Nantkwest, Inc. v. Iancu , 898 F.3d 1177 ( 2018 )


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  •   United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    ______________________
    NANTKWEST, INC.,
    Plaintiff-Appellee
    v.
    ANDREI IANCU, UNDER SECRETARY OF
    COMMERCE FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
    AND DIRECTOR OF THE UNITED STATES
    PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE,
    Defendant-Appellant
    ______________________
    2016-1794
    ______________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the
    Eastern District of Virginia in No. 1:13-cv-01566-GBL-
    TCB, Judge Gerald Bruce Lee.
    ______________________
    Decided: July 27, 2018
    ______________________
    MORGAN CHU, Irell & Manella LLP, Los Angeles, CA,
    argued for plaintiff-appellee. Also represented by LAUREN
    NICOLE DRAKE, GARY N. FRISCHLING, ALAN J. HEINRICH;
    SANDRA HABERNY, Newport Beach, CA.
    JAYNIE RANDALL LILLEY, Appellate Staff, Civil Divi-
    sion, United States Department of Justice, Washington,
    DC, argued for defendant-appellant. Also represented by
    BENJAMIN C. MIZER, DANA J. BOENTE, MARK R. FREEMAN;
    2                               NANTKWEST, INC.   v. IANCU
    THOMAS W. KRAUSE, THOMAS L. CASAGRANDE, Office of the
    Solicitor, United States Patent and Trademark Office,
    Alexandria, VA.
    ANTHONY J. DREYER, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher
    & Flom LLP, New York, NY, for amicus curiae Interna-
    tional Trademark Association. Also represented by MARK
    N. MUTTERPERL, Zeisler PLLC, New York, NY.
    WILLIAM P. ATKINS, Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman
    LLP, McLean, VA, for amicus curiae Federal Circuit Bar
    Association. Also represented by WILLIAM K. WEST, JR.,
    Washington, DC; MARTIN SCOTT HIGH, Martin S. High,
    P.C., Clemson, SC.
    KEVIN TOTTIS, TottisLaw, Chicago, IL,   for amicus
    curiae American Intellectual Property Law   Association.
    Also represented by MONICA L. THOMPSON,     RACHEL M.
    VORBEK; LISA K. JORGENSON, American         Intellectual
    Property Law Association, Arlington, VA.
    GREGORY A. CASTANIAS, Jones Day, Washington, DC,
    for amicus curiae Intellectual Property Owners Associa-
    tion. Also represented by DANIEL KAZHDAN; HENRY S.
    HADAD, Bristol-Myers Squibb Company, Princeton, NJ;
    MARK W. LAUROESCH, Intellectual Property Owners
    Association, Washington, DC; STEVEN W. MILLER, Global
    Legal Department, Procter & Gamble Company, Cincin-
    nati, OH.
    HILARIE BASS, Greenberg Traurig, P.A., Miami, FL,
    for amicus curiae American Bar Association. Also repre-
    sented by SALVATORE ANASTASI, Barley Snyder, Malvern,
    PA; JOSHUA SCHWARTZ, Lancaster, PA; DONALD W.
    RUPERT, Marshall, Gerstein & Borun LLP, Chicago, IL;
    CHARLES W. SHIFLEY, Banner & Witcoff, Ltd., Chicago, IL.
    NANTKWEST, INC.   v. IANCU                            3
    MARGARET MARY DUNCAN, McDermott Will & Emery
    LLP, Chicago, IL, for amicus curiae Intellectual Property
    Law Association of Chicago. Also represented by DAVID
    MLAVER, Washington, DC; ROBERT H. RESIS, CHARLES W.
    SHIFLEY, Banner & Witcoff, Ltd., Chicago, IL.
    CHARLES ERIC MILLER, Eaton & Van Winkle LLP,
    New York, NY, for amicus curiae Association of Amicus
    Counsel. Also represented by KELLY L. MORRON, Law
    Offices of Kelly L. Morron, Wilton, CT; JONATHAN E.
    MOSKIN, Foley & Lardner LLP, New York, NY; ROBERT
    JOSEPH RANDO, The Rando Law Firm P.C., Syosset, NY;
    ALAN M. SACK, SACK IP Law PC, Syosset, NY.
    PATRICK RICHARD DELANEY, Ditthavong & Steiner,
    P.C., Alexandria, VA, for amicus curiae Realvirt, LLC.
    CHARLES ERIC MILLER, Eaton & Van Winkle LLP,
    New York, NY, for amici curiae Isshiki & Co., Hiraide &
    Takahashi.
    ______________________
    Before PROST, Chief Judge, NEWMAN, LOURIE, DYK,
    MOORE, O’MALLEY, REYNA, WALLACH, TARANTO, HUGHES,
    and STOLL, Circuit Judges. *
    Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge STOLL, in
    which Circuit Judges NEWMAN, LOURIE, MOORE,
    O’MALLEY, WALLACH, and TARANTO join.
    Dissenting opinion filed by Chief Judge PROST, in
    which Circuit Judges DYK, REYNA, and HUGHES join.
    *   Circuit Judge Chen did not participate.
    4                                 NANTKWEST, INC.   v. IANCU
    STOLL, Circuit Judge.
    When the United States Patent and Trademark Of-
    fice’s Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“Board”) affirms an
    examiner’s rejection of a patent application, § 145 of the
    Patent Act permits the disappointed applicant to chal-
    lenge the Board’s decision in district court. Applicants
    who invoke § 145 are required by statute to pay “[a]ll the
    expenses of the proceedings” incurred by the U.S. Patent
    and Trademark Office (“PTO”) in defending the Board’s
    decision, regardless of the outcome. Historically, the
    agency relied on this provision to recover sums it spent on
    travel and printing and, more recently, expert witnesses.
    Now, 170 years after Congress introduced § 145’s prede-
    cessor, the agency argues that § 145 also compels appli-
    cants to pay its attorneys’ fees. We hold that it does not,
    for the American Rule prohibits courts from shifting
    attorneys’ fees from one party to another absent a “specif-
    ic and explicit” directive from Congress. The phrase “[a]ll
    the expenses of the proceedings” falls short of this strin-
    gent standard. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s
    judgment.
    I
    A
    The Patent Act gives applicants two mutually exclu-
    sive options for judicial review of an adverse Board deci-
    sion. First, the applicant may appeal directly to this
    court. 
    35 U.S.C. § 141
    . Second, the applicant may file a
    civil action against the Director of the PTO in the United
    States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.
    
    35 U.S.C. § 145
    . We, in turn, have jurisdiction over
    subsequent appeals from the district court under
    
    28 U.S.C. § 1295
    (a)(1).
    Section 141 provides standard judicial review of an
    agency decision under the Administrative Procedure Act.
    We review the Board’s legal determinations de novo,
    NANTKWEST, INC.   v. IANCU                                 5
    Honeywell Int’l Inc. v. Mexichem Amanco Holding S.A. DE
    C.V., 
    865 F.3d 1348
    , 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2017), and we “set
    aside the PTO’s factual findings only if they are ‘unsup-
    ported by substantial evidence,’” Kappos v. Hyatt,
    
    566 U.S. 431
    , 435 (2012) (quoting Dickinson v. Zurko,
    
    527 U.S. 150
    , 152 (1999)). Importantly, appellate review
    in § 141 proceedings is confined to the record before the
    PTO. 
    35 U.S.C. § 144
    .
    Section 145, by contrast, authorizes a more expansive
    challenge to the Board’s decision and is generally more
    time consuming. For example, patent applicants can
    conduct discovery and introduce new evidence. And once
    an applicant submits new evidence on a disputed factual
    question, “the district court must make a de novo finding.”
    Hyatt, 
    566 U.S. at
    434–35 (“This opportunity . . . is signif-
    icant, not the least because the PTO generally does not
    accept oral testimony.”). The parties may also engage in
    motion practice, and the proceeding can culminate in a
    full-blown trial. Congress set the price for engaging the
    PTO in this type of litigation: “All the expenses of the
    proceedings shall be paid by the applicant.” 
    35 U.S.C. § 145
    . Thus, an applicant who proceeds under § 145 must
    shoulder not only his own significant expenses and fees,
    but also the PTO’s “expenses of the proceedings.”
    Congress introduced § 145’s predecessor in 1839, 1 and
    over the years, the PTO has relied on these “expenses”
    provisions to recover PTO attorneys’ travel expenses to
    attend depositions, see Robertson v. Cooper, 
    46 F.2d 766
    ,
    769 (4th Cir. 1931), printing expenses, cf. Cook v. Watson,
    1    The original language from 1839 required an ap-
    plicant to pay “the whole of the expenses of the proceeding
    . . . whether the final decision shall be in his favor or
    otherwise.” Act of Mar. 3, 1839, ch. 88, § 10, 
    5 Stat. 353
    ,
    354. Neither party argues that subsequent revisions to
    § 145 impact our analysis.
    6                                  NANTKWEST, INC.   v. IANCU
    
    208 F.2d 529
    , 530 (D.C. Cir. 1953), court reporter fees,
    and reasonable fees for expert witnesses, see Sandvik
    Aktiebolag v. Samuels, CIV. A. No. 89-3127-LFO,
    
    1991 WL 25774
    , at *1 (D.D.C. Feb. 7, 1991). For more
    than 170 years, however, the PTO never sought—and no
    court ever awarded—attorneys’ fees under § 145 or its
    predecessor.
    B
    As its name suggests, the American Rule is a “bedrock
    principle” of this country’s jurisprudence. Hardt v. Reli-
    ance Standard Life Ins. Co., 
    560 U.S. 242
    , 253 (2010). It
    provides that, in the United States, “[e]ach litigant pays
    his own attorney’s fees, win or lose.” Baker Botts L.L.P. v.
    ASARCO LLC, 
    135 S. Ct. 2158
    , 2164 (2015) (quoting
    Hardt, 
    560 U.S. at 253
    ). The American Rule may only be
    displaced by an express grant from Congress. 
    Id.
     And it
    serves as the “basic point of reference” whenever a court
    “consider[s] the award of attorney’s fees.” 
    Id.
     (quoting
    Hardt, 
    560 U.S. at
    252–53).
    The rationale supporting the American Rule is rooted
    in fair access to the legal system, as well as the difficulty
    of litigating the fee question:
    [S]ince litigation is at best uncertain one should
    not be penalized for merely defending or prosecut-
    ing a lawsuit, and . . . the poor might be unjustly
    discouraged from instituting actions to vindicate
    their rights if the penalty for losing included the
    fees of their opponents’ counsel. Also, the time,
    expense, and difficulties of proof inherent in liti-
    gating the question of what constitutes reasonable
    attorney’s fees would pose substantial burdens for
    judicial administration.
    Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co.,
    
    386 U.S. 714
    , 718 (1967) (citations omitted). In the con-
    text of this case, the American Rule preserves access to
    NANTKWEST, INC.   v. IANCU                                   7
    district courts for small businesses and individual inven-
    tors seeking to avail themselves of § 145’s benefits.
    The American Rule traces its origins back to at least
    the late 1700s. In Arcambel v. Wiseman, the circuit court
    included $1,600 in counsel’s fees as part of the damages.
    3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306, 306 (1796). The assessment of attor-
    neys’ fees, the Supreme Court concluded, could not be
    allowed because the “general practice of the United States
    is in opposition to it; and even if that practice were not
    strictly correct in principle, it is entitled to the respect of
    the court, till it is changed, or modified, by statute.” Id.
    “[O]ur courts have generally resisted any movement”
    toward the English system—which permits the award of
    attorneys’ fees to successful parties in litigation—ever
    since. 2 Fleischmann, 
    386 U.S. at 717
    ; see Runyon v.
    McCrary, 
    427 U.S. 160
    , 185 (1976) (“[T]he law of the
    United States . . . has always been that absent explicit
    congressional authorization, attorneys’ fees are not a
    recoverable cost of litigation.”).
    2    The Supreme Court has carved out several equi-
    table exceptions to further the interests of justice.
    See F. D. Rich Co. v. U.S. for Use of Indus. Lumber Co.,
    
    417 U.S. 116
    , 129 (1974) (acknowledging availability of
    attorneys’ fees where party “has acted in bad faith, vexa-
    tiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons”); Toledo
    Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co., 
    261 U.S. 399
    , 426–28
    (1923) (allowing attorneys’ fees as part of penalty for
    willful disobedience of court order); Trustees v. Greenough,
    
    105 U.S. 527
    , 532–33, 537 (1882) (permitting party recov-
    ering fund for the benefit of himself and others to seek
    attorneys’ fees from the fund itself or directly from other
    parties who enjoyed the benefit); see generally Alyeska
    Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 
    421 U.S. 240
    , 257–
    59 (1975). None of these exceptions are implicated here.
    8                                   NANTKWEST, INC.   v. IANCU
    Only Congress “has the power and judgment to pick
    and choose among its statutes and to allow attorneys’ fees
    under some, but not others.” Alyeska Pipeline, 
    421 U.S. at 263
    . Congress has not “extended any roving authority
    to the Judiciary to allow counsel fees as costs or otherwise
    whenever the courts might deem them warranted.”
    
    Id. at 260
    . Thus, the Supreme Court has held that the
    American Rule presumptively applies and any statutory
    deviations from it must be “specific and explicit.”
    
    Id.
     at 260–62, 269.
    According to the Supreme Court, one “good example of
    the clarity . . . required to deviate from the American
    Rule” can be found in the Equal Access to Justice Act’s
    attorneys’ fees provision. Baker Botts, 135 S. Ct. at 2164.
    That provision commands courts to “award to a prevailing
    party other than the United States fees and other expenses
    . . . incurred by that party in any civil action,” so long as
    certain conditions are met. Id. at 2164 (emphasis added)
    (quoting 
    28 U.S.C. § 2412
    (d)(1)(A)).        As the Supreme
    Court explained, “there could be little dispute that this
    provision—which mentions ‘fees,’ a ‘prevailing party,’ and
    a ‘civil action’—is a ‘fee-shifting statut[e]’ that trumps the
    American Rule.” 
    Id.
     (alteration in original).
    Not all fee-shifting statutes follow this template
    though. For example, the Supreme Court has a separate
    line of precedent “addressing statutory deviations from
    the American Rule that do not limit attorney’s fees
    awards to the ‘prevailing party.’” Hardt, 
    560 U.S. at 254
    .
    In Hardt, the Court analyzed whether Congress deviated
    from the American Rule when it passed a statute provid-
    ing that a “court in its discretion may allow a reasonable
    attorney’s fee and costs of action to either party.”
    
    Id.
     at 251–52 (quoting 
    29 U.S.C. § 1132
    (g)(1)). The same
    is true in Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, where the Court
    examined a provision of the Clean Air Act allowing a
    court to “award costs of litigation (including reasonable
    attorney and expert witness fees) whenever it determines
    NANTKWEST, INC.   v. IANCU                                 9
    that such an award is appropriate.” 
    463 U.S. 680
    , 682–83
    (1983) (emphasis omitted) (quoting 
    42 U.S.C. § 7607
    (f)).
    And while the American Rule sets a high bar for shift-
    ing attorneys’ fees, it does not impose a magic words
    requirement so long as Congress’s intent is “specific and
    explicit.” See Summit Valley Indus., Inc. v. Local 112,
    United Bhd. of Carpenters, 
    456 U.S. 717
    , 721–22 (1982).
    As the Supreme Court acknowledged in Key Tronic Corp.
    v. United States, “[t]he absence of [a] specific reference to
    attorney’s fees is not dispositive if the statute otherwise
    evinces an intent to provide for such fees.” 
    511 U.S. 809
    ,
    815 (1994); see Baker Botts, 135 S. Ct. at 2165 (discussing
    statute providing for “reasonable compensation for actual,
    necessary services rendered by” various “professional
    person[s],” including “attorney[s]” (emphasis omitted)
    (quoting 
    11 U.S.C. § 330
    (a)(1)(A))).
    II
    This brings us to the procedural background of the
    current case. In 2001, Dr. Hans Klingemann filed a
    patent application directed to a method for treating
    cancer using natural killer cells. Dr. Klingemann’s appli-
    cation was eventually assigned to NantKwest, Inc. The
    examiner rejected the application as obvious in 2010, and
    the Board affirmed the rejection in 2013.
    Pursuant to § 145, NantKwest challenged the Board’s
    decision by filing a complaint against the Director of the
    PTO in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
    Virginia. Discovery ensued and the PTO moved for sum-
    mary judgment that the application’s claims would have
    been obvious. The district court granted the PTO’s mo-
    tion, and we affirmed. See NantKwest, Inc. v. Lee,
    686 F. App’x 864, 865 (Fed. Cir. 2017). After prevailing
    on the merits, the PTO filed a motion for reimbursement
    of the “expenses of the proceedings” under § 145. The
    $111,696.39 sum sought by the PTO included $78,592.50
    in attorneys’ fees—calculated based on the pro rata sala-
    10                                   NANTKWEST, INC.   v. IANCU
    ries of the two PTO attorneys and one paralegal who
    worked on the case—and $33,103.89 in expert witness
    fees.
    The district court denied the PTO’s motion with re-
    spect to attorneys’ fees, citing the American Rule.
    Nan[tK]west, Inc. v. Lee, 
    162 F. Supp. 3d 540
    , 542–43
    (E.D. Va. 2016). In the court’s view, “Congress’s reference
    to ‘all . . . the expenses’ merely points to a collection of the
    expenses used, commonly understood to encompass . . .
    printing, travel, and reasonable expert witness expenses.”
    
    Id. at 543
    . The district court noted that “[i]n § 145 Con-
    gress neither used the phrase ‘attorneys’ fees’ nor ‘fees’
    nor any alternative phrase demonstrating a clear refer-
    ence to attorneys’ fees.” Id. at 545. It then concluded that
    the “ambiguity regarding the exact reach of the term
    ‘expenses’ means § 145 does not meet the Supreme
    Court’s Baker Botts standard and therefore, cannot devi-
    ate from the American Rule.” Id.
    The PTO appealed the denial of its motion to recover
    attorneys’ fees, and a divided panel of this court reversed
    the district court’s judgment. The majority relied on the
    Fourth Circuit’s opinion in Shammas v. Focarino, which
    interpreted a nearly identical provision of the Lanham
    Act, 
    15 U.S.C. § 1071
    (b)(3).        
    784 F.3d 219
    , 223–24
    (4th Cir. 2015). There, the Fourth Circuit held that the
    American Rule only applies to statutes that refer to a
    “prevailing party.” 
    Id. at 223
    . Referring to this language,
    the majority here voiced “substantial doubts” that § 145
    implicates the American Rule because it imposes the
    PTO’s expenses on applicants without referring to a
    “prevailing party.” NantKwest, Inc. v. Matal, 
    860 F.3d 1352
    , 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Nevertheless, the majority
    assumed the American Rule applied for purposes of its
    analysis and concluded that the word “expenses” “‘specif-
    ic[ally]’ and ‘explicit[ly]’ authorizes an award of fees.”
    
    Id. at 1356
     (alterations in original) (quoting Alyeska
    Pipeline, 
    421 U.S. at 260
    ). For support, the majority
    NANTKWEST, INC.   v. IANCU                               11
    relied on dictionaries defining “expenses” as “expendi-
    ture[s] of money, time, labor, or resources to accomplish a
    result,” 
    id.
     (alteration in original) (quoting Black’s Law
    Dictionary 698 (10th ed. 2014)), and a statement from
    Taniguchi v. Kan Pacific Saipan, Ltd., distinguishing
    “taxable costs” from “nontaxable expenses,” id. at 1357
    (quoting 
    566 U.S. 560
    , 573 (2012)). Finally, the majority
    rejected NantKwest’s contention that pro-rata salaries of
    the PTO’s employees were not “expenses of the proceed-
    ings.” Id. at 1359. 3
    Our court voted sua sponte to hear the appeal en banc
    and vacated the panel’s judgment. NantKwest, Inc. v.
    Matal, 
    869 F.3d 1327
     (Fed. Cir. 2017). We requested
    briefing on a single question: whether the panel “correctly
    determine[d] that 
    35 U.S.C. § 145
    ’s ‘[a]ll the expenses of
    the proceedings’ provision authorizes an award of the
    [PTO’s] attorneys’ fees.” 
    Id. at 1327
    . In addition to the
    parties’ briefs and argument, we received seven amicus
    briefs, none of which support the PTO’s position. We now
    affirm the judgment of the district court.
    III
    We review de novo a district court’s interpretation of a
    statute. Boston Sci. Scimed, Inc. v. Medtronic Vascular,
    3     Following issuance of this Court’s NantKwest de-
    cision, the PTO requested and received attorneys’ fees in
    at least one § 145 action. See, e.g., Realvirt, LLC v. Lee,
    
    220 F. Supp. 3d 695
    , 704 (E.D. Va. 2016) (awarding more
    than $48,000 in attorneys’ fees in § 145 action). The PTO
    also convinced a district court to impose a $40,000 bond
    on a pro se plaintiff who filed suit under § 145. Taylor v.
    Lee, No. 1:15-CV-1607, 
    2016 WL 9308420
    , at *2 (E.D. Va.
    July 12, 2016) (requiring payment of bond before permit-
    ting § 145 action to proceed, but noting uncertainty sur-
    rounding applicant’s finances).
    12                                 NANTKWEST, INC.   v. IANCU
    Inc., 
    497 F.3d 1293
    , 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Unless other-
    wise defined, words in a statute “will be interpreted as
    taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.”
    Summit Valley, 
    456 U.S. at 722
     (quoting Perrin v. United
    States, 
    444 U.S. 37
    , 42 (1979)).
    According to the PTO, the American Rule does not
    govern our interpretation of § 145. Even if it does, the
    PTO and the dissent aver that the statutory text suffices
    to displace this long-standing, common-law rule. We
    disagree on both counts and address each issue in turn.
    A
    At the outset, we hold that the American Rule applies
    to § 145. As noted, the American Rule provides that each
    litigant bears its own attorneys’ fees, win or lose, and a
    statute must use “specific and explicit” language to depart
    from this rule. The Supreme Court in Baker Botts em-
    phasized that the American Rule is the starting point
    whenever a party seeks to shift fees from one side to the
    other in adversarial litigation. 135 S. Ct. at 2164 (ex-
    plaining that “when considering the award of attorney’s
    fees,” the American Rule constitutes the “basic point of
    reference” (quoting Hardt, 
    560 U.S. at
    252–53)). Because
    the PTO contends that § 145 should be construed to shift
    its attorneys’ fees to the patent applicants bringing suit,
    the American Rule necessarily applies. Accordingly, we
    must be able to discern from § 145’s text a “specific and
    explicit” congressional directive to make an award of
    attorneys’ fees available.     Alyeska Pipeline, 
    421 U.S. at 260
    .
    We are not persuaded by the PTO’s contrary argu-
    ments for why the American Rule should not apply to
    litigation under § 145. The PTO begins by relying on the
    Fourth Circuit’s Shammas opinion for the proposition
    that the American Rule only governs the interpretation of
    statutes that shift fees from a prevailing party to a losing
    party. Because § 145 imposes “[a]ll the expenses” on the
    NANTKWEST, INC.   v. IANCU                               13
    applicant, win or lose, the PTO asserts it is not a fee-
    shifting statute that falls within the American Rule’s
    ambit. We disagree. Given the primary purpose of the
    American Rule—protection of access to courts—the PTO’s
    alleged distinction makes little sense. We submit that the
    policy behind the American Rule would be even more
    strongly implicated where attorneys’ fees would be im-
    posed on a winning plaintiff.
    In Shammas, a divided panel of the Fourth Circuit
    awarded attorneys’ fees to the PTO under 
    15 U.S.C. § 1071
    (b)(3)—the trademark analogue to § 145—which
    also refers to “all the expenses of the proceeding.” The
    Shammas court reached this decision only by first holding
    that the American Rule does not apply to § 1071(b)(3).
    784 F.3d at 223. Based on a narrow interpretation of the
    Supreme Court’s statement in Alyeska Pipeline, the
    Fourth Circuit held that “the American Rule provides
    only that ‘the prevailing party may not recover attorneys’
    fees’ from the losing party.” Id. (quoting Alyeska Pipeline,
    
    421 U.S. at 245
    ). The Fourth Circuit also relied on the
    Supreme Court’s observation in Ruckelshaus that “virtu-
    ally every one of the more than 150 existing federal fee-
    shifting provisions predicates fee awards on some success
    by the claimant” to conclude that a statute mandating fees
    without regard to a party’s success is not a fee-shifting
    statute governed by the American Rule. 
    Id.
     (quoting
    Ruckelshaus, 
    463 U.S. at 684
    ).
    We respectfully submit that Shammas’s holding can-
    not be squared with the Supreme Court’s line of non-
    prevailing party precedent applying the American Rule.
    Although Alyeska Pipeline does refer to the American
    Rule in the context of a “prevailing party,” the rule is not
    so limited. Rather, the Supreme Court has consistently
    applied the rule broadly to any statute that allows fee
    shifting to either party, win or lose. For example, the
    Supreme Court in Hardt evaluated a request for attor-
    neys’ fees under 
    29 U.S.C. § 1132
    (g)(1), which grants
    14                                  NANTKWEST, INC.   v. IANCU
    courts authority to award “reasonable attorney’s fee[s] . . .
    to    either   party”      at    the   court’s   “discretion.”
    
    560 U.S. at
    251–52. The Supreme Court held that “a fee
    claimant need not be a ‘prevailing party’ to be eligible for
    an attorney’s fees award under § 1132(g)(1)” because the
    statutory text contained no such limitation. Id. at 252.
    But the absence of a “prevailing party” requirement did
    not render the American Rule inapplicable to the fee-
    shifting inquiry.      Instead, the Court “interpret[ed]
    § 1132(g)(1) in light of [its] precedents addressing statuto-
    ry deviations from the American Rule that do not limit
    attorney’s fees awards to the ‘prevailing party.’” Id.
    at 254.
    Our decision is in keeping with Ruckelshaus, relied on
    by the Fourth Circuit in Shammas. While the Court in
    Ruckelshaus acknowledged that the vast majority of fee-
    shifting provisions impose a “success” requirement, the
    Court made clear that its absence does not render the
    American Rule inapplicable. Instead, the Court applied
    the American Rule even though the district court awarded
    fees to a “party that achieved no success on the merits”
    based on a statute that authorized “reasonable attorney
    . . . fees[] whenever [the court] determines that such an
    award is appropriate.” Ruckelshaus, 
    463 U.S. at
    682–85
    (emphasis omitted) (quoting 
    42 U.S.C. § 7607
    (f)). Accord-
    ingly, we think that the Fourth Circuit’s reliance on
    Ruckelshaus to support its view that the American Rule
    does not apply to statutes lacking a success requirement
    is misplaced.
    Our understanding is likewise confirmed by numerous
    other cases that applied the American Rule to a variety of
    statutes that did not mention a “prevailing party.” The
    Supreme Court applied the American Rule to a bankrupt-
    cy statute allowing “reasonable compensation for actual,
    necessary services rendered by the trustee . . . or attor-
    ney.” Baker Botts, 135 S. Ct. at 2165 (emphasis omitted).
    An environmental statute permitting the recovery of any
    NANTKWEST, INC.   v. IANCU                               15
    “necessary costs of response,” including “enforcement
    activities” was also analyzed by the Court under the
    American Rule. Key Tronic, 
    511 U.S. at 813, 819
    . So too
    with a statute authorizing an injured person to “recover
    the damages by him sustained and the cost of the suit.”
    Summit Valley, 
    456 U.S. at 722
    . The Court likewise held
    that the American Rule governed an attorneys’ fees
    request under a statute authorizing the recovery of “sums
    justly due.” F. D. Rich Co., 
    417 U.S. at 128
    , 130–31.
    The PTO also cites the Supreme Court’s decision in
    Sebelius v. Cloer, which interpreted a statute requiring
    the payment of attorneys’ fees regardless of the party’s
    litigation success without expressly discussing the Ameri-
    can Rule. 
    569 U.S. 369
     (2013). This, the PTO argues,
    shows that the American Rule does not apply to statutes
    that do not refer to a “prevailing party.” At issue in Cloer
    was the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986
    (“NCVIA”). The statute creates an “unusual scheme for
    compensating attorneys who work on NCVIA petitions”: it
    requires courts to award “reasonable attorneys’ fees” for a
    successful petition, and it grants courts discretion to
    make the same award for an unsuccessful petition
    “brought in good faith [with] a reasonable basis for the
    claim.” 
    Id.
     at 373–74 & n.1 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-
    15(e)(1)). Therefore, Congress specifically and explicitly
    authorized the award of attorneys’ fees. The only ques-
    tion for the Court was whether attorneys’ fees could be
    recovered for untimely petitions.
    The Court answered this question in the affirmative,
    but its analysis does not undercut the American Rule’s
    applicability to § 145. First, the Court rejected the gov-
    ernment’s argument that an untimely petition was ineli-
    gible for fees because it was never “filed” within the
    meaning of the statute. Id. at 377–79. The Court then
    turned to the government’s argument that common-law
    principles, including the American Rule, barred the award
    of attorneys’ fees for untimely petitions. Citing the page
    16                                   NANTKWEST, INC.   v. IANCU
    of the government’s brief discussing the American Rule,
    the Court held that the “presumption favoring the reten-
    tion of long-established and familiar [common-law] prin-
    ciples,” i.e., the American Rule, must “give way” to the
    unambiguous statutory language. Id. at 380–81 (altera-
    tion in original) (quoting Brief for the Petitioner at 32,
    Sebelius v. Cloer, 
    569 U.S. 369
     (2013) (No. 12-236),
    
    2013 WL 75285
    , *32). Cloer thus stands for the unre-
    markable principle that a statute providing for the award
    of “attorneys’ fees” can displace the American Rule.
    Given the Supreme Court’s line of non-prevailing par-
    ty precedent and the inapposite nature of Cloer, we see no
    reason why the American Rule would not apply to § 145.
    As the Supreme Court has explained, the American Rule
    simply provides that each litigant bears its own attorney
    fees. Hardt, 
    560 U.S. at 253
    . The PTO’s reading of § 145
    requires the opposite. Accordingly, § 145 should not
    escape the heightened standard required for congressional
    departure from this bedrock principle.
    B
    Having concluded that the American Rule applies, we
    now ask whether § 145 displaces it. The Supreme Court
    has explained that when, as here, a statutory provision
    “does not expressly provide for the recovery of attorney’s
    fees . . . we are not presented with a situation where
    Congress has made ‘specific and explicit provisions for the
    allowance of’ such fees.” Summit Valley, 
    456 U.S. at 722
    (quoting Alyeska Pipeline, 
    421 U.S. at
    260 & n.33); see
    also Key Tronic, 
    511 U.S. at 815
    . But “[t]he absence of [a]
    specific reference to attorney’s fees is not dispositive if the
    statute otherwise evinces an intent to provide for such
    fees.” Key Tronic, 
    511 U.S. at 815
    . Congress can convey
    this intent through the ordinary meaning of the statutory
    term alleged to shift attorneys’ fees—here, “[a]ll the
    expenses of the proceedings”—although the ordinary
    meaning must supply a “specific and explicit” directive to
    NANTKWEST, INC.   v. IANCU                               17
    depart from the American Rule. See Summit Valley,
    
    456 U.S. at
    722–23; see also 
    id. at 721, 726
     (declining to
    deviate from American Rule after finding no “express
    statutory authorization” in statute’s text to support
    contention that “damages” includes attorneys’ fees); Key
    Tronic, 
    511 U.S. at 819
     (requiring “explicit statutory
    authority” to depart from American Rule).
    In our view, § 145’s statement that “[a]ll the expenses
    of the proceedings shall be paid by the applicant” lacks
    the “specific and explicit” congressional authorization
    required to displace the American Rule. Section 145
    contains no reference to attorneys’ fees, “reasonable
    compensation for actual, necessary services rendered by
    the . . . attorney,” Baker Botts, 135 S. Ct. at 2165 (empha-
    sis omitted), PTO attorney salaries, or any other equally
    clear language. To satisfy the Supreme Court’s strict
    standard, the PTO must show that “[a]ll the expenses of
    the proceedings” specifically and explicitly includes attor-
    neys’ fees. But this phrase is at best ambiguous as to
    attorneys’ fees. As explained below, the cases and defini-
    tions relied on by the PTO demonstrate that, at most, this
    language is merely capable of implicitly covering attor-
    neys’ fees. The American Rule and the “specific and
    explicit” requirement demand more than language that
    merely can be and is sometimes used broadly to implicitly
    cover attorneys’ fees. Moreover, other statutory provi-
    sions enacted by Congress demonstrate that ordinarily, a
    statutory right to “expenses” does not include an implicit
    authorization to award attorneys’ fees. This is further
    demonstrated by both contemporaneous and current court
    cases and other statutory provisions in the Patent Act.
    We begin our analysis with contemporaneous defini-
    tions and usages of “expenses.” In 1839, when Congress
    introduced the “whole of the expenses” language in § 145’s
    predecessor, Act of Mar. 3, 1839, § 10, 5 Stat. at 354, the
    ordinary meaning of “expenses” did not implicitly encom-
    pass attorneys’ fees. The PTO only cites one dictionary
    18                                 NANTKWEST, INC.   v. IANCU
    from this time period, which defined “expense” as “[a]
    laying out or expending; the disbursing of money, or the
    employment and consumption, as of time or labor.”
    Appellant Br. 17 (quoting Noah Webster, American Dic-
    tionary of the English Language (1st ed. 1828)). Other
    1830s dictionaries defined “expense” as “cost; charges;
    money expended,” J.E. Worcester, A Comprehensive
    Pronouncing and Explanatory Dictionary of the English
    Language, with Pronouncing Vocabularies of Classical
    and Scripture Proper Names 117 (1830), and as “the
    disbursing of money,” “[m]oney expended,” “cost,” and
    “[t]hat which is used, employed, laid out, or consumed,”
    Noah Webster et al., An American Dictionary of the Eng-
    lish Language 319 (Joseph Worcester ed., 1830). These
    vague definitions, however, do not establish that a statu-
    tory right to “expenses” includes “an implicit authoriza-
    tion to award attorney’s fees.”         Summit Valley,
    
    456 U.S. at 722
    .
    More compelling than the dictionary definitions,
    though, is Congress’s usage of the terms “expenses” and
    “attorneys’ fees” in other statutes. These statutes demon-
    strate Congress’s understanding that the ordinary mean-
    ing of “expenses” does not include attorneys’ fees. Similar
    to the Supreme Court’s analysis in West Virginia Univer-
    sity Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, we think the “record of statu-
    tory usage” convincingly demonstrates that attorneys’ fees
    and expenses are regarded as separate elements unless
    specifically identified otherwise. 
    499 U.S. 83
    , 88 (1991)
    (reviewing statutes using terms “attorney’s fees” and
    “expert fees” to understand whether reference to “attor-
    ney’s fees” would necessarily shift expert fees as well).
    Indeed, Congress has drafted numerous statutes au-
    thorizing the award of both “expenses” and “attorneys’
    fees.” This first category of statutes list expenses and
    attorneys’ fees as separate items of recovery. See, e.g.,
    
    11 U.S.C. § 363
    (n) (authorizing trustee to recover “any
    costs, attorneys’ fees, or expenses incurred” in certain
    NANTKWEST, INC.   v. IANCU                               19
    situations); 
    12 U.S.C. § 1464
    (d)(1)(B)(vii) (“[C]ourt . . .
    may allow to any such party reasonable expenses and
    attorneys’ fees.”); 
    12 U.S.C. § 1786
    (p) (“[C]ourt . . . may
    allow to any such party such reasonable expenses and
    attorneys’ fees as it deems just and proper . . . .”);
    
    25 U.S.C. § 1401
    (a) (discussing “payment of attorney fees
    and litigation expenses”); 
    26 U.S.C. § 6673
    (a)(2)(A) (allow-
    ing recovery of “excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’
    fees” against attorney who vexatiously multiplied pro-
    ceedings); 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(a)(6) (discussing “[t]otal
    attorneys’ fees and expenses” that can be awarded by
    court); 
    31 U.S.C. § 3730
    (d)(1) (“Any such person shall also
    receive an amount for reasonable expenses which the
    court finds to have been necessarily incurred, plus rea-
    sonable attorneys’ fees and costs.”); 
    38 U.S.C. § 4323
    (h)(2)
    (“[T]he court may award any such person who prevails in
    such action or proceeding reasonable attorney fees, expert
    witness fees, and other litigation expenses.”); Act of
    Dec. 23, 1930, ch. 23, § 4, 
    46 Stat. 1033
    , 1034 (granting
    Court of Claims jurisdiction to “determine a reasonable
    fee . . . to be paid the attorney or attorneys employed as
    herein provided, together with all necessary and proper
    expenses”); Act of Mar. 23, 1932, ch. 90, § 7, 
    47 Stat. 70
    ,
    72 (requiring adequate security to cover “all reasonable
    costs (together with a reasonable attorney’s fee) and
    expense” before permitting issuance of temporary re-
    straining order or temporary injunction). It is hard to
    imagine that the ordinary meaning of “expenses” specifi-
    cally and explicitly includes “attorneys’ fees” given the
    volume of statutory provisions that treat expenses and
    attorneys’ fees as separate items. 4 If “expenses” includes
    4   The dissent questions the import of these statutes
    because they post-date the enactment of § 145’s predeces-
    sor. Dissent Op. 6–7 n.1. But Congress distinguished
    between attorneys’ fees and expenses during the mid-
    1800s too, see, e.g., S.J. Res. 25, 40th Cong. § 1, 
    15 Stat. 20
                                     NANTKWEST, INC.   v. IANCU
    attorneys’ fees, then many “statutes referring to the two
    separately become an inexplicable exercise in redundan-
    cy.” W. Va. Univ., 
    499 U.S. at 92
    .
    A second category of statutes define expenses to in-
    clude attorneys’ fees, but they do so explicitly. These
    statutes demonstrate that “expenses” does not necessarily
    include attorneys’ fees, else there would be no need to so
    define “expenses.” See, e.g., 
    12 U.S.C. § 5005
    (b)(2)(B)
    (providing that, in absence of breach of warranty, amount
    of indemnity shall be sum of “interest and expenses
    (including costs and reasonable attorney’s fees and other
    expenses of representation)”); 
    10 U.S.C. § 2409
    (c)(1)(C)
    (permitting agency head to require that contractor pay
    “an amount equal to the aggregate amount of all costs and
    expenses (including attorneys’ fees and expert witnesses’
    fees)” in connection with complaint regarding a reprisal);
    
    15 U.S.C. § 2310
    (d)(2) (permitting recovery of “a sum
    equal to the aggregate amount of cost and expenses
    (including attorneys’ fees based on actual time expend-
    ed)”); 
    28 U.S.C. § 1447
    (c) (“An order remanding the case
    may require payment of just costs and any actual expens-
    es, including attorney fees, incurred as a result of the
    removal.”); 
    29 U.S.C. § 1370
    (e)(1) (“[T]he court in its
    discretion may award all or a portion of the costs and
    expenses incurred in connection with such action, includ-
    ing reasonable attorney’s fees . . . .”); 
    30 U.S.C. § 938
    (c)
    (allowing successful miner to recover “a sum equal to the
    aggregate amount of all costs and expenses (including the
    attorney’s fees)”); 
    33 U.S.C. § 1367
    (c) (“[A] sum equal to
    the aggregate amount of all costs and expenses (including
    26, 26 (1867) (discussing payment to “agent or attorney
    [of] his lawful fees and expenses”). In any event, neither
    the PTO nor the dissent suggests that Congress’s under-
    standing in this regard changed between 1839 and the
    passage of the above-cited statutes.
    NANTKWEST, INC.   v. IANCU                                    21
    the attorney’s fees) . . . shall be assessed . . . .”); 
    41 U.S.C. § 4705
    (d)(1)(C) (noting that head of agency may “[o]rder
    the contractor to pay the complainant an amount equal to
    the aggregate amount of all costs and expenses (including
    attorneys’ fees and expert witnesses’ fees) that the com-
    plainant reasonably incurred”); 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(e)(9)
    (permitting party to recover “reasonable expenses in-
    curred . . . including a reasonable attorney’s fee”);
    
    2 U.S.C. § 396
     (“The committee may allow any party
    reimbursement from the applicable accounts of the House
    of Representatives of his reasonable expenses of the
    contested election case, including reasonable attorneys
    fees . . . .”).
    Collectively, these statutes encompass diverse catego-
    ries of legislation and demonstrate that Congress under-
    stood the “ordinary, contemporary, common meaning” of
    “expenses” as being something other than “attorneys’
    fees” unless expressly specified. See Summit Valley,
    
    456 U.S. at 722
     (quoting Perrin, 
    444 U.S. at 42
    ). Statutes
    awarding both expenses and attorneys’ fees suggest that
    Congress viewed them as distinct tools in its toolbox of
    recovery items that can be shifted at its discretion to
    accomplish a policy objective. If “expenses” necessarily
    included “attorneys’ fees,” the numerous statutes provid-
    ing for both would have superfluous words and, as a
    general rule, courts should “avoid an interpretation of a
    statute that ‘renders some words altogether redundant.’”
    See United States v. Alaska, 
    521 U.S. 1
    , 59 (1997) (quoting
    Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 
    513 U.S. 561
    , 574 (1995)). Like-
    wise, Congress would have no reason to permit the recov-
    ery of “expenses”—and then specify whether it included
    “attorneys’ fees”—if the former always encompassed the
    latter. To us, the logical implication of Congress’s prior
    usage is that “attorneys’ fees” are not even ordinarily, let
    alone necessarily, included in “expenses” absent an ex-
    press expansion of “expenses” to include “attorneys’ fees.”
    At best, whether “expenses” includes “attorneys’ fees” is
    22                                 NANTKWEST, INC.   v. IANCU
    ambiguous. 5 But ambiguity cannot satisfy the exacting
    standard erected by the American Rule for shifting attor-
    neys’ fees.
    In considering whether the ordinary meaning of a
    particular statutory provision shifted attorneys’ fees, the
    Supreme Court in Key Tronic found it persuasive that
    Congress included express provisions for fee awards in
    related statutes without including a similar provision in
    the statute at issue. 
    511 U.S. at
    817–18. So too here. 6
    5   We note that § 145 is not discretionary; it requires
    that “[a]ll the expenses of the proceedings shall be paid by
    the applicant.” 
    35 U.S.C. § 145
     (emphasis added). To the
    extent the phrase “expenses” unambiguously includes
    attorneys’ fees, it is unclear why it took the PTO more
    than 170 years to appreciate the statute’s alleged clarity
    and seek the attorneys’ fees that are statutorily mandated
    under its interpretation. The dissent excuses the PTO’s
    failure to pursue fees in earlier proceedings, citing “dra-
    matic[]” changes in the patent landscape, Dissent Op. 18,
    but this does nothing to soften the statute’s mandatory
    directive.
    6    The dissent cites Key Tronic as an example of the
    Supreme Court favorably citing the Eighth Circuit’s
    conclusion that a statute’s reference to “necessary costs of
    response” and “enforcement activities” constituted a
    “sufficient degree of explicitness” to permit the award of
    attorneys’ fees. Dissent Op. 15 (quoting Key Tronic,
    
    511 U.S. at 815
    ). But the Supreme Court analyzed the
    same statutory language as the Eighth Circuit and held
    that it cannot support an award of attorneys’ fees: “To
    conclude that a provision that only impliedly authorizes
    suit nonetheless provides for attorney’s fees with the
    clarity required by Alyeska would be unusual if not un-
    precedented.” Key Tronic, 
    511 U.S. at 818
    . This decision
    was informed in part by the presence of “two express
    NANTKWEST, INC.   v. IANCU                                23
    The existence of several Patent Act provisions awarding
    “attorneys’ fees” demonstrates Congress’s use of “specific
    and explicit” language in the Patent Act to shift fees when
    it so desired. For example, § 285 states: “The court in
    exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to
    the prevailing party.” 
    35 U.S.C. § 285
     (emphasis added).
    Other provisions of the Patent Act recognize the availabil-
    ity of attorneys’ fees by cross-referencing § 285. See, e.g.,
    
    35 U.S.C. § 271
    (e)(4) (noting “that a court may award
    attorney fees under section 285” as part of remedy for
    infringement under § 271(e)(2) (emphasis added));
    
    35 U.S.C. § 273
    (f) (listing circumstances where “the court
    shall find the case exceptional for the purpose of awarding
    attorney fees under section 285” (emphasis added)).
    Finally, § 297(b)(1) permits customers who have been
    defrauded by an invention promoter to recover “reasona-
    ble costs and attorneys’ fees” in addition to damages.
    
    35 U.S.C. § 297
    (b)(1) (emphasis added).
    Congress elected in § 145 to provide for the recovery
    of the PTO’s “expenses,” not its “attorneys’ fees.” When
    “Congress includes particular language in one section of a
    statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it
    is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally
    and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.”
    Russello v. United States, 
    464 U.S. 16
    , 23 (1983) (quoting
    United States v. Wong Kim Bo, 
    472 F.2d 720
    , 722 (5th Cir.
    1972)). Here, Congress did not award “attorneys’ fees”
    under § 145 but did make them available under other
    sections of the Patent Act. We presume this was inten-
    tional, id., and thus the omission of “attorneys’ fees” from
    § 145 “strongly suggest[s] a deliberate decision not to
    authorize such awards.” See Key Tronic, 
    511 U.S. at
    819
    provisions for fee awards” in a related statute, which the
    Court understood to “strongly suggest a deliberate deci-
    sion not to authorize such awards” here. 
    Id.
     at 818–19.
    24                                NANTKWEST, INC.   v. IANCU
    (declining to award fees under provision that did not refer
    to “attorneys’ fees,” in part because two other provisions
    in related statute contained express authority to shift
    fees). 7 We are dubious of the dissent’s attempt to distin-
    guish § 285 from § 145 on the ground that § 145 does not
    “arise[] in traditional patent litigation.” Dissent Op. 8.
    To the contrary, § 145 is titled “Civil action to obtain
    patent,” and it provides “remedy by civil action against
    the Director in the United States District Court for the
    Eastern District of Virginia.” § 145. This statutory
    language clearly gives rise to “patent litigation” between
    the disappointed patent applicant and the Director of the
    PTO.
    We have also considered judicial usage of “expenses.”
    See W. Va. Univ., 
    499 U.S. at
    92–93 (looking to contempo-
    raneous court decisions to determine whether expert fees
    7  The patent laws have been amended on numerous
    occasions since Congress enacted § 145’s predecessor in
    1839. If the PTO’s decision not to seek fees during this
    time contradicted Congress’s intent, Congress could have
    revised the statute to make its intent more clear. For
    example, Congress amended the law in 1946 to permit the
    “award [of] reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing
    party” in infringement actions. Act of Aug. 1, 1946,
    ch. 726, 
    60 Stat. 778
    , 778 (emphasis added) (creating
    predecessor to § 285). Congress could have included
    similar language in § 145, but it did not. “When Congress
    amends one statutory provision but not another, it is
    presumed to have acted intentionally.” Gross v. FBL Fin.
    Servs., Inc., 
    557 U.S. 167
    , 174 (2009). Although Gross
    drew this inference based on Congress’s decision to amend
    a provision in one statute but not amend a similar provi-
    sion in another statute, we think the inference carries
    equal force with respect to two provisions within the same
    statutory scheme.
    NANTKWEST, INC.   v. IANCU                                25
    were shifted as element of attorneys’ fees). Many courts
    and litigants in the 1800s referred to “expenses” and
    “attorneys’ fees” as distinct items. See, e.g., Morris v.
    Way, 
    16 Ohio 469
    , 472 (1847) (referring to statement of
    accounts listing “attorney’s fees and expenses”); Hayden v.
    Sample, 
    10 Mo. 215
    , 221 (1846) (noting defendant’s re-
    quest that jury be instructed to ignore evidence of “the
    expenses incurred . . . and the fees paid counsel and
    attorneys”); Anderson v. Farns, 
    7 Blackf. 343
    , 343 (Ind.
    1845) (citing party’s request for indemnity from all “pen-
    alties, costs, damages, attorney’s fees, and expenses”);
    State v. Williams, 
    13 Ohio 495
    , 499 (1844) (providing that
    trustees had authority to settle “the expense of prosecut-
    ing suits, attorney’s fees, etc.”); Bishop v. Day, 
    13 Vt. 81
    ,
    83 (1841) (discussing contract containing indemnity from
    “any costs, lawyers’ fees, and expenses”); Hickman v.
    Quinn, 
    14 Tenn. 96
    , 107 n.1 (1834) (explaining that
    defendants deducted “their expenses, attorney’s fees, etc.”
    from amount voluntarily given to plaintiff); see also Br. of
    Amici Curiae Intellectual Prop. Owners Ass’n 8 (collecting
    cases).
    This distinction remains evident in recent legal opin-
    ions. For example, one court recognized that “[t]he terms
    ‘costs’ or ‘expenses’ when used in a statute do not ordinar-
    ily include attorney’s fees.” Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs.,
    Div. of Econ. & Med. Servs. v. Kistler, 
    320 Ark. 501
    , 509
    (1995); see also Tracy v. T & B Constr. Co., 
    182 N.W.2d 320
    , 322 (S.D. 1970) (“Ordinarily the terms ‘costs’ and
    ‘expenses’ as used in a statute are not understood to
    include attorney’s fees.”); McAdam v. Dean Witter Reyn-
    olds, Inc., 
    896 F.2d 750
    , 776 (3d Cir. 1990) (“[W]e can not
    find the vague reference in § 4-207(3) to ‘expenses’ [to be
    a] sufficient basis on which to predicate such an award [of
    attorneys’ fees].”); Lewis v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp.,
    
    197 F. Supp. 3d 16
    , 29 (D.D.C. 2016) (finding no authority
    to shift attorneys’ fees under 
    29 U.S.C. § 1303
    (f), subsec-
    tion (3) of which permits court to “award all or a portion of
    26                                 NANTKWEST, INC.   v. IANCU
    the costs and expenses incurred in connection with such
    action”).
    Finally, we emphasize that the PTO’s interpretation
    of § 145 would have a patent applicant pay the govern-
    ment’s attorneys’ fees even when the patent applicant
    succeeds. Other than what we believe to be an incorrect
    interpretation of the trademark analogue in Shammas,
    we are aware of no statute that requires a private litigant
    to pay the government’s attorneys’ fees without regard to
    the party’s success in the litigation. Indeed, the PTO
    could not identify any statute that shifts the salaries of an
    agency’s attorneys onto the party bringing suit to chal-
    lenge the agency’s decision. See Oral Arg. at 26:53–27:09,
    http://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/default.aspx?fl=20
    16-1794_382018.mp3; see also Br. of Amici Curiae Am.
    Bar Ass’n 5 (“Congress has never enacted a fee-shifting
    provision that shifts only the government’s fees onto
    private parties, much less a provision that does so even if
    the government loses the litigation.”). Thus, adopting the
    PTO’s interpretation would create a particularly unusual
    divergence from the American Rule. Had Congress in-
    tended to produce such an anomalous result, we believe
    “it would have said so in far plainer language than that
    employed here.” Ruckelshaus, 
    463 U.S. at 694
    .
    The Supreme Court’s reluctance to endorse statutory
    interpretations that would create sweeping departures
    from the American Rule furthers our conclusion. For
    example, even in statutes where Congress has granted
    courts broad leeway to shift “attorneys’ fees,” the Supreme
    Court has restricted the availability of those awards. See,
    e.g., Hardt, 
    560 U.S. at
    251–52, 255 (requiring “some
    degree of success on the merits” to recover attorneys’ fees
    even though statute permits “court in its discretion [to]
    allow a reasonable attorney’s fee and costs of action to
    either party” (emphases added)); Ruckelshaus, 
    463 U.S. at
    682–83, 694 (requiring “some degree of success on the
    merits” before shifting attorneys’ fees even though statute
    NANTKWEST, INC.   v. IANCU                               27
    allows court to “award costs of litigation (including rea-
    sonable attorney and expert witness fees) whenever it
    determines that such an award is appropriate” (emphasis
    added)); Baker Botts, 135 S. Ct. at 2165 (permitting
    recovery of attorneys’ fees for work done during bankrupt-
    cy proceeding, but not in fee-defense litigation, under
    statute allowing “reasonable compensation for actual,
    necessary services rendered by the trustee . . . or attor-
    ney” (emphasis omitted)).
    And the Court often rejects fee-shifting requests un-
    der the American Rule where Congress employs vague
    statutory language that might, to a layperson, seem broad
    enough to cover attorneys’ fees as well as other items.
    See, e.g., Summit Valley, 
    456 U.S. at 722, 726
     (declining
    to shift attorneys’ fees under statute permitting recovery
    of “the damages by him sustained and the cost of the
    suit”); F. D. Rich Co., 
    417 U.S. at 128
    , 130–31 (declining
    to award attorneys’ fees pursuant to statute authorizing
    recovery of “sums justly due”); Fleischmann, 
    386 U.S. at 720
     (declining to award attorneys’ fees under statute
    giving courts authority to award “costs of the action”); Key
    Tronic, 
    511 U.S. at 813, 819
     (declining to shift attorneys’
    fees pursuant to statute making responsible parties liable
    for “any . . . necessary costs of response,” including “en-
    forcement activities”). Using these cases as a barometer,
    we cannot conclude that a statute awarding “[a]ll the
    expenses,” with nothing more, effects such an extreme
    departure from the American Rule.
    IV
    The PTO and the dissent resist our conclusion that
    § 145 does not displace the American Rule. They both
    begin—as we do—with the meaning of “expenses.” To
    support an expansive reading of “expenses” that includes
    attorney fees, the PTO and the dissent cite the Supreme
    Court’s statement in Taniguchi that “[t]axable costs are a
    fraction of the nontaxable expenses borne by litigants for
    28                                   NANTKWEST, INC.   v. IANCU
    attorneys, experts, consultants, and investigators.”
    566 U.S. at 573 (emphasis added); see generally Appellant
    Br. 38–39; Dissent Op. 6. We acknowledge that the word
    “expenses” is broad and, like “costs” or “litigation costs,” is
    sometimes used in judicial opinions to refer to a variety of
    burdens incurred by a litigant, including attorneys’ fees.
    But the Supreme Court has never interpreted the phrase
    “expenses” or “all the expenses” to authorize a departure
    from the American Rule. Indeed, Taniguchi only ana-
    lyzed “whether [the phrase] ‘compensation of interpreters’
    covers the cost of translating documents.” Id. at 562.
    In a similar vein, the PTO relies on a single sentence
    from Arlington Central School District Board of Education
    v. Murphy, 
    548 U.S. 291
     (2006). See Appellant Br. 39.
    There, the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
    (“IDEA”) permitted courts, in their discretion, to award
    “reasonable attorneys’ fees as part of the costs” to the
    prevailing party. Arlington Central, 
    548 U.S. at 297
    (quoting 
    20 U.S.C. § 1415
    (i)(3)(B)). Respondents asserted
    that “costs” should be interpreted to cover all the costs of
    an IDEA proceeding, including expert fees. The Court
    rejected respondents’ argument, noting that the statute’s
    “use of this term of art [‘costs’], rather than a term such as
    ‘expenses,’ strongly suggests that § 1415(i)(3)(B) was not
    meant to be an open-ended provision that makes partici-
    pating States liable for all expenses incurred.” Id. The
    PTO seizes on this language, but it omits the end of the
    sentence, which provides examples of the “open-ended . . .
    expenses” envisioned by the Court: “travel and lodging
    expenses or lost wages due to time taken off from work.”
    Id. Absent from the list is a reference to attorneys’ fees.
    Thus, Arlington Central does not address the interpreta-
    tion of a statute containing the word “expenses” in light of
    the American Rule. Nor does it stand for the proposition
    that the ordinary meaning of “expenses” is broad enough
    to include “attorneys’ fees.”
    NANTKWEST, INC.   v. IANCU                                 29
    The PTO likewise insists that a single sentence in
    Baker Botts suggests that a statutory reference to “litiga-
    tion costs” alone would suffice to shift attorneys’ fees.
    Appellant Br. 39 (quoting 135 S. Ct. at 2164). Specifical-
    ly, the Court in Baker Botts stated: “We have recognized
    departures from the American Rule” and these departures
    “tend to authorize the award of ‘a reasonable attorney’s
    fee,’ ‘fees,’ or ‘litigation costs,’ and usually refer to a
    ‘prevailing party.’” Id. But none of the cited statutes—
    either in Baker Botts itself or in the cases Baker Botts
    cites—contain a stand-alone reference to “litigation costs.”
    See Appellee Br. 24–25. Rather, each of the statutes
    expressly provides for the award of attorneys’ fees in
    addition to, or as part of, the litigation costs. We there-
    fore do not read Baker Botts to stand for the proposition
    that the phrase “litigation costs,” by itself, can displace
    the American Rule. 8
    8   Alyeska Pipeline also cited numerous statutory
    examples of “specific and explicit provisions for the allow-
    ance of attorneys’ fees.” 
    421 U.S. at
    260–62 & n.33–35.
    Again, every cited statute referred to either “fees,” “attor-
    neys’ fees,” or “reasonable compensation for services
    rendered” by an “attorney.” See 
    id.
     The same holds true
    for the 2008 Congressional Research Service Report in
    which Congress compiled the text of several hundred
    other fee-shifting provisions. Each of these statutes
    referred to “attorneys’ fees,” “fees,” “compensation for . . .
    attorney[s],” “fees for attorneys,” “compensation for repre-
    sentation . . . equivalent to that provided for court-
    appointed representation,” “fees of counsel,” “legal fees,”
    or “compensation” for “foreign counsel.” Henry Cohen,
    Cong. Research Serv., Awards of Attorneys’ Fees by Feder-
    al Courts and Federal Agencies 64–114 (2008), available
    at https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/94-970.pdf. Notably, § 145
    was not included in the statutory compilation.
    30                                  NANTKWEST, INC.   v. IANCU
    The PTO and dissent next accuse us of transforming a
    statute requiring the payment of “[a]ll the expenses” to
    one demanding reimbursement for only “some” of the
    expenses. Appellant Br. 41; see Dissent Op. 9–10. Both
    emphasize the modifier “[a]ll” in arguing that Congress
    intended § 145 to be fully remedial. But the word “all”
    sheds no light on the breadth of “expenses” vis-à-vis
    attorneys’ fees—the crux of the dispute—and serves only
    to clarify that, whatever the “expenses” are, all of them
    must be paid by the applicant. In addition, at least one
    statute expressly identifies “attorneys’ fees” as one of an
    enumerated list of “all expenses” recoverable, further
    supporting the notion that the phrase “all expenses” does
    not carry the weight afforded to it by the PTO and the
    dissent. See 
    50 U.S.C. § 4531
    (b)(4) (permitting recovery of
    “all expenses and losses incurred . . . including . . . attor-
    neys’ fees and expenses of litigation”). Finally, we note
    that, even if “attorney’s fees are necessary to achieve full
    compensation [for the PTO’s involvement in a § 145
    action], this justification alone is not sufficient to create
    an exception to the American Rule in the absence of
    express congressional authority.”          Summit Valley,
    
    456 U.S. at 724
     (emphasis added). The argument by the
    PTO is “nothing more than a ‘restate[ment] of one of the
    oft-repeated criticisms of the American Rule.’” 
    Id. at 725
    (alteration in original) (quoting F. D. Rich Co., 
    417 U.S. at 128
    ).
    The dissent next invokes “legislative history and the
    purpose of § 145” for displacing the American Rule.
    Dissent Op. 10–13. At the outset, we question the role of
    legislative history in this context where the very point of
    the “specific and explicit” standard is to demand clarity in
    the statute’s text. See Baker Botts, 135 S. Ct. at 2164
    (“We have recognized departures from the American Rule
    only in ‘specific and explicit provisions for the allowance
    of attorneys’ fees under selected statutes.’” (quoting
    Alyeska Pipeline, 
    421 U.S. at 260
    )); cf. Conroy v. Aniskoff,
    NANTKWEST, INC.   v. IANCU                                 31
    
    507 U.S. 511
    , 519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The law
    as it passed is the will of the majority of both houses, and
    the only mode in which that will is spoken is in the act
    itself . . . .” (emphasis in original) (quoting Aldridge v.
    Williams, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 9, 24 (1844))). Where the
    textual indications are unclear, we are skeptical of what
    legislative history and policy could add to satisfy this
    standard. But even if we set these concerns aside, the
    dissent’s legislative history fails to advance its interpreta-
    tion of § 145.
    The dissent points to an expense reimbursement pro-
    vision in the 1870 amendments to the patent laws, which
    it notes is similar to the language employed by Congress
    in § 145’s predecessor. Dissent Op. 11. Initial versions of
    the House bill limited the reimbursement by using the
    word “costs” and capping it at $25. See H.R. 1714, 41st
    Cong. § 52 (as passed by House, Apr. 25, 1870). The
    Senate, however, changed “costs” to “expenses” and re-
    moved the $25 cap. See H.R. 1714, 41st Cong. § 52 (as
    amended by Senate, May 31, 1870). The enacted version
    reflects the Senate amendments, see Act of July 8, 1870,
    ch. 230, § 52, 
    16 Stat. 198
    , 205, which according to the
    dissent, “demonstrates—or at least strongly suggests—
    that Congress specifically intended that ‘expenses’ be
    broader than ‘costs.’” Dissent Op. 12. We do not contest
    that “expenses” is broader than “costs.” But the breadth
    of expenses relative to costs has no relevance here. Our
    task is to determine whether “expenses” includes attor-
    neys’ fees, and the dissent’s legislative history is silent on
    this crucial point.
    The PTO and the dissent also direct our attention to
    § 9 of the 1836 patent statute—a budgetary provision that
    uses the word “expenses.” Appellant Br. 27–28; Dissent
    Op. 4. Section 9 requires that money paid by patent
    applicants into the Treasury be used “for the payment of
    the salaries of the officers and clerks herein provided for,
    and all other expenses of the Patent Office.” Act of July 4,
    32                                 NANTKWEST, INC.   v. IANCU
    1836, ch. 357, § 9, 
    5 Stat. 117
    , 121. In the dissent’s view,
    this establishes that Congress “understood salaries to be
    within the scope of ‘expenses.’” Dissent Op. 4. But as the
    dissent recognizes, context is important when interpreting
    a statute. Dissent Op. 7. Here, § 9 is an accounting
    provision that earmarks money the PTO receives to cover
    various “expenses of the Patent Office”; it does not ad-
    dress how “expenses of the proceedings” are to be allocat-
    ed in the context of adversarial litigation involving the
    PTO. Moreover, it is doubtful (or at least uncertain)
    whether any of the salaries of the particular “officers and
    clerks herein provided for” under § 9 included the salaries
    of PTO attorneys and paralegals who engaged in litigation
    on the agency’s behalf. § 9, 5 Stat. at 121 (emphasis
    added); see id. §§ 1–2, 5 Stat. at 117–18 (creating roles for
    Commissioner of Patents, Chief Clerk of Patent Office, an
    examining clerk, and two “other” clerks). Accordingly, § 9
    at most supports the idea that “expenses” can be broad
    enough to cover salaries of some PTO employees in an
    unrelated context. But, even then, Congress felt it neces-
    sary to expressly enumerate “salaries of the officers and
    clerks” in addition to “all other expenses,” demonstrating
    again that the ordinary meaning of expenses does not
    include attorney salaries.
    Both the dissent and the PTO contend that it would
    not make sense for Congress to use the phrase “attorneys’
    fees” in the context of § 145 actions because it is more
    accurate to classify the salaries of the PTO’s attorneys as
    personnel “expenses.” Appellant Br. 42; Dissent Op. 8. In
    light of other statutes providing for the government’s
    recoupment of attorneys’ fees, as opposed to personnel
    expenses, in enforcement actions, we do not find this
    argument convincing. See, e.g., 
    42 U.S.C. § 7413
    (d)(5)
    (“Any person who fails to pay on a timely basis a civil
    penalty ordered or assessed under this section shall be
    required to pay . . . the United States enforcement ex-
    penses, including but not limited to attorneys fees and
    NANTKWEST, INC.   v. IANCU                                  33
    costs incurred by the United States for collection proceed-
    ings . . . .”); 
    33 U.S.C. § 1319
    (g)(9) (similar). Indeed, aside
    from the trademark analogue at issue in Shammas, the
    PTO did not identify a single statute that awards to the
    government prorated portions of its attorneys’ salaries
    without using the phrase “attorneys’ fees.”
    Finally, the PTO and the dissent paint § 145 actions
    as a scourge on other patent applicants. Appellant
    Br. 21–25; Dissent Op. 12, 17–18. They claim it is unfair
    to burden all applicants with the additional costs caused
    by those who voluntarily initiate § 145 proceedings. But
    this policy debate on the value of § 145 actions is best left
    for Congress. And, as various amici indicate, Congress
    already addressed the debate by rebuffing an attempt to
    repeal § 145. Br. of Amici Curiae Intellectual Prop.
    Owners Ass’n 21 n.3; Br. of Amici Curiae Ass’n of Amicus
    Counsel 14. In any event, the dissent’s concerns appear
    to us exaggerated. A back-of-the-envelope calculation
    elucidates the minuscule impact of these proceedings on
    the overall cost of a patent application. Although neither
    party could provide an exact tally of the § 145 proceed-
    ings, at the panel stage the PTO estimated that there
    were four to five of these proceedings in the last three
    years.          See    Oral      Arg.    at     19:19–20:10,
    http://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/default.aspx?fl=20
    16-1794.mp3. If we were to take a conservative estimate
    of ten § 145 actions per year (five times the rate estimated
    by the PTO) and assume that the PTO expended $100,000
    in attorneys’ fees defending each action ($20,000 more
    than the amount the PTO incurred in this case), the total
    expense for fiscal year 2018 would be $1 million. The
    PTO estimates that it will receive more than 627,000
    patent applications during this same time period. See
    U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Fiscal Year 2018
    Congressional          Justification        11        (2017),
    https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/fy18p
    br.pdf. When spread amongst the 627,000+ applications,
    34                                  NANTKWEST, INC.   v. IANCU
    the $1 million price tag amounts to less than $1.60 per
    application.
    V
    The general rule in the United States is that each
    party pays for its own attorneys. To deviate from the
    status quo embodied in the American Rule, Congress
    must draft legislation—“specific and explicit” legislation—
    demonstrating its intent to make the award of attorneys’
    fees available under that statute. Awarding “[a]ll the
    expenses” simply cannot supply the “specific and explicit”
    directive from Congress to shift attorneys’ fees, and
    nothing else in the statute evinces congressional intent to
    make them available. Other than Shammas’s interpreta-
    tion of the trademark analogue, we are not aware of any
    statute requiring a private litigant to pay the govern-
    ment’s attorneys’ fees without regard to the party’s suc-
    cess in the litigation. We are unwilling to “invade the
    legislature’s province by redistributing litigation costs” in
    a way that would create such an anomalous statute here.
    See Alyeska Pipeline, 
    421 U.S. at 271
    . The judgment of
    the district court is affirmed.
    AFFIRMED
    COSTS
    Costs to Appellee.
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    ______________________
    NANTKWEST, INC.,
    Plaintiff-Appellee
    v.
    ANDREI IANCU, UNDER SECRETARY OF
    COMMERCE FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
    AND DIRECTOR OF THE UNITED STATES
    PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE,
    Defendant-Appellant
    ______________________
    2016-1794
    ______________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the
    Eastern District of Virginia in No. 1:13-cv-01566-GBL-
    TCB, Judge Gerald Bruce Lee.
    ______________________
    PROST, Chief Judge, dissenting, with whom DYK, REYNA,
    and HUGHES, Circuit Judges, join.
    The question for the en banc court is whether 
    35 U.S.C. § 145
    , which provides that “[a]ll the expenses of
    the proceedings shall be paid by the applicant,” requires
    the applicant to pay all the expenses of the proceedings,
    including the PTO’s personnel expenses, or just some of
    the expenses. When Congress said, “[a]ll the expenses,” I
    believe it meant all the expenses. The Fourth Circuit
    agrees. Shammas v. Focarino, 
    784 F.3d 219
     (4th Cir.
    2015), cert. denied sub nom. Shammas v. Hirshfeld, 136 S.
    2                                  NANTKWEST, INC.   v. IANCU
    Ct. 1376 (2016). The majority opinion creates an unfortu-
    nate and unnecessary conflict between the circuits. I
    respectfully dissent.
    I
    When electing to pursue its § 145 action, NantKwest,
    a disappointed patent applicant, had two options for
    judicial review of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board’s
    decision. See Kappos v. Hyatt, 
    566 U.S. 431
    , 434 (2012).
    NantKwest could have “either: (1) appeal[ed] the decision
    directly to [this court], pursuant to § 141; or (2) file[d] a
    civil action against the Director of the PTO in the United
    States District Court for the [Eastern District of Virginia]
    pursuant to § 145.” Id. at 434 & n.1. Litigation in district
    court is expensive and time-consuming, much more so
    than direct appeals to this court limited to the adminis-
    trative record. Section 145, unlike § 141, requires the
    applicant to pay “[a]ll the expenses of the proceedings,” 
    35 U.S.C. § 145
    , “regardless of the outcome,” Hyatt v. Kap-
    pos, 
    625 F.3d 1320
    , 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc), aff’d
    and remanded, 
    566 U.S. 431
     (2012). Section 145 actions
    are also uncommon. 
    Id.
     (noting that “the vast majority of
    applicants pursue an on-the-record appeal [under § 141]
    instead of a § 145 action”).
    In defending the § 145 proceedings initiated by
    NantKwest, the PTO incurred expenses for expert wit-
    nesses and personnel expenses—that is, the expense of
    diverting agency attorneys and paralegals from other
    matters to this § 145 action. The district court ordered
    NantKwest to reimburse the agency’s expenses for its
    expert witness but not its personnel. The parties do not
    dispute that “[a]ll the expenses of the proceedings” in-
    cludes the PTO’s expert witness expenses. On appeal, the
    PTO seeks reimbursement under § 145 for personnel
    expenses it incurred.
    NANTKWEST, INC.   v. IANCU                                 3
    II
    I start, as I must, with the language of the statute.
    E.g., United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 
    489 U.S. 235
    ,
    241 (1989). And its plain text provides our answer. See
    SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 
    138 S. Ct. 1348
    , 1354 (2018).
    When § 145 says “[a]ll the expenses of the proceedings
    shall be paid by the applicant” it means the applicant
    must pay all the expenses of the proceedings. “Absent
    persuasive indications to the contrary, we presume Con-
    gress says what it means and means what it says.”
    Simmons v. Himmelreich, 
    136 S. Ct. 1843
    , 1848 (2016).
    Here, neither the majority opinion nor NantKwest’s
    arguments give me any reason to doubt what I see as the
    plain-text result in this case. 
    Id.
    A
    Initially, I note that the PTO did not retain outside
    counsel to assist in defending this § 145 action. Instead,
    it used its salaried government lawyers. These lawyers
    incurred expenses because the time they devoted to this
    case was not available for other work. See Wis. v. Hotline
    Indus., Inc., 
    236 F.3d 363
    , 365 (7th Cir. 2000) (“[S]alaried
    government lawyers, like in-house and non-profit counsel,
    do incur expenses if the time and resources they devote to
    one case are not available for other work.”). Additionally,
    the PTO is not seeking reimbursement for its lawyers’
    time at market rate. Rather, the PTO seeks personnel
    expenses it actually incurred in these proceedings. Com-
    pare J.A. 83–84 (the PTO’s request for the actual expens-
    es it incurred in this § 145 action by calculating a
    proportional share of its attorneys’ salaries (citing Hotline
    Indus., 
    236 F.3d at 368
    )), with, e.g., Raney v. Fed. Bureau
    of Prisons, 
    222 F.3d 927
    , 933 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“[A] non-
    profit legal services organization is entitled to receive a
    prevailing market rate pursuant to a statute that author-
    izes the prevailing party to be awarded ‘a reasonable
    4                                  NANTKWEST, INC.   v. IANCU
    attorney[s’] fee as part of the cost.’” (citing Blum v. Sten-
    son, 
    465 U.S. 886
    , 894–96 (1984)).
    Thus,   the question in this case is whether “[a]ll the
    expenses    of the proceedings” includes the personnel
    expenses    the PTO actually incurred for attorneys in
    defending    these § 145 proceedings. I conclude that it
    does.
    B
    To determine whether the phrase “[a]ll the expenses”
    includes the PTO’s personnel expenses, I first look to the
    meaning of “expenses.” Although the statute does not
    expressly define that term, the Patent Act of 1836 did use
    the term “expenses” in a provision discussing application
    fees. That provision, which was retained when Congress
    added the expense-reimbursement language in 1839, read
    in relevant part:
    [T]he applicant shall pay into the Treasury of the
    United States, or into the Patent Office, or into
    any of the deposite banks to the credit of the
    Treasury . . . the sum of thirty dollars . . . . And
    the moneys received into the Treasury under this
    act shall constitute a fund for the payment of the
    salaries of the officers and clerks herein provided
    for, and all other expenses of the Patent Office, and
    to be called the patent fund.
    Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 9, 
    5 Stat. 117
    , 121 (empha-
    sis added). Congress understood “salaries of the officers
    and clerks” as one kind of “expense.” To be sure, there is
    a difference between “expenses of the Patent Office” and
    “expenses of the proceedings,” but the point is that Con-
    gress, at the time it enacted the precursor to § 145, un-
    derstood salaries to be within the scope of “expenses.”
    When a term goes undefined in a statute, we give the
    term its ordinary meaning. Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Sai-
    pan, Ltd., 
    566 U.S. 560
    , 566 (2012). The ordinary mean-
    NANTKWEST, INC.   v. IANCU                                5
    ing of “expenses” encompasses expenditures for personnel.
    Dictionaries in use when Congress enacted § 145’s precur-
    sor generally defined “expenses” as an expenditure of
    money, time, labor, or resources. For example, in 1830
    “expense” was defined as “1. [a] laying out or expending;
    the disbursing of money, or the employment and consump-
    tion, as of time or labor.” Noah Webster, An American
    Dictionary of the English Language 319 (3d ed. 1830)
    (emphasis added). The majority points to other 1830s
    dictionary definitions, which defined “expense” as “cost;
    charges; money expended,” J.E. Worcester, A Comprehen-
    sive Pronouncing and Explanatory Dictionary of the
    English Language, with Pronouncing Vocabularies of
    Classical and Scripture Proper Names 117 (1830), and as
    “the disbursing of money,” “2. Money expended,” “cost,”
    and “3. That which is used, employed, laid out or con-
    sumed,” Noah Webster, An American Dictionary of the
    English Language 319 (3d ed. 1830). Based on these
    definitions, I agree with the government that the ordinary
    or common meaning of “expenses” includes personnel
    expenditures. It also includes out-of-pocket attorneys’
    fees.
    Although the PTO did not retain outside counsel in
    this case, the statute’s history suggests that Congress
    intended “expenses” to also include attorneys’ fees for the
    PTO’s retained outside counsel. At the time the expense-
    reimbursement provision appeared, proceedings in equity
    seem to have been quite rare. And when they occurred, it
    seems that the PTO incurred the expense of employing
    outside counsel. This conclusion is drawn from the Report
    of the Commissioner of Patents for the Year 1845, in
    which the Commissioner explained that “[t]wo suits in
    equity are now pending against the Commissioner in the
    circuit court for the district of Pennsylvania, in which, as
    it has not been necessary for me to attend, I have em-
    ployed counsel.” REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF
    6                                 NANTKWEST, INC.   v. IANCU
    PATENTS FOR THE YEAR 1845, H. Doc. No. 29-140, at
    8 (1st Sess. 1846).
    The plain and ordinary meaning that the Supreme
    Court has ascribed to the word “expenses” comports with
    my reading of the dictionary definitions cited above. For
    example, the Court has recognized that “expenses” (as
    compared to taxable costs) contemplates the full range of
    expenditures a party must make in litigation (including
    attorneys). Taniguchi, 
    566 U.S. at 573
     (“Taxable costs are
    a fraction of the nontaxable expenses borne by litigants
    for attorneys, experts, consultants, and investigators.”).
    In other words, the Supreme Court has told us that the
    plain and ordinary meaning of the word “expenses” in the
    litigation context includes those incurred for attorneys.
    Although NantKwest and the majority do not deny
    that “expenses” is broad enough to cover the PTO’s per-
    sonnel expenses, they contend that the term “is merely
    capable of implicitly covering attorneys’ fees” and “is at
    best ambiguous as to attorneys’ fees.” Majority Op. 17.
    As support, NantKwest and the majority rely on other
    federal statutes under various titles where Congress has
    employed the term “expenses” to authorize attorneys’ fees
    either in addition to expenses (e.g., “expenses and attor-
    neys’ fees”), or as a component of them (e.g., “expenses
    including attorneys’ fees”). 1 The majority contends that
    1   When the Supreme Court examines the “record of
    statutory usage” it focuses on contemporaneous statutes.
    See W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 
    499 U.S. 83
    , 88
    (1991) (reviewing statutes enacted the same year as the
    statute at issue, and in one case a statute enacted “just
    over a week prior”); see also 
    id.
     at 88–89 & n.4 (reviewing
    statutes enacted within a few years of the statute at
    issue). The majority acknowledges that its cited statutes
    were not enacted contemporaneously with Congress’s
    NANTKWEST, INC.   v. IANCU                                7
    “[t]hese statutes demonstrate Congress’s understanding
    that the ordinary meaning of ‘expenses’ does not include
    attorneys’ fees.” Majority Op. 18.
    Certainly, “a definition [being] broad enough to en-
    compass one sense of a word does not establish that the
    word is ordinarily understood in that sense.” Taniguchi,
    566 U.S. at 568. But even if I were to agree with
    NantKwest and the majority’s characterization of what
    “expenses” ordinarily means, here the statutory context in
    which “expenses” appears indicates that it includes per-
    sonnel expenditures for attorneys. See id. at 569 (observ-
    ing that the context in which a word appears may over-
    override the word’s ordinary meaning). As noted, the
    word “expenses” showed up one other time in the Patent
    Act of 1836—where the Act expressly characterized the
    salaries of PTO officers and clerks as “expenses.” Patent
    Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 9, 
    5 Stat. 117
    , 121.
    The majority addresses the statutory context by point-
    ing to 
    35 U.S.C. § 285
    , which provides that “[t]he court in
    exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to
    the prevailing party.” The majority suggests that because
    this provision of the Patent Act specifically mentions
    attorneys’ fees, Congress must have intended to exclude
    them from “expenses” in § 145. Majority Op. 22–24. I
    disagree.
    enactment of § 145’s precursor, so it points to an 1867
    statute that distinguishes between an individual attor-
    ney’s fees and his or her expenses. Majority Op. 19 n.4.
    This distinction hardly suggests that “[a]ll the expenses of
    the proceedings” does not include the PTO’s personnel
    expenses. Regardless, my point is that because statutory
    interpretation depends very much on context, I would not
    assign the same probative value to unrelated, later-
    enacted statutes as does the majority.
    8                                  NANTKWEST, INC.   v. IANCU
    First, Congress intended a broader compensation
    scheme under § 145 than under § 285. Compare § 145
    (“[a]ll the expenses of the proceedings”), with § 285 (“rea-
    sonable attorneys’ fees”). For example, NantKwest does
    not contest that the language of § 145 includes the PTO’s
    expert witness expenses. In § 285, Congress chose not to
    award all the expenses to the prevailing party, but only
    attorneys’ fees. Congress can certainly employ a broad
    word over other narrower alternatives if it so chooses.
    Second, as salaried employees, the PTO’s attorneys do
    not bill individual hours for their work, nor do they collect
    fees from those whom they represent. In this context, the
    overhead associated with the PTO’s attorneys’ work is
    more aptly characterized as an “expense” to the PTO than
    a “fee.” Compare Expense, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th
    ed. 2014) (defining “expense” as “expenditure[s] of money,
    time, labor, or resources to accomplish a result”), with
    Attorney’s fee, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014)
    (defining “attorney’s fee” as “[t]he charge to a client for
    services performed for the client, such as an hourly fee, a
    flat fee, or a contingent fee”). I would not require Con-
    gress to mimic § 285 and use the phrase “attorneys’ fees”
    when, in this context, “expenses” is the more apt term.
    Third, the § 145 and § 285 provisions are implicated
    in different settings. Section 285 arises in traditional
    patent litigation, and authorizes a district court to award
    attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party. See Octane Fit-
    ness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 
    134 S. Ct. 1749
    ,
    1752 (2014). In contrast, § 145 proceedings are, “in fact
    and necessarily, a part of the application for the patent.”
    Gandy v. Marble, 
    122 U.S. 432
    , 439 (1887). The “[a]ll the
    expenses” contemplated by § 145 are a direct counterpart
    to the application fees that are designed to reimburse the
    PTO’s examination expenses—application fees that, like
    the “[a]ll the expenses” of § 145, the applicant must pay
    regardless of whether it receives a patent. Congress’s use
    of different phrases therefore makes sense in these differ-
    NANTKWEST, INC.   v. IANCU                               9
    ent settings. And Congress’s choice to depart from the
    model of a related statute is a choice we may not disre-
    gard. 2 SAS Inst., 
    138 S. Ct. at 1355
    .
    But I need not rely on the word “expenses” alone.
    Congress did not simply provide for “expenses of the
    proceedings” in § 145—it clarified that it was requiring
    the applicant to pay “[a]ll the expenses of the proceed-
    ings.”
    The majority maintains that “the word ‘all’ sheds no
    light on the breadth of ‘expenses,’” and reasons that “all”
    “serves only to clarify that, whatever the ‘expenses’ are,
    all of them must be paid by the applicant.” Majority Op.
    30. I disagree. Such an interpretation leaves little work
    for “all” to do; simply saying “the expenses” would seem to
    do just as well. While this latter, more limited phrasing
    2    The majority proposes that Congress should have
    amended § 145 to include the “attorneys’ fees” language
    when it amended the Patent Act in 1946 to permit the
    “award [of] reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing
    party” in infringement actions (i.e., the precursor to
    § 285). Majority Op. 24 n.7 (quoting Patent Act of 1946,
    ch. 726, 
    60 Stat. 778
    , 778 (emphasis added)). In other
    words, the majority would require Congress to review and
    amend § 145, its already-clear expense-reimbursement
    statute, so as to make it extra clear. This just can’t be
    right. Especially not when, as I have detailed, the stat-
    utes are implicated in different settings and intentionally
    provide for compensation schemes of varying breadth.
    The majority seems to infer that because Congress added
    other statutory provisions (which arise in different cir-
    cumstances), that it necessarily intended to not provide
    for the PTO’s personnel expenses in those provisions it did
    not amend. This inference is far too attenuated to have
    any persuasive force.
    10                                 NANTKWEST, INC.   v. IANCU
    would still not explicate the breadth of “expenses,” neither
    would it, by itself, provide a basis for excluding anything
    properly regarded as an “expense.” In my view, Congress
    used the word “all” to broadly and comprehensively cap-
    ture anything fairly regarded as an “expense,” resolving
    any lingering doubt in favor of inclusion. The majority
    acknowledges that the term “expenses” is capable of
    including attorneys’ fees and cites to several statutes that
    list attorneys’ fees as part of expenses. Majority Op. 20–
    21 (citing ten such statutes). In § 145, Congress’s use of
    the word “all” indicated its desire to broadly and compre-
    hensively include all of the expenses as it commonly
    understood them, which includes the personnel expenses
    the PTO incurs in defending § 145 actions.
    C
    Both the legislative history and the purpose of § 145
    support my reading of the statutory text and context.
    The majority questions the relevance of legislative
    history in interpreting fee statutes. Majority Op. 30–31.
    I note, however, that the Supreme Court has examined
    legislative history in cases implicating fee-shifting and
    the American Rule. E.g., Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 
    463 U.S. 680
    , 686–91 (1983); Summit Valley Indus., Inc. v.
    Local 112, United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am.,
    
    456 U.S. 717
    , 723–24 (1982).
    Consideration of the history of § 145 suggests that
    Congress intended “expenses” to capture broadly, not
    narrowly. As the parties have noted, the “expenses”
    provision arose (in slightly different form) in the 1839
    Amendments to the Patent Act, which provided that an
    applicant bringing a proceeding in equity to contest an
    adverse decision of the Patent Office would be required to
    pay “the whole of the expenses of the proceeding . . .
    whether the final decision shall be in his favor or other-
    wise.” Patent Act of 1839, ch. 88, § 10, 
    5 Stat. 353
    , 354.
    NANTKWEST, INC.   v. IANCU                                 11
    When Congress revised the Patent Act in 1870, it
    used expense-reimbursement language very similar to the
    language used in the previously enacted 1839 statute.
    Initial versions of the House bill sought to limit the reim-
    bursement provision by using the word “costs” instead of
    “expenses” and by limiting any reimbursement to $25.
    But these changes were rejected and the word “expenses”
    was retained. The version of the bill reported in the
    House and referred to the Senate read, in relevant part:
    SEC. 52. And be it further enacted, That when the
    Commissioner of Patents is the only defendant in
    any such suit, all costs shall be paid by the com-
    plainant, and whole amount of costs taxed against
    the complainant shall not exceed the sum of twen-
    ty-five dollars . . . .
    H.R. 1714, 41st Cong. § 52 (as referred to the S. Commit-
    tee on Patents, Apr. 25, 1870) (emphasis added). The
    Senate made significant amendments to the bill, includ-
    ing changing Section 52 to use “expenses” rather than
    “costs” and by removing the $25 cap. The version passed
    by the Senate read, in relevant part:
    SEC. 52. And be it further enacted, That whenev-
    er a patent on application is refused, for any rea-
    son whatever, either by the Commissioner or by
    the supreme court of the District of Columbia up-
    on appeal from the Commissioner, the applicant
    may have remedy by bill in equity; . . . . And in all
    cases where there is no opposing party a copy of
    the bill shall be served on the Commissioner, and
    all the expenses of the proceeding shall be paid by
    the applicant, whether the final decision is in his
    favor or not.
    H.R. 1714, 41st Cong. § 52 (as amended by the Senate,
    May 31, 1870) (emphasis added). The House disagreed
    with the Senate amendments and asked for a conference.
    Ultimately, the House members dropped their objections
    12                                 NANTKWEST, INC.   v. IANCU
    to the Senate amendments to § 52, and the enacted ver-
    sion reflected the Senate’s version using the word “ex-
    penses.”     This demonstrates—or at least strongly
    suggests—that Congress specifically intended that “ex-
    penses” be broader than “costs.”
    The statute’s purpose also confirms that Congress in-
    tended all of the expenses associated with § 145 proceed-
    ings to be borne by the applicants who elect them—not by
    taxpayers or other PTO users whose fees fund the agen-
    cy’s operations. Section 145 proceedings are an optional
    extension of the application process. See Gandy, 
    122 U.S. at
    439–40 (referring to § 145’s precursor as “in fact and
    necessarily, a part of the application for the patent” and
    “clearly a branch of the application for the patent”). And
    litigation in district court is expensive and time-
    consuming, much more so than the direct appeals limited
    to the administrative record also available to disappointed
    applicants. Proceedings under § 145 force the PTO and
    its employees to dedicate time and effort to conducting
    discovery, interviewing witnesses, filing and responding
    to motions, and addressing new evidence. PTO’s En Banc
    Br. 22.
    Indeed, even in 1838, Congress was aware that pro-
    ceedings in equity were adding to the Patent Office’s
    expenses—including labor expenses. H.R. Rep. No. 25-
    797, at 3 (1838) (discussing the 1839 Act). A letter from
    the Commissioner of Patents annexed to the House Re-
    port stated:
    The judicial decisions on interfering applications,
    subsequent to the examination, on application,
    will, both in number and importance, exceed all
    the patent cases before the United States courts.
    On the first of January three cases were pending
    a hearing, valued at upwards of $100,000 each.
    The evidence is voluminous, and the arguments
    often lengthy. The subject of appeals is beginning
    NANTKWEST, INC.   v. IANCU                               13
    to add considerably to the labor of the office, and
    the litigated cases demand many long copies.
    Id. (emphasis added).
    An applicant’s choice to proceed under § 145 diverts
    the agency’s resources from the PTO’s principal mission of
    examining patent and trademark applications at the
    agency. The purpose of § 145’s expense-reimbursement
    provision is to ensure that these expenses fall on the
    applicants who elect the more expensive district court
    proceedings over the standard appeal route.
    III
    The majority concludes that the text of § 145 fails to
    provide the necessary congressional directive to overcome
    the American Rule’s bar against shifting attorneys’ fees.
    Under the American Rule, “the prevailing litigant is
    ordinarily not entitled to collect a reasonable attorneys’
    fee from the loser.” Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilder-
    ness Soc’y, 
    421 U.S. 240
    , 247 (1975). Courts uniformly
    recognize an exception to this general proposition, howev-
    er: when the statute itself “specific[ally]” and “explic-
    it[ly]” authorizes an award of fees, the prevailing party
    may be entitled to collect its fees. Alyeska, 
    421 U.S. at 260
    .
    I note that the Fourth Circuit reviewed 
    15 U.S.C. § 1071
    (b)(3), which contains language nearly identical to
    the relevant language in § 145, and concluded that the
    statute is “not a fee-shifting statute that operates against
    the backdrop of the American Rule” because it “mandates
    the payment of attorneys[’] fees without regard to a
    party’s success.” Shammas, 784 F.3d at 223. While I
    assume that the American Rule applies here, I share the
    Fourth Circuit’s doubt that the Rule applies in this con-
    text—i.e., where Congress has simply assigned payment
    responsibility to the applicant, consistent with the various
    14                                  NANTKWEST, INC.   v. IANCU
    other application-related fees Congress has assigned to
    the applicant.
    But even assuming the American Rule applies here, I
    still disagree with the majority’s analysis. For example,
    the majority attempts to create ambiguity by focusing on
    the word “expenses” in a vacuum. But, as I’ve discussed,
    Congress did not simply provide that under § 145 an
    applicant pays “expenses.” Nor did it say “may pay” or
    something that could be less than “all.” Congress said
    that the applicant “shall” pay “[a]ll the expenses of the
    proceedings.”
    It is also well established that “[t]he absence of specif-
    ic reference to attorney[s’] fees is not dispositive if the
    statute otherwise evinces an intent to provide for such
    fees.” Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 
    511 U.S. 809
    ,
    815 (1994). Although the majority gives lip service to this
    principle, as a practical matter, it still seems to require a
    statute’s use of the magic words “attorneys’ fees” to meet
    the American Rule’s heightened demands. 3 For example,
    the majority spends pages contrasting § 145 unfavorably
    with other statutes that explicitly mention attorneys’ fees.
    3   When asked during oral argument to propose oth-
    er language that Congress could have employed to over-
    come the American Rule, NantKwest offered “including,
    without limitation, the time spent by lawyers working on
    the particular matter from the Solicitor’s office . . . and
    outside counsel” or “persons providing lawyer services
    who are hired internally or externally by the Patent
    Office” as the only alternatives. Oral Argument No. 2016-
    1794 (Mar. 8, 2018) 40:45–41:23, 43:57–44:05,
    http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/oral-argument-recordings. I
    do not believe the American Rule requires such labored
    descriptions, when “[a]ll the expenses of the proceedings”
    suffices in this context.
    NANTKWEST, INC.   v. IANCU                                15
    Majority Op. 18–24. It further cites a Congressional
    Research Service Report compiling the text of other fee-
    shifting statutes. The majority notes that each of these
    statutes recites either the magic words “attorneys’ fees,”
    or the (slightly) less magical “fees,” “fees for attorneys,”
    “compensation . . . for attorney[s],” “fees of counsel,” and
    the like. Majority Op. 29 n.8.
    But again, the absence of “attorneys’ fees” is not dis-
    positive. In making clear that “[t]he absence of specific
    reference to attorney[s’] fees is not dispositive if the
    statute otherwise evinces an intent to provide for such
    fees,” the Supreme Court pointed to an Eighth Circuit
    decision, stating that “[t]he Eighth Circuit, for example,
    found ‘a sufficient degree of explicitness’ in [the Act’s]
    references to ‘necessary costs of response’ and ‘enforce-
    ment activities’ to warrant the award of attorney[s’] fees
    and expenses.” Key Tronic, 
    511 U.S. at 815
    . The Court
    then contrasted these sufficiently explicit phrases with
    “[m]ere ‘generalized commands,’ . . . [which would] not
    suffice to authorize such fees.” 
    Id.
     Surely, “[a]ll the
    expenses of the proceedings” is just as, if not more, explic-
    it than “necessary costs of response” or “enforcement
    activities” in reference to personnel expenses.
    In sum, contrary to the majority’s views, the language
    of § 145 evinces Congress’s “specific and explicit” intent to
    depart from the American Rule and to impose upon the
    applicant payment of all the expenses of the proceedings,
    including the PTO’s personnel expenses.
    IV
    The majority also references certain policy justifica-
    tions for its interpretation of § 145. First, the majority
    cites the access-to-justice concern underlying the Ameri-
    can Rule. Majority Op. 6. I am unconvinced that these
    disappointed applicants’ access to justice is lacking.
    Applicants have the option to forgo § 145 actions alto-
    gether and pursue appeals before this court under § 141—
    16                                NANTKWEST, INC.   v. IANCU
    a choice the overwhelming majority of applicants make.
    See Hyatt, 625 F.3d at 1337 (observing that “the vast
    majority of applicants pursue an on-the-record appeal
    [under § 141] instead of a § 145 action”). These disap-
    pointed applicants only reach the point of electing a § 145
    action after an extended application examination process
    before the PTO. A patent examiner first determines
    whether the application satisfies the statutory prerequi-
    sites for granting a patent. Kappos, 
    566 U.S. at
    434
    (citing 
    35 U.S.C. § 131
    ). If the examiner denies the appli-
    cation, the applicant may then file an administrative
    appeal with the PTO’s Patent Trial and Appeal Board.
    See 
    id.
     If the Board also denies the application, only then
    is the disappointed applicant faced with electing between
    an appeal under § 141 or a § 145 action. Id.
    Second, and relatedly, the majority expresses special
    solicitude for “small businesses and individual inventors,”
    Majority Op. 6–7, presumably because they may be less
    able to afford the PTO’s personnel expenses. This possi-
    bility is entirely speculative. And, even if it were always
    the case, it is of no moment. “Our unwillingness to soften
    the import of Congress’[s] chosen words even if we believe
    the words lead to a harsh outcome is longstanding.”
    Baker Botts L.L.P. v. ASARCO LLC, 
    135 S. Ct. 2158
    , 2169
    (2015) (quoting Lamie v. United States Tr., 
    540 U.S. 526
    ,
    538 (2004)).
    While I do not deny that the PTO’s personnel expens-
    es may, in some cases, amount to substantial sums, it is
    important to view these amounts against those expenses
    that applicants must undisputedly pay if they elect a
    § 145 action. For example, the parties do not dispute that
    “[a]ll the expenses of the proceedings” includes the PTO’s
    expert witness expenses. In Booking.com B.V. v. Matal,
    aside from the $51,472.53 in personnel expenses, the
    applicant was required to pay $21,750 in expert witness
    expenses. No. 1:16-CV-425, 
    2017 WL 4853755
    , at *4 n.3
    (E.D. Va. Oct. 26, 2017). In Realvirt, LLC v. Lee, the
    NANTKWEST, INC.   v. IANCU                               17
    expert witness expenses amounted to more than the
    $48,454.62 in PTO personnel expenses, costing the appli-
    cant $50,160. 
    220 F. Supp. 3d 695
    , 704 (E.D. Va. 2016).
    Finally, in Taylor v. Lee, the court made it clear that the
    PTO’s motion for the $40,000 bond cited by the majority
    should be granted, even if the PTO’s $45,000 in personnel
    expenses were not included because the other anticipated
    expenses, including expert witness expenses, were rea-
    sonably expected to exceed $40,000. No. 1:15-CV-1607,
    
    2016 WL 9308420
    , at *2 n.1 (E.D. Va. July 12, 2016).
    Further, unless the applicant is proceeding pro se, it
    is of course quite likely that its own attorneys’ fees would
    vastly exceed the PTO’s personnel expenses. 4 Indeed, I
    wonder who the majority seeks to protect: the hypothet-
    ical applicant who would pay its own attorneys and the
    PTO’s expert witness expenses, yet balk at the PTO’s
    personnel expenses.
    And while it may be true that the PTO’s personnel
    expenses in some cases might amount to a significant sum
    for applicants who choose to proceed down the optional
    § 145 route, those expenses have to be paid by someone.
    As the PTO observes, at Congress’s direction, the PTO
    now must operate entirely as a user-funded agency.
    PTO’s En Banc Br. 23. All applicants pay a number of
    fees throughout the patent-examination process to cover
    the PTO’s expenses of operation. Id. at 24. Thus, in
    asking this court to exclude personnel expenses from “[a]ll
    the expenses of the proceedings,” NantKwest asks this
    4    For example, in this case, the PTO’s calculations
    indicated that its attorneys earned only $78.55 per hour,
    yet the district court has authorized a range of rates for
    private attorneys between $300 and $600 per hour.
    J.A. 84 & n.7 (citing Tech Sys., Inc. v. Pyles, No. 1:12-CV-
    374, 
    2013 WL 4033650
    , at *7 (E.D. Va. Aug. 6, 2013)).
    18                                 NANTKWEST, INC.   v. IANCU
    court to require other PTO applicants to pay the PTO’s
    personnel expenses incurred in response to its § 145
    complaint, rather than NantKwest itself. This contra-
    venes Congress’s intent. The statutory language is clear:
    it is the applicant that voluntarily chooses a § 145 action,
    and not other PTO users, who must pay “[a]ll the expens-
    es of the proceedings.” Thus, the question of the equitable
    allocation of burdens is one that Congress has already
    addressed in the language of the statute. It is not this
    court’s job to allocate those burdens differently based on
    our own policy preferences.
    Finally, much is made of the fact that the PTO re-
    frained from seeking reimbursement for its personnel
    expenses until recently, despite the provision’s 170-year
    existence. Notably, however, while the PTO has histori-
    cally refrained from seeking reimbursement of these
    expenses, it has never affirmatively disclaimed that
    authority. Given how dramatically the patent and litiga-
    tion landscapes have changed since the provision was first
    enacted, it is hardly surprising that the PTO would have
    felt compelled in recent years to change its strategy. The
    PTO’s past decisions to not seek reimbursement for its
    personnel expenses may be related to the fact that it is so
    rarely confronted by these cases. The PTO now points,
    however, to how § 145 proceedings have become more
    common and more expensive. PTO’s En Banc Br. 30.
    Accordingly, the PTO has become increasingly reluctant
    to require other PTO users to subsidize the expenses of
    these optional proceedings, in light of Congress’s mandate
    that the PTO fund itself exclusively through fees.
    Even within the more rigorous administrative rule-
    making environment, “[a]gencies are free to change their
    existing policies as long as they provide a reasoned expla-
    nation for the change.” Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navar-
    ro, 
    136 S. Ct. 2117
    , 2125 (2016). Further, even where
    longstanding policies may have engendered reliance
    interests, an agency may still change its position as long
    NANTKWEST, INC.   v. IANCU                              19
    as it shows that there are good reasons for the new policy.
    
    Id. at 2126
    . The PTO has done so here.
    *   *   *
    Because Congress meant all the expenses of the pro-
    ceedings when it said “[a]ll the expenses of the proceed-
    ings,” I respectfully dissent.