Martin v. United States ( 2023 )

Case: 22-1810 Document: 51 Page: 1 Filed: 02/10/2023
NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
ROWLAND J. MARTIN, JR.,
Plaintiff-Appellant
v.
UNITED STATES,
Defendant-Appellee
______________________
2022-1810
______________________
Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims
in No. 1:21-cv-01987-EDK, Chief Judge Elaine Kaplan.
______________________
Decided: February 10, 2023
______________________
ROWLAND J. MARTIN, JR., San Antonio, TX, pro se.
JOSHUA A. MANDLEBAUM, Commercial Litigation
Branch, Civil Division, United Department of Justice,
Washington, DC, for defendant-appellee. Also represented
by BRIAN M. BOYNTON, ERIC P. BRUSKIN, PATRICIA M.
MCCARTHY.
______________________
Before STOLL, SCHALL, and CUNNINGHAM, Circuit Judges.
Case: 22-1810 Document: 51 Page: 2 Filed: 02/10/2023
2 MARTIN v. US
PER CURIAM.
Rowland J. Martin, Jr. appeals from two orders of the
United States Court of Federal Claims, the first dismissing
his complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and the
second denying his motions for leave to file an amended
complaint and for modification of the judgment. For the
below reasons, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
In 2010, Mr. Martin filed a pro se complaint against
various parties in the United States District Court for the
Western District of Texas. See Martin v. Grehn, 546
F. App’x 415, 418 (5th Cir. 2013). The dispute giving rise
to this complaint began in 2005, when Mr. Martin filed for
bankruptcy protection and listed among his assets a prop-
erty in San Antonio, Texas. Several entities held liens on
this property, including the law firm of McKnight and
Bravenec, which held a lien for unpaid legal fees. In 2006,
the law firm paid the lien, claimed title to the property, and
foreclosed. In response, Mr. Martin sued, among others,
Edward Bravenec of the McKnight and Bravenec firm,
seeking the return of his property. The court ultimately
granted summary judgment for the defendants, and the
Fifth Circuit affirmed. Id. at 417.
During the pendency of that lawsuit, Mr. Martin filed
a lis pendens lien against the disputed property, alleging
that the property was subject to ongoing litigation in fed-
eral court. Martin v. Bravenec, 627 F. App’x 310, 311
(5th Cir. 2015). After the Fifth Circuit affirmed the suit’s
dismissal, Mr. Bravenec moved to expunge this lien, and
the district court granted that motion. Mr. Martin then
filed a new lis pendens lien, asserting that the property re-
mained subject to ongoing litigation because the Fifth Cir-
cuit had not yet issued its mandate. Mr. Bravenec moved
for sanctions. Without holding a hearing or ordering a re-
sponse from Mr. Martin, the district court granted the mo-
tion and awarded Mr. Bravenec attorneys’ fees.
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MARTIN v. US 3
Mr. Martin appealed the sanctions order, and the Fifth Cir-
cuit reversed, holding that the district court had not af-
forded Mr. Martin due process before imposing the
sanctions. Id. at 313.
We now come to the complaint at issue in this appeal.
In 2021, Mr. Martin filed a pro se complaint at the Court of
Federal Claims, alleging that the sanctions decision of the
U.S. District Court of the Western District of Texas—which
had been reversed by the Fifth Circuit—entitled him to
monetary damages. See, e.g., SAppx. 1 1–2 ¶¶ 1–3; see also,
e.g., SAppx. 12 ¶ 36 (alleging a “violation of constitutional
rights that the Fifth Circuit vacated by its 2015 decree”).
The Court of Federal Claims liberally construed Mr. Mar-
tin’s complaint to include several categories of claims but
concluded it did not have jurisdiction to hear any of them.
Accordingly, in March 2022, the trial court granted the
government’s motion to dismiss. SAppx. 22–29; Martin
v. United States, No. 21-1987C, 2022 WL 793142(Fed. Cl. Mar. 15, 2022). The trial court also noted that in
his complaint, Mr. Martin requested that the court appoint
a special master. The court denied that request, explaining
that Mr. Martin had not identified an “exceptional condi-
tion” that would require the appointment of a special mas-
ter. SAppx. 28 (citing R. Ct. Fed. Cl. 53(a)(1)).
Subsequently, Mr. Martin filed a motion seeking to file
an amended complaint and to modify the court’s judgment,
expressly relying on Rules 15(b)(2) and 59 of the Rules of
the Court of Federal Claims (RCFC). SAppx. 31–41. In an
April 2022 order, the trial court denied this motion.
SAppx. 43–48; Martin v. United States, No. 21-1987C,
2022 WL 1154139 (Fed. Cl. Apr. 18, 2022). In that order,
the court explained that Rule 15(b)(2), which applies to
“amendments during and after trial,” provided no basis to
1 “SAppx.” refers to the supplemental appendix filed
by the Government.
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4 MARTIN v. US
amend the complaint because there had been no trial.
SAppx. 44–45. Regarding Rule 59, the trial court ex-
plained that Mr. Martin would have had to demonstrate an
intervening change in controlling law, newly discovered ev-
idence, or a manifest error of law or mistake of fact in the
court’s prior decision to dismiss. The trial court deter-
mined that Mr. Martin’s motion did not meet this stand-
ard. Accordingly, the trial court concluded there was no
basis to reconsider its March 2022 order.
Mr. Martin appeals the March 2022 order dismissing
his complaint and the April 2022 order denying his motion.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).
DISCUSSION
We review the Court of Federal Claims’ dismissal of a
complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction de novo.
Creative Mgmt. Servs., LLC v. United States, 989 F.3d 955,
961 (Fed. Cir. 2021). We construe pro se filings like
Mr. Martin’s liberally, but that does not alleviate Mr. Mar-
tin’s burden to establish jurisdiction. Henke v. United
States, 60 F.3d 795, 799 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Kelly v. Sec’y,
U.S. Dep’t of Lab., 812 F.2d 1378, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
We review the denial of a motion for leave to amend the
complaint, as well as the denial of a motion for reconsider-
ation, for an abuse of discretion. Renda Marine, Inc.
v. United States, 509 F.3d 1372, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2007). The
trial court abuses its discretion when it “misunderstands
or misapplies the relevant law or makes clearly erroneous
findings of fact.” Id.On appeal, Mr. Martin argues that the trial court
(1) improperly dismissed his complaint and (2) abused its
discretion in denying his motion to amend and for recon-
sideration. See generally Appellant’s Br. 15–18, 27–28. We
address each of these in turn.
We turn first to the court’s determination to dismiss
Mr. Martin’s complaint for lack of subject matter
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MARTIN v. US 5
jurisdiction. The Court of Federal Claims is a court of lim-
ited jurisdiction, meaning it can only hear certain types of
legal claims. Specifically, the Court of Federal Claims is
primarily authorized to hear money claims founded upon
the Constitution, federal statutes, executive regulations, or
contracts with the United States. For example, the court
has jurisdiction over claims for just compensation for the
taking of private property under the Fifth Amendment, re-
quests for the refund of federal taxes, claims regarding mil-
itary and civilian pay, and claims for damages for the
government’s breaches of contract. The court also has ju-
risdiction over bid protests involving government con-
tracts, vaccine compensation, claims of patent and
copyright infringement against the United States, and cer-
tain suits brought by Indian tribes.
To show jurisdiction, plaintiffs at the Court of Federal
Claims must identify a contract or a source of substantive
law (such as a constitutional provision, federal statute, or
agency regulation) that provides a right to money damages.
28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1); see Todd v. United States, 386 F.3d
1091, 1093–94 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The source of law must be
“money-mandating,” i.e., it must mandate compensation by
the government. Smith v. United States, 709 F.3d 1114,
1116 (Fed. Cir. 2013). A plaintiff cannot establish jurisdic-
tion in the Court of Federal Claims through only vague,
conclusory, or unsupported assertions. Bradley v. Chiron
Corp., 136 F.3d 1317, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“Conclusory
allegations of law and unwarranted inferences of fact do
not suffice to support a claim.”).
The court’s limited jurisdiction means that it cannot
hear many types of claims. For example, the court can only
hear claims against the government; thus, it cannot hear
claims brought against individuals, even individuals al-
leged to be federal officials. Brown v. United States, 105
F.3d 621, 624 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“The Tucker Act grants the
Court of Federal Claims jurisdiction over suits against the
United States, not against individual federal officials.”).
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6 MARTIN v. US
The Court of Federal Claims also cannot review the deci-
sions of other federal courts, including federal district
courts. Joshua v. United States, 17 F.3d 378, 380 (Fed. Cir.
1994). And unlike district courts, the Court of Federal
Claims can neither hear claims involving allegedly crimi-
nal or tortious actions, § 1491(a)(1), nor claims arising un-
der the civil rights statutes, 42 U.S.C. § 1988(a) (stating
that jurisdiction over civil rights claims is “conferred on the
district courts”). Similarly, claims challenging certain
agency decisions, including decisions of the Federal Com-
munications Commission (FCC), may not be brought before
the Court of Federal Claims. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2342 (ex-
plaining that challenges to FCC decisions can only be
brought in certain courts).
While the Court of Federal Claims can review certain
contractual claims, see § 1491(a)(1), jurisdiction requires a
non-frivolous allegation that an express or implied-in-fact
contract exists. Trauma Serv. Grp. v. United States, 104
F.3d 1321, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“To show jurisdiction in
the Court of Federal Claims, [a plaintiff] must show that
either an express or implied-in-fact contract underlies its
claim.”). Simply citing to various Constitutional Amend-
ments or Articles, without more, is insufficient for a plain-
tiff to establish the existence of a contract for jurisdictional
purposes. See, e.g., Taylor v. United States, 113 Fed. Cl.
171, 173 (2013) (rejecting the argument that the Constitu-
tion was a contract with plaintiff). Further, the Constitu-
tion is not itself a money-mandating source of law that
would grant jurisdiction to the Court of Federal Claims.
See, e.g., United States v. Connolly, 716 F.2d 882, 887
(Fed. Cir. 1983) (explaining that the First Amendment is
not money-mandating).
In this case, the Court of Federal Claims construed
Mr. Martin’s complaint and subsequent filings as asserting
the following claims: (1) challenges to the district court’s
sanctions order; (2) claims against Mr. Bravenec; (3) alle-
gations that the district court’s actions were criminal or
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MARTIN v. US 7
tortious; (4) a claim for breach of contract based on the Con-
stitution; (5) various claims under Article I of the Constitu-
tion as well as the First, Fourth, Fifth, Tenth, and
Thirteenth Amendments; (6) various claims under civil
rights statutes; (7) a claim under 47 U.S.C. § 151, the stat-
ute which established the FCC; and (8) various claims
brought under unspecified “norms of judicial and govern-
mental conduct,” “treaty covenants,” “the customary inter-
national law of human rights,” and “the law of nations,”
SAppx. 3, ¶ 6. Martin, 2022 WL 793142, at *3–5. On ap-
peal, Mr. Martin reasserts these claims and also raises a
few new claims: (1) a “purchase money lien claim,” Appel-
lant’s Br. 40; (2) an assertion that the district court’s va-
cated sanctions order “violat[ed] . . . the American Rule on
court costs,” id. at 18, 40–42, 45, 49, 57; and (3) a claim un-
der 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(2), id. at 18.
As we explained above, the Court of Federal Claims can
only hear certain types of claims. Here, even broadly inter-
preting Mr. Martin’s complaint, the Court of Federal
Claims determined none of his arguments were of the type
that the court has the power to adjudicate, and thus that it
was required to dismiss his complaint. Because each of
Mr. Martin’s allegations are of the type over which the
Court of Federal Claims lacks jurisdiction, we affirm. Spe-
cifically, upon review of Mr. Martin’s complaint, most of his
claims—like those against an individual, alleging criminal
or tortious behavior, the violation of civil rights statutes, or
challenging the district court’s or the FCC’s decisions—are
explicitly excluded from the Court of Federal Claims’ juris-
diction. The remainder of Mr. Martin’s claims are vague,
conclusory, and unsupported, i.e., are not pled with suffi-
cient specificity to show that the court had jurisdiction.
Bradley, 136 F.3d at 1322. We see no error in the trial
court’s determination that each of Mr. Martin’s claims was
outside its jurisdiction. Accordingly, we affirm that court’s
decision.
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8 MARTIN v. US
We now address the three additional claims that
Mr. Martin raises for the first time on appeal. As an initial
matter, because Mr. Martin “did not raise th[ese claims]
before the Court of Federal Claims, [they are] waived on
appeal.” San Carlos Apache Tribe v. United States, 639
F.3d 1346, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Even if Mr. Martin had
raised these claims before the Court of Federal Claims,
that court would lack jurisdiction to consider them. Re-
garding the first claim, the Court of Federal Claims lacks
jurisdiction over claims seeking damages for allegedly un-
lawful IRS collection activities, including tax liens. Led-
ford v. United States, 297 F.3d 1378, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
Regarding the second claim, the “American Rule on court
costs” is not a money-mandating source of law, and thus
the trial court has no jurisdiction to claims arising under
that rule. And regarding the third claim, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1491(a)(2) provides only that the Court of Federal Claims
may remand cases, render judgment in Contract Disputes
Act cases, and correct records; it does not create an inde-
pendent basis for jurisdiction. Thus, even if Mr. Martin
had clearly raised these claims before the Court of Federal
Claims, that court would have been required to dismiss
them for lack of jurisdiction.
Next, we turn to Mr. Martin’s argument that the trial
court abused its discretion in denying his motion that re-
quested (1) leave to file an amended complaint under
Rule 15 of the Rules for the Court of Federal Claims and
(2) modification of the judgment under Rule 59 of those
same rules. First, under Rule 15, a party may move to
amend the pleadings to incorporate an issue that was “tried
by the parties’ express or implied consent.” R. Ct. Fed.
Cl. 15(b)(2). Here, there was no basis to amend the com-
plaint to incorporate a “tried” issue because there was no
trial. Second, under Rule 59, the trial court “may grant a
motion for reconsideration when there has been an inter-
vening change in the controlling law, newly discovered ev-
idence, or a need to correct clear factual or legal error or
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MARTIN v. US 9
prevent manifest injustice.” Biery v. United States, 818
F.3d 704, 711 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Here, Mr. Martin’s motion
did not identify an intervening change in the law, any
newly discovered evidence, or an error of fact or law; in-
stead, his motion merely reiterated his prior claims. See
generally SAppx. 31–41, 47. Accordingly, the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in denying Mr. Martin’s motion.
Finally, we note that Mr. Martin has filed multiple mo-
tions in this case, including a “Motion for All Writs Act Re-
lief.” See Martin v. United States, No. 22-1810 (Fed. Cir.
Aug. 16, 2022), ECF No. 14. In that motion, Mr. Martin
challenges a July 2022 decision in County of Bexar v. Mar-
tin, No. SA-22-CV-00374-XR (W.D. Tex. July 18, 2022),
granting the government’s motion to remand a state fore-
closure action back to state court. Mr. Martin’s appellate
briefing further addresses this motion. See Appellant’s
Br. 18 (invoking 28 U.S.C. § 1631, which addresses trans-
fer). As an initial matter, this motion—seeking relief in an
unrelated district court case—has no bearing on the pre-
sent appeal from the Court of Federal Claims. Further,
“[a]n order remanding a case to the [s]tate court from which
it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise.”
28 U.S.C. § 1447(d). For at least these two reasons, we are
prohibited from reviewing the district court’s remand or-
der. Accordingly, we deny Mr. Martin’s motion.
Mr. Martin also filed a motion requesting both a writ
of mandamus and stay of this appeal pending review of the
motion. See Martin v. United States, No. 22-1810
(Fed. Cir. Sept. 30, 2022), ECF No. 43. Like the previous
motion, this motion appears to be related to the action
pending in the Western District of Texas. See, e.g., id. at 2
(requesting a writ of mandamus to Judge Pulliam, a judge
in that district). Accordingly, we deny this motion for the
same reasons as stated above.
We have considered each of Mr. Martin’s remaining ar-
guments and find them unpersuasive.
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10 MARTIN v. US
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, we affirm the judgment of the
Court of Federal Claims and deny Mr. Martin’s pending
motion for “Motion for All Writs Act Relief” and his motion
requesting a writ of mandamus and a stay of appeal.
AFFIRMED
COSTS
No costs.