMC”)
sued Apple in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Texas, alleging that Apple FairPlay 1 infringed
1 FairPlay is a digital rights management technology
that Apple uses on its computers, mobile phones, and other
devices. J.A. 2 (FF 1). FairPlay is software that prevents
Apple users from unauthorized uses of content—such as il-
legally copying songs on iTunes. J.A. 25 (FF 68);
Resp. Br. 22. To protect content, FairPlay encrypts data
and uses “decryption keys” to control decryption.
J.A. 25–26 (FF 69–70). Recognizing that “the weakest
link” in a system’s security is the decryption key, Apple en-
crypted the decryption key as an additional layer of protec-
tion. Id.Case: 21-2275 Document: 49 Page: 3 Filed: 01/20/2023
PERSONALIZED MEDIA COMMUNICATIONS, LLC v. APPLE INC. 3
claim 13 (and related dependent claims) of U.S. Patent No.
8,191,091 (the “’091 patent”). J.A. 2–3 (FF 1, 5). The case
went to trial, where a jury returned a unanimous verdict,
finding that Apple infringed at least one of claims 13–16.
J.A. 3 (FF 5). The jury awarded PMC over $308 million in
reasonable-royalty damages. Id.Thereafter, the district court held a bench trial on re-
maining issues and found the ’091 patent unenforceable
based on prosecution laches. J.A. 1–3. Relying on our re-
cent decision in Hyatt, the court determined that laches re-
quired a challenger to prove that the applicant’s delay was
unreasonable and inexcusable under the totality of the cir-
cumstances and that there was prejudice attributable to
the delay. J.A. 28 (CL 4–7) (discussing Hyatt v. Hirshfeld,
998 F.3d 1347, 1359–62 (Fed. Cir. 2021)). Under this
framework, the court found that PMC engaged in an un-
reasonable and unexplained delay amounting to an egre-
gious abuse of the statutory patent system.
The court described our recent Hyatt decision as a
“white horse” case, with “remarkably similar” facts.
J.A. 32, 41 (CL 15). The court explained that the patentee
in Hyatt had filed 381 GATT-Bubble applications, and
PMC had filed 328 GATT-Bubble applications. 2 J.A. 32
2 During negotiations of the Agreement on Trade-Re-
lated Aspects of Intellectual Property (“TRIPS Agree-
ment”) at the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on
Tariff and Trade (“GATT”), the U.S. agreed to change the
term of U.S. patents from 17 years following the date of
issuance to 20 years following the patent’s priority date.
Hyatt, 998 F.3d at 1352. In the months leading up to the
law change, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”)
saw an enormous influx of so-called “GATT Bubble” appli-
cations as applicants sought to take advantage of the exist-
ing law providing a patent term keyed from issuance.
Id. at 1352–53.
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4 PERSONALIZED MEDIA COMMUNICATIONS, LLC v. APPLE INC.
(CL 16). In addition, the court noted that as in Hyatt,
where each application was a photocopy of one of 11 earlier
patent applications, PMC’s applications derive from two
earlier applications. J.A. 32 (CL 17). Similar to Hyatt,
“PMC’s applications . . . were ‘atypically long and com-
plex,’” containing over 500 pages of text and over 22 pages
of figures. J.A. 33 (CL 20). And PMC filed each of its ap-
plications with a single claim, then subsequently amended
the claims, sometimes to recite identical language across
different applications. J.A. 33 (CL 19). The court further
explained that, like in Hyatt, “[o]ver time, PMC [] greatly
increase[d] the total number of claims” in the range of
6,000 to 20,000 claims. J.A. 10, 33–34 (FF 31, CL 21).
The court also found the length of the delay similar to
Hyatt because “PMC waited eight to fourteen years to file
its patent applications and at least sixteen years to present
the asserted claims for examination.” J.A. 32–33 (CL 18)
(explaining that the applicant in Hyatt argued that he “de-
layed only seven to 11 years to file the four applications at
issue and between 10 and 19 years before presenting the
claims now in dispute” (citing Hyatt, 998 F.3d at 1368)).
Moreover, “as in Hyatt, even though the PTO suspended
prosecution of PMC’s applications, such is directly attribut-
able to the manner in which PMC prosecuted its applica-
tions in the first place.” J.A. 35 (CL 25). The court
reasoned that “PMC’s prosecution conduct made it virtu-
ally impossible for the PTO to conduct double patenting,
priority, or written description analyses.” J.A. 37 (CL 31).
In addition to the scope and nature of PMC’s applications,
the court pointed to PMC’s vast prior art disclosure, which
included references having little-to-no relevance, and ex-
aminers’ statements in office actions describing PMC’s
prosecution strategy and conduct as improper. J.A. 37–38
(CL 31, 34); J.A. 47–78 (listing references filling more than
30 pages). Regardless, prosecution had been pending for
“nearly ten years” before the PTO suspended it. J.A. 35
(CL 25).
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PERSONALIZED MEDIA COMMUNICATIONS, LLC v. APPLE INC. 5
“The only notable distinction” the court found between
Hyatt and this case was that “Mr. Hyatt acknowledged he
lacked a ‘master plan’ for demarcating his applications”
whereas PMC developed the “Consolidation Agreement”
with the PTO. J.A. 34 (CL 23). Under the Consolidation
Agreement, PMC agreed to group its applications into 56
subject-matter categories, with subcategories for each of
the two priority dates. J.A. 14 (FF 39); J.A. 8081–82.
Within the categories, PMC was to designate “A” applica-
tions and “B” applications, with the PTO prioritizing “A”
applications. Id. Rejected claims would transfer to the cor-
responding “B” application and prosecution of “B” applica-
tions was stayed until the corresponding “A” application
issued. Id. PMC would abandon any remaining applica-
tions that were not designated “A” or “B.” Id. This “A” ap-
plication-to-“B” application examination scheme, in effect,
gave PMC an additional bite at the apple to extend out
prosecution of its many claims without the cost of having
to file a continuation application. 3
The court determined that the Consolidation Agree-
ment alone does not operate to shift blame on the PTO.
J.A. 34–35 (CL 24). The court explained that the Consoli-
dation Agreement had to be understood in the context of
PMC’s business-driven, unreasonable prosecution strat-
egy. J.A. 36 (CL 28–30).
Specifically, the court explained that prior to the
GATT, PMC had an express prosecution policy of pursuing
one application at a time and filing a continuation as the
prior application reached issuance—with the sole purpose
to delay issuance of PMC’s patents in order to extend
PMC’s patents’ terms. 4 In addition, the court discussed
3 The record does not explain how PMC and the PTO
decided on the elements of the Consolidation Agreement.
4 See J.A. 6 (FF 15) (discussing a 1990 document
stating “[PMC’s] strategy is to prosecute coverage on its
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6 PERSONALIZED MEDIA COMMUNICATIONS, LLC v. APPLE INC.
other documents from the same time period describing
PMC’s strategy at the time of hiding its technologies, “qui-
etly monitor[ing]” infringement, and “roll[ing] out” patents
over time because “[o]nce infringement becomes wide-
spread in an industry, the patented technology becomes so
deeply embedded in commercial products that design
around is not an option to infringers.” 5
The court analyzed prosecution conduct concerning the
asserted ’091 patent and found that PMC used the Consol-
idation Agreement “to realize [PMC’s] initial strategy of se-
rialized prosecution, notwithstanding the GATT
amendments.” J.A. 36 (CL 28). In particular, the court
explained that on July 18, 2002, the PTO accepted PMC’s
request to designate Application No. 08/485,507 (the “’507
application”) as the “B” application corresponding to Appli-
cation No. 08/474,145 (the “’145 application”) and suspend
prosecution of the ’507 application. J.A. 19 (FF 57). On
February 4, 2003, PMC amended claim 22 of
technologies deliberately over time in such a way that broad
coverage is in effect at any given time while the duration of
coverage is prolonged as long as possible.” (quoting J.A.
37730–31)); J.A. 6 (FF 16) (discussing an April 1992 docu-
ment explaining that PMC “believes that its intellectual
property position will enable it to exercise far-reaching
market control for as long as 30 to 50 years.” (quoting J.A.
39220)).
5 See J.A. 7 (FF 17–18) (discussing J.A. 37817); see
also J.A. 7–8 (FF 19–20) (discussing a document dated Sep-
tember 12, 1991, that states, “[i]n some cases markets had
not yet matured to benefit from applications of [PMC’s]
technologies . . . [so PMC] had deliberately chosen not to
publicize widely its technologies or plans” and targets Ap-
ple as one of several “companies that are natural candi-
dates for participating in the commercialization of [PMC’s]
technologies.” (quoting J.A. 37865, 37870)).
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PERSONALIZED MEDIA COMMUNICATIONS, LLC v. APPLE INC. 7
the ’145 application. J.A. 22 (FF 61). The amendment
changed the claim from “[a] method of enabling a program-
ming presentation at a receiver station” to “[a] method of
decrypting programming at a receiver station” and intro-
duced various encryption and decryption steps:
'145 application claim 22 ' 145 application claim 22
(March 15 , 2002 amendment) (February 4, 2003 amendment)
A method of enabling a programming A method of enaliling a decrypting
presentation at a receiver station, said method programming JJrnsentatisn at a receiver station,
comprising the steps of: said method comprising the steps of:
receiving an infonnation transmission receiving an infonnation transmission
from at least one of a local source and a remote frnm at least ene sfa leeal ss8ree and a remste
source, said infonnation transmission including ss8ree, said infurmatien transmissien including
disabled information; 4tsahle4 encrypted information;
detecting the presence of an instruct-to- detecting the presence of an instruct-to-
enable signal, said instruct-to-enable signal enable signal, said inslmel 10 enalile signal
designating enabling information; designating enaliling infurmalien;
passing said instruct-to-enable signal to passing said instruct-to-enable signal to
a processor; a processor;
modifying a fashion in which said ms dif) ing determining a fashion in
receiver station locates said enabling which said receiver station locates sat4
information in response to said instruct-to- enaliling infum1a1i0n in resJJsnse 10 a fir st
enable signal; decryptio n key by processing said instruct-to-
locating said enabling information enable signal;
based on said step of modifying a fashion; locating said enaliling infurmatien fi rst
enabling said disabled information decryption key based 011 said step of
based on said step of locating said enabling medifJ ing a fusaien determining;
information; and enabl-mg decrypting said 4tsahle4
outputting said programming encrypted infonnation eased en said sleJJ ef
presentation based on said step of enabling said lseating said enaliling infurmalisn using said
disabled information. first decryption key; and
outputting said programming
(DTX-1568 at 978) JJresentalisn based on said step sfenaliling said
disaliled infurmalien decrypting.
(DTX- 1568 at 1132, 1177)
Id. The court found that the February 4, 2003 amendment
was the first time that encryption, decryption, and decryp-
tion keys were a part of this claim. Id.
That same year, the PTO stayed the prosecution of
PMC’s applications pending resolution of eleven reexami-
nation proceedings on related, issued patents. J.A. 16 (FF
46). The stay lasted several years, as reexamination con-
tinued, and was lifted in 2009. J.A. 16 (FF 46–47).
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8 PERSONALIZED MEDIA COMMUNICATIONS, LLC v. APPLE INC.
Once prosecution reopened, the PTO rejected amended
claim 22 of the ’145 application claiming the “decrypting
programming” method. J.A. 23 (FF 63). PMC subse-
quently amended claim 22 significantly, and the ’145 appli-
cation ultimately issued. Id.
But on April 11, 2011, PMC reintroduced the rejected
“decrypting programming” method claim to the ’507 appli-
cation (the corresponding “B” application), as a part of sev-
eral other claim amendments. J.A. 23 (FF 64). PMC told
the PTO that the amendments “place the claims in condi-
tion for allowance,” despite the “decrypting programming”
claim having previously been rejected. Id. This time, how-
ever, the claim was allowed in large part. J.A. 24 (FF 65).
The ’507 application issued as the asserted ’091 patent,
with the reintroduced claim as claim 13. Id. The ’091 pa-
tent is set to expire in 2027—forty years after its 1987 pri-
ority date. 6 J.A. 36 (CL 30).
The court concluded that “the only rational explanation
for PMC’s approach to prosecution is a deliberate strategy
of delay” and that “PMC’s actions were a conscious and
egregious misuse of the statutory patent system.”
J.A. 38 (CL 35). Thus, the court found that Apple met its
burden to prove the first element of laches.
The court then turned to prejudice. J.A. 38–41
(CL 36–47). The court explained that Apple had already
begun developing the accused FairPlay system by 2003, the
year that PMC first added the asserted technology to the
’091 patent’s predecessor. J.A. 39–40 (CL 38–43). Further,
the ’091 patent issued in 2012—seven years after FairPlay
6 The parties appear to dispute whether the ’091 pa-
tent also claims priority to PMC’s 1981 application. Com-
pare Appellant’s Br. 8, with Resp. Br. 3. We do not resolve
this dispute as it is unnecessary for the purposes of this
appeal.
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had already matured into the version accused of infringe-
ment. J.A. 39 (CL 38). The court reasoned that the prose-
cution delays had to be understood in the context of PMC’s
expressed desire to extend its patent rights as long as pos-
sible and conceal its inventions until infringement was
deeply embedded into the industry. J.A. 40 (CL 45). This
scheme contributed to the prejudice, which was under-
scored by the fact that a jury found that Apple’s FairPlay
technology infringed the ’091 patent. J.A. 39 (CL 39).
Thus, Apple established prejudice, and laches rendered
the ’091 patent unenforceable.
PMC timely appeals the laches determination. We
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review a district court’s determination of prosecu-
tion laches for abuse of discretion. Cancer Research Tech.
Ltd. v. Barr Labs Inc., 625 F.3d 724, 728–29
(Fed. Cir. 2010). “‘We may find an abuse of discretion on a
showing that the court . . . exercised its discretion based
upon an error of law or clearly erroneous factual findings.’”
SiOnyx LLC v. Hamamatsu Photonics K.K., 981 F.3d 1339,
1349 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (quoting Innogenetics, N.V. v. Abbott
Labs, 512 F.3d 1363, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).
DISCUSSION
Prosecution laches is an equitable affirmative defense
dating back to the early 1900s. Hyatt, 998 F.3d at 1360.
Prosecution laches may render a patent unenforceable
where a patentee’s conduct “constitutes an egregious mis-
use of the statutory patent system.” Id. at 1360–61 (cita-
tion omitted). Prosecution laches requires proving two
elements: (1) the patentee’s delay in prosecution must be
unreasonable and inexcusable under the totality of circum-
stances and (2) the accused infringer must have suffered
prejudice attributable to the delay. Id. at 1362. We con-
clude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by
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10 PERSONALIZED MEDIA COMMUNICATIONS, LLC v. APPLE INC.
legally erring or making clearly erroneous factual findings
in determining that Apple established both laches ele-
ments.
Unreasonable and Inexcusable Delay
PMC argues that the district court erred in finding an
unreasonable and inexcusable delay, such that the district
court failed to consider the totality of the circumstances.
We disagree.
First, PMC argues legal error because its “conduct
looks nothing like Hyatt or the handful of other cases that
have found prosecution laches.” Appellant’s Br. 39. This
is not a legal error and is factually incorrect.
Laches is an equitable and flexible doctrine that re-
quires considering the totality of the circumstances. Hyatt,
998 F.3d at 1359–66. In Hyatt, we found that the district
court improperly failed to consider the totality of the cir-
cumstances by repeatedly discounting or ignoring relevant
evidence. Id. Thus, PMC’s argument rests on a faulty
premise: that PMC’s conduct has to look like “Hyatt or the
handful of other [laches] cases.” Appellant’s Br. 39. Set-
ting this aside, this case is very similar to Hyatt and prior
cases, and, in some ways, involves even more egregious
facts because, as the district court found, the record shows
that PMC institutionalized its abuse of the patent system
by expressly adopting and implementing dilatory prosecu-
tion strategies, specifically to ambush companies like Ap-
ple many years after PMC filed its applications.
Second, PMC asserts that its “compliance” with the
Consolidation Agreement and the PTO’s rules precludes a
finding of laches as a matter of law. Appellant’s Br. III(B);
id. at 38, 46–47, 50–51. We disagree.
In Hyatt, the PTO used “atypical procedures”—as it did
here—to facilitate prosecution because the applicant, like
PMC, had filed hundreds of burdensome GATT-Bubble ap-
plications. Hyatt, 998 F.3d at 1354–55, 1370. Still, we
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PERSONALIZED MEDIA COMMUNICATIONS, LLC v. APPLE INC. 11
found that the PTO met its burden to prove an unreasona-
ble and unjustifiable delay. Id. at 1369. We also explained
that “[a]n applicant must . . . not only comply with the stat-
utory requirements and PTO regulations but must also
prosecute its applications in an equitable way.” Id. at 1366.
Moreover, PMC’s compliance with the Consolidation
Agreement supports, rather than refutes, a finding of un-
reasonable and inexcusable delay. PMC’s agreement to
structure a serial examination of a claim through first an
A application and then a B application gave PMC the very
kind of prosecution delays that supported PMC’s campaign
for drawn-out prosecution. J.A. 36 (CL 28).
Third, PMC asserts that the “district court improperly
disregarded the reasons for the prosecution’s length.” Ap-
pellant’s Br. III(C). PMC points to delays in prosecution
that occurred due to the PTO grappling with PMC’s GATT-
Bubble applications and attempting to resolve overlapping
issues across many of PMC’s applications. Id. at 42–43.
In Hyatt, we rejected a similar argument and explained
that “a delay by the PTO cannot excuse the appellant’s own
delay.” Hyatt, 998 F.3d at 1364–65 (citation omitted) (find-
ing that the district court erroneously found the PTO solely
responsible for a 9-year stay on prosecution, when the pe-
riod was “directly attributable to” the applicant’s conduct
and the stay’s outcome could have “rendered meaningless”
PTO time spent examining the applications). Unlike in Hy-
att, the district court here determined that the various
prosecution delays occurred because of issues PMC inten-
tionally created, correctly focusing on PMC’s inequitable
prosecution. Compare id. at 1365, with J.A. 12–13
(FF 35–36) (discussing the In re Schneller stay), and J.A.
16 (FF 46–47) (discussing the reexamination stay), and
J.A. 35 (CL 25) (“[E]ven though the PTO suspended prose-
cution of PMC’s applications, such is directly attributable
to the manner in which PMC prosecuted its applications in
the first place.”).
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12 PERSONALIZED MEDIA COMMUNICATIONS, LLC v. APPLE INC.
Fourth, PMC argues that the “district court committed
legal error by relying on the simple number of PMC’s ap-
plications.” Appellant’s Br. III(D). This argument also
fails.
While we discussed in Hyatt the fact that the applicant
had filed 381 GATT-Bubble applications, we also consid-
ered other facts evidencing an unreasonable and unex-
plained delay. See Hyatt, 998 F.3d at 1353, 1367
(considering the applications’ length and complexity).
Thus, the district court here did not legally err by consid-
ering that PMC filed 328 GATT-Bubble applications as a
part of the court’s analysis, which also properly considered
other relevant facts.
Fifth, PMC argues that it was a legal error for the dis-
trict court to find delay due to PMC adding “narrowing”
limitations directed to encryption and decryption in 2003,
years after the priority date of the ’091 patent. Appel-
lant’s Br. 47–48; Reply Br. 28–29. PMC, however, merely
asserts that the 2003 amendments are “narrowing” with-
out any attempt to explain why this is so, especially in view
of the significant overhaul to the claims. See id. PMC does
not cite case law holding legal error in a similar situation.
In light of the significant amendments made in 2003, we
are not persuaded that the district court erred in conclud-
ing that PMC unreasonably delayed in presenting the en-
cryption and decryption subject matter.
PMC misconstrues the district court’s rationale for
finding delay due to the 2003 amendments. The district
court faulted PMC for waiting until 2003—sixteen years
after the priority date of the ’091 patent and nearly eight
years after PMC filed its 328 GATT-bubble applications—
to include the subject encryption and decryption limita-
tions to the claims. J.A. 39–40 (CL 38, 42). In Hyatt, we
found that a similar delay in presenting claims was suffi-
cient to trigger prosecution laches. Hyatt, 998 F.3d at
1367–68. In particular, we found that a delay of between
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PERSONALIZED MEDIA COMMUNICATIONS, LLC v. APPLE INC. 13
7–11 years to file applications and 10–19 years before pre-
senting claims contributed to the unreasonableness of the
delay. Id. at 1368. We also found that the district court
erroneously “ignored evidence of Hyatt’s pattern of rewrit-
ing or shifting claims midway through prosecution” and
that it was not enough for the district court to merely note
that “it is ‘not unusual to see a few claims rewritten’” and
that “the PTO accepted the amendments and continued ex-
amination.” Id. at 1363. The district court properly con-
sidered the facts surrounding the amendment to find delay.
J.A. 22–25, 36–38 (FF 61–67; CL 28–35).
In sum, the district court did not legally err. The dis-
trict court correctly considered the totality of the circum-
stances and did not disregard or ignore relevant facts.
PMC also asserts that several of the district court’s fac-
tual findings concerning the first laches element amount to
an abuse of discretion. Appellant’s Br. IV. First, PMC as-
serts that Apple needed an expert on PTO proceedings to
support its case. Id. at 2, 52–53. Hyatt does not require
PTO testimony for a laches determination to be supported,
and PMC cites no case law suggesting otherwise. Nor is
there any other basis in the record to suggest that the dis-
trict court needed an expert’s specialized knowledge to help
understand the administrative records and the PTO regu-
lations in this case.
Second, PMC argues that the district court clearly
erred because it found PMC contributed to the delay by
making it “virtually impossible for the PTO to conduct dou-
ble patenting, priority, or written description analyses,”
but the PTO has issued over 100 patents to PMC. Id. at 52
(quoting J.A. 37 (CL 31)). That the PTO issued PMC many
patents does not suggest clear error—especially given how
many other facts weigh against PMC here. See Symbol
Techs., Inc. v. Lemelson Med., Educ. & Rsch. Found., 422
F.3d 1378, 1380–85 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (affirming the court’s
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14 PERSONALIZED MEDIA COMMUNICATIONS, LLC v. APPLE INC.
finding of laches, despite the patentee having many issued
patents).
Third, PMC argues that the district court should not
have considered the office actions where examiners harshly
criticized PMC’s prosecution strategy. Appel-
lant’s Br. 53–55. The district court was within its purview
to consider these statements as evidence. J.A. 14–16, 17–
19, 38 (FF 40–45, 52–55; CL 34). Further, the court
properly considered the context of the criticisms and rea-
sonably weighed them in view of other evidence. 7 Id.Fourth, PMC argues that the district court clearly
erred because it misinterpreted PMC’s internal documents.
Id. at 57–58. PMC argues that its document stating that
PMC’s “intellectual property position will enable [PMC] to
exercise far-reaching market control for as long as 30 to 50
years,” referred to copyrights, not patents. Id.The district court did not clearly err; the document it-
self describes “issued and pending patents.” See J.A. 8573.
And the court corroborated this document with similar ev-
idence. See J.A. 6–7 (FF 16–17); see also J.A. 9425–26 (tes-
timony that PMC’s patent strategy was to extend its
intellectual property rights and coverage out 30 to 50
years).
7 PMC also rehashes several other instances where
the district court rejected PMC’s interpretation of the pros-
ecution history. Appellant’s Br. 55–56 (arguing clear error
by rejecting PMC testimony concerning discussions with
the PTO); id. at 56 (disputing the district court’s finding
that PMC filed duplicate claims); id. at 56–57 (disputing
the district court’s finding that the prior art PMC submit-
ted was irrelevant because “there was a reasonable expla-
nation” for PMC submitting the references). These
arguments amount to mere disagreement, not clearly erro-
neous factual findings.
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PERSONALIZED MEDIA COMMUNICATIONS, LLC v. APPLE INC. 15
Along those same lines, PMC argues that the district
court clearly erred by considering PMC’s document describ-
ing a strategy of keeping “patents hidden while industry
infringement is quietly monitored” because that strategy
would support “post-issuance laches, which since SCA Hy-
giene is not even a defense” as opposed to prosecution
laches. Appellant’s Br. 58 (quoting SCA Hygiene, 580 U.S.
328). Put simply, PMC’s enforcement strategy is part of
the “totality of the circumstances” here. See Hyatt, 998
F.3d at 1362; see also Symbol Techs., 422 F.3d at 1385 (ex-
plaining that actions taken “for the business purpose of de-
laying [] issuance can be considered an abuse of the patent
system”).
In sum, the district court’s factual findings were not
clearly erroneous. Thus, the district court did not abuse its
discretion in finding that PMC’s delay in prosecution was
unreasonable and inexcusable under the totality of circum-
stances.
Prejudice
Laches requires that the accused infringer suffered
prejudice attributable to the delay. Hyatt, 998 F.3d at
1362. An accused infringer can establish prejudice by prov-
ing that it “invested in, worked on, or used the claimed
technology during the period of delay.” Id. (citation omit-
ted). We affirm the district court’s finding that PMC’s de-
lay prejudiced Apple.
PMC argues that the district court abused its discre-
tion in finding that PMC’s delay prejudiced Apple. Appel-
lant’s Br. V; Reply Br. II. We disagree.
PMC argues that the district court erred because “Ap-
ple needed to prove that PMC still was engaged in egre-
gious conduct causing delays after 2003, which is when the
district court found Apple began developing FairPlay.” Ap-
pellant’s Br. 59. This argument misconstrues the record
and the law.
Case: 21-2275 Document: 49 Page: 16 Filed: 01/20/2023
16 PERSONALIZED MEDIA COMMUNICATIONS, LLC v. APPLE INC.
PMC incorrectly assumes that the district court did not
find that PMC was still engaging in “conduct causing de-
lays after 2003.” Id. The district court found that the de-
liberate strategy of delay began at least in 1995 and
continued through PMC filing this suit in 2015.
See, e.g., J.A. 38, 40 (CL 35, 44). The court found that in
2011, while PMC was in pre-suit negotiations with Apple,
PMC reintroduced a previously-rejected claim in
the ’507 application (the “B” application). See, e.g., J.A. 23–
25, 39–40 (FF 64–67; CL 41–45). PMC did not mention the
application or claim to Apple during negotiations. J.A. 40
(CL 44). PMC was able to get the claim quickly granted,
assert that claim against Apple, and obtain a damages
award. J.A. 3, 40 (FF 5; CL 43). This shows that the dis-
trict court did not err by determining that well after 2003
PMC was still implementing its express strategy of delay
to “reserve [its] patent till the trade independently devel-
ops, and then [] pounce upon it for a full term.” 8 Victor
Talking Mach. Co. v. Thomas A. Edison, Inc., 229 F. 999,
1000–01 (2d Cir. 1916); see also J.A. 40 (CL 45) (“All of
these events must be viewed in the context of PMC’s origi-
nal plans: to prosecute its patents serially over time and
keep them hidden until infringement was engrained and
widespread.”).
8 We disagree with the dissent’s suggestion that the
period of delay ended before 2000. See Dissent pp. 14–16.
The district court did not clearly err in finding that the pe-
riod of delay lasted until at least 2003, when PMC intro-
duced the encryption and decryption subject matter into
the ’145 “A” application, and further until 2011, when PMC
reintroduced the previously-rejected claim from the ’145
“A” application into the ’507 “B” application, for the reasons
discussed in this section and above, see Discussion supra
pp. 10–15.
Case: 21-2275 Document: 49 Page: 17 Filed: 01/20/2023
PERSONALIZED MEDIA COMMUNICATIONS, LLC v. APPLE INC. 17
We find no clear error in the district court’s determina-
tion that PMC engaged in conduct causing delays at least
through 2011. PMC ignores the effect of its Consolidation
Agreement with the PTO, which permitted PMC in 2011 to
re-file the same decryption claim in the ’507 “B” application
that was not allowed in the corresponding ’145 “A” applica-
tion. By taking a second bite at the examination apple
through the “B” application, PMC further lengthened the
examination process beyond normal prosecution proce-
dure, creating improper delay during prosecution. That
the PTO suspended prosecution for a period of time does
not negate the fact that Apple had begun developing Fair-
Play well before PMC was engaging in these amendments.
Even if the district court’s analysis had found that the
period of PMC’s delay ended by 2003, the district court
properly concluded that PMC’s delayed presentation of the
decryption claim in 2003 prejudiced Apple because, as the
court found, “[i]n so delaying, PMC prejudiced Apple,
which had already begun investing in FairPlay’s develop-
ment and continued to do so.” J.A. 39 (CL 38). 9 The record
indicates that Apple began developing FairPlay before
2003. Apple began developing FairPlay “in the early
2000s” and “launched” FairPlay with the Apple Music store
in 2003. J.A. 26 (FF 71); J.A. 4713 at 684:1–4 (“Q: When
did Apple begin developing FairPlay? A: In . . . the early
9 Although the district court stated in a later part of
its opinion that “Apple began developing FairPlay in 2003,”
J.A. 39 (CL 40 (citing FF 71)), we take this statement to be
a typo because it refers to but is inconsistent with the dis-
trict court’s previous findings that “Apple began developing
FairPlay in the early 2000s” and launched FairPlay “to-
gether with the Apple Music store in 2003,” J.A. 26 (FF 71);
see also J.A. 39 (CL 38) (stating that by the time PMC in-
troduced the decryption claim in 2003, Apple “had already
begun investing in FairPlay’s development”).
Case: 21-2275 Document: 49 Page: 18 Filed: 01/20/2023
18 PERSONALIZED MEDIA COMMUNICATIONS, LLC v. APPLE INC.
2000s”), 684:21–23 (“Q: Now, when did Apple first launch
FairPlay? A: We launched FairPlay together with the Ap-
ple Music store, which I believe was in 2003”); J.A. 8085
(¶¶ 73, 76) (parties stipulating that Apple began develop-
ing FairPlay “in the early 2000s” and the iTunes Music
Store launching in 2003). Because Apple began developing
FairPlay in the early 2000s and launched it in 2003, Apple
necessarily invested in or worked on FairPlay before 2003,
which is undisputedly during the period of delay.
In sum, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
finding that Apple established prejudice.
CONCLUSION
The district court did not abuse its discretion in finding
that Apple established laches, rendering the ’091 patent
unenforceable. We have considered PMC’s remaining ar-
guments and find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing
reasons, we affirm the district court’s decision.
AFFIRMED
COSTS
Costs to Apple.
Case: 21-2275 Document: 49 Page: 19 Filed: 01/20/2023
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
PERSONALIZED MEDIA COMMUNICATIONS, LLC,
Plaintiff-Appellant
v.
APPLE INC.,
Defendant-Appellee
______________________
2021-2275
______________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Texas in No. 2:15-cv-01366-JRG-RSP,
Chief Judge J. Rodney Gilstrap.
______________________
STARK, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
I agree with the Majority that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in finding, based on the totality of the
circumstances, that Personalized Media Communications,
LLC’s (“PMC”) delay in prosecuting its patent was unrea-
sonable and inexcusable. To prevail on its laches claim,
however, Apple also had to show that it suffered prejudice
during the period in which PMC was wrongfully delaying
prosecution. Apple failed to do so. Accordingly, I would
reverse the district court’s judgment that PMC’s U.S.
Case: 21-2275 Document: 49 Page: 20 Filed: 01/20/2023
2 PERSONALIZED MEDIA COMMUNICATIONS, LLC v. APPLE INC.
Patent No. 8,191,091 (“’091 patent”) is unenforceable due
to prosecution laches. 1
I
We review the district court’s conclusion that Apple
met its burden to prove prosecution laches for abuse of dis-
cretion. See Cancer Rsch. Tech. Ltd. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 625
F.3d 724, 728-29 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“Cancer Research”). “‘We
may find an abuse of discretion on a showing that the court
made a clear error of judgment in weighing relevant factors
or exercised its discretion based upon an error of law or
clearly erroneous factual findings.’” SiOnyx LLC v. Hama-
matsu Photonics K.K., 981 F.3d 1339, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2020)
(quoting Innogenetics, N.V. v. Abbott Labs., 512 F.3d 1363,
1379 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). Importantly, “we review the legal
standard applied by the district court de novo.” Cancer Re-
search, 625 F.3d at 729. Thus, notwithstanding that our
ultimate standard of review is for abuse of discretion, we
may reverse where a district court commits legal error. See
id. at 732.
To prevail on its prosecution laches counterclaim, Ap-
ple has to prove both that (1) PMC’s “delay in prosecution
1 Because Apple asserted other affirmative defenses
to infringement that the district court did not have to
reach, I would remand for that court to address these tried
but unresolved defenses. See J.A. 2 n.2 (“As Apple has pre-
vailed on its counterclaim—extinguishing any liability for
patent infringement—the Court does not reach Apple’s af-
firmative defenses of obviousness-type double patenting
and unclean hands.”); J.A. 3 (FF 7) (noting district court
heard evidence and argument on “prosecution laches,
OTDP [obviousness-type double patenting], and unclean
hands”).
Case: 21-2275 Document: 49 Page: 21 Filed: 01/20/2023
PERSONALIZED MEDIA COMMUNICATIONS, LLC v. APPLE INC. 3
was unreasonable and inexcusable[ 2] under the totality of
circumstances,” and (2) it “suffered prejudice attributable
to the delay.” Hyatt v. Hirshfeld, 998 F.3d 1347, 1362 (Fed.
Cir. 2021). Proving the prejudice necessary to succeed on
a prosecution laches defense to infringement “requires
proving intervening rights.” Id. at 1369. Establishing in-
tervening rights, in turn, requires showing “‘that either the
accused infringer or others invested in, worked on, or used
the claimed technology during the period of delay.’” Id.(quoting Cancer Research, 625 F.3d at 729) (emphasis
added). Because the prejudice Apple suffered must be
“prejudice attributable to the delay,” Apple must prove it
was prejudiced at some point during the period in which
PMC was engaged in unreasonable and inexcusable prose-
cution delay. See Cancer Research, 625 F.3d at 732.
Our analysis in Cancer Research confirms this under-
standing of Apple’s burden. In Cancer Research, the dis-
trict court had decided that “prosecution laches did not
require a showing of intervening rights but rather turned
on whether under the totality of the circumstances [the pa-
tentee’s] delay in prosecution in light of the PTO’s utility
rejections was unreasonable and unexplained.” Id. at 727.
We rejected this conclusion and, instead, explicitly “recog-
nize[d] intervening adverse rights as a requirement to
holding a patent unenforceable for prosecution laches.” Id.2 We have sometimes referred to the required show-
ing as “unreasonable and unexplained delay,” and at other
times as “unreasonable and inexcusable” delay. Compare,
e.g., Maj. Op. at 3, 12 (“unexplained”); Hyatt, 998 F.3d at
1360 (“unexplained”); Cancer Research, 625 F.3d at 728(“unexplained”), with Maj. Op. at 3, 9, 10, 11, 15 (“inexcus-
able”); Hyatt, 998 F.3d at 1362 (“inexcusable”); Cancer Re-
search, 625 F.3d at 729 (“inexcusable”). No party argues
there is any material difference between these formula-
tions.
Case: 21-2275 Document: 49 Page: 22 Filed: 01/20/2023
4 PERSONALIZED MEDIA COMMUNICATIONS, LLC v. APPLE INC.
at 729-31. Moreover, we declined to find intervening
rights, and hence the prejudice necessary to prove laches,
where an inventor merely “delay[s] in prosecuting and is-
suing its patent application,” observing that our cases and
“[t]he Supreme Court cases underlying the [laches] doc-
trine all rely on a finding that the applicant’s delay in pros-
ecution adversely affected others working in the same
field.” Id. (discussing Woodbridge v. United States, 263
U.S. 50 (1923); Webster Elec. Co. v. Splitdorf Elec. Co., 264
U.S. 463 (1924); Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Ferdinand Gut-
mann Co., 304 U.S. 159 (1938); and Gen. Talking Pictures
Corp. v. Western Elec. Co., 304 U.S. 175 (1938)). We then
expressly held that “to establish prejudice an accused in-
fringer must show evidence of intervening rights, i.e., that
either the accused infringer or others invested in, worked
on, or used the claimed technology during the period of de-
lay.” Id. at 729 (second emphasis added).
Our application of this standard to the facts in Cancer
Research, and our conclusion as to the relevant period of
delay, provides further guidance. The patentee’s predeces-
sor filed its original patent application, which matured into
the patent-in-suit, in 1982, and then in 1991 “ownership of
the patent application changed hands” to Cancer Research.
Id. at 726. Thereafter, Cancer Research began to move the
prosecution along at a reasonable pace, and the patent
eventually issued in 1993. See id. at 726-27. We found that
the pertinent period during which the accused infringer
had to prove prejudice was “between 1982 and 1991,” id. at
726, 732, and did not include 1991 to 1993.
We next considered whether Barr, the party asserting
prosecution laches as a defense to infringement, had devel-
oped intervening rights during the pertinent period. Barr
had filed an Abbreviated New Drug Application (“ANDA”)
to market its infringing product in 2007. See id. at 727.
Because “Barr filed its ANDA more than thirteen years af-
ter the issuance of Cancer Research’s patent,” we con-
cluded that Barr was “hardly prejudiced by the delay in the
Case: 21-2275 Document: 49 Page: 23 Filed: 01/20/2023
PERSONALIZED MEDIA COMMUNICATIONS, LLC v. APPLE INC. 5
issuance of the [patent-in-suit], in 1993.” Id. at 731. As
Barr likewise failed to identify any other way in which it or
another entity 3 or the public was prejudiced by the patent
applicant’s delay between 1982 and 1991, it had failed to
prove prosecution laches. See id. at 732. Any prejudice
that Barr or anyone else may have developed after 1991—
that is, after the patent applicant stopped acting unreason-
ably and inexcusably—was irrelevant to our analysis. 4
Apple distinguishes Cancer Research by inviting us to
eliminate the line between the “period of delay,” as we un-
derstood and applied that term in Cancer Research, and the
period after the pertinent delay, which is not relevant to
the prejudice analysis. See, e.g., Appellee’s Br. 74 (“Even if
it were somehow true, as PMC suggests, that PMC’s af-
firmative misconduct had stopped by 2003, the delay in
prosecution continued due to its [PMC’s] earlier miscon-
duct.”); id. (“Whereas the delay in Cancer Research con-
sisted of a defined period of delay . . . this case involves
conduct deliberately intended to (and that did)
3 Although our cases allow a party asserting laches
to satisfy the prejudice prong by identifying prejudice dur-
ing the pertinent time to others besides the party itself, see,
e.g., Cancer Research, 625 F.3d at 729, Apple has not at-
tempted to make such a showing in this case, see Appellee’s
Br. 71-77.
4 The dissenting opinion in Cancer Research was
based on this very aspect of the holding. In dissent, Judge
Prost disagreed with the “temporal limitation that the prej-
udice exist[] during the period of delay,” which she faulted
as a “new requirement” the Cancer Research majority was
improperly imposing on parties asserting prosecution
laches. 625 F.3d at 735-37; see also id. at 737 (“[I]t is not
appropriate to confine the inquiry to the period of time
when Cancer Research was actively delaying prosecu-
tion.”).
Case: 21-2275 Document: 49 Page: 24 Filed: 01/20/2023
6 PERSONALIZED MEDIA COMMUNICATIONS, LLC v. APPLE INC.
affirmatively hamper the PTO’s examination and cause on-
going delay in examination for years after its occurrence.”);
id. (arguing law permits “considering the delay resulting
from those [delaying] acts”). I believe we should reject this
invitation and adhere to the legal requirement that preju-
dice be shown to have occurred during the patentee’s period
of unreasonable and inexcusable delay. 5 If we were to do
so, it would follow that Apple has failed to meet its burden
and the district court’s finding of laches could not stand.
II
Turning to the facts before us, there is no material dis-
pute as to the date by which Apple obtained intervening
rights in the technology the jury found to be infringing.
The acquisition of such intervening rights depends on the
timing of Apple’s “invest[ment] in, work[] on, or use[]” of
the infringing FairPlay technology. Cancer Research, 625
F.3d at 729. The district court found that Apple proved it
began this work “in the early 2000s.” J.A. 26 (FF 71). The
Majority affirms this finding and I agree it is not clearly
5 In Hyatt, 998 F.3d at 1370, we said that “where a
patent applicant has committed a clear abuse of the PTO’s
patent examination system, the applicant’s abuse and its
effects meet the prejudice requirement of prosecution
laches.” I read this statement as limited to the § 145 con-
text in which Hyatt arose, where the entity confronting the
burden to show prejudice was the PTO, not a patent in-
fringer. It makes sense that the PTO can show prejudice
by proving it, the PTO, was clearly abused by the applicant.
I am not aware of this Court making similar statements
when the party asserting prosecution laches is an accused
infringer.
Case: 21-2275 Document: 49 Page: 25 Filed: 01/20/2023
PERSONALIZED MEDIA COMMUNICATIONS, LLC v. APPLE INC. 7
erroneous. The earliest date by which Apple obtained in-
tervening rights, then, was January 2000. 6
Consequently, Apple must also prove that PMC was
engaged in unreasonable and inexcusable prosecution de-
lay in or after January 2000. If all of PMC’s improper delay
concluded before January 2000, before Apple began work-
ing on FairPlay, then whatever prejudice Apple suffered is
not “attributable to” PMC’s delay. While Apple does not
agree that this is the proper analysis—believing, as it per-
suaded the district court, that the lingering post-2000 im-
pact of PMC’s pre-2000 delay is sufficient to make Apple’s
post-2000 development of FairPlay dispositive in our prej-
udice analysis—it contends, in the alternative, that it
proved unreasonable and inexcusable prosecution delay af-
ter 2000. I disagree.
As PMC observes, the district court’s focus in finding
delay was primarily on PMC’s activities between 1987 and
6 In fact, the record strongly suggests that Apple did
not work on what became FairPlay until 2002. Apple’s ap-
pellate briefing indicates Apple started developing Fair-
Play after launching iTunes and the iPod in late 2001. See
Appellee’s Br. 22 (citing J.A. 4706-07, 4712-13, 8085 (Stip.
¶ 76)). In closing argument at the bench trial, Apple’s
counsel told the district court that FairPlay “[l]aunched in
April of 2003, [and was] developed shortly before that.”
Personalized Media Commc’ns, LLC v. Apple, Inc., No.
2:15-cv-01366, ECF No. 645 (Bench Trial Transcript), at
237. Moreover, FairPlay did not “mature[]” into the ver-
sion that infringes the asserted claims until perhaps as late
as 2005. J.A. 39 (CL 38) (“By 2005 . . . FairPlay had ma-
tured into the version accused of infringement.”); see also
J.A. 26 (FF 72). Because PMC’s unreasonable and inexcus-
able delay had ended before 2000, the specific date in the
2000s when Apple acquired intervening rights is immate-
rial.
Case: 21-2275 Document: 49 Page: 26 Filed: 01/20/2023
8 PERSONALIZED MEDIA COMMUNICATIONS, LLC v. APPLE INC.
1995. The district court relied on the number of applica-
tions PMC filed in 1995, and the fact that “PMC’s 328 ap-
plications derive[d] from two earlier applications,
respectively filed in 1981 and 1987. These pre-date PMC’s
1995 applications by 8 to 14 years.” J.A. 32 (CL 17). The
district court compared PMC’s filing delays to the delays
involved in Hyatt, concluding that “PMC delayed filing of
its applications for a comparable period.” J.A. 32-33
(CL 18). The district court noted that PMC’s applications
were filed with a small number of claims, J.A. 33 (CL 19),
which were later multiplied and amended, J.A. 33-34
(CL 21), and the applications themselves were lengthy and
complex, J.A. 33 (CL 20). The district court also pointed to
the large number of references PMC disclosed as pertinent
prior art. J.A. 34 (CL 22).
When addressing PMC’s post-2000 prosecution con-
duct, the district court specifically mentions a 2002 office
action, which PMC was slow in responding to; a 2003
amendment to what became independent claim 13 of the
’091 patent; and PMC’s 2011 reintroduction—as a proposed
“B” application claim—of what had been rejected as an “A”
application claim and eventually became claim 13 of the
’091 patent. Thus, the only conduct after 2000 that either
the district court or Apple points to as constituting unrea-
sonable and inexcusable prosecution delay is: (i) the 2002
failure to respond promptly to an office action; (ii) the 2003
claim amendment; and (iii) the 2011 reintroduction of what
became claim 13 of the ’091 patent. As I see it, none of
these actions, either individually or as part of the totality
of circumstances, were the type of “egregious misuse of the
statutory patent system” we have required to find prosecu-
tion laches. Cancer Research, 625 F.3d at 728.
A
Apple points to PMC’s January 2003 response to a July
2002 office action as abusive prosecutorial conduct. See Ap-
pellee’s Br. 45-46. While I agree with Apple that the
Case: 21-2275 Document: 49 Page: 27 Filed: 01/20/2023
PERSONALIZED MEDIA COMMUNICATIONS, LLC v. APPLE INC. 9
district court could properly consider this evidence, I disa-
gree that PMC’s activities in 2002 and 2003 widen the win-
dow of unreasonable and inexcusable delay to a period after
2000.
In the July 2002 office action, the examiner expressed
frustration with PMC’s “misle[a]d[ing]” statements about
priority dates for the claims in U.S. Patent Application No.
08/474,145 (“’145 application”). J.A. 15 (FF 43). The exam-
iner wrote that the PTO “continue[d] to struggle in its ef-
forts to make [§ 112 ¶ 1] determinations for the 10,000 or
so pending amended claims,” adding that PMC failed to
identify “precisely what is being claimed.” J.A. 16 (FF 44)
(emphasis and alteration in original).
The office action specified a three-month period during
which PMC could reply, while also noting that extensions
might be available under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a), adding that
in no event could a reply be filed more than six months af-
ter the July 31, 2002 mailing date of the office action.
J.A. 48027-28. Precisely six months after the mailing date,
on January 31, 2003, PMC filed its reply, simultaneously
requesting a three-month extension under § 1.136(a) and
paying the fee for the extension. J.A. 48135-36. PMC’s
January 2003 reply thoroughly responded to the exam-
iner’s concerns. See J.A. 48137-80. Thereafter, prosecu-
tion proceeded, including by PMC filing two information
disclosure statements. See File History of U.S. Patent No.
7,992,169 (showing information disclosure statements filed
on February 7, 2003, and May 5, 2003); see also J.A. 48299.
The district court found that the July 2002 office action
was a relevant example of PMC’s prosecution misconduct,
see J.A. 15-16 (FF 42-45), although the district court did
not rely on or cite to these findings of fact in explicating its
conclusions of law on unreasonable and inexcusable delay
or prejudice, see J.A. 30-41 (CL 11-47). The district court
also did not make any finding regarding PMC’s January
2003 reply, see J.A. 15-16 (FF 42-45), a reply which
Case: 21-2275 Document: 49 Page: 28 Filed: 01/20/2023
10 PERSONALIZED MEDIA COMMUNICATIONS, LLC v. APPLE INC.
appears to have been timely, see J.A. 48136 (PMC request-
ing three-month extension and paying fee, “thereby extend-
ing the period for response to January 31, 2003”). The “give
and take” between the examiner and PMC in and around
the July 2002 office action and January 2003 reply is rou-
tine, not unreasonable and inexcusable. See In re Buszard,
504 F.3d 1364, 1366-67 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“The patent exam-
iner and the applicant, in the give and take of rejection and
response, work toward defining the metes and bounds of
the invention to be patented.”).
In short, I do not see how PMC’s prosecution conduct
in connection with the July 2002 office action constitutes
unreasonable and inexcusable delay that could give rise to
Apple developing intervening rights in the 2002 or 2003
timeframe. And neither the district court nor the Majority
explain how it could.
B
The district court also found that PMC’s February 4,
2003 amendment “was the first time that encryption, de-
cryption, or decryption keys” appeared in the ’145 applica-
tion’s claims. J.A. 22 (FF 61). The Majority finds no abuse
of discretion in this finding. See Maj. Op. at 6-7, 15. I view
the question of whether the amendment added encryption,
decryption, and decryption keys to the claims as a matter
of claim scope and, therefore, an issue of law. See Mark-
man v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 391
(1996). Moreover, I am persuaded that each of these limi-
tations was within the scope of the pre-amendment claims
and, therefore, the amendment was a routine narrowing
amendment. See PPC Broadband, Inc. v. Corning Optical
Commc’ns RF, LLC, 815 F.3d 734, 740 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(“[T]he patentee can amend the claim language during
prosecution—and narrow it if necessary—to clarify the
scope of the invention and avoid rejection or cancellation of
the claims.”); see also In re Zletz, 893 F.2d 319, 321 (Fed.
Cir. 1989) (“[D]uring patent prosecution . . . claims can be
Case: 21-2275 Document: 49 Page: 29 Filed: 01/20/2023
PERSONALIZED MEDIA COMMUNICATIONS, LLC v. APPLE INC. 11
amended, ambiguities should be recognized, scope and
breadth of language explored, and clarification imposed.”).
As the Majority explains, the 2003 “amendment
changed the claim from ‘[a] method of enabling a program-
ming presentation at a receiver station’ to ‘[a] method of
decrypting programming at a receiver station,’ and intro-
duced various encryption and decryption steps.” Maj. Op.
at 7 (internal emphasis omitted). The Majority, district
court, and Apple all fail to provide any reason to view this
amendment—to the claim’s preamble—as even a claim lim-
itation, and certainly not one that broadens claim scope.
See generally Symantec Corp. v. Comput. Assocs. Int’l, Inc.,
522 F.3d 1279, 1288-89 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“[I]n general, the
purpose of a claim preamble is to give context for what is
being described in the body of the claim; if it is reasonably
susceptible to being construed to be merely duplicative of
the limitations in the body of the claim (and was not clearly
added to overcome a rejection), we do not construe it to be
a separate limitation.”).
The amendment additionally changed “enabling said
disabled information” to “decrypting said encrypted infor-
mation,” and similarly changed other instances of “ena-
bling said disabled information” to “decrypting;” “disabled
information” to “encrypted information;” and “enabling in-
formation” to “decryption key.” J.A. 22 (FF 61). These
amendments narrowed and limited the scope of the claims
to encryption, decryption, and decryption keys, elements
that were present in the claims at least as far back as 1997.
See, e.g., J.A. 40125, 40139 (June 10, 1997 response to of-
fice action, showing amendment and request for reconsid-
eration in connection with U.S. Patent Application No.
08/485,507 (“’507 application”), stating: “One place where
the specification discloses enabling information and disa-
bled (encrypted) information begins on page 297 line 20 and
goes through to page 298, line 21.”) (emphasis added);
J.A. 27711, 27734 (PMC designating certain pending
Case: 21-2275 Document: 49 Page: 30 Filed: 01/20/2023
12 PERSONALIZED MEDIA COMMUNICATIONS, LLC v. APPLE INC.
applications—including ’507 and ’145—as “relat[ing] to de-
cryption of broadcast information,” also known as “DECR”).
Prior to the 2003 amendment, one could practice the
claims by disabling information using mechanisms other
than encryption, and enabling information could be of a
type other than decryption keys. Moreover, disabled infor-
mation could be enabled without specifically decrypting it
via a decryption key. After the 2003 amendment, by con-
trast, the claims were narrowed to encryption, decryption,
and decryption keys. There was nothing unreasonable, in-
excusable, or even unusual about this routine amendment.
Therefore, Apple has not shown that any prejudice it suf-
fered in 2003 is attributable to PMC’s prosecution delay.
C
Apple portrays PMC’s conduct in 2011, which had the
effect of amending the ’091 patent’s independent claim 13,
as “one of its more egregious tactics.” Appellee’s Br. 76.
The Majority “find[s] no clear error in the district court’s
determination that PMC engaged in conduct causing de-
lays at least through 2011.” Maj. Op. at 17. But PMC’s
2011 claim amendment was permitted by the Consolida-
tion Agreement reached between PMC and the PTO. I do
not believe PMC’s compliance with the Consolidation
Agreement justifies a finding that PMC’s unreasonable and
inexcusable delay persisted until 2011.
As the parties stipulated in the district court, a key
component of the Consolidation Agreement was: “Appli-
cants and the PTO agreed that, in order to expedite allow-
ance of patentable claims, if there were claims that
remained finally rejected in an application, those claims
were to be moved to the ‘B’ Application for further action,
and the ‘A’ Application would be allowed to issue.”
J.A. 8082 (Stip. ¶ 50). Consistent with this Agreement, in
or around 2000, PMC designated the ’145 application an
“A” application and the ’507 application as the correspond-
ing “B” application. J.A. 18 (FF 54). Pursuant to the
Case: 21-2275 Document: 49 Page: 31 Filed: 01/20/2023
PERSONALIZED MEDIA COMMUNICATIONS, LLC v. APPLE INC. 13
Consolidation Agreement, PMC “[m]aintain[ed] applica-
tion B as a potential application for any claims not allowed”
in the A application. J.A. 27725. When, in April 2011,
PMC reintroduced via the ’507 “B” application claim 45—
which is identical to claim 22 of the ’145 “A” application as
it existed after its February 4, 2003 amendment—it was
acting in accordance with the Consolidation Agreement to
which the PTO had agreed. After minimal further amend-
ments, claim 45 of the ’507 application issued as independ-
ent claim 13 of the ’091 patent, and the jury later found
Apple infringed “at least one of claims 13, 14, 15, and 16 of
the ’091 patent.” J.A. 27 (FF 73).
PMC explained to the examiner exactly what it was do-
ing with its 2011 submissions, writing: “Consistent with
the consolidation agreement between the Applicants and
the Office, Applicants now wish to pursue the subject mat-
ter within the scope of the ‘A’ claims of the DECR 87 group
‘A’ application (U.S. Patent Application Serial No.
08/474,145) by claiming such subject matter that was not
patented in the ‘A’ application in the instant ‘B’ applica-
tion.” J.A. 16864. PMC also sought to “aid the Examiner
in understanding the amendments to the claim[s]” by “at-
tach[ing] a marked up copy of the claims (Appendix A) in-
dicating the differences between the ‘A’ Claims and the
amended form submitted herein.” Id. Furthermore, PMC
signed a terminal disclaimer that “disclaim[ed] the termi-
nal portion of any patent granted on [the ’507] application
which would extend beyond the expiration date of [the ’169
patent].” Apple Inc. v. Personalized Media Commc’ns.,
LLC., No. IPR2016-00755, Ex. 1040, at 6 (P.T.A.B. March
14, 2016) (March 2012 Notice of Allowance for ’507 appli-
cation).
As the Majority points out, “[t]he record does not ex-
plain how PMC and the PTO decided on” the provisions of
the Consolidation Agreement, including the “A” and “B” ap-
plication provisions. Maj. Op. at 5 n.3. While the Consoli-
dation Agreement does not necessarily render all actions
Case: 21-2275 Document: 49 Page: 32 Filed: 01/20/2023
14 PERSONALIZED MEDIA COMMUNICATIONS, LLC v. APPLE INC.
taken by PMC pursuant to it reasonable and excusable, I
would find that, under the totality of circumstances, Apple
failed to show PMC’s 2011 conduct, which is consistent
with the Consolidation Agreement, renders 2011 a perti-
nent time during which Apple could have suffered preju-
dice attributable to PMC’s delay. 7
III
Today’s holding, which allows Apple to prevail on
laches by proving it suffered prejudice in and around 2003,
due to the ongoing impact of prosecution delays PMC
caused primarily between 1987 and 1995, implies that
PMC was doomed to procure unenforceable patents regard-
less of how well it conducted itself after 1995, and no mat-
ter how egregious Apple’s infringement might be. This
outcome, which renders irrelevant years of PMC’s conduct
(i.e., 1995 to 2003 and beyond), is inconsistent with the to-
tality of circumstances analysis required for assessing ap-
plication of prosecution laches. See Lemon v. Kurtzman,
411 U.S. 192, 200 (1973) (“[E]quitable remedies are a spe-
cial blend of what is necessary, what is fair, and what is
workable.”) (internal footnote omitted); see also Symbol
Techs., Inc. v. Lemelson Med., Educ. & Rsch. Found., LP,
422 F.3d 1378, 1385-86 (Fed. Cir. 2005). It is also in ten-
sion with our holding in Hyatt, in which we suggested that,
even decades into the prosecution, when the PTO “notified
Hyatt of its own obligations and requirements and thereby
gave him the opportunity to avoid prosecution laches,” 998
7 We stated in Hyatt, 998 F.3d at 1369, that a “clear
abuse of the patent system” can exist even if the prosecu-
tion tactics do “not literally violate regulations or statutory
provisions.” This does not mean, however, that the permis-
sibility of the patentee’s conduct, including if it was under-
taken pursuant to an agreement the PTO chose to enter
into, is irrelevant to weighing the equities of the overall sit-
uation.
Case: 21-2275 Document: 49 Page: 33 Filed: 01/20/2023
PERSONALIZED MEDIA COMMUNICATIONS, LLC v. APPLE INC. 15
F.3d at 1366 (emphasis added), Hyatt’s subsequent cooper-
ation with the PTO could, even then, have saved his pa-
tents. In Hyatt, we “remand[ed] to the district court for the
limited purpose of affording Hyatt the opportunity to pre-
sent evidence on the issue of prosecution laches,” id. at
1371, which we would not have done had the ongoing im-
pact of Hyatt’s delays already conclusively established that
his patents were unenforceable.
In my view, Apple failed to prove it obtained interven-
ing rights in the accused technology any sooner than 2000,
as that is the earliest date it was possibly working on what
became the infringing FairPlay product. Apple also failed
to prove that PMC unreasonably and inexcusably delayed
prosecution in or after 2000. As Apple did not establish
any time during which there was both delay and prejudice,
Apple did not demonstrate it suffered prejudice “attributa-
ble to” PMC’s delay. Therefore, Apple did not meet its bur-
den to prevail on its prosecution laches counterclaim. The
district court’s contrary finding, which I believe is based on
an incorrect reading of the law—one which wrongly per-
mitted Apple to persuade the court that PMC’s delay had
material lingering effects as late as 2011—should be re-
versed. 8 Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
8 The prejudice prong of the prosecution laches test
received very little attention in the parties’ appellate
briefs, covering just 11 of the 167 pages of briefing we re-
ceived. See Appellant’s Br. 59-60; Appellee’s Br. 71-77; Ap-
pellant’s Reply Br. 29-30. The parties seem to have taken
the same approach in the district court. Near the conclu-
sion of the bench trial on equitable issues, the district judge
was left to ask Apple’s counsel to “in one sentence, tell me
what the prejudice to your client is,” to which the response
was: “Well, the prejudice is that, had these applications
been prosecuted diligently as they should have been, that
the invention that is being claimed in the ’091 patent would
Case: 21-2275 Document: 49 Page: 34 Filed: 01/20/2023
have been long since in the public domain.” Personalized
Media Commc’ns, LLC v. Apple, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-01366,
ECF No. 645 (Bench Trial Transcript), at 239-40; see also
id. at 261 (“[Apple] has been prejudiced the same way the
public has been prejudiced, that the term of the patent mo-
nopoly was shifted.”). The parties’ decision to devote scant
consideration to prejudice undoubtedly increased the chal-
lenge confronted by the district court.