Fairwarning Ip, LLC v. Iatric Systems, Inc. , 839 F.3d 1089 ( 2016 )


Menu:
  •   United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    ______________________
    FAIRWARNING IP, LLC,
    Plaintiff-Appellant
    v.
    IATRIC SYSTEMS, INC.,
    Defendant-Appellee
    ______________________
    2015-1985
    ______________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the
    Middle District of Florida in No. 8:14-cv-02685-SDM-
    MAP, Judge Steven D. Merryday.
    ______________________
    Decided: October 11, 2016
    ______________________
    SEAN A. PASSINO, Hauptman Ham, LLP, Alexandria,
    VA, argued for plaintiff-appellant. Also represented by
    RACHEL KAREN PILLOFF; MICHAEL S. HOOKER, JASON PAUL
    STEARNS, Phelps Dunbar LLP, Tampa, FL.
    LISA M. TITTEMORE, Sunstein Kann Murphy & Tim-
    bers LLP, Boston, MA, argued for defendant-appellee.
    Also represented by BRANDON TAYLOR SCRUGGS.
    ______________________
    2                FAIRWARNING IP, LLC   v. IATRIC SYSTEMS, INC.
    Before LOURIE, PLAGER, and STOLL, Circuit Judges.
    STOLL, Circuit Judge.
    FairWarning IP, LLC, appeals a judgment of the
    United States District Court for the Middle District of
    Florida dismissing its suit with prejudice after holding
    that the asserted patent, 
    U.S. Patent No. 8,578,500,
    claims patent-ineligible subject matter under 
    35 U.S.C. § 101
    . Because we agree with the district court that
    FairWarning’s ’500 patent claims patent-ineligible subject
    matter, we affirm.
    BACKGROUND
    FairWarning sued Iatric Systems, Inc. for infringing
    claims of the ’500 patent. The ’500 patent is titled “Sys-
    tem and Method of Fraud and Misuse Detection” and
    discloses ways to detect fraud and misuse by identifying
    unusual patterns in users’ access of sensitive data. The
    specification describes systems and methods to detect
    fraud by an otherwise-authorized user of a patient’s
    protected health information (“PHI”). According to the
    specification, pre-existing systems were able to record
    audit log data concerning user access of digitally stored
    PHI. The claimed systems and methods record this data,
    analyze it against a rule, and provide a notification if the
    analysis detects misuse. Claim 1 recites:
    1. A method of detecting improper access of a pa-
    tient’s protected health information (PHI) in a
    computer environment, the method comprising:
    generating a rule for monitoring audit
    log data representing at least one of
    transactions or activities that are executed
    in the computer environment, which are
    associated with the patient’s PHI, the rule
    comprising at least one criterion related to
    accesses in excess of a specific volume, ac-
    cesses during a pre-determined time in-
    FAIRWARNING IP, LLC   v. IATRIC SYSTEMS, INC.              3
    terval, accesses by a specific user, that is
    indicative of improper access of the pa-
    tient’s PHI by an authorized user wherein
    the improper access is an indication of po-
    tential snooping or identity theft of the pa-
    tient’s PHI, the authorized user having a
    pre-defined role comprising authorized
    computer access to the patient’s PHI;
    applying the rule to the audit log data
    to determine if an event has occurred, the
    event occurring if the at least one criterion
    has been met;
    storing, in a memory, a hit if the event
    has occurred; and
    providing notification if the event has
    occurred.
    ’500 patent col. 16 ll. 27–46.
    Before the district court, Iatric moved to dismiss the
    complaint, arguing the asserted patent claimed patent-
    ineligible subject matter under § 101. FairWarning filed
    an amended complaint asserting all claims of the ’500
    patent, and Iatric again moved to dismiss. The district
    court granted Iatric’s motion and dismissed the case
    under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
    dure.
    Following the two-step test for patent-eligibility iden-
    tified in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International, 
    134 S. Ct. 2347
     (2014), the court first found the claims were directed
    to a patent-ineligible abstract idea: “the concept of analyz-
    ing records of human activity to detect suspicious behav-
    ior.” FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., No. 8:14-
    CV-2685, 
    2015 WL 3883958
    , at *2 (M.D. Fla. June 24,
    2015) (quotation marks omitted). This concept, the court
    explained, “is a basic and well-established abstract idea.”
    
    Id.
     Turning to step two, the court found that the claims
    4                FAIRWARNING IP, LLC   v. IATRIC SYSTEMS, INC.
    contained nothing to “transform[] the abstract idea into a
    patentable concept.” 
    Id. at *4
    . The court analyzed the
    elements of the claim individually and as an ordered
    combination, but found “nothing significantly more than
    an instruction to apply the abstract idea . . . using some
    unspecified, generic computer.” 
    Id.
     (quoting Alice, 
    134 S. Ct. at 2360
    ) (alteration in original).
    FairWarning appealed.     We have jurisdiction under
    
    28 U.S.C. § 1295
    (a)(1).
    DISCUSSION
    We review motions to dismiss under the law of the re-
    gional circuit. OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.,
    
    788 F.3d 1359
    , 1362 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 
    136 S. Ct. 701
     (2015). The Eleventh Circuit reviews the dismissal of
    a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) de novo, “[a]ccepting all
    of the well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true
    and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the
    plaintiff.” Montgomery Cty. Comm’n v. Fed. Hous. Fin.
    Agency, 
    776 F.3d 1247
    , 1254 (11th Cir. 2015).
    I.
    Section 101 defines patent-eligible subject matter as
    “any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
    composition of matter, or any new and useful improve-
    ment thereof.” 
    35 U.S.C. § 101
    . The Supreme Court has
    “long held that this provision contains an important
    implicit exception: Laws of nature, natural phenomena,
    and abstract ideas are not patentable.” Ass’n for Molecu-
    lar Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 
    133 S. Ct. 2107
    ,
    2116 (2013) (internal brackets omitted) (quoting Mayo
    Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 
    132 S. Ct. 1289
    , 1293 (2012)).
    To determine patent eligibility, “the Supreme Court
    set forth a two-step analytical framework to identify
    patents that, in essence, claim nothing more than ab-
    stract ideas.” BASCOM Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v.
    FAIRWARNING IP, LLC   v. IATRIC SYSTEMS, INC.               5
    AT&T Mobility LLC, 
    827 F.3d 1341
    , 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
    (citing Mayo, 
    132 S. Ct. at
    1296–97). The inquiry’s first
    step requires a court to “determine whether the claims at
    issue are directed to a patent-ineligible concept.” Alice,
    
    134 S. Ct. at 2355
    . If they are, the court must then, under
    the second step, “examine the elements of the claim to
    determine whether it contains an ‘inventive concept’
    sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a
    patent-eligible application.” 
    Id. at 2357
     (quoting Mayo,
    
    132 S. Ct. at 1294, 1298
    ). This inventive concept must do
    more than simply recite “well-understood, routine, con-
    ventional activity.” Mayo, 
    132 S. Ct. at 1298
    .
    A.
    We find that, under step one, the claims of the ’500
    patent are directed to an abstract idea. As the ’500 patent
    specification explains, the invention “relates to a system
    and method of detecting fraud and/or misuse in a comput-
    er environment based on analyzing data such as in log
    files, or other similar records, including user identifier
    data.” ’500 patent col. 1 ll. 15–18. The district court
    found that “the ’500 patent is directed to or drawn to the
    concept of analyzing records of human activity to detect
    suspicious behavior.” FairWarning, 
    2015 WL 3883958
    , at
    *2 (quotation marks omitted). We agree. The patented
    method, as illustrated by claim 1 quoted above, collects
    information regarding accesses of a patient’s personal
    health information, analyzes the information according to
    one of several rules (i.e., related to accesses in excess of a
    specific volume, accesses during a pre-determined time
    interval, or accesses by a specific user) to determine if the
    activity indicates improper access, and provides notifica-
    tion if it determines that improper access has occurred.
    We have explained that the “realm of abstract ideas”
    includes “collecting information, including when limited
    to particular content.” Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstrom
    S.A., No. 15-1778, 
    2016 WL 4073318
    , at *3 (Fed. Cir. Aug.
    6                 FAIRWARNING IP, LLC   v. IATRIC SYSTEMS, INC.
    1, 2016) (collecting cases). We have also “treated analyz-
    ing information by steps people go through in their minds,
    or by mathematical algorithms, without more, as essen-
    tially mental processes within the abstract-idea category.”
    
    Id.
     And we have found that “merely presenting the
    results of abstract processes of collecting and analyzing
    information, without more (such as identifying a particu-
    lar tool for presentation), is abstract as an ancillary part
    of such collection and analysis.” 
    Id.
     Here, the claims are
    directed to a combination of these abstract-idea catego-
    ries. Specifically, the claims here are directed to collect-
    ing and analyzing information to detect misuse and
    notifying a user when misuse is detected. See 
    id.
    While the claims here recite using one of a few possi-
    ble rules to analyze the audit log data, this does not make
    them eligible under our decision in McRO, Inc. v. Bandai
    Namco Games America Inc., No. 15-1080, 
    2016 WL 4896481
     (Fed. Cir. Sept. 13, 2016), which also involved
    claims reciting rules. In McRO we held that, in analyzing
    step one, “the claims are considered in their entirety to
    ascertain whether their character as a whole is directed to
    excluded subject matter.” 
    Id. at *6
     (quoting Internet
    Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 
    790 F.3d 1343
    , 1346
    (Fed. Cir. 2015)). Of course, claims cannot be directed to
    “laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas,”
    but must instead “claim patent-eligible applications of
    those concepts.” Alice, 
    134 S. Ct. at
    2355 (citing Mayo,
    
    132 S. Ct. at
    1296–97). Indeed, even though a claim can
    be abstracted to the point that it reflects a patent-
    ineligible concept—for, “[a]t some level, ‘all inventions . . .
    embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature,
    natural phenomena, or abstract ideas,’” id. at 2354 (quot-
    ing Mayo, 
    132 S. Ct. at 1293
    )—that claim may neverthe-
    less be patent eligible if the claim language is directed to
    a patent-eligible application of that concept. See Rapid
    Litig. Mgmt. Ltd. v. CellzDirect, Inc., 
    827 F.3d 1042
    , 1050
    (Fed. Cir. 2016).
    FAIRWARNING IP, LLC   v. IATRIC SYSTEMS, INC.             7
    The claims in McRO were not directed to an abstract
    idea, but instead were directed to “a specific asserted
    improvement in computer animation, i.e., the automatic
    use of rules of a particular type.” McRO, 
    2016 WL 4896481
    , at *8. We explained that “the claimed improve-
    ment [was] allowing computers to produce ‘accurate and
    realistic lip synchronization and facial expressions in
    animated characters’ that previously could only be pro-
    duced by human animators.” 
    Id. at *8
     (quoting 
    U.S. Patent No. 6,307,576
     col. 2 ll. 49–50). The claimed rules
    in McRO transformed a traditionally subjective process
    performed by human artists into a mathematically auto-
    mated process executed on computers. 
    Id.
     at *8–9.
    Indeed, Defendants conceded that prior animating pro-
    cesses were “driven by subjective determinations rather
    than specific, limited mathematical rules,” such as the
    mathematical rules articulated in McRO’s claimed meth-
    od. 
    Id. at *8
    . Thus, the traditional process and newly
    claimed method stood in contrast: while both produced a
    similar result, i.e., realistic animations of facial move-
    ments accompanying speech, the two practices produced
    those results in fundamentally different ways.
    As such, we explained that “it [was] the incorporation
    of the claimed rules, not the use of the computer, that
    ‘improved [the] existing technological process’ by allowing
    the automation of further tasks.” 
    Id.
     (alteration in origi-
    nal) (quoting Alice, 
    134 S. Ct. at 2358
    ). “This [was] unlike
    Flook, Bilski, and Alice, where the claimed comput-
    er-automated process and the prior method were carried
    out in the same way.” 
    Id.
     (citing Parker v. Flook, 
    437 U.S. 584
    , 585–86 (1978); Bilski v. Kappos, 
    561 U.S. 593
    , 611
    (2010); Alice, 
    134 S. Ct. at 2356
    ).
    The claims here are more like those in Alice than
    McRO. FairWarning’s claims merely implement an old
    practice in a new environment. See Alice, 
    134 S. Ct. at 2356
    . The claimed rules ask whether accesses of PHI, as
    reflected in audit log data, are 1) “by a specific user,”
    8                 FAIRWARNING IP, LLC   v. IATRIC SYSTEMS, INC.
    2) “during a pre-determined time interval,” or 3) “in
    excess of a specific volume.” ’500 patent col. 16 ll. 34–36.
    These are the same questions (though perhaps phrased
    with different words) that humans in analogous situa-
    tions detecting fraud have asked for decades, if not centu-
    ries. Although FairWarning’s claims require the use of a
    computer, it is this incorporation of a computer, not the
    claimed rule, that purportedly “improve[s] [the] existing
    technological process” by allowing the automation of
    further tasks. Alice, 
    134 S. Ct. at 2358
    .
    Moreover, the claims here are not like those we found
    patent eligible in Enfish. In that case, we explained that
    the claims were “specifically directed to a self-referential
    table for a computer database.” Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft
    Corp., 
    822 F.3d 1327
    , 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2016). The claims
    were thus “directed to a specific improvement to the way
    computers operate,” rather than an abstract idea imple-
    mented on a computer. 
    Id. at 1336
    . The claims here, in
    contrast, are not directed to an improvement in the way
    computers operate, nor does FairWarning contend as
    much. While the claimed system and method certainly
    purport to accelerate the process of analyzing audit log
    data, the speed increase comes from the capabilities of a
    general-purpose computer, rather than the patented
    method itself. See Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life
    Assurance Co. of Can. (U.S.), 
    687 F.3d 1266
    , 1278 (Fed.
    Cir. 2012) (“[T]he fact that the required calculations could
    be performed more efficiently via a computer does not
    materially alter the patent eligibility of the claimed
    subject matter.”). Thus here, as in Electric Power, “the
    focus of the claims is not on . . . an improvement in com-
    puters as tools, but on certain independently abstract
    ideas that use computers as tools.” Elec. Power, 
    2016 WL 4073318
    , at *4.
    Because we find these claims are directed to an ab-
    stract idea at step one of the patent-eligibility inquiry, we
    turn to step two.
    FAIRWARNING IP, LLC   v. IATRIC SYSTEMS, INC.             9
    B.
    After “scrutiniz[ing] the claim elements more micro-
    scopically” under step two, 
    id.,
     we find nothing sufficient
    “to ‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-
    eligible application,” Alice, 
    134 S. Ct. at 2355
     (quoting
    Mayo, 
    132 S. Ct. at 1297
    ). As the district court correctly
    explained, the claims generally require “(1) generating a
    rule ‘related to’ the number of accesses, the timing of
    accesses, and the specific users in order to review ‘trans-
    actions or activities that are executed in a computer
    environment’; (2) applying the rule; (3) storing the result;
    and (4) announcing the result.” FairWarning, 
    2015 WL 3883958
    , at *3 (quoting ’500 patent col. 16 ll. 31–32, 34).
    The claim limitations, analyzed alone and in combination,
    fail to add “something more” to “transform” the claimed
    abstract idea of collecting and analyzing information to
    detect misuse into “a patent-eligible application.” See
    Alice, 
    134 S. Ct. at 2354, 2357
    .
    FairWarning argues claims 12–13 and 14–17 sepa-
    rately, but none of these claims add limitations that
    impart patent eligibility. Claim 12 reads as follows:
    12. A system for detecting improper access of a
    patient’s protected health information (PHI) in a
    health-care system computer environment, the
    system comprising:
    a user interface for selection of at least
    one criterion related to accesses in excess
    of a specific volume, accesses during a pre-
    determined time interval, accesses by a
    specific user, representing at least one of
    transactions or activities associated with
    the patient’s PHI that is indicative of im-
    proper access of the patient’s PHI within
    the health-care system computer envi-
    ronment by an authorized user wherein
    the improper access is an indication of po-
    10               FAIRWARNING IP, LLC   v. IATRIC SYSTEMS, INC.
    tential snooping or identity theft of the pa-
    tient’s PHI, the authorized user having a
    pre-defined role comprising authorized
    computer access to the patient’s PHI, and
    for selection of a schedule for application
    of a rule for monitoring audit log data rep-
    resenting at least one of the transactions
    or the activities;
    a microprocessor in communication
    with the user interface and having access
    to the audit log data representing the
    transactions or the activities of the pa-
    tient’s PHI, the microprocessor generating
    the rule based at least in part on the at
    least one criterion selected and applying
    the rule to the audit log data according to
    the schedule selected in order to deter-
    mine if an event has occurred,
    wherein the event occurs if the at least
    one criterion has been met,
    wherein the microprocessor stores a
    hit if the event has occurred, and
    wherein the microprocessor provides
    notification if the event has occurred.
    ’500 patent col. 17 l. 24 – col. 18 l. 2. Claim 12 and its
    dependent claim 13 are system claims that add the re-
    quirement that the system include a “user interface” for
    selection of a rule, as well as a microprocessor that ana-
    lyzes audit log data under various rules. But, under our
    precedent, the features of claims 12 and 13 do not recite
    that “something more” required to make these claims
    patent eligible. As we have explained, the use of generic
    computer elements like a microprocessor or user interface
    do not alone transform an otherwise abstract idea into
    FAIRWARNING IP, LLC   v. IATRIC SYSTEMS, INC.             11
    patent-eligible subject matter. See DDR Holdings, LLC v.
    Hotels.com, L.P., 
    773 F.3d 1245
    , 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
    Claim 14 is a system claim, but it recites limitations
    that FairWarning admits are “analogous to that recited in
    [method] claim 1” and argues that they are patentable for
    the same reasons as claim 1.              Appellant Br. 41.
    Claims 15–17 depend from claim 14 and, like claim 14,
    add nothing more than similar nominal recitations of
    basic computer hardware, such as “a non-transitory
    computer-readable medium with computer-executable
    instructions” and a microprocessor. See ’500 patent
    col. 18 ll. 37–50. “While it is not always true that related
    system claims are patent-ineligible because similar meth-
    od claims are, when they exist in the same patent and are
    shown to contain insignificant meaningful limitations, the
    conclusion of ineligibility is inescapable.” Accenture Glob.
    Servs., GmbH v. Guidewire Software, Inc., 
    728 F.3d 1336
    ,
    1344 (Fed. Cir. 2013). The claims here are decidedly not
    the exception to that rule. The limitations added in
    FairWarning’s system claims merely graft generic com-
    puter components onto otherwise-ineligible method
    claims. As such, these claims are patent ineligible along
    with claim 1 and its dependents.
    Nonetheless, FairWarning argues that all of the
    claims, without exception, solve technical problems
    unique to the computer environment and thus should be
    patent eligible under DDR Holdings. Appellant Br. 44–48
    (citing DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1257). FairWarning
    explains that, at the time of the ’500 patent’s filing, audit
    log data of patient health information “tended to have
    different file formats” and that this information was
    stored in different applications and data stores. Reply
    Br. 9 (citing ’500 patent col. 1 ll. 26–31). FairWarning
    contends that its system allowed for the compilation and
    combination of these disparate information sources and
    that the patented method “made it possible to generate a
    full picture of a user’s activity, identity, frequency of
    12                FAIRWARNING IP, LLC   v. IATRIC SYSTEMS, INC.
    activity, and the like in a computer environment.” Id. at
    10. The mere combination of data sources, however, does
    not make the claims patent eligible. As we have ex-
    plained, “merely selecting information, by content or
    source, for collection, analysis, and [announcement] does
    nothing significant to differentiate a process from ordi-
    nary mental processes, whose implicit exclusion from
    § 101 undergirds the information-based category of ab-
    stract ideas.” Elec. Power, 
    2016 WL 4073318
    , at *4.
    Furthermore, to the extent that FairWarning suggests
    that its claimed invention recites a technological advance
    relating to accessing and combining disparate information
    sources, its claims do not recite any such improvement.
    Rather, the claimed invention is directed to the broad
    concept of monitoring audit log data. The claims here do
    not propose a solution or overcome a problem “specifically
    arising in the realm of computer [technology].” DDR
    Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1257. At most, the claims require
    that these processes be executed on a generic computer.
    But, “after Alice, there can remain no doubt: recitation of
    generic computer limitations does not make an otherwise
    ineligible claim patent-eligible.” Id. at 1256 (citing Alice,
    
    134 S. Ct. at 2358
    ). Thus, while the patent may in fact
    require that the claimed data relate to “transactions or
    activities that are executed in the computer environ-
    ment,” Reply Br. 10, limiting the claims to the computer
    field does not alone transform them into a patent-eligible
    application. See Alice, 
    134 S. Ct. at 2358
    .
    After closely examining the claims of the ’500 patent
    in search of “something more” to transform the underlying
    abstract idea into a patent-eligible application, we con-
    clude that there is nothing claimed in the patent—either
    by considering the claim limitations individually or as an
    ordered combination—that makes its claims patent
    eligible.
    FAIRWARNING IP, LLC   v. IATRIC SYSTEMS, INC.             13
    II.
    FairWarning further alleges that the district court
    improperly granted Iatric’s motion under Rule 12(b)(6).
    We disagree. “We have repeatedly recognized that in
    many cases it is possible and proper to determine patent
    eligibility under 
    35 U.S.C. § 101
     on a Rule 12(b)(6) mo-
    tion.” Genetic Techs. Ltd. v. Merial L.L.C., 
    818 F.3d 1369
    ,
    1373–74 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing OIP Techs., 788 F.3d at
    1362; Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells
    Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 
    776 F.3d 1343
    , 1351 (Fed. Cir.
    2014); buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 
    765 F.3d 1350
    , 1355
    (Fed. Cir. 2014)). We have also acknowledged, however,
    that plausible factual allegations may preclude dismissing
    a case under § 101 where, for example, “nothing on th[e]
    record . . . refutes those allegations as a matter of law or
    justifies dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).”         BASCOM,
    827 F.3d at 1352.
    FairWarning argues that the district court wrongly
    found facts outside of the pleadings and construed disput-
    ed facts in a light unfavorable to FairWarning. It argues
    that the court erred in finding, on a motion to dismiss,
    that the ’500 patent is not necessarily rooted in computer
    technology. It points to the ability of its system and
    method to collect and analyze disparate data sources in
    real time. And it claims that the court, drawing all rea-
    sonable inferences in its favor, could not resolve this issue
    on a motion to dismiss. We disagree. As we explained
    above, the practices of collecting, analyzing, and display-
    ing data, with nothing more, are practices “whose implicit
    exclusion from § 101 undergirds the information-based
    category of abstract ideas.”       Elec. Power, 
    2016 WL 4073318
    , at *4. The district court correctly dismissed
    FairWarning’s purportedly factual claims as insufficient
    to impart patent eligibility.
    FairWarning also contends that the court erred by
    finding that “the human mind can perform each step”
    14                FAIRWARNING IP, LLC   v. IATRIC SYSTEMS, INC.
    because there is no support in the complaint or the patent
    for this finding. Appellant Br. 30–34. It argues that the
    large number of calculations required in its patents
    precludes a pen and paper test. 
    Id. at 32
    . First of all, we
    do not rely on the pen and paper test to reach our holding
    of patent eligibility in this case. At the same time, we
    note that, in viewing the facts in FairWarning’s favor, the
    inability for the human mind to perform each claim step
    does not alone confer patentability. As we have ex-
    plained, “the fact that the required calculations could be
    performed more efficiently via a computer does not mate-
    rially alter the patent eligibility of the claimed subject
    matter.” Bancorp Servs., 687 F.3d at 1278.
    FairWarning further argues that the district court in-
    correctly found that its patents preempt the field of
    HIPAA regulation compliance. FairWarning contends
    that, while HIPAA regulations require certain privacy
    protections for PHI, they do not mandate a particular set
    of specific response measures. But even assuming that
    the ’500 patent does not preempt the field, its lack of
    preemption does not save these claims. As this court
    explained in Ariosa, “[w]hile preemption may signal
    patent ineligible subject matter, the absence of complete
    preemption does not demonstrate patent eligibility.”
    Ariosa, 788 F.3d at 1379; see also OIP Techs., 788 F.3d at
    1362–63. So too here. That the ’500 patent’s claims
    might not preempt the entire field of HIPAA compliance
    “do[es] not make them any less abstract.” OIP Techs., 788
    F.3d at 1363.
    Finally, FairWarning argues that “there is an identi-
    fied claim construction issue” that precludes dismissal
    under Rule 12(b)(6). Appellant Br. 19. FairWarning
    appears to argue that, under a correct construction, the
    district court would have understood the term audit log
    data to “exist[] in the computer environment after at least
    one of [the] transactions or activities . . . are executed in
    the computer environment by an authorized user.” Id. at
    FAIRWARNING IP, LLC   v. IATRIC SYSTEMS, INC.            15
    30 (emphases omitted). The implication of this construc-
    tion, FairWarning argues, would be that “the ‘500 patent
    is necessarily rooted in computer technology.” Id. But
    this is the same argument we dismissed above, cloaked as
    claim construction. Simply requiring computer imple-
    mentation of an otherwise abstract-idea process, as Fair-
    Warning would require of the claim, does not make the
    claims patent eligible. Regardless of the resolution of this
    construction issue, the ’500 patent claims patent-
    ineligible subject matter.
    CONCLUSION
    We have considered FairWarning’s remaining argu-
    ments and find them unpersuasive. For the forgoing
    reasons, we affirm the district court’s determination that
    the claims of the ’500 patent recite patent-ineligible
    subject matter under § 101 and its dismissal of FairWarn-
    ing’s infringement suit.
    AFFIRMED